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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation aims to examine the role of modern education in the production 
of an Arab nationalist identity in Kuwait, a process that played out on multiple levels. 
Firstly, within Kuwait, modern schools were founded starting in 1911 with the goal of 
emulating the educational systems of the more developed Arab countries. Kuwaiti 
educational administrators relied on their ties to Arab nationalist networks to obtain 
assistance from educators, officials, and activists throughout the region. Kuwait’s 
schools became increasingly “Arabized” as they imported teachers and curriculums 
from Arab states, most notably Palestine, Iraq, and Egypt.  
Secondly, as domestic education improved, Kuwaitis increasingly pursued 
secondary and tertiary study in Arab countries, thus becoming integrated into Pan-Arab 
cultural and political networks. This became a broad phenomenon in the 1940s when oil 
wealth allowed for an extensive government scholarship program. Combined with the 
expansion of education locally, this led to the creation of a new social stratum defined 
by modern education, the effendiyya (known locally as the muthaqqafīn). In the 1950s, 
this group led the Arab nationalist opposition movement in Kuwait, while at the same 
time dominating certain government departments.  
The Educational Department, directed by Kuwaiti muthaqqafīn and largely 
staffed by Arab expatriates, became a stronghold of Arab nationalism within the state. 
Signs of this include the introduction of Kuwait’s first national curriculum in 1955-
1956, which had the spread of Arab national awareness as one of its goals, and the 
department’s support for the protest movement that erupted in Kuwait during the Suez 
Crisis. By the time of Kuwait’s independence in 1961, however, Arab nationalist 
influence began to gradually decline within the department due to a number of 
developments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To the memory of my grandparents: 
 
Andrew & Margarette Farkas, & Hessa Al-Habishi, 
 
who passed away during the writing of this dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   5 
 
 Table of Contents  
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................... 7	
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 8	
Literature Review .................................................................................................................. 10	
Arab Nationalism in the Gulf .............................................................................................. 10	
Nationalism in the Arab World ........................................................................................... 18	
Education & Nationalism: Theoretical Approaches ........................................................... 24	
Sources ................................................................................................................................... 33	
Chapterization ....................................................................................................................... 39	
Chapter One: Islamic Modernism and the Beginnings of Modern Education, 1911-
1930 ................................................................................................................................ 44	
The Rise of Kuwait’s Islamic Modernist Movement .......................................................... 46	
The Foundations of Modern Education in Kuwait ............................................................ 63	
Kuwait’s “Cultural Renaissance” ........................................................................................ 78	
Chapter Two: Arab Nationalist Connections and the Birth of State Education, 
1930-1942 ....................................................................................................................... 86	
Nationalism & Education in the Arab World ..................................................................... 88	
The Pan-Arab Connections of Kuwait’s Merchant Opposition, 1931-1940 .................. 100	
The Iraqi Connection ........................................................................................................ 103	
The Palestinian Connection .............................................................................................. 107	
Cross-Regional Activism: The Kuwait Branch of the Red Book Group .......................... 112	
The Birth of the Council System, 1930-1938 .................................................................... 119	
The Majlis Movement, 1938-1939 ...................................................................................... 125	
Palestinian Teachers, Iraqi Curriculum, 1936-1942 ........................................................ 136	
Kuwaiti Students Abroad, 1938-1942 ................................................................................ 152	
Chapter Three: British Intervention, Egyptian Control, and Arab Nationalist 
Resistance, 1942-1950 ................................................................................................. 158	
A Transitional Period, 1942-1943 ...................................................................................... 159	
British Control & Nationalist Resistance, 1943-1945 ...................................................... 169	
Education Under Egyptian Control, 1945-1950 ............................................................... 174	
Local Teachers: The New Nationalist Vanguard .............................................................. 182	
The Palestinian Threat to Egyptian Hegemony ................................................................ 188	
Kuwaiti Students Abroad, 1943-1950 ................................................................................ 194	
Chapter Four: Arab Nationalism Resurgent, 1950-1956 ........................................ 204	
The Educational Department Under Darwish al-Miqdadi, 1950-1952 .......................... 204	
Al-Miqdadi’s Educational-Political Philosophy ............................................................... 211	
Al-Miqdadi’s Educational Policies ................................................................................... 215	
The Rise of Kuwait’s Muthaqqafīn: ................................................................................... 227	
Markers & Practices of Modernity ................................................................................... 236	
The Politics of the Muthaqqafīn ....................................................................................... 239	
The Educational Department Under ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain: A Tripartite 
Administration, 1952-1956 ................................................................................................. 253	
The Rise of the Educational Department’s Nationalist Policies, 1952-1956: ................. 262	
Chapter Five: The Educational Department in the Arab Nationalist Heyday, 1956-
1961 .............................................................................................................................. 279	
The Educational Department & the State: An “Island of Arab Nationalism” ............. 279	
The Suez Crisis and the Educational Department’s Politicization, 1956-1959 ............. 291	
Education After the Suez Crisis, 1956-1959 ..................................................................... 299	
Indoctrination in the Classroom ........................................................................................ 304	
Arab Nationalism in the Curriculum ................................................................................ 308	
   6 
Popular Acculturation ....................................................................................................... 315	
Nationalism on Display: Sports Days and Celebrations ................................................... 321	
The Ruling Family’s Response, 1959-1961 ....................................................................... 326	
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 333	
Works Cited ................................................................................................................ 340	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   7 
Acknowledgments 
 
 I am indebted to numerous individuals for their invaluable assistance in 
completing this dissertation. I would like to apologize in advance to anyone whose 
name I have not mentioned. Please note that all names are listed in alphabetical order. 
My supervisor Dr. Nelida Fuccaro has provided her unfailing trust and support 
throughout this process, and I am ever grateful for her patience, understanding, and 
encouragement. The first two chapters of this dissertation are based on my MRes thesis 
entitled “Media, Education, and the Rise of Arab Nationalism in Kuwait, 1912-1939,” 
which I completed at King’s College London in 2011 under the capable and caring 
supervision of Dr. Madawi Al-Rasheed, to whom I owe great thanks.  
 Conducting research in the Gulf is often a challenging experience, and I would 
like to thank the following people who facilitated this process by graciously sharing 
source material with me: Dr. Abbas Al-Haddad, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Ayyub, Ahmad 
Alsalhi, Badir Al-Zwayyir, Muhammad Al-Hussaini, Muhammad Al-Yousifi, Saleh Al-
Misbah, Sulaiman Abughosh, and Yahya Al-Kandiri. Special thanks goes to 
Abdulrahman Alebrahim, who selflessly shared material that tremendously enriched 
this dissertation, also sharing his deep and nuanced knowledge of Kuwaiti history.  
 I would also like to thank the administrators and staff of the various libraries, 
archives, and institutions I have visited. Special thanks to Bill Huntington at the 
Whitman College Archives, Dhari Al-Meer at al-Taliʿa, Maha Al-Mutawwa at the ʿAbd 
al-ʿAziz Husain Library, Nassar Bulabga at the Kuwait National Library, Peter Housego 
and the staff at the BP Archive, Dr. Saud Al-Dusari at the Kuwaiti Ministry of 
Education, and Taqi Al-Baharna and Abdul Rasul Al-Jishi of Bahrain’s ʿUruba Club.  
 Many thanks are due to the following persons who kindly allowed me to 
interview them, hosting me in their homes and workplaces and offering me their 
hospitality: Abdullah Al-Naibari, Abdullah Al-Sane, Dr. Abdullah Juma Al-Kobaisi, 
Dr. Ahmad Al-Khatib, Dr. Ali Khalifa Al-Kuwwari, Khayri Abu Al-Jubayn, 
Muhammad Abu Ghazala, Muhammad Al-Saddah, Muhammad Diab Al-Musa, and 
Zuhdi Al-Khatib. Abdul Hamid Ahmad, Mohammed Almezel, Nadir Abu Al-Jubayn, 
Saad Al-Matwi, Dr. Saleh Al-Nafisi, Siham and Fatin Abu Ghazala, and Sultan Al-
Qassemi graciously facilitated interviews. I am especially grateful to Nadir Abu Al-
Jubayn for sharing his insightful analysis and for his enthusiastic support.  
 A number of people also kindly shared their ideas, expertise, or unpublished 
work with me: Dr. Abdullah Al-Tabur, Dr. Ali Al-Zumai, Dr. Dyala Hamzah, Farida 
Makar, Louis Allday, Motaz Attalla, Omar Al-Qattan, Raid Al-Jamali, and Dr. Shafiq 
Al-Ghabra. Louis Allday also gave me comments on my work and has assisted me 
greatly. 
 Finally, my wife Wafa Alsayed has been an endless source of support, both 
academic and personal, and I am fortunate in being able to count on her. Of course, no 
thanks would be sufficient for my parents, Salah and Claudia Al-Rashoud, who have 
endured a great deal over the course of my twelve years of study abroad.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   8 
Introduction 
 
 In 1962, the British ambassador to Kuwait sought to evaluate the impact of state 
education within the newly independent country. At the time, Kuwait had close ties to 
Nasserist Egypt and was emerging from a period of sustained Arab nationalist activism. 
The ambassador largely attributed this state of affairs to education, arguing that it 
“taught the people of Kuwait to be Arabs.” He elaborated: 
It was largely due to the foreign teachers in the [Educational] Department that 
the ideas of Arabism became widespread in Kuwait, at a time when the country 
was insulated, by the special nature of her relationship with Her Majesty’s 
Government, from many of the contemporary developments in the Arab world. 
Kuwait hardly seemed to be a country which would be receptive to the ideas of 
the Egyptian revolution. Her future prosperity seemed to be safe, her 
relationship with “imperialism” too profitable. That the Amir and his family 
were warmly espousing the causes of the Arabs some years before the question 
of Kuwait’s relations with her Arab neighbours became pressing, is due to the 
awareness of those causes which the Education Department spread in Kuwait.1 
 
The ambassador was correct in identifying education as one of the primary conduits 
through which a growing segment of Kuwaitis interacted and came to identify with the 
broader Arab world.  
The ambassador, however, was also mistaken on a number of counts. For one, 
he was clearly unaware of the long history of modern education in Kuwait. Beginning 
in 1911, well before the advent of state education, merchants and ʿulamaʾ inspired by 
Islamic modernist and Arabist ideals founded Kuwait’s first modern school. Their goal 
was to import the modern culture of the Arab world to their peripheral shaykhdom. 
These early activists also contradict the ambassador’s portrayal of a Kuwait “insulated” 
under British protection, an image that persists in contemporary scholarship. Through 
the press and regional networks of trade and religious learning, the merchants and 
ʿulamaʾ became active participants in the Pan-Arab intellectual and political scene. By 
the 1930s, these connections led to the emergence of a vibrant and ambitious Arab 
nationalist movement in Kuwait with ties to likeminded activists across the region.  																																																								
1 FO/371/162937: Richmond to Home, 5/1/1962. 
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It was the Arab nationalist merchants who in 1936 founded the Educational 
Council, an elected body that governed state education in Kuwait. That year, the 
councilmen used their Pan-Arab networks to obtain the services of Palestinian teachers, 
who took charge of the pedagogical aspect of educational administration. Through 
various school activities and the adoption of the Iraqi curriculum, these teachers played 
a key role in spreading Arab nationalist ideas. Over the coming years, control over 
Kuwait’s Educational Department would alternate between various educators hailing 
from various Arab countries, particularly Palestine, Syria, and Egypt.  
As education in Kuwait became increasingly aligned with the more developed 
Arab countries, local students began to pursue secondary and tertiary study in the 
metropolises of the Arab world. They underwent “pilgrimages,” becoming integrated 
into Pan-Arab cultural and political networks. This became a broad phenomenon 
beginning in the second half of the 1940s, when oil revenues allowed for an extensive 
government scholarship program. The scholarships played a key role in creating a new 
social stratum defined by its modern education: the effendiyya, most commonly known 
in Kuwait as the muthaqqafīn. Beginning in the 1950s, this group formed the backbone 
of a mass Arab nationalist opposition movement, while at the same time becoming 
influential within certain government departments. Chief among them was the 
Educational Department, which became an Arab nationalist stronghold within the 
Kuwaiti state.  
Contrary to the British ambassador’s portrayal of Arab expatriates imposing an 
Arab identity on unwitting locals, by the 1950s the Kuwaiti muthaqqafīn were playing a 
leading role in teaching “the people of Kuwait to be Arabs,” in cooperation with their 
Palestinian and Egyptian colleagues. With the adoption of Kuwait’s first national 
curriculum in 1956, spreading Arab nationalist awareness became the Educational 
Department’s official policy. This was expressed in its textbooks and extracurricular 
   10 
and public activities. The Suez Crisis also marked the rise of coordination between the 
department and the Arab nationalist opposition. However, in the period between 1959 
and 1961, factors including a crackdown by the ruling family and an increase in state 
centralization led to the onset of a gradual decline in nationalist influence within the 
department.  
Literature Review 
  
 This dissertation engages with the literature on several subjects: Arab 
nationalism in the Gulf, nationalism in the Arab world, and nationalism theory, 
particularly as it relates to the role of education in the creation of nationalism. The first 
body of literature is marked by a lack of theoretical approaches. Though it provides a 
detailed source of information, it is largely dated and in need of updating in light of 
methodological innovations and newly available sources. Though more critical 
approaches to the analysis of political identity in the Gulf have emerged, they largely 
overlook Arab nationalism.  
The study of nationalism in the Arab world has also long suffered from the 
failure to incorporate theoretical approaches. A new strand of literature has emerged 
that has done much to remedy this shortcoming, though further engagement with 
nationalism theory is still necessary. This study seeks to contribute to the discourse on 
nationalism in the Arab world in general through analyzing its emergence at the 
periphery and adopting a transnational perspective. Finally, this dissertation will engage 
with theoretical questions pertaining to the role of education in the production of 
nationalism. 
Arab Nationalism in the Gulf 
 
The earliest literature on Arab nationalism in the Gulf appeared in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, and is strongly imbued with the ideological spirit of the age. Though this 
   11 
scholarship is hence somewhat partisan, it tends to employ social scientific 
methodologies that set it apart from the previous narrative historiography. Leftist 
authors such as Fred Halliday and Helen Lackner were among the first Western authors 
to devote attention to opposition movements in the Arabian Peninsula.2 Another pioneer 
was the Palestinian-American scholar Rosemarie Said Zahlan, whose work highlights 
Arab nationalist tendencies in the Gulf and their support for the Palestinian cause.3  
Other scholars persisted in adhering to the British imperialist line, portraying the 
Gulf’s Arab nationalists as “extremists.” J.B. Kelly serves as a prominent example.4 A 
comparison between his portrayal of Kuwait and that of Halliday illustrates the 
ideological polarization present in some of the early literature. The former accuses the 
Kuwaiti state of accommodating Arab radicals, leading it “to plumb some murky, at 
times positively Stygian depths.” 5  Halliday, on the other hand, hardly mentions 
nationalist tendencies in the shaykhdom, arguing that “the independent state of Kuwait 
displayed a political character, both internally and externally, that must have delighted 
its imperial masters.”6  
It was not Western authors, however, who made the biggest contribution to the 
historiography of the Gulf during this period; rather, a newly emergent indigenous 
scholarship took center stage. 7  The work of these scholars is generally anti-
establishment and anti-imperialist, and employs “[broad] theoretical framework[s] in 
order to understand the socio-political structure and international relations of the 
																																																								
2 Helen Lackner, A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia (London: Ithaca Press, 
1978); Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974; London: Saqi 
Books, 2002). 
3 Rosemarie Said Zahlan, “The Gulf States and the Palestinian Problem, 1936-48,” Arab Studies 
Quarterly 3, no. 1 (Winter 1981); Rosemarie J. Said, “The 1938 Reform Movement in Dubai,” al-Abhath 
23 (1970). 
4 J.B. Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf, and the West (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980). 
5 Ibid., 174. 
6 Halliday, 433-434.  
7 Jacqueline Ismael and Tareq Ismael, “The Politics of Social Change in the Arab States of the Gulf: The 
View from Within,” Middle East Journal 32, no. 3 (Summer 1978), 352. 
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region.”8 Often, the Gulf as a whole serves as the unit of analysis, and is situated within 
the broader context of the Arab world.9 Many of these scholars, such as Khaldoun Al-
Naqeeb and Muhammad Jabir al-Ansari, had Arab nationalist tendencies. They 
published some of the earliest in-depth articles on Arab nationalist movements in the 
Gulf in Arabic language periodicals.10  
Country-level studies by Gulf scholars during this period also shed light on Arab 
nationalist movements. Muhammad Al-Rumaihi’s history of Bahrain from World War I 
to the 1950s remains one of the best accounts on the country’s nationalist opposition.11 
Another work that remains relevant is Najat al-Jasim’s history of Kuwait in the interwar 
period, which contains what is still one of the most detailed treatments of the 1938 
Majlis Movement.12 A late addition to this literature is Falah Al-Mdairis’s dissertation 
on the Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN) in Kuwait, which is remarkable in its 
depth and detail, relying on a mixture of local and Western sources.13 Other Arab 
scholars during this period also covered the Gulf from an Arab nationalist standpoint. 
The most prominent is the Iraqi Saeed Khalil Hashim, whose dissertation on the 
connections between Iraq and the nationalist movements of Kuwait and Bahrain is 
exceptionally thorough and informative.14 
																																																								
8 Assem Dessouki, “Social and Political Dimensions of the Historiography of the Arab Gulf,” in 
Statecraft in the Middle East: Oil, Historical Memory, and Popular Culture, ed. Eric Davis and Nicolas 
Gavrielides (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991), 101. 
9 See: Khaldoun Al-Naqeeb, al-Mujtamaʿ wa-l-Dawla fi al-Khalij wa-l-Jazira al-ʿArabiyya: Min Manzur 
Mukhtalif (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wihda al-ʿArabiyya, 1987); Muhammad Ghanim al-Rumaihi, al-
Bitrul wa-l-Taghyir al-Ijtimaʿi fi al-Khalij al-ʿArabi (Kuwait: Muʾasasat al-Wihda, 1975). 
10 Muhammad Jabir al-Ansari, “Tarikh al-Haraka al-Dimuqratiyya al-Ula fi al-Khalij al-ʿArabi,” al-
Muʾarikh al-ʿArabi 15 (1980); Muhammad Ghanim al-Rumaihi, “Harakat 1938 al-Islahiyya fi al-Kuwait 
wa-l-Bahrain wa-Dubai,” Majallat Dirasat al-Khalij wa-l-Jazira al-ʿArabiyya 1, no. 4 (1975); al-
Rumaihi, “al-Nasiriyya fi al-Khalij al-ʿArabi,” al-Thaqafa al-ʿArabiyya 1, no. 12 (Oct 1971). 
11 Muhammad Ghanim al-Rumaihi, Bahrain: Social and Political Change Since the First World War 
(London: Bowker, 1976). 
12 Najat ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Jasim, al-Tatawwur al-Siyasi wa-l-Iqtisadi li-l-Kuwait Bayn al-Harbayn (1914-
1939) (Cairo: al-Matbaʿa al-Faniyya al-Haditha, 1973). 
13 Falah Al-Mdairis, “The Arab Nationalist Movement in Kuwait From its Origins to 1970” (PhD diss., 
University of Oxford, 1987). 
14 Saeed Khalil Hashim, “The Influence of Iraq on the Nationalist Movements of Kuwait and Bahrain, 
1920-1961” (PhD diss., University of Exeter, 1984). See also: Ibrahim Khalaf al-ʿUbaidi, al-Haraka al-
Wataniyya fi al-Bahrain 1914-1971 (Baghdad: Matbaʿat al-Andalus, 1976). 
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The first wave of scholarship dealing with Arab nationalism in the Gulf, both 
Western and local, is distinguished by an unprecedented depth of analysis. However, its 
ideological coloring causes it not only to occasionally display flagrant bias as cited 
above, but more commonly to take social categories such as the nation for granted. 
Outmoded Marxist and modernization paradigms also detract from the contemporary 
relevance of some studies. Nevertheless, on the subject of Arab nationalism specifically, 
much of this literature has yet to be surpassed.  
While literature on the Gulf produced during the 1970s and 1980s frequently 
adopted a broad regional approach, the country study started to become popular in the 
1980s and became dominant in the 1990s. Due to the prominent role played by Arab 
nationalist opposition movements in local histories, particularly in Kuwait and Bahrain, 
most of these studies allocate them a significant amount of attention. However, Arab 
nationalism per se, as ideology, identity, and social movement, is no longer a subject of 
analysis. Nationalist movements are subsumed under broader analytical frameworks. In 
Fuad Khuri’s sociological study of Bahrain, this framework is the tension between 
modern and tribal state models, while Jill Crystal focuses on the relationship between 
Kuwaiti rulers and merchants in the transition towards the rentier state.15 Ghanim al-
Najjar similarly structures his account of Kuwait’s political development in the 
twentieth century around the struggle between opposition forces and the ruling family 
over participatory government.16 In addition, Fred Lawson devotes a chapter to the 
nationalist movement of the 1950s in his introductory survey of the political and 
economic development of Bahrain.17  A final work worthy of mention is Zahlan’s 
history of the Gulf states, which to a large extent takes the form of a collection of 
																																																								
15 Fuad Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Jill Crystal, Oil 
and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990). 
16 Ghanim al-Najjar, Madkhal li-l-Tatawwur al-Siyasi fi al-Kuwait (Kuwait: Dar Qurtas, 1996). 
17 Fred H. Lawson, Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy (Boulder, San Francisco, and London: 
Westview, 1989). 
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country studies without an overarching theoretical argument. In keeping with her earlier 
writings, it devotes considerable attention to Arab nationalist movements, particularly 
Kuwait’s 1938 Majlis Movement and the 1950s opposition in Bahrain.18  
These works are extremely useful in contextualizing Arab nationalist 
movements and highlighting the economic, class, and social dynamics that underlay 
them. However, they generally do not explain why disaffected merchants or the new 
intelligentsia would frame their political activism in Arab nationalist terms. They also 
have little to say about transnational dynamics, confining historical development within 
borders that were fairly porous throughout much of history. Furthermore, with the 
exception of Khuri and to an extent al-Najjar, these studies rely overwhelmingly on 
British archival material, and thus tend to lack a local perspective.  
In the mid-1990s, there began to emerge a new indigenous literature on Arab 
nationalism in the Gulf as the region’s waning nationalist and leftist movements turned 
towards documenting their own history. Qurtas and al-Kunuz al-Adabiyya, two 
publishing houses respectively affiliated with the Kuwaiti and Bahraini leftist 
oppositions, led this initiative. The various authors are sympathetic academics in 
addition to former activists. In contrast to the grand theorizing of the previous Gulf 
scholarship, and the more nuanced social analysis of the country studies, these works 
are mostly plain chronicles of political groups with little or no analysis of the wider 
sociopolitical context. Nevertheless, written primarily on the basis of local sources, 
unpublished party documents, and interviews, they provide a wealth of information and 
an indigenous perspective lacking in most Western scholarship.  
A key author in this genre is the aforementioned Falah Al-Mdairis, who has 
produced numerous concise studies on the Gulf’s political movements, particularly in 
Kuwait. These are partly based on his unpublished dissertation, but offer nowhere near 																																																								
18 Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United 
Arab Emirates, and Oman (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
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the same level of detail and analysis.19 Another noteworthy work is ʿAbd al-Nabi al-
ʿIkri’s survey of the history of the region’s leftist movements.20 A number of other brief 
yet informative publications highlight various aspects of Bahrain’s nationalist and leftist 
history.21  
 The numerous histories of the transnational Movement of Arab Nationalists 
(MAN) authored by former activists comprise a similar body of literature.22 These 
works offer useful information on the group’s branches in Kuwait, Oman, and Yemen. 
Coverage of these countries, however, pales in comparison to that devoted to Iraq and 
the Levant. Moreover, this literature resembles that on the Gulf’s political groups in its 
lack of theoretical pretensions or in-depth social and political analysis. Finally, Beirut’s 
Center for Arab Unity Studies also contributed to the literature on Arab nationalism in 
the Gulf through two broad surveys relying primarily on secondary sources.23 
This survey of the main bodies of writing on Arab nationalism in the Gulf, 
namely the early scholarship, the country studies, and the party literature, reveal a 
number of shortcomings. Firstly, it is very rare that Arab nationalism is examined 
holistically as social movement, political identity, and transnational phenomenon. The 
country studies submerge Arab nationalist movements within broader (albeit localized) 
																																																								
19 Falah Al-Mdairis, al-Harakat wa-l-Jamaʿat al-Siyasiyya fi-l-Bahrain 1938-2002 (Beirut: Dar al-Kunuz 
al-Adabiyya, 2004); Al-Mdairis, al-Tawajuhat al-Marksiyya al-Kuwaitiyya (Kuwait: Dar Qurtas, 2003); 
Al-Mdairis, al-Baʿthiyun fi al-Khalij wa-l-Jazira al-ʿArabiyya (Kuwait: Dar Qurtas, 2002); Al-Mdairis, 
al-Mujtamaʿ al-Madani wa-l-Haraka al-Wataniyya fi al-Kuwait (Kuwait: Dar Qurtas, 2000); Al-Mdairis, 
Malamih Awaliyya Hawla Nashʾat al-Tajammuʿat wa-l-Tanzimat al-Siyasiyya fi al-Kuwait 1938-1975 
(Kuwait: Dar Qurtas, 1999).  
20 ʿAbd al-Nabi al-ʿIkri, al-Tanzimat al-Yasariyya fi al-Jazira wa-l-Khalij al-ʿArabi (Beirut: Dar al-
Kunuz al-Adabiyya), 2003. 
21 ʿAbd Allah Mutaiwiʿ, Safahat min Tarikh al-Haraka al-ʿUmaliyya al-Bahrainiyya (Beirut: Dar al-
Kunuz al-Adabiyya, 2006); ʿAbd al-Munʿim al-Shirawi, Awraq ʿUmaliyya (Beirut: Dar al-Kunuz al-
Adabiyya, 2005); Ahmad Humaidan, Hayʾat al-Ittihad al-Watani fi al-Bahrain (Beirut: Dar al-Kunuz al-
Adabiyya, 2004). 
22 Hani Hindi, Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-ʿArab: Nashʾatuha wa-Tatawuruha ʿAbr Wathaʾiqiha 1951-
1968 (Beirut: Muʾasasat al-Abhath al-ʿArabiyya, 2001); Muhammad Jamal Barut, Harakat al-Qawmiyyin 
al-ʿArab: al-Nashʾa, al-Tatawwur, al-Masaʾir (Damascus: al-Markaz al-ʿArabi li-l-Dirasat al-Istratijiyya, 
1997); Walid Kazziha, Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World: Habash and his Comrades from 
Nationalism to Marxism (London: Charles Knight, 1975).  
23 Nur al-Din Hijlawi, Taʾthir al-Fikr al-Nasiri ʿala al-Khalij al-ʿArabi 1952-1971 (Beirut: Markaz 
Dirasat al-Wihda al-ʿArabiyya, 2003); Mufid al-Zaidi, al-Tayyarat al-Fikriyya fi al-Khalij al-ʿArabi 
1938-1971 (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wihda al-ʿArabiyya, 2000).  
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contexts, such that they appear to be secondary and contingent manifestations of 
endogenous socioeconomic developments. The party-focused literature, obversely, 
limits Arab nationalism to formal organizations, ignoring its wider impact on state and 
society. Few studies have sought to chart a middle path between these approaches.  
In addition, both genres are more or less oblivious to the transnational dynamics 
of these movements. The earliest literature does the best job of highlighting this point. 
Zahlan seeks to dispel the myth of the Gulf’s isolation from Palestine. In a recent book, 
she expands on her earlier work on the subject, though she unfortunately forsakes her 
previous focus on popular movements for a regime-centered perspective. This is 
probably due to the fact that she passed away before completing the book, and it was 
published posthumously.24 More work needs to be done on the crucial role of the Pan-
Arab media, transnational political organizations, Arab expatriates, and the regional 
influence of Hashemite Iraq and Nasserist Egypt. There is a need for new studies in 
which Arab nationalism takes center stage as a subject of analysis, but is at the same 
time grounded in detailed analysis of both the local and transnational contexts.  
Finally, perhaps the most striking deficiency in the literature on Arab 
nationalism in the Gulf is the virtual absence of theoretical approaches that examine the 
processes behind the formation of nationalism and political identity. Categories of 
identity, such as nation and tribe, are taken for granted and are not examined as 
dynamic, historically constructed artifacts. This is surprising given the salience of the 
struggle over identity in the history of the region. An exception in this regard is an 
article by Sharon Stanton Russell, which demonstrates how Kuwait’s ruling family used 
immigration policy to foster a local identity and counter the Arab nationalist 
opposition.25 The limited literature on Arab nationalism in the Gulf reveals that the 																																																								
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topic has yet to be subjected to serious, theoretically informed analysis. Works focused 
on Arab nationalism are primarily descriptive, while those with a sophisticated 
analytical structure concentrate on other aspects.   
A recent increase in academic interest in the Gulf26 has led to the emergence of a 
more theoretically sophisticated literature on political identity in the region. Works on 
citizenship, 27  the manipulation of cultural heritage, 28  and communalist politics 
(sectarian, tribal, and ethnic),29 have gone further in analyzing political identity and the 
processes behind its formation. The latter segment of the literature has also made 
significant advances in the study of the transnational dimensions of sub-state identities, 
challenging the state-focused approach of the 1980s and 1990s.  
It is striking that, with few exceptions,30 this new wave of scholarship devotes 
scant attention to Arab nationalism, despite the fact that its emergence was fundamental 
to the transition to modern forms of political identity in the Gulf. In some cases, the 
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significance of Arab nationalism is unjustly downplayed. In an otherwise insightful 
article on the complexities of national identity in the region, Neil Partrick questions if 
Arab nationalism in the Gulf “was ever much more than financial generosity and 
exceptional and well-managed Palestinian solidarity demonstrations.” 31  No 
understanding of territorial identity would be complete without acknowledging that 
these identities emerged in contention with Arab nationalism. It also must be recognized 
that Arab nationalist movements were able to bridge many of the communalist 
cleavages that subsequently flourished under state-sponsored patriotism. A new 
approach to the study of Arab nationalism is thus vital in order to secure its recognition 
as a formative stage in the evolution of political identity in the region.  
Nationalism in the Arab World 
 
The lack of theoretical approaches to nationalism is by no means confined to 
Gulf studies, for it also characterizes scholarship on nationalism in the wider Arab 
world. Rashid Khalidi was among the first to highlight the failure of Middle East 
scholars to “analyze the Arab case using methodologies derived from the more critical 
recent approaches in the study of nationalism.”32 Jankowski and Gershoni echo this 
point in their edited volume that seeks to address this lacuna.33 Gershoni argues that 
much literature on Arab nationalism, particularly that from the 1950s and 1960s, adopts 
an ideational, “diffusionist” approach.  This “old narrative” views nationalism as an 
ideology imported from Europe by elites and thence disseminated among the populace. 
It thus focuses on analyzing the writings of nationalist ideologues.34  
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Gershoni holds that in the 1970s and 1980s, the old narrative began to be 
superseded by a new version that conceives of nationalism as “a multidimensional 
historical movement closely connected with social and economic changes.” The history 
of ideas approach gave way to “the ‘new’ social history of the Annales school, together 
with the ‘political economy’ and ‘world-system’ theories.” Rather than focusing on 
nationalist thinkers and elites, a wide array of classes, social movements, and 
institutions were incorporated into the analysis. Nationalism theory, “although not 
always tapped directly, provided a general theoretical background” for this “new 
narrative.”35  
Writing a number of years later, Behar challenges Gershoni’s assertion that the 
ideational approach has been superseded, arguing that the gap between Middle East 
studies and nationalism theory remains prominent. Assessing the literature of the “new 
narrative,” he argues that “ideational factors in these new studies outweigh political, 
economic, or social factors.”36 The field remains “dominated by narrative historians” 
who fail “to introduce… a guiding theoretical or conceptual framework” for their 
research. Definitions for “key terms such as ‘nation,’ ‘nationalism,’” etc. are rarely 
provided, resulting in the lack of common points of reference that provide the basis for 
comparative, cross-regional study.37  
Behar’s argument regarding the tenacity of the history of ideas approach and a 
reluctance to adopt new theoretical approaches holds true for a significant portion of 
contemporary scholarship on nationalism in the Arab world. This is the case even in 
works that seek to incorporate nationalism theory, as in Israel Gershoni and James 
Jankowski’s study of the shift from Egyptian to “supra-Egyptian nationalism” in the 
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1930s and 1940s.38 In a promising introductory chapter, various social and political 
developments are cited for this shift. However, the remainder of the book takes the form 
of a survey of the writings of various thinkers and activists.  
While the integration of nationalism theory into the study of the region can 
definitely be furthered, over the last two decades there has been much progress in the 
adoption of more developed theoretical frameworks. An examination of this literature 
reveals two broad tendencies: one that emphasizes the role of the state in identity 
formation, and another that takes a bottom-up approach, stressing the role of subaltern 
and popular forces. The first approach shares much in common with the theory of Eric 
Hobsbawm, occasionally cited in these works, in which nationalist “traditions” are 
invented by elites as instruments to ensure the subservience of the masses.39  
An example of a work within this genre is Eric Davis’s study of the production 
of nationalist ideologies in Iraq. Drawing on Gramsci, he argues that successive 
governments have confronted this task through the manipulation of popular “historical 
memory.” He denies that this is a “top-down process,” arguing that “cultural 
production… [is] an important domain of struggle” between the state and opposition 
forces.40 However, the state, with its abundant resources, is at an advantage in this 
struggle, and receives the majority of attention in the book. Another work within the 
state-focused genre is that of Joseph Massad, which employs a Foucauldian framework 
to argue that Jordanian nationalism was manufactured by the colonial state through 
legislation and the military. Massad does not maintain a place for popular resistance to 
the official nation-building project, arguing that even the realm of purportedly 
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traditional culture has been thoroughly shaped by the state.41 Nationalism, in this point 
of view, is little more than a tool wielded by the elite to deceive an unwitting populace.  
 The state-focused current within the literature on nationalism in the Arab world 
has come to be eclipsed by another that highlights the agency of popular and subaltern 
actors in nation building. Emerging “over the past decade and a half,” this literature can 
be said to represent the culmination of the “new narrative” identified by Gershoni. It 
shares with it a social history approach, but goes beyond it in incorporating theoretical 
insights from cultural history, postcolonialism, and to a lesser extent nationalism theory. 
This approach seeks to contest grand, homogenizing narratives regarding the emergence 
of nationalism, instead highlighting the variable ways in which it developed in local 
contexts.42  
Rashid Khalidi took one of the early steps in the formation of this approach in 
his work on the emergence of Palestinian nationalism in the early twentieth century. 
The study is noteworthy in that it recognizes the need to address the role of subaltern 
actors, devoting a chapter to Palestinian peasants. It also introduces a more nuanced 
picture of nationalism, recognizing the existence of overlapping identities (i.e. 
Palestinian, Syrian, Arab, and Islamic).43 Shryock’s contemporary study on the tribal 
population in Jordan presents a similarly nuanced, bottom-up perspective. It argues that 
tribal intellectuals have reacted to the homogenizing nationalism of the state by 
hybridizing Western nationalism with indigenous identity. The product has been a novel 
conception of nationalism that posits tribal descent as the basis of the national 
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community.44 Both authors engage with theorists of nationalism, particularly Anderson, 
albeit to a limited extent.  
One of the most important works in crystallizing the new approach, which 
appeared shortly after the previous two, is James Gelvin’s study of nationalist activism 
within Syria’s urban underclass during King Faisal’s rule. This activism produced a 
“discursive field” very different from that advanced by the elites in that it emphasized 
Syrian over Arab identity, while at the same time sharing many of the same symbols.45 
Gelvin thus argues against the “privileging [of] an essentialized ‘Arab nationalism’ over 
all other constructions of nationalism.”46 In order to access this subaltern nationalism, 
which is not always directly articulated, Gelvin employs a Geertzian methodology to 
analyze the “collective ceremonies” of the activists.47  
Since these seminal works were published, scholars of nationalism in the Arab 
world have increasingly been writing histories from below. Michael Provence follows 
in the footsteps of Khalidi and Gelvin in presenting a history of the Syrian Revolt of 
1925 from the perspective of its rural protagonists. He emphasizes the idiosyncrasy and 
indigenousness of the Syrian territorial nationalism these activists espoused.48 Ziad 
Fahmy argues that Egyptian nationalism was more influenced by colloquial songs, 
poetry, and plays than by the elite-produced fuṣḥa press. He introduces the concept of 
“media-capitalism” as an expansion of Anderson’s “print-capitalism.”49 This new wave 
of scholarship has thus used novel theoretical approaches to assert popular agency in the 
face of elites, and local variance in opposition to homogenizing grand narratives.  
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Though the “history from below” approach to nationalism in the Arab world 
offers much to be emulated, it retains certain shortcomings. The new literature has 
established that nationalism develops in different ways according to local contextual 
factors, undermining the previous image of a monolithic Arab nationalism. It also 
underlines the dynamic and contested nature of political identity. This literature, 
however, tends to prioritize the local and the idiosyncratic at the expense of the 
transnational, thus downplaying the important connections between the two planes. 
Gelvin goes as far as to place the term “Arab nationalism” within quotation marks, 
suggesting that commonalities of identity beyond a broad “culture of nationalism” do 
not exist.50 This view does not take into account the markedly transnational quality of 
nationalist activism between the 1920s and 1950s, when activists, migrants, and media 
traversed the region. As has been stated, Jankowski and Gershoni argue that increased 
Egyptian links with the Arab world in the 1930s were key in the emergence of supra-
Egyptian identities. Furthermore, Amal Ghazal demonstrates how Ibadis in Zanzibar 
and North Africa became drawn into a Pan-Arab imagined community through the 
medium of the highly transnational Islamic modernist press.51  
A second limitation within the current literature is that it remains geographically 
limited to the Arab heartland. Arab nationalism in the Arabian Peninsula, the Maghrib, 
East Africa, and the Arab diaspora is woefully under studied. Again, the work of Ghazal 
represents a prominent exception in this regard. She argues that Middle Eastern studies 
“has not taken into account marginality of geography but rather social marginality in 
Foucauldian terms.”52 The failure to examine center-periphery relations in the Arab 
world may partly account for the downplaying of transnational connections discussed 
above.  																																																								
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 This dissertation will seek to address several deficiencies within the literature on 
nationalism and political identity in the Gulf, and will seek to enrich the study of 
nationalism in the Arab world by employing a novel perspective. The literature on Arab 
nationalism in the Gulf region is characterized by the absence of critical, theoretically 
informed approaches. Questions of how particular political identities emerged and 
developed and the social dynamics behind them must be grappled with. Secondly, the 
study of Arab nationalism in the Gulf remains confined within the framework of the 
nation-state and/or particular political groups. The transnational dimensions of Arab 
nationalism as well as its wider impact upon state and society must be considered. Arab 
nationalism must also be addressed when considering the evolution of political identity 
in the Gulf. Finally, this dissertation will seek to enrich the literature on nationalism in 
the Arab world by furthering the incorporation of nationalism theory and employing 
transnational and peripheral perspectives.    
Education & Nationalism: Theoretical Approaches 
 
 The final body of literature with which this dissertation will seek to engage is 
that of nationalism theory, particularly as it pertains to the role of education in the 
construction of political identity. Scholars of nationalism have long highlighted the role 
of modern education in its creation and dissemination, though they differ in their 
explanations of this role. Their approaches can be roughly divided into three categories: 
top-down, grassroots, and indirect. It will be argued that elements of each are applicable 
to the case of Kuwait starting with the onset of state education in 1936.  The first of 
these approaches, which is perhaps the most widespread, views mass, standardized 
education as a primary means by which the state inculcates nationalism within the 
populace. This dynamic is most evident in Europe, where the rise of modern 
bureaucratic states often preceded the emergence of nationalism.  
 Eugen Weber provides a classic example of this approach. He argues that 
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universal education was a key means by which the French state transformed its isolated, 
autonomous, and culturally diverse peasant subjects into French citizens.53 This was 
part of a larger process whereby Paris asserted its economic and political control over 
peripheral areas. Centralized state education imposed linguistic uniformity at the 
expense of the various patois, in addition to a common culture and symbolic repertoire. 
Moreover, the curriculum was specially designed to instill nationalism and patriotism 
through subjects such as history and geography.54  
Nationalism theorists provide more detailed analyses of the motives and 
mechanisms behind the state’s use of the educational system to implant nationalism 
within society. Most notably, Ernest Gellner holds that states manufacture nations 
through centralized systems of education. This development is a response to the 
transition from agrarian to industrial society. In the former, literate “high culture” is the 
preserve of an elite minority.55 Industrialization, however, necessitates a fluid division 
of labor, in which people are no longer confined to specialized socioeconomic roles. It 
is now vital to the state that the populace be literate and culturally homogenous, and that 
men become “modular,” i.e. able to serve various functions. The state engineers this 
situation by inculcating its subjects with the same vernacular language and “high 
culture” via the educational system.56 It is when the same high culture “[pervades] 
entire populations and not just elite minorities” that nations are born.57 Nationalism, in 
short, is “the organization of human groups into large, centrally educated, culturally 
homogenous units.”58 
Gellner’s paradigm has two key shortcomings that limit its applicability to 
nationalism in the Arab world. The first is its deterministic, one-track approach that 																																																								
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holds nationalism to be the product of industrialization. Several scholars have faulted 
Gellner on this basis, pointing to the fact that nationalism preceded industrialization in 
many cases, including the Arab countries.59 Secondly, as Smith and Conversi point out, 
Gellner’s conception of “high culture” essentially refers to vernacular language.60 It is 
the need for a shared medium of communication that leads states to engender universal 
literacy through mass education. The nation is a linguistically defined unit. Though 
nationalists claim to preserve “putative folk cultures,” these trappings are in fact largely 
“invented.”61 This process of vernacularization, which lies at the heart of Gellner’s 
paradigm, is absent from the Arab case. In fact, Gellner cites the continued utility of 
Islamic high culture (i.e. the Arabic language) in the modern world as the primary 
reason why, in his opinion, Muslim countries would fail to develop secular 
nationalism.62  
 The second broad approach to explaining the role of education in the fostering 
of nationalism adopts a grassroots perspective, examining how students and educators 
formulate national identities independently of or in opposition to state authority. Partha 
Chatterjee argues that the crucial difference between the Western and anti-colonial 
variants of nationalism is that the latter first emerges in the cultural or “spiritual 
domain” (i.e. religion, literature, the arts) before asserting itself politically. As the 
“material domain” is controlled by the Western colonizer, “nationalism declares the 
domain of the spiritual its sovereign territory and refuses to allow the colonial power to 
intervene in that domain.” Once this is achieved, the nationalists proceed “to fashion a 
‘modern’ national culture that is nevertheless not Western.”63 Educational institutions 
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are key sites where this process unfolds, as Chatterjee demonstrates in the case of 
Bengal. Around the turn of the century, a network of newly established indigenous 
schools “outside the influence of… the colonial state,” along with the increasingly 
independent University of Calcutta, played an important role in the modernization of 
indigenous culture. 64  The colonial state allows for greater independence in this 
ostensibly apolitical field, providing a space where nationalists can develop and 
disseminate their ideology without provoking the authorities. 
A second scholar who adopts a grassroots perspective is Benedict Anderson, 
who holds that the shared foundational experience of education can give rise to a 
common national identity. This is one among multiple mechanisms for the emergence 
of nationalism that Anderson identifies. He points out that religious pilgrimages such as 
the hajj reify the unity of the faith, bringing diverse people together to recognize their 
common identity. A similar effect, he argues, is produced by “secular pilgrimages” such 
as working within a government administration, or studying at the same school.65 For 
example, natives of the Dutch East Indies could only pursue higher education in a few 
centrally located institutions. This led to the intermixing of students of various religions 
and ethnicities from across the archipelago, who all “read the same books and [did] the 
same sums.” A shared identity, later dubbed “Indonesian,” therefore began to emerge 
within this educated class.66 A similar process occurred in the French colonies of West 
Africa and Indochina, where centrally located schools brought together the elites of the 
various territories within these respective regions. Anderson attributes the rise of pan-
West African and pan-Indochinese nationalisms to this process.67 Colonial education 
thus fosters nationalism in a fashion that is not anticipated by the colonizing power.   
 A third trend within the scholarship adopts a social approach to explaining the 																																																								
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link between education and nationalism, arguing that the rise of modern education in 
developing countries produces a new social group that becomes the primary 
constituency for nationalist movements. In this conception, the social effect of 
education and its broad modernist orientation matter more than the specific ideological 
or linguistic content of the curriculum. While some scholars adopt a class-based 
perspective,68 others emphasize the role of modern education in imparting a radically 
new worldview to its subjects, as described by Anthony Smith: 
This novel type of education is radically opposed to the traditional elite or folk 
varieties. It stresses secular, utilitarian values, is linguistic in form, relates 
individuals through sets of shared symbols, and transmits memories and 
experiences to posterity… It opens up undreamt of vistas, subjects all ideas to 
the tests of reason and observation, and endows individuals with a new status 
and sense of identity. It replaces precedent and myth and custom by the habit of 
critical inquiry, technical efficiency and professional expertise.69 
 
This shift in worldview is held to have far-reaching social and political implications.  
 
 An early exemplar of this approach is modernization theory, whose basic 
premise holds that traditional societies undergo a wholesale process of modernization as 
they are incorporated into the Western market economy. This entails a number of 
drastic changes, such as urbanization and industrialization, that undermine traditional 
sociopolitical institutions and cast society into a state of disarray, from which a new 
order is then formed.70 The traditional elites are not equipped to deal with this situation, 
and are hence opposed and eventually supplanted by those “exposed… to the impact of 
modern education and urban life.”71 These are variously described as “marginal men,”72 
“new men,”73 or simply the intelligentsia. They are distinguished above all by a 
dynamic, secular frame of mind and a desire for progress that sets them apart from their 																																																								
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hidebound traditional societies. Nationalism is an expression of this outlook, its ethnic 
component the result of “ambivalence” towards the passing of traditional society and 
the adoption of modern Western values. Once empowered, the intelligentsia presides 
over society’s transition from tradition to modernity, establishing a Westernized, 
democratic state.74  
 Although modernization theory is largely outmoded, Smith argues that its model 
of the intelligentsia remains relevant. He rejects the theory’s simplistic, clear-cut 
division between the traditional and the modern, and the idea that modernity is an “end-
state” which developing societies are bound to reach.75 However, he holds that as 
subjective concepts, tradition and modernity stand at the foundations of the 
intelligentsia’s worldview.76 Moreover, the intelligentsia has been key to the emergence 
of all nationalist movements.77 Building on modernization theory, Smith defines the 
intelligentsia as “all who possess some form of further or higher education and use their 
educational diplomas to gain a livelihood through vocational activity.”78 It should not 
be seen as a class but as “a ‘stratum,’ because [the members of the intelligentsia] are 
socially similar in work situation, education and perhaps life-styles, rather than in 
property or relation to the means of production.”79 
 The intelligentsia is the product of the secular mass education instated by the 
“scientific” or “bureaucratic state.”80 Arising in the West, this state model was emulated 
across the globe due to its sheer efficiency. It is dependent on the expertise of the 
intelligentsia, but is initially dominated by traditional elites and/or “old hierarchical 
bureaucrats.”81 The intelligentsia’s rational outlook and meritocratic values predispose 
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it to seek upward mobility. Its rise may be impeded by elite opposition, unemployment 
due to educational overproduction, or social discrimination. Seeing its material interests 
and its modernist ideals flouted, the intelligentsia undergoes “radicalization,” espousing 
nationalist ideology.82 It then forms a nationalist movement in alliance with other social 
groups, and moves to take control of the state.83  
The triumph of nationalism, however, is by no means certain; a key point that 
sets Smith apart from modernization theorists is that he does not see nationalism as the 
sole ideological option open to the intelligentsia. In response to the challenge of 
modernization, the intelligentsia may resort to the rival “assimilationist” or 
“traditionalist” currents. The former adopts “a global cosmopolitanism, which denies 
the significance of ethnic and national divisions,” while the position of the second can 
be summed up in the motto “Western arts, Eastern morality.”84  Smith cites the 
Narodniks and the Muslim Brotherhood as representatives of the latter. Moreover, 
considerable overlap can exist between these currents, which can account for the 
traditionalist elements seen in many nationalist ideologies.85 Smith thus portrays the 
emergence of nationalism as part of a multifaceted and contingent process.  
The concept of the intelligentsia as the vanguard of nationalism is prevalent in 
Middle Eastern studies, although the indigenous term effendiyya is often preferred.86 
Eppel argues that this term, “adopted from popular Middle Eastern discourse” as 
opposed to Western academia, is more suitable for capturing the nuances and 
peculiarities of the regional context. It should not replace social-scientific terminology, 
but be used in conjunction with it. Eppel grants that “as a popular term… effendiyya has 
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a blurred meaning that depends on social context.”87 Nevertheless, a brief survey of the 
literature on this group shows that scholars broadly agree on a number of key 
characteristics that, while similar to the concept of the intelligentsia, display subtle 
differences from it.  
As with Smith’s definition of the intelligentsia, the principal defining attribute of 
the effendiyya is their modern, Western-style education rather than class or 
occupation.88 However, while Smith specifies that the intelligentsia must hold higher 
degrees, 89  the effendiyya category encompasses “persons who received a modern 
Western education at any level (elementary school, secondary school, or higher 
education).”90 Students still completing their studies are also regarded as a primary 
component.91 It can also be applied to workers who are “technical school graduates.”92 
As with Smith’s intelligentsia, the effendiyya are characterized by a self-consciously 
modern culture. This is expressed in their adoption of Western clothing, which 
conspicuously sets them apart from traditional society. Although the majority of the 
effendiyya are engaged in middle class professions, particularly the government 
bureaucracy, certain skilled workers and sons of the elite can be counted among its 
ranks. The petty bourgeoisie is also frequently classed as effendiyya, though it does not 
comply with Smith’s definition of the intelligentsia as a group that depends on its 
diplomas for vocational activity.93  
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 The effendiyya are also closely associated with urbanization, to which is 
ascribed the stratum’s rapid expansion and increased prominence in the Arab world in 
the 1930s.94 A further point, explicitly stated by Eppel but implicit in the work of other 
scholars, is that the label effendiyya is only relevant to a particular period spanning from 
the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, when the spread of literacy and 
modern schools in the region was still very uneven. The cultural difference between this 
group and the remainder of society was therefore marked.95 These nuances conveyed in 
the term effendiyya are lacking in standardized social-scientific terminology.   
While the basic attributes of the effendiyya are largely agreed upon, scholars 
diverge in their explanation of the group’s political role. It is well established that the 
effendiyya constituted the backbone of the more radical opposition movements that 
emerged in the Arab world between the 1920s and 1940s. These espoused Arab 
nationalism but also Islamism, communism, and new territorial and regional 
nationalisms.96 Some authors, echoing modernization theory, consider the effendiyya’s 
adoption of these ideologies to be a symptom of an “identity crisis” caused by social 
dislocation and “ambivalence” towards the West and modernization.97 Others see the 
group’s espousal of radical ideologies in a more utilitarian light, furnishing its members 
with a discourse of opposition in their struggle with ruling regimes and colonial 
powers.98 A third view attributes their Arab nationalist tendencies to the influence of 
this ideology within educational institutions in Iraq and the Levant.99 Modern education 
also provided the stratum with the sense of being an elite vanguard with an obligation to 
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liberate, reform, and lead their societies.100 Usually, a combination of the above factors 
is cited.  
 The multiplicity of approaches to explaining the role of modern education in the 
production and dissemination of nationalism suggests that no “one size fits all” model 
can be applied to the various regional and historical contexts. Furthermore, it will be 
argued that in the case of the Arab world generally and Kuwait specifically, a 
combination of the top-down, grassroots, and social dynamics can be simultaneously 
observed.  
Sources  
 
 A primary objective of this dissertation is to balance British archival sources 
with a thorough use of Arabic language material. The failure to combine Western and 
local sources has been a primary shortcoming of the literature dealing with Arab 
nationalism in the Gulf. This can be attributed to the difficulties faced by researchers in 
accessing this material. As in most Gulf states, official archives in Kuwait are closed to 
most researchers, periodical archives are usually incomplete, and much material lies in 
private hands. Most scholars have thus tended to rely almost completely upon British 
government documents. This is true of the vast majority of English language literature 
as well as some of the key works written in Arabic.  
Apart from the aforementioned party literature, which uses internal documents 
but is largely descriptive, only a few academic studies have extensively used local 
sources. Prominent among them are dissertations by native scholars including Al-
Mdairis, Hashim, and to a lesser extent al-Rumaihi. Certain local Arabic language 
works stand out in this regard, though they do not engage with the Western academic 
and theoretical discourse. Yusuf al-Hijji’s biography of the pioneering Kuwaiti Islamic 
modernist ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Rushaid is particularly noteworthy, drawing on unpublished 																																																								
100 Schumann 174, 198; Wien 16, 34.  
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documents and periodicals from across the Arab world and Southeast Asia. 101 
Furthermore, in the absence of widely read academic journals in the Gulf, professional 
and amateur historians alike publish historical articles in the press that often rely on 
Arabic source material.102  
There is a need for new studies that bridge the chasm between Western and 
indigenous perspectives. Due to a number of recent developments, local source material 
is now more readily available to the researcher. Local periodicals are the most detailed 
and voluminous of this material. A substantial number of these have been compiled and 
published, but appear to have been overlooked by scholars in the West. The country’s 
first journal, the Islamic modernist al-Kuwait magazine (1928-1930), is available in a 
single volume published by Dar Qurtas.103 The Center for Research and Studies on 
Kuwait (CRSK) has republished a number of previously hard to find periodicals, 
including helpful indexes and introductions. The oldest of these is al-Biʿtha (1946-
1954), authored by the Kuwaiti student mission in Egypt.104 Kazima (1948-1949) was 
the second Kuwaiti journal to be published locally.105  
The organ of the Teacher’s Club, al-Raʾid (1952-1954), is the earliest of the 
journals published by the professional and cultural clubs that appeared in the early 
1950s.106 An important source for the purposes of this dissertation is al-Iman (1953-
1954), which was published by the National Cultural Club and represents the 
mouthpiece of the nascent Arab nationalist movement.107 Another of the center’s 
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publications consists of a collection of articles from various student newspapers in the 
1950s and 1960s.108  
A recent trend that has facilitated access to Arabic source material is the 
publication of books that compile articles on Kuwait and the Gulf published in the Arab 
press. This dissertation has particularly benefited from a collection of articles on Kuwait 
from Cairo’s al-Shura (1924-1931), and the reprinting of a collection of special issues 
on Kuwait from the Egyptian press between the 1950s and 1970s.109 Furthermore, 
several journalists have compiled their press interviews with prominent Kuwaiti persons 
in books.110 These compilations, along with interviews published in newspapers and 
magazines, are used extensively in this dissertation.  
Original copies of Kuwaiti newspapers have also provided vital source material 
for this dissertation, though these are much more difficult to access.  Kuwait 
University’s Center for Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies (CGAPS) has a newspaper 
archive that contains clippings from various local and regional publications organized 
according to theme. Though not very organized or comprehensive, it has yielded useful 
material. Comprehensive collections of certain periodicals have been accessed at the 
CGAPS library. These include al-Taliʿa (1962-), mouthpiece of the local branch of the 
MAN, and the government gazette al-Kuwait al-Yawm (1955- ). The latter contains a 
record of laws, appointments, government agencies, and other official news. It also 
published the minutes of certain departmental meetings in the 1950s, including those of 
the Educational Department from the periods 1955-1957 and 1960-1961. This 
dissertation also makes use of individual issues of the elusive al-Baʿth (1950) and the 																																																								
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Shuwaikh Secondary School’s al-Yaqza (1952 - ?). Periodicals used from outside the 
Gulf include the Cairo-based Islamic modernist journal al-Manar, Egypt’s al-
Musawwar, and Neglected Arabia, organ of the missionaries of the Reform Church of 
America in the Gulf.  
A second development that has facilitated the use of local source material is a 
recent increase in the publication of memoires, many of which have yet to be studied by 
scholars. Various Kuwaiti personalities have written about their experience of Arab 
nationalist activism, studying in other Arab states, and serving as teachers and 
bureaucrats.111 In addition, memoires published by Arab teachers in Kuwait are of 
crucial importance to this dissertation.112 Finally, the accounts of Western observers 
have also been used.113  
There also exists a hybrid literature that mixes history with firsthand accounts.114 
A particularly important example of this is al-Rushaid’s Tarikh al-Kuwait, the first 
history of the country published in 1926. Though the work begins with the origins of 																																																								
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Kuwait in the eighteenth century, it devotes a great deal of attention to the budding 
Kuwaiti cultural and educational movement that was emerging at the time of writing. 
The author, a religious scholar associated with the Islamic modernist trend, was a 
leading participant in this activity. The histories of education in Kuwait by al-Nuri and 
al-Shihab are enhanced by accounts of the authors’ personal experience as teachers. 
Khalid Sulaiman al-ʿAdsani’s history of the Legislative Council, finally, is largely 
based on his own memoires and experience as an activist and secretary of the 
institution.  
 A final body of local sources upon which this dissertation has depended is the 
Educational Department’s publications. Of all the local material used in this 
dissertation, this has been the hardest to access. The Ministry of Education has a central 
library and documents center, and the ministry’s Curriculum Authority has a collection 
of old textbooks. However, these institutions have very little material from the 1950s 
and the early 1960s. The material discussed below was gradually collected from a 
variety of places, namely: CGAPS, CRSK, the Kuwait National Library, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz 
Husain Library, al-Babtain Poetry Library, al-ʿUthman Museum, and, crucially, private 
collections.  
The Educational Department’s annual reports provide a wealth of information 
on its policies and achievements as well as detailed statistics. These were published 
sporadically in the early 1950s and consistently from the academic year 1955-1956. The 
earliest local textbooks were published in two waves, the first beginning in 1953 and the 
second in 1956. Other official publications consulted include reports by certain 
educational committees, and the proceedings of the department’s annual cultural season 
and the 1958 Arab Men of Letters Conference.  
Finally, one of the most important local sources used in this dissertation are the 
unpublished minutes of the Educational Council between the years 1950 and 1957, 
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which apparently have not been used in any published scholarship. Copies of these 
minutes were taken from a private collection. It has already been stated that the official 
gazette contains some of the Educational Council’s minutes, but a comparison between 
the published and unpublished versions reveals that the former have been censored. 
Moreover, the unpublished minutes cover the period prior to the publication of the 
official gazette in 1954. However, this version does not cover the years 1960-1961, so 
the minutes published in the gazette have been used for this period.  
 No matter how much care is taken to use local sources, no historian of the Gulf 
can do without the British government archives, which contain by far the most 
substantive accounts of Kuwaiti history in the period under study. Several collections of 
documents were used for this dissertation, namely: the renowned India Office Records 
and Records of the Foreign Office, and the less well known Records of the British 
Council. The latter are housed at the National Archives, and contain detailed 
information on the development of education in Kuwait and other Gulf states from the 
late 1940s. As far as can be ascertained, they have been not yet been used in any of the 
scholarship on Kuwait.  
Finally, though not a government archive, the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) 
archive also provides a wealth of information that has been rarely used by historians 
(particularly those working on subjects not directly related to oil). It is contained within 
the British Petroleum Archive at the University of Warwick. The KOC maintained 
detailed records of local political developments, devoting significant attention to the 
Arab nationalist movement due to its hostility towards the Western owned company. 
Often, these reports appear in the Foreign Office Records due to their detail and 
comprehensiveness. 
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Chapterization 		
This dissertation argues that modern education played a central role in the 
production of an Arab nationalist identity in Kuwait. It examines the period between the 
establishment of Kuwait’s first modern school in 1911 and the country’s independence 
in 1961, when this peripheral shaykhdom experienced far-reaching cultural, political, 
and institutional modernization on the model of the more developed Arab states. The 
first chapter charts the beginnings of this process in the first three decades of the 
twentieth century, when Kuwaiti merchants and ʿulamaʾ established an Islamic 
modernist movement with strong Arabist inclinations. Focusing primarily on cultural 
and charitable activity (albeit with clear political overtones), this movement began a 
process of cultural reorientation away from the Indian Ocean world and towards the 
Arab states, connecting Kuwait to intellectual and political networks spanning the 
region. The introduction of modern education was a central concern of this movement, 
which inaugurated its activities by founding the Mubarakiyya School in 1911. This 
school and its successors pioneered the importation of Arab staff and modern subjects 
and organization, thus paving the way for increasing numbers of Kuwaiti youth to 
continue their education in the metropolises of the Arab world.  
The second chapter turns to the 1930s, when a secular, merchant-led Arab 
nationalist movement emerged in Kuwait, taking over the role of the Islamic modernists 
as the driving force behind the modernization and development of education.  Fuelled 
by Iraq’s Arab nationalist policies, the Palestinian issue, and ties to regional political 
networks, this movement sought to carve out a role in governance and implement a 
modernizing reformist agenda. It culminated with the formation of the elected 
Legislative Council in 1938, which temporarily wrested power from the ruler. It is 
within this context that the Arab nationalist merchants formed the Educational Council 
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in 1936, bringing Kuwait’s modern schools under state control. Through their Pan-Arab 
connections, they employed Palestinian teachers who constructed the country’s 
educational system on the basis of the Iraqi Arab nationalist curriculum. This brought 
Kuwaiti education in line with the dominant trends in the Arab world, where schooling 
was highly politicized and characterized by extensive intra-regional exchange. At the 
same time, the number of Kuwaiti youths educated in Arab states, particularly Iraq, was 
becoming large enough to have an influence within the shaykhdom. After being 
immersed in the political and cultural life of their host countries and adopting the 
outlook and habits of the ascendant effendiyya stratum, these students returned to 
reinforce Kuwait’s growing Arab nationalist mood. 
The turbulent yet formative decade of the 1940s is the subject of the third 
chapter. Two primary developments shaped Kuwaiti education during this period. The 
first was the emergence of competition over control of the Educational Department and 
its ideological orientation. The chapter begins in 1942, with Syrian teachers and a 
government-sponsored Egyptian Educational Mission serving under a Bahraini director. 
This administration’s ties to Arab governments and continued use of the nationalist 
Iraqi curriculum led the British to intervene against it, seeking to assert control over 
education. The British Educational Adviser to Kuwait engineered an Egyptian takeover 
of the department, introducing Egypt’s insular and pro-Western curriculum. This 
produced a backlash from Arab nationalist elements among the local staff, leading to 
the curtailment of British intervention. Egyptian control over Kuwaiti education 
continued for the rest of the decade, though it faced challenges from the rising Arab 
nationalist current in the schools and the influx of Palestinian teachers after 1948.  
The second key development during the 1940s was the expansion of the 
educational system due to generous Egyptian assistance and the influx of oil revenue. A 
particularly important aspect was the development of an extensive scholarship program. 
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The vast majority of students went to Cairo, where they participated wholeheartedly in 
the city’s intellectual scene and increasingly turbulent politics. The centrally important 
case of Ahmad al-Khatib, who cofounded the Movement of Arab Nationalists as a 
scholarship student in Beirut, will also be discussed. These scholarships, along with the 
expansion of education at home, were instrumental in the emergence of a new social 
stratum in the early 1950s: the effendiyya, known locally as the muthaqqafīn.  
 With the onset of the 1950s, the Educational Department gradually returned to a 
policy of top-down inculcation of Arab nationalism, a development that forms the focus 
of the fourth chapter. This shift can be credited to the Palestinian educator and Arab 
nationalist thinker Darwish al-Miqdadi, who became director of the department as a 
result of his ties to Arab nationalist merchants on the Educational Council. Al-Miqdadi 
remained in his post for only two years (1950-1952) and faced staunch resistance from 
conservative elements. However, he succeeded in broadening the department’s regional 
connections and took the first steps towards introducing a national curriculum 
emphasizing both Kuwaiti and Pan-Arab identities. Al-Miqdadi was demoted to 
Assistant Director following the emergence of a movement demanding Kuwaiti 
leadership for the department. Its leaders were members of the ascendant muthaqqafīn 
stratum, which began to assert its influence within the political field and state 
bureaucracy. The composition, outlook, and political orientation of this influential yet 
under studied social group will be analyzed. Though initially divided between 
competing ideological trends, the vast majority of muthaqqafīn soon came to identify 
with Arab nationalism, and took over from the merchants as the leaders of Kuwait’s 
opposition movement.  
 The muthaqqafīn asserted their control over the Educational Department with 
the appointment of ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain, a young Egyptian-educated Kuwaiti, as 
director in 1952. However, the department continued to rely heavily on staff from 
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Palestine and Egypt, which reinstated its Educational Mission to Kuwait. Each of these 
three groups contributed to shaping the department’s environment and policies, which 
became progressively more Arab nationalist. This can be attributed to al-Miqdadi’s 
continued influence, the new revolutionary mood in Cairo, and Husain’s increasing 
espousal of Arab nationalism. Changes to the curriculum reflected this ideological shift. 
Soon after Husain assumed his position, the department introduced its first locally 
authored textbooks, which were Arab nationalist in tone. In the academic year 1955-
1956, the Educational Department set the foundations of Kuwait’s first national 
curriculum, which made the spreading of Arab national awareness a primary goal of 
education. Remarkably, Kuwait preceded Nasserist Egypt in adopting this measure. The 
department also sought to disseminate nationalist ideas beyond the classroom through 
its program of popular acculturation.  
 The fifth and final chapter covers the period between the 1956 Suez Crisis and 
Kuwait’s independence in 1961, a time when Arab nationalist influence reached its 
zenith within the Educational Department. The chapter begins by outlining the 
decentralized and variegated structure of the Kuwaiti state in the 1950s, which allowed 
the professional and well-endowed Educational Department to exercise a considerable 
degree of independence. Under the leadership of the muthaqqafīn, it became a bastion 
of Arab nationalist influence within the state. The department demonstrated its 
independence during the Suez Crisis, when it broke with state policy and threw its 
weight behind the popular protest movement led by the Arab nationalist muthaqqafīn. 
In the wake of the crisis, a bolder and more radical brand of Arab nationalism came to 
dominate the department’s textbooks, classroom instruction, and extracurricular and 
public activities. In early 1959, the department hosted a particularly inflammatory 
public celebration in conjunction with the opposition, prompting the ruler to crack down 
on the country’s Arab nationalist movement. This proved to be the beginning of the 
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gradual decline of nationalist influence within the department. It would be further 
eroded in the lead up to independence as a more centralized state framework emerged, 
and as many of the department’s cadres moved to other state institutions.      
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Chapter One: Islamic Modernism and the  
Beginnings of Modern Education, 1911-1930 
 
 The genesis of Arab nationalism in Kuwait and the wider Gulf region has received 
little attention in the scholarly literature. Most studies argue that the ideology was imported 
to Kuwait in the 1930s as a result of newly formed linkages with the Arab world. Prior to 
this period, the Gulf states are largely portrayed as pristine traditional societies, far 
removed from the intellectual trends and political struggles in the Arab lands of the 
Ottoman Empire. Crystal thus argues that until the 1938 Majlis Movement, the Kuwaiti 
merchant elite displayed “indifference” towards the broader Arab world. The merchants 
regarded events in Egypt and Palestine as “foreign news, not something to weigh in 
considering local matters,” and only came to oppose British imperialism and identify with 
Pan-Arab causes in the 1940s.1 Zahlan places this opening up to regional influence in the 
early 1930s,2 highlighting the importance of the Palestinian issue in the emergence of 
merchant opposition in Kuwait between 1934 and 1938.3 Prior to this period, however, she 
emphasizes that “by and large, the treaties with Britain sealed the Gulf states off from the 
rest of the world” outside British India, causing them to become “very parochial and 
inward-looking.”4  
 While the Gulf was clearly situated at the periphery of the Arab world and the 
Ottoman Empire during this period, it was by no means cut off from developments there. In 
the case of Kuwait, close ties with large cosmopolitan cities such as Bombay and Basra 
ensured that the cultural and political currents sweeping the region, including Islamic 
modernism and Arabism, were strongly felt in the shaykhdom. This development can be 
dated to the first three decades of the twentieth century, during which a new form of 																																																								
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activism gradually emerged within the Kuwaiti merchant class. These merchants espoused 
Islamic modernist ideology and focused primarily on cultural and charitable activity. The 
introduction of modern education to Kuwait was one of their primary achievements.  
 The merchants’ cultural activity was imbued with a profound political significance 
and transnational character. It is strange that the aforementioned studies would characterize 
a period that saw the establishment of Kuwait’s first modern schools, libraries, charitable 
association, literary club, scholarships, and magazine as one of “indifference” and 
“isolation.” These developments are rarely mentioned in political histories of Kuwait, 
perhaps due to a failure to appreciate their political dimensions. Chatterjee argues that the 
early Indian nationalists first asserted their ideology in the “spiritual domain,” in cultural 
fields such as literature, religious practice, and education, before challenging the British 
politically. This perspective allows him to date the emergence of Indian nationalism to the 
early nineteenth century, rather than the 1880s as the standard narrative holds.5 Similarly, 
Islamic modernist cultural activity provided the foundations upon which Kuwait’s Arab 
nationalist movement would later be built.  
 This chapter will chart the rise of an Islamic modernist current among Kuwaiti 
merchants and ʿulamaʾ in the period leading up to the First World War. It will detail the 
history of Kuwait’s first modern schools, focusing on the role of Islamic modernism in 
fostering educational links between Kuwait and the wider Arab world. The final section 
will situate the development of education within the context of a broader, Arab-oriented 
cultural movement in Kuwait that prefigured the Arab nationalist political activism of the 
1930s.  
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The Rise of Kuwait’s Islamic Modernist Movement 
 
 In the period leading up to the First World War, a growing sector of the Kuwaiti 
merchant class and some ʿulamaʾ came under the influence of Islamic modernist ideology. 
In 1911, this nascent movement inaugurated its activities with the creation of Kuwait’s first 
modern school, the Mubarakiyya, followed by the Arab Charitable Association in 1913. 
Although both projects were cultural, their political dimensions are readily apparent. By 
1915, the repercussions of the First World War interrupted the Islamic modernists’ 
activities, though this would prove only a temporary hiatus.   
 The onset of Islamic modernist activism in Kuwait occurred during a transitional 
period in the shaykhdom’s history. The autonomous city-state had been a nominal 
dependency of the Ottoman Empire since 1870,6 but this changed after Shaykh Mubarak al-
Sabah seized power in a bloody coup. When the Ottomans sided with the supporters of the 
ancien régime, Mubarak signed a secret treaty of protection with the British in 1899.7 
Kuwait’s transformation into a British protectorate, however, was not immediate and 
straightforward. Mubarak continued to formally pledge allegiance to the Ottomans until the 
First World War, when he came out on the side of Britain.8   
 Mubarak also abandoned the longstanding tradition of consultation with Kuwait’s 
powerful merchant class, instating authoritarian rule. He also aggravated the merchants by 
imposing exorbitant taxes to finance a series of adventurist military campaigns. Merchant 
discontent surfaced in 1909, when three of Kuwait’s most prominent pearl traders seceded 
to Bahrain in protest. This event proved to be the beginning of a rising current of merchant 
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opposition that provided fertile ground for new political ideas.9  
 Islamic modernism’s relatively early arrival to Kuwait is not surprising given this 
ideology’s vast transnational reach between the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The headquarters of this intellectual and political current was Cairo, where its 
principal pioneer, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, left his most lasting impression. His thought 
was developed by his disciples Muhammad ʿAbdu and Muhammad Rashid Rida. These 
religious scholars sought to respond to European power by appropriating modern values, 
“especially rationality, science, constitutionalism, and certain forms of human equality.”10 
They saw these values as compatible with true Islam, which they considered to be 
overcome by tradition and superstition. They argued for a return to the practice of the salaf, 
the pious forerunners, and their ideology became known as Salafiyya.11 The Islamic 
modernists spread their ideas through the revolutionary medium of the periodical press. Al-
ʿUrwa al-Wuthqa (1884), published by al-Afghani and ʿAbdu in Paris, and Rida’s al-
Manar (1898-1935) reached a wide audience throughout the Muslim world.12 Gradually, 
journals sympathetic to Islamic modernism were established “in virtually every community 
of the Islamic world,”13 eventually including Kuwait. As a result, “many communities were 
pulled together through this web of… press organs.”14  
 In the Kuwaiti context, Islamic modernist ideology was combined with elements of 
Ottomanist Pan-Islamism and Arabism. The relationship between Islamic modernism and 
these ideologies was complex.  In the 1860s and 1870s, the Ottoman Empire increasingly 																																																								
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sought to legitimize its rule through portraying the sultan as caliph. Under Sultan ʿAbd al-
Hamid II (1876-1909), this claim began to be asserted through organized propaganda. One 
of the goals of this policy was to secure the allegiance of the empire’s non-Turkish Muslim 
subjects, particularly the Arabs.15 While often highly critical of Ottoman rule, al-Afghani 
and his successors defended the caliphate as the last vestige of Islamic unity, particularly in 
the face of European threats.16  
 The Islamic modernists’ stance towards the Ottomans can be better understood by 
examining their close association with Arabism, which denotes “a variety of political 
movements and currents among Arabs short of demands for Arab sovereignty.”17 It is thus 
distinct from Arab nationalism, which seeks political unity and independence for the Arabs. 
Ernest Gellner’s widely accepted definition of nationalism thus maintains that it is 
“primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should 
be congruent.”18 Culturally, Arabism entailed the revival of the Arabic language and 
literature, while its political manifestation centered on calls for greater autonomy for the 
Ottoman Empire’s Arab provinces.19  
 While calling for Islamic unity and loyalty to the caliphate, many Islamic 
modernists also emphasized the privileged position of the Arabs within Islam.20 Some 
translated these positions into Arabist political activism. Rida notably co-founded the 
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Ottoman Administrative Decentralization Party in Cairo in 1912. 21  The prominent 
contribution of the Islamic modernists to Arabist thought leads Ernest Dawn to argue that it 
was they who provided “the nucleus of Arab nationalist ideology,” rather than the Arab 
Christians as is commonly held. A number of prominent Islamic modernists in fact became 
Arab nationalists, but only after the First World War brought about “the failure of… 
Islamic modernist Ottomanism.”22  
 The main portals through which Islamic modernist ideas entered Kuwait were two 
cities with which it had strong economic, social, and cultural ties: Bombay and Basra. The 
first of these cities was at the heart of Kuwait’s long established trade links with India, and 
had a substantial colony of Kuwaiti merchants.23 They formed part of a vibrant Arab 
community, boasting its own schools, printing presses, and periodicals.24 Some of the first 
Kuwaitis to receive a modern education were the sons of merchants sent to the schools of 
Bombay and the Islamic University of Aligarh, an Islamic modernist institution.25  
 Perhaps the most significant Kuwaiti merchant family in Bombay was the Al 
Ibrahim, which became closely associated with the Islamic modernist movement. The 
family also owned large estates in the village of Dawra near Basra,26 and appears to have 
enjoyed a historic relationship with the Ottomans. A British account holds that ʿAli bin 
Ibrahim (d. ~1880), who was one of the first members of the family to settle in Bombay, 
may have been a pro-Ottoman “pan-Islamic agent.”27 In the early twentieth century, ʿAli’s 
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grandson Jasim was one of the most prominent pearl merchants in Bombay,28 and was 
known for his extensive donations to Ottoman causes.29  
 On a visit to Cairo in the spring of 1911, Jasim al-Ibrahim became acquainted with 
the leading Islamic modernist cleric Muhammad Rashid Rida. This was the start of a close 
relationship between the two men. Jasim had come with the intention of making a large 
donation to Dar al-Daʿwa wa-l-Irshad (The House of Preaching and Guidance). Rida was 
then in the process of establishing this seminary, which aimed to train missionaries and 
religious reformers. In gratitude for his contribution, Rida proclaimed Jasim the “First 
Honorary Member” of the institution.30 Following this encounter, Rida recounts further 
mutual visits between the two men in al-Manar in which he always refers to Jasim as “my 
close friend.”31 Jasim al-Ibrahim thus provided the Kuwaitis with a direct link with the 
leader of the mainstream Islamic modernist movement.  
 A closer source of ideological influence on Kuwait was Basra, through which the 
shaykhdom became drawn into the politics of the Ottoman Empire. Located a mere 170 km 
north of Kuwait, Basra had always had close ties to the shaykhdom. From the late 
nineteenth century, Kuwait’s maritime trade revolved around the export of dates produced 
in the city’s environs.32 The Al Sabah and merchant families such as the Al Saqr, Al 
Khalid, Al Ibrahim, Al Ghanim, and Al Khrafi owned vast date plantations in the area.33 
Many Basra notables also developed interests in Kuwait. This led to the emergence of a 
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group of merchants with feet in both territories. Al-Rushaid described one such merchant, 
Sayyid Hamid Bek al-Naqib, in the 1920s: “He is Kuwaiti and Iraqi at the same time, as he 
has houses and relatives in both Kuwait and Basra. He has businesses in both, and 
ambitions for both.”34 Though slightly anachronistic, this description is equally applicable 
to merchants during the Ottoman period.  
 The political implications of the social ties binding Kuwait and Basra are evident in 
the case of the Al Naqib family, to which the afore-mentioned Hamid belonged. Members 
of this family, which includes the closely related Al Rifaʿi, were present in Kuwait from at 
least the nineteenth century. They included ʿulamaʾ as well as prominent merchants.35 As 
sāda (sing. sayyid), or descendents of the Prophet, and shaykhs of the influential Rifaʿiyya 
Sufi order, they possessed considerable spiritual authority. They capitalized on this to 
become one of the biggest landowning and merchant families in Basra, also acquiring 
strong political connections in Istanbul. Their influence was such that they allegedly 
orchestrated the deposition of several Ottoman governors of Basra province. The Ottoman 
authorities looked askance at the excessive strength and independence of the Al Naqib, 
particularly as they had close relations with other mavericks in the area such as the shaykhs 
of neighboring Muhammara (a nominal dependency of Iran) and Kuwait. However, the Al 
Naqib propitiated the Ottomans by acting as brokers between Istanbul and the Arab 
shaykhdoms in the region, especially Kuwait, which they promised to bring back into the 
Ottoman fold.36  
 The complex relationship between the Al Naqib and the Ottomans is illustrated in 
the career of Sayyid Rajab Effendi al-Naqib, father of the afore-mentioned Hamid. Rajab 																																																								
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was the naqīb al-ashrāf of Basra, a title awarded to the headmen of the Prophet’s 
descendents in the various cities of the Ottoman Empire. At the time of Mubarak’s 
accession, Rajab “was becoming one of Abdulhamid II's most trusted agents of influence in 
the area.” As part of his policy of Pan-Islamic propaganda, the sultan sought to use him “to 
win Mubarak's submission to him, the caliph, by emphasizing their bond of faith.”37 At the 
same time, the naqīb became a very close friend of Mubarak, defending him to the Ottoman 
authorities.38  
 Rajab’s son Sayyid Talib Pasha al-Naqib inherited his political position, becoming 
an influential Ottoman politician and a leader of the Arabist movement. His ties to Kuwait 
drew the shaykhdom into the empire’s politics of decentralization. Talib preserved his 
father’s pro-Hamidian stance until the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) overthrew 
the sultan in 1908. Following a dalliance with the CUP, Talib began opposing the central 
government after it began to strengthen its hold over Basra province. In late 1911 Talib 
formed a Basra branch of the Moderate Liberal Party,39 a mainly Arab faction that in early 
1912 “merged with other oppositional forces across the empire to form… the Party of 
Liberty and Entente.”40 Saif Marzuq al-Shamlan, one of Kuwait’s foremost traditional 
historians, states on the basis of oral accounts that Shaykh Mubarak al-Sabah joined the 
latter party.41 In addition, the Kuwait-born ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Tabtabaʾi was secretary of 
this party and editor of its mouthpiece al-Dustur.42 Like the Al Naqib, the Al Tabtabaʾi was 
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a prominent Basra-based sayyid family with a branch in Kuwait.43 
 In 1913, Talib took a more radical step by forming Jamʿiyyat al-Islah al-Basriyya 
(the Basra Reform Society), which called for self-rule for Basra in virtually all fields except 
foreign policy and defence.44 He aligned his society with the Cairo-based Decentralization 
Party, which was cofounded by Rida.45 He also sought support from neighboring rulers, 
and organized a meeting in Muhammara in March of 1913 to “amplify the new demands” 
for radical decentralization. Shaykh Mubarak was among the attendees,46 and a follow-up 
meeting was due to be held in Kuwait in November but was cancelled.47  Kuwaiti 
involvement in Talib’s political schemes thus seems to have been significant.  
 The particular brand of Arabism advanced by Talib and his comrades can further 
account for the blend of ideologies espoused by the Kuwaiti merchants. In some respects, it 
represented a continuation of the Ottomanist Islamism of the Hamidian era, and called for a 
return to the more decentralized administration of the ancien régime. The Basra Reform 
Society and its predecessors used Pan-Islamist rhetoric to attack the CUP government for 
its alleged Turkish nationalism and secularism. It also accused the CUP of harbouring pro-
foreign tendencies, referring to its providing of concessions to European companies. The 
movement ironically portrayed itself as defending the Ottoman caliphate against the CUP 
and its foreign allies, and saw no contradiction in simultaneously demanding Arab 
autonomy. Haddad notes the prevalence of this position in Iraq before the First World War, 
and terms it “Anti-European Arab Ottomanism.’”48 The close links of Kuwaiti notables to 
Basra and the Al Naqib no doubt led them to adopt similar views.  																																																								
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 By the early 1910s, the influence of Bombay and Basra led to the emergence of a 
new activism among Kuwaiti merchants. The chief family in the town to espouse Islamic 
modernism and Ottomanist Pan-Islamism was the Al Khalid, members of which played a 
key role in virtually all the early cultural projects in Kuwait. This includes members of the 
Al Kulaib and Al Khudair families, which are branches of the Al Khalid.49 Al-Rushaid 
describes this house as “the pole around which all important affairs [in Kuwait] revolve.”50  
The family’s patriarch, Hamad, was the leader of the pro-Ottoman faction in Kuwait during 
the First World War.51 Members of the family were also among the first in Kuwait to 
subscribe to Arabic periodicals at a time when most Kuwaitis, under the influence of 
conservative ʿulamaʾ, considered them to be irreligious innovations. The periodicals in 
question were the Egyptian Islamic modernist and anti-British organs al-Manar and al-
Muʾayyad.52 This development has variously been dated to 190253 and 1908.54 The family 
allowed others to access these publications at their dīwānīyya, a traditional men’s salon, 
which served as a forum for Kuwait’s nascent intelligentsia.55 Furthermore, the Al Khalid 
became known for hosting ʿulamaʾ visiting from abroad.56  
 The first practical manifestation of the Kuwaiti merchants’ Islamic modernist 
tendencies was the establishment of the Mubarakiyya School, which will be introduced 
here and discussed in detail subsequently. That a school should be the first project of this 
movement reflects the Islamic modernists’ belief in the power of “modern science” and its 
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ability to bring about a renaissance within the umma. 57  It also reflects another 
preoccupation of the Islamic modernists: the defence of Islam against the threat of Christian 
missionaries. In 1910, Shaykh Mubarak al-Sabah permitted missionaries of the Reform 
Church in America to establish a clinic and bible shop in Kuwait.58 In 1912 they also 
opened a small school.59  One of the missionaries recalls that the Kuwaiti populace 
overwhelmingly opposed their presence.60 
 It is often held that the Mubarakiyya was founded as a direct reaction to the 
missionary school. 61  However, preparations for the Mubarakiyya in fact began in 
November of 1911, months before the missionary school was established.62  This may have 
been a preemptive measure on the part of the merchants. At that time, the Reform Church 
already operated a school in Muscat and was in the process of establishing another in 
Basra.63 When the missionaries began tutoring several Kuwaitis in English in 1911,64 the 
merchants may have concluded that the establishment of a school would follow. They were 
also probably influenced by al-Manar, which “placed particular emphasis upon the 
necessity of counteracting the activities of Christian missions… through schools that could 
provide instruction in the duties and doctrines of Islam.”65 In any case, once established, the 
Mubarakiyya placed itself in direct competition with the missionaries, who referred to it as 
“the opposition school.”66  
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 The Mubarakiyya School was the product of collaboration between the merchants, 
who funded the project, and certain ʿulamaʾ, who oversaw the pedagogical aspect. The idea 
was proposed during a commemoration of the Prophet’s birthday by the religious scholar 
Sayyid Yasin al-Tabtabaʾi, and was taken up by Yusuf bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi.67 The latter was a 
religious scholar who had studied in al-Hasa, Basra, and Mecca.68 Though his education 
appears to have been traditional, he espoused Islamic modernism after reading al-Manar 
and other Egyptian periodicals. 69  Al-Qinaʿi was appointed headmaster of the 
Mubarakiyya.70 
 The merchants, meanwhile, contributed the funds and formed a permanent 
committee to oversee the school’s finances. The largest donors were Jasim and his cousin 
ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Ibrahim of Bombay, and the Al Khalid.71 The committee was headed 
by Hamad al-Khalid, with Ahmad al-Humaiḍi and Shamlan bin ʿAli bin Saif as members.72 
The latter was one of the three major pearl traders who seceded in protest at Mubarak’s 
policies in 1909.73 The ruling family remained distant from this project with the exception 
of Mubarak’s son Nasir, a blind man devoted to religious learning who played a leading 
role in fundraising for the Mubarakiyya.74 Though the school was named after Mubarak as 
a courtesy, the ruler did not contribute anything to it. Al-Qinaʿi’s explanation for this 
attitude is summed up in a statement he attributes to Mubarak’s brother Jabir: “It is to our 
benefit that you [i.e. the Kuwaiti people] remain ignorant.”75  
 The ruling family’s passivity towards education and similar charitable initiatives 																																																								
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contrasted with the merchants’ increasing penchant for this activity. Al-Qinaʿi describes 
this trend within the merchant class as novel and unprecedented,76 and it possibly reflected 
new ideological influences. The Mubarakiyya School was the first in a series of projects, 
focusing to a large extent on education, by which the merchants cultivated a public role as 
drivers of development in Kuwait town. By the 1930s, the merchants were taking part in 
the shaykhdom’s governance through voluntary elected councils that can be seen as a 
continuation of this early activity. It has thus been argued that the Mubarakiyya’s financial 
committee, the first of its kind, was the nucleus around which Kuwait’s Educational 
Council later took shape.77  
 Al-Qinaʿi sought to establish the school on Islamic modernist lines. It opened its 
doors in December of 1911.78 The Mubarakiyya’s committee wrote to Jasim al-Ibrahim in 
Bombay, asking him to contact Muhammad Rashid Rida and request that he set out the 
school’s curriculum and appoint its teachers. On March 19th 1912, Rida reported in al-
Manar that he was honored by this request and that he had written back asking for further 
details. He would address this matter after arriving in Bombay in April to attend a 
conference.79 Rida was hosted in Bombay by Jasim al-Ibrahim, who may have convinced 
the cleric to visit Kuwait on his way back to Cairo.80 
 Following a short visit to Muscat, Rida arrived in Kuwait in early May 1912 on a 
visit that had far reaching consequences for the shaykhdom’s nascent Islamic modernist 
movement.81 Al-Rushaid likens its impact to a revolution, and reports that the number of 
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subscribers to al-Manar rose dramatically.82 Rida stayed a week as a guest of the ruler, 
delivering lectures in Kuwait’s main mosque and receiving the town’s notables in the 
evenings to answer their religious inquiries.83 The British Political Agent reports that the 
largest of the mosque lectures was attended by “some 1,000 Arabs of all classes,” and 
warned against the dangers of Christian missionaries.84 One of the missionaries in Kuwait 
later recounted that Rida urged the locals “to avoid association with us and to make it 
unnecessary for the people to come to us by themselves providing medical and school 
facilities along progressive lines.”85  
Not all Kuwaitis agreed with Rida’s agenda and welcomed his presence. Certain 
conservative ʿulamaʾ considered his modernist views and use of the press to be heretical, 
and went so far as to call for his death. Al-Rushaid claims that Rida escaped an 
assassination attempt by a follower of one of these ʿulamaʾ during his visit.86  The 
conservative backlash caused the key merchants supporting the Mubarakiyya School, 
including Hamad al-Khalid and Shamlan bin ʿAli, to go back on their decision to have Rida 
select the curriculum and the teachers.87 The Islamic modernists’ influence within the 
Mubarakiyya did not end with this setback, and they would continue to challenge the 
conservatives for control of the school for the rest of the decade. These developments will 
be dealt with in the next section of this chapter.  
 Although the controversy surrounding Rida’s visit to Kuwait may have marred the 
progress of one project, his call to counter the Christian missionaries inspired another. A 
group of younger Kuwaiti men took his advice to heart, forming al-Jamʿiyya al-Khayriyya 																																																								
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al-ʿArabiyya (The Arab Charitable Association) in February or March of 1913.88 They 
were mostly sons of Shamlan bin ʿAli and the Al Khalid family, the very same merchants 
who had opposed modernizing the Mubarakiyya.89 This marks a generational division 
within these merchant families between the modernist-inclined youth and their more 
conservative seniors. The British Political Agent reported that the association “was not 
received very favourably by the elders of the town who said that they should have been 
consulted.” 90  The association’s president was Farhan al-Khalid. 91  An avid reader of 
journals and books, Farhan was an admirer of the Egyptian politician Mustafa Kamil, 
sharing with him his Pan-Islamic, pro-Ottoman orientation.92 The association also received 
support from Shaykh Nasir al-Mubarak al-Sabah and ʿAbd Allah Khalaf Duhayyan, a 
prominent Kuwaiti cleric with modernist sympathies.93   
The main goals listed in the Arab Charitable Association’s charter were: (a) 
providing scholarships “to Islamic universities in the advanced Arab lands like Egypt, 
Beirut, and Damascus”; (b) employing a Muslim preacher; and (c) appointing a Muslim 
doctor and pharmacist to provide free healthcare to the poor.94 Although the association’s 
surviving documents do not mention countering Christian missionaries, al-Nuri holds that 
this was in fact its aim.95 The missionaries themselves also held this impression.96 The 
association also engaged in missionary activity of its own, converting a number of local 
Jews and Christians.97  
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 Owing to its short lifespan, the association only carried out clauses (b) and (c) of its 
program. Soon after its founding, it engaged the Mauritanian Islamic modernist cleric 
Muhammad Amin al-Shinqiti as a preacher.98 He arrived to Kuwait from Zubair near Basra, 
where he had been an imam,99 and began preaching at a mosque and giving literacy lessons 
at the Arab Charitable Association’s headquarters. 100  The association also opened a 
dispensary staffed by a doctor and pharmacist, both Turks who were brought in from 
Basra.101 Several Kuwaiti youth, including Sultan al-Kulaib and ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Saniʿ, 
volunteered to nurse the patients.102 A final achievement of the association, which was not 
listed in its program, was the establishment of Kuwait’s first public library. It was endowed 
with subscriptions to a number of Arabic journals.103  
The Arab Charitable Association appears to have had Arabist sympathies, which is 
unsurprising given its ties to Rida. Badr al-Mutairi argues that an Arabist orientation is the 
best explanation for the association’s use of the label “Arab” as opposed to “Islamic” in its 
name.104 Al-Shamlan, furthermore, speculates that Farhan al-Khalid had ties to Talib al-
Naqib’s branch of the Liberty and Entente Party given his frequent visits to Basra on 
business.105 The association did indeed have close ties to Basra, distributing literature there 
and advertising its activities in the city’s press.106 Moreover, ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Saniʿ, one 
of the association’s volunteers, later stated in an interview that Talib’s campaign for 
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decentralization in Basra had a profound impact on him and other Kuwaiti youth. He 
recounts that it led himself and two of his friends, Sulaiman al-ʿAdsani and ʿAbd al-
Rahman Khalaf al-Naqib, to espouse Arab nationalism prior to the First World War. They 
did so secretly because nationalist views were deemed un-Islamic, and chose to support 
neither the British nor the Turks after the war broke out.107 At least one member of the 
association thus went beyond Arabism to adopt full-fledged nationalism, though the 
association as a whole was pro-Ottoman. 
A number of factors combined to cut short the experiment of the Arab Charitable 
Association. One was the departure of Farhan al-Khalid to Bombay for medical treatment 
and his untimely death in December of 1913.108 A second was opposition from religious 
conservatives.109 The chief factor, however, was Mubarak’s adoption of a pro-British stance 
in the run up to the First World War.  This led him to close the association’s clinic and 
expel its Turkish doctor in October 1913.110  
The shaykh’s support for the British did not go unopposed; as stated earlier, a 
faction of pro-Ottoman merchants emerged under the leadership of Hamad al-Khalid. A 
missionary present at the time recalls that “there was a good deal of anti-British agitation in 
Kuwait.”111 Al-Shinqiti, who stayed on after the Arab Charitable Association was closed, 
instigated a dispute between Mubarak and his Ottomanist opponents in 1915. During that 
year a revolt erupted against the shaykh of Muhammara, a close ally of Mubarak who was 
also aiding the British. When Mubarak sought men to help quell the uprising, al-Shinqiti 
urged the people of Kuwait to refrain from fighting fellow Muslims. Hafiz Wahba, an 
Egyptian teacher at the Mubarakiyya School, supported his call. One account holds that a 																																																								
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Turkish teacher at the Mubarakiyya, Sayyid ʿUmar ʿAsim al-Izmiri, was also involved.112 
The Kuwaitis complied with this appeal and refused to fight.113  
This rare act of opposition to the ruling family and the British points to the 
increasing impact of modern political ideology on the Kuwaiti populace. Al-Rushaid 
highlights the novel character of this mutiny, describing the reaction of Mubarak’s son 
Jabir upon hearing that the men would not fight: “[He] was confounded by this surprising 
response, and he had the right to be confounded, for this [event] was exceptional for 
Kuwait, and the likes of it had not occurred since [the town] was established.”114 Mubarak 
was infuriated, but retreated from his earlier intention, claiming he was only sending ships 
to transport the shaykh of Muhammara’s family and property. He confronted al-Shinqiti 
and Wahba in the presence of the British Political Agent, and the two protested their 
innocence. Suspecting punishment, al-Shinqiti fled Kuwait to Zubair.115 Mubarak also 
punished the Kuwaiti ringleaders of the mutiny, who are not named in any accounts of the 
incident.116  
The British Political Agent’s version of events differs from the Arabic sources. He 
states: “it was suspected that… [al-Shinqiti] was preaching a jehad within Kuwaiti 
territory.”117 The Ottoman ʿulamaʾ and Shiʿi clergy had indeed declared jihad against the 
British invaders, and their call received a degree of popular support in southern Iraq.118 The 
British version of events is lent credence by the fact that after arriving in Iraq, al-Shinqiti 
joined the Arab irregulars assisting the Ottoman forces at the Battle of Shuʿaiba.119 Some 
Kuwaitis heeded the call to jihad. Sultan al-Kulaib, son of a branch of the Al Khalid family 																																																								
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and one of the Arab Charitable Association’s volunteers, fought at Shuʿaiba along with his 
brother Muhammad, who fell in battle.120 It is possible that others participated but failed to 
publicly discuss this so as not to incur the hostility of the British and the ruling family.  In 
any case, it is clear that the Arab Charitable Association did much to foster an anti-
imperialist current in Kuwait despite its short period of existence. 
The outbreak of the First World War brought an end to Islamic modernist activity in 
Kuwait for the rest of the decade. The death of the authoritarian Mubarak in late 1915 did 
not bring about much change in this regard. His sons and successors Jabir (1915-1917) and 
Salim (1917-1921) did not display any interest in education or sympathy for Islamic 
modernism. This is evinced by Salim’s prompt expulsion of al-Shinqiti when he attempted 
to return to Kuwait in 1919.121 Kuwait’s activists had to wait until Jabir’s son Ahmad 
assumed the throne in 1921 in order to resume their cultural and educational endeavors. 
Once again, these were inspired largely by Islamic modernism, with hints of new, more 
secular ideological influences. Before this period is dealt with, Kuwait’s earliest modernist-
inspired educational projects will be examined in detail.  
The Foundations of Modern Education in Kuwait  
 
Had my family schooled me in Egypt or Beirut, 
I’d have created wonders to be recalled after I die 
 
- Colloquial poetry, ʿIsa bin Qatami, ca. 1910122 
The Mubarakiyya School and the Arab Cultural Association attest to the importance 
of education in the agenda of Kuwait’s Islamic modernist movement. The latter institution, 
while not exclusively educational, conducted literacy classes, founded a library, and sought 
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to provide scholarships to Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus. It is to these Arab metropolises that 
Kuwait’s merchants increasingly began to look when it came to education and culture. The 
above couplet by a renowned Kuwaiti ship’s captain and poet is emblematic of the extent to 
which Arab education became an object of desire and emulation during this period. This 
turn towards the Arab world came at the expense of earlier cultural ties with the Indian 
Ocean world. In 1931 the British Political Agent reported that “India is not popular with the 
Arabs” of Kuwait as a destination for education.123 His successor elaborated on this point in 
1939. 
India, from… the educational point of view, has, I regret, less appeal to Kuwaiti 
Arabs than hitherto and their eyes are naturally turned, in these days of what is called 
“the Arab Renaissance” to the West, to Arabia and the Middle East “Arab” 
Countries.124 
 
Although this realignment culminated in the 1930s, it was a gradual process rooted in the 
period when Kuwait’s modern schools were first established.  
 The Mubarakiyya School and its successor, the Ahmadiyya, imported teachers from 
the more developed Arab countries, and modernized their structures and regulations to 
bring them into conformity with the educational systems of these states. The “Arabization” 
of education at home led to an increase in the numbers of Kuwaitis studying in the 
secondary schools and universities of the Arab metropolises. This section will highlight the 
nature and implications of Islamic modernist influence within Kuwait’s first modern 
schools. It will conclude with a discussion of Kuwait’s first scholarships to Iraq in 1925. 
 As been stated, the Mubarakiyya was founded in late 1911 at the initiative of the 
modernist religious scholar Yusuf bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi, and with the support of sympathetic 
merchants. They sought to counter the educational activity of the Christian missionaries by 
combining modern form with Islamic content. Although plans to allow Muhammad Rashid 																																																								
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Rida to select the school’s curriculum and staff fell through, Islamic modernist influence 
persisted due to the continued oversight of its headmaster al-Qinaʿi. This influence was 
strengthened with the arrival of Hafiz Wahba in 1914. By 1915, however, it was severely 
undermined as a result of the anti-Ottoman policies of Shaykh Mubarak. Subsequent 
attempts by the Islamic modernists to reassert control over the school failed, causing them 
to establish a new institution, the Ahmadiyya, in 1921. This marked the beginning of a 
short-lived golden age for Islamic modernism in Kuwait, during which the quality and scale 
of education changed significantly. 
 From the start, the Mubarakiyya had a cosmopolitan character, employing ʿulamaʾ 
from across the Islamic world who would otherwise not have settled in Kuwait. Modern 
education thus provided a unique channel through which the Kuwaitis came into contact 
with new ideas and worldviews. Among the first teachers was Sayyid ʿUmar ʿAsim, a 
Turkish religious scholar. According to his son’s memoires, ʿAsim’s membership of the 
CUP forced him to flee his native Izmir in 1905 to avoid repression. He settled in India. In 
1911, he was on his way back to Turkey when he passed through Kuwait.125 Here, he 
became acquainted with merchants such as Hamad al-Khalid, Shamlan bin ʿAli bin Saif, 
and Hamad al-Saqr. Preparations for the Mubarakiyya were then underway, and the 
merchants convinced ʿAsim to become the mudīr (director) of the school, i.e. al-Qinaʿi’s 
deputy. Another of the school’s original faculty members was the religious scholar 
Muhammad Najm al-Din, a native of Lahore.126   
 The remainder of the school’s staff was Arab, some hailing from more developed 
countries where Islamic modernism was prevalent. When it first opened, the Mubarakiyya 
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employed two natives of Baghdad.127 Little is known about these men. The most influential 
of the Mubarakiyya’s early teachers was the Egyptian Hafiz Wahba, who was employed in 
1914. In his memoires, Wahba recounts that he was influenced by the modernist thought of 
Muhammad ʿAbdu while a student at al-Azhar. His dissatisfaction with the stagnation of 
Islamic education and opposition to British colonial rule led him to leave Cairo for Istanbul. 
At one point he mentions in passing that the British authorities detained him, though he 
does not elaborate.128  
 Upon arriving in Istanbul, Wahba worked for a pro-Ottoman Arabic-language 
newspaper supported by the CUP, but left after a time because of his Arabist tendencies. He 
subsequently travelled to Bombay, where he developed close links with Arab merchants, 
particularly the Kuwaiti Jasim al-Ibrahim. He also went to Delhi where he became 
associated with the Khilafat Movement. In conjunction with this Islamic modernist and 
anti-British group, he launched an Arabic periodical that closed down after the outbreak of 
the First World War. Once again, he briefly states that he was detained by the British in 
India but does not mention when or why.129 In 1914, Wahba left India for Basra, but 
stopped in Kuwait after hearing reports that the British were again going to arrest him. Al-
Qinaʿi then convinced him to remain in the town and teach at the Mubarakiyya.130  
Yet another staunch Islamic modernist who taught at the Mubarakiyya in its early 
years was ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-ʿAtiqi. Of Najdi origin, he was a resident of Zubair near Basra. 
After meeting Muhammad Rashid Rida, he decided to study at the aforementioned Dar al-
Daʿwa wa-l-Irshad in Cairo. This he did between 1911 and 1913. He apparently began 
teaching in Kuwait soon afterwards. In October 1914, he accompanied the prominent 																																																								
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Islamic modernist and Arabist Muhib al-Din al-Khatib on a trip from Cairo to Basra. Rida 
had charged the two men with conveying a secret message to Talib Pasha al-Naqib. 
However, the British apprehended and imprisoned them in Iraq, and it appears that al-
ʿAtiqi did not subsequently return to Kuwait until the 1930s.131 
The modern reforms implemented by these men entailed changes in both the 
organization and content of education that demarcated the Mubarakiyya from the traditional 
kuttāb, or Qurʾanic schools. The latter taught basic literacy, rudimentary arithmetic, and 
most importantly recitation of the Qurʾan. A pupil’s studies were completed upon reading 
the entire holy book.132 In terms of organization, the Mubarakiyya differed from this model 
in a number of respects. The school was much larger than the kuttāb and its teachers more 
numerous. It housed 170-180 students when it first opened.133  Al-Nuri, who started 
teaching at the Mubarakiya in 1923, reports that the number of students fluctuated between 
400 and 160 over the course of a single year, as many withdrew during the pearl diving 
season.134  
The key organizational innovation was the introduction of an educational ladder 
composed of five grades, each associated with specific subjects. Each grade was presided 
over by a particular teacher, and an oral examination determined the advancement of 
students from one grade to the next.135 This allowed the Mubarakiyya to integrate itself 
with the modern educational system of the Ottoman Empire and its successor states. 
Graduates of the Mubarakiyya went on to study at secondary schools in Iraq and elsewhere 
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at least as early as the 1920s. A British report from 1931 states that the Mubarakiyya was 
considered to be a primary school.136  
The Mubarakiyya’s curriculum was also modernized, although the Islamic 
modernists faced stiff resistance from conservatives over this issue. The teaching of profane 
subjects contradicted the basic philosophy of traditional Islamic education, whose aim was 
the oral transmission of religious knowledge.137 The conservatives who had opposed Rida’s 
role in the Mubarakiyya also foiled al-Qinaʿi’s attempt to teach English on the grounds that 
it was contrary to religion.138 The Mubarakiyya was therefore initially confined to the 
religious sciences, Arabic, and arithmetic. Although these were basically the same subjects 
taught at the kuttāb, the Mubarakiyya adopted novel teaching methods and maintained 
higher standards.139 When Wahba arrived in 1914, he introduced the nontraditional subjects 
of geography, history, and geometry for the first time.140 None of the subjects at the 
Mubarakiyya had standardized syllabi or textbooks, and the way they were taught depended 
on the discretion of the individual teachers.141 The nature of the curriculum thus depended 
upon the composition of the school’s staff.  
When Shaykh Mubarak dissolved the Arab Charitable Association after the 
outbreak of the First World War, he also sought to purge the Mubarakiyya of Ottomanist 
elements. It will be remembered that Wahba cooperated with al-Shinqiti in inciting a 
mutiny against the ruler in 1915. Wahba’s fate following this incident is unclear. Al-
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Rushaid holds that the British and the ruler cleared him of blame,142 but al-Nuri vaguely 
states that he left the country for political reasons.143 Wahba himself relates that in 1915 he 
left Kuwait for Basra, where the British detained him for six months due to his political 
orientation. He subsequently founded a school in the village of Dawra,144 fiefdom of the Al 
Ibrahim family with which he had developed close ties while in Bombay. With Wahba’s 
departure, the subjects he had introduced in the Mubarakiyya were discontinued and would 
not be taught again in Kuwait until the 1920s.145  
 At around the same time, Shaykh Mubarak dealt a further blow to Islamic modernist 
influence within the school by dismissing its headmaster and architect Yusuf bin ʿIsa al-
Qinaʿi. The latter provides two reasons for this action. The first was al-Qinaʿi’s refusal to 
allow Mubarak to employ his brother as a scribe, which aggravated the ruler. Secondly, 
Mubarak accused al-Qinaʿi of harbouring “foreigners” at his residence and voiced 
suspicion of his intentions.146 This probably referred to al-Qinaʿi’s dīwānīyya, which was a 
center of religious and intellectual discussion that was often attended by visitors from 
outside Kuwait. Al-Shinqiti and Wahba were also regular participants in this forum.147 The 
year 1915 thus saw the disappearance of virtually all Islamic modernists from the 
Mubarakiyya.  
 For the next two years the Mubarakiyya was run on more traditional lines. Al-
Qinaʿi’s successor as headmaster was the religious scholar and teacher at the school Yusuf 
bin Hmud, whose tenure was short and uneventful. The school’s Turkish director, ʿUmar 
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ʿAsim, succeeded him.148 Though ʿAsim is known to have introduced novel methods for 
the teaching of Arabic,149 he was regarded as a traditionalist with no expertise in modern 
subjects.150 In 1917 the Islamic modernist presence in the Mubarakiyya resumed when the 
Kuwaiti religious scholar ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Rushaid was appointed director.151 Al-Rushaid 
had studied in Baghdad under the prominent Islamic modernist cleric Mahmud Shukri al-
Alusi in 1911.152 After a year, he travelled to Cairo with the intention of enrolling in Dar al-
Daʿwa wa-l-Irshad, but was for some reason unsuccessful.153 Alongside al-Qinaʿi, al-
Rushaid became Kuwait’s principal Islamic modernist thinker and activist.  
 Al-Rushaid was unable to reintroduce modern subjects to the Mubarakiyya due to 
continued conservative resistance, yet his failure led to a new educational project. In 1919, 
a dispute over pay led al-Rushaid to resign from the Mubarakiyya along with two other 
teachers. One of them was ʿAbd al-Malik al-Salih, who had migrated from Zubair to teach 
at the Mubarakiyya. He decided to found his own school, the ʿAmiriyya, and convinced al-
Rushaid to join him.154 The ʿAmiriyya acted as a steppingstone in the founding of the 
Ahmadiyya School, the Islamic modernists’ alternative to the conservative Mubarakiyya.  
 The establishment of the Ahmadiyya was made possible by the eponymous Shaykh 
Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, whose rule marked a turning point in political liberalization, 
cultural activity, and Islamic modernist influence in Kuwait. Ahmad’s predecessor Salim 
had continued the warmongering of his father Mubarak, which had led to popular 
discontent in the shaykhdom. After Salim’s death in February 1921, the merchants 
prevailed upon his successor Ahmad to form an advisory council, and made him agree that 																																																								
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criminal cases would be judged by the ʿulamaʾ according to the shariʿa. According to al-
Qinaʿi, the council was his idea.155   
 Although short-lived and ineffectual, the 1921 advisory council was important in 
that it was the first attempt by the merchants to formalize their role in governance through 
modern political institutions. The body was headed by Hamad al-Saqr, who was recognized 
during this period as leader of the merchant opposition.156 By the 1930s his family, which 
had close business ties to Iraq, would become closely identified with the Arab nationalist 
movement. A significant proportion of the council’s members were sympathetic to Islamic 
modernism. Key among these was Ahmad al-Fahad al-Khalid, brother of Farhan and his 
successor as president of the defunct Arab Charitable Association. The Al Khalid also 
fielded a second member, Mashʿan al-Khudair. The sāda were represented by ʿAbd al-
Rahman Bek al-Naqib, who al-Saniʿ mentioned as one of Kuwait’s first Arab nationalists. 
Also present were the Mubarakiyya committee members Shamlan bin ʿAli and Ahmad al-
Humaiḍi.157 
 In addition to the merchants, the ʿulamaʾ were represented on the council by Yusuf 
bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi and ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Rushaid.158 This marked a boost in their standing 
and a legitimation of their Islamic modernist beliefs, for they were not the oldest or most 
prominent ʿulamaʾ in Kuwait. Their appointment suggests that Islamic modernism had 
become more influential within merchant circles.  Shaykh Ahmad may also have had some 
sympathy for Islamic modernism; he was in communication with the exiled al-Shinqiti 
during Salim’s reign,159 and after assuming power he appointed al-Rushaid as his court 
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preacher.160 Unlike his predecessors, he would also play an active role in the formation of 
the Ahmadiyya School. The advisory council, however, quickly disintegrated due to 
infighting amongst its members.161 Nevertheless, it formed an important precedent that the 
merchant opposition would build upon in the 1930s.  
 The newfound prominence of the Islamic modernists set the stage for the 
establishment of a school of their own. Al-Qinaʿi reports that Shaykh Ahmad charged him 
with reforming the Mubarakiyya, but that those responsible for the school opposed his 
plans to teach modern subjects and English.162 This led al-Rushaid to propose forming a 
new school to avoid clashing with the conservatives. It would be named the Ahmadiyya in 
honor of the ruler. The prominent merchants supported the scheme, with almost all 
members of the advisory council contributing funds.163 Hamad al-Saqr and Hamad al-
Khalid were the largest contributors.164  Sultan al-Kulaib, the former member of the Arab 
Charitable Association who fought against the British, played a key role in soliciting 
donations. Shaykh Ahmad, finally, pledged a substantial annual contribution. As in the case 
of the Mubarakiyya, an administrative committee for the school was formed. Its members 
were ʿAbd al-Rahman Bek al-Naqib, Sayyid ʿAli bin Sayyid Sulaiman al-Rifaʿi, Mashʿan 
al-Khudair, Mishari al-Kulaib, and Sultan al-Kulaib.165 It is noteworthy that the first two 
were Rifaʿi sāda, and the other three sons of the Al Khalid.  
 The Ahmadiyya School was built upon the foundations of previous Islamic 
modernist initiatives. It took over the premises of the Arab Charitable Association, donated 
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by Ahmad al-Fahad al-Khalid.166 It also merged with the ʿAmiriyya School, absorbing its 
students and teachers, including al-Rushaid. The ʿAmiriyya’s headmaster, al-Salih, was 
made director (mudīr) of the Ahmadiyya.167  
 Al-Qinaʿi became headmaster of the Ahmadiyya, and was finally able to implement 
the educational reforms he had strived for over the past decade. Along with al-Rushaid, he 
insisted on incorporating modern subjects and English into the curriculum. The two said 
that unless they had their way, they would form their own school and hang a sign on it 
saying “English Language and Geography.” They also stipulated that the Ahmadiyya 
should employ teachers from Egypt who would be “enlightened and modern (ʿalā al-ṭarāz 
al-jadīd).” Two Egyptians were engaged, one of whom taught English.168 Furthermore, 
Hafiz Wahba, who returned to Kuwait after the British expelled him from Bahrain, 
volunteered his time to the school free of charge. His main occupation was now trade, and 
he engaged in teaching and preaching part-time.169 The Ahmadiyya School opened its doors 
in September of 1921,170 and al-Qinaʿi recalls that it was remarkably successful in its early 
years.171  
 Although the Mubarakiyya’s administration continued to oppose curricular reform 
for the rest of the decade, the school experienced an influx of Arab teachers with 
experience of modern education during this period. One of the most notable was 
Muhammad Nuri, a religious scholar from Mosul who had taught at an Ottoman 
government school in Zubair. A staunch anti-imperialist and opponent of Christian 
missionaries, his harassment by the British authorities drove him to settle in Kuwait in 1922 
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or 1923.172 He was hosted by Hamad al-Khalid and also received assistance from Hamid al-
Naqib.173 Muhammad’s son ʿAbd Allah accompanied him to Kuwait but later returned to 
study at Dar al-Muʿalimin, the government teachers’ college in Baghdad. The following 
year he discontinued his studies and assumed a teaching position at the Mubarakiyya.174  
 Another of the school’s teachers who attended Dar al-Muʿalimin was Mahmud 
Shawqi al-Ayyubi, the son of a Kurdish immigrant to Kuwait. He taught in Iraqi schools for 
a time after graduating, moving to the Mubarakiyya in 1924.175 ʿAbd Allah al-Nuri and al-
Ayyubi were apparently the first teachers in Kuwait who were trained at a modern teachers’ 
college. In 1926, an Egyptian Azharite scholar, Muhammad al-Khurashi, arrived from 
Zubair and became director of both the Mubarakiyya and Ahmadiyya schools. Although he 
stayed for less than a year, he did much to modernize the organization of both institutions. 
He departed after quarreling with al-Rushaid, who accused him of being a secret Bahai 
missionary.176 While the Mubarakiyya did not experience the same modernizing reforms as 
the Ahmadiyya, it too experienced an increase in modern influence during the 1920s.  
 The establishment of the Ahmadiyya was followed by the creation of another 
modern school, the Saʿada School for orphans, in 1924. It was entirely funded by the pearl 
merchant Shamlan bin ʿAli. The school resembled the Mubarakiyya in having a more 
traditional curriculum, yet it is also reported to have taught history. It is yet another 
illustration of the intensification of the merchant’s educational and charitable activities in 
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the 1920s.177  
 By the middle of the decade, the standard of education in Kuwait had improved to 
the point where its effects within society had become palpable. In 1923, the Arab 
nationalist writer Amin al-Raihani, a Lebanese Christian, visited Kuwait on a tour of 
Arabia. He reported that it was experiencing a “cultural renaissance (nahḍa thaqāfīyya)” 
based on two pillars, the schools and the Ahliyya Library (to be discussed below). He 
added that Kuwait was imbibing the modern knowledge of Egypt and Syria, and spreading 
it to less developed areas of Arabia.178 In his history of Kuwait, published in 1926, al-
Rushaid similarly spoke of an “intellectual movement and cultural renaissance” in Kuwait. 
It was fuelled by several factors including education.179 Not only did the schools introduce 
modern subjects, but they also popularized traditional disciplines such as Islamic 
jurisprudence and Arabic grammar, “which were previously confined to a few individuals 
with long beards.”180 Al-Nuri notes that Kuwait experienced a significant rise in literacy 
between 1912 and the 1930s due to the impact of the modern schools and the increasing 
number of kuttāb.181 
 An important result of the development and modernization of education was that 
studying in the secondary schools and universities of the Arab world became more viable 
and attractive. The first Kuwaitis to receive a modern education abroad were the sons of 
merchants, many of whom resided in India or Iraq. Little is known about the numbers and 
experiences of these students. Badr Khalid al-Badr, the son of a merchant with family and 
business ties to Basra, provides a rare firsthand account of his study in Iraq between 1921 																																																								
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and 1931. He started his education in Kuwait at a kuttāb and then joined the ʿAmiriyya to 
learn how to write, as the former only taught memorization of the Qurʿan. Al-Badr 
highlights the stark contrast between the kuttāb and the ʿAmiriyya, which had an 
educational ladder like the Mubarakiyya. He states that his education there prepared him 
well for the government primary school he joined in Basra in 1921, illustrating the 
importance of modern education in preparing Kuwaiti students for study abroad.182   
 Al-Badr also recounts that Iraq was experiencing a “remarkable Arab awakening 
(ṣaḥwa)” in the mid-1920s. Its effects were strongly felt in the schools, whose curriculum 
was designed by the Arab nationalist ideologue Satiʿ al-Husri. He recalls reciting rousing 
nationalist anthems and poetry, and learning about the history of the Arab nation up to the 
Arab Revolt against the Ottomans. The teachers also lectured students on the Balfour 
Declaration and the danger of Zionism.183 
 The increasing appeal of the Arab countries as a destination for study is illustrated 
by Kuwait’s first scholarships in 1925, awarded to seven graduates of the Ahmadiyya and 
Mubarakiyya schools. The students were sent to Iraq for two years of secondary schooling. 
Six of them went to the Aʿzamiyya College in Baghdad, while one, a ruling family 
member, attended the Rahmaniyya College in Basra. Although referred to as colleges 
(kullīyya), these institutions were in fact secondary schools. Of the first six students, the 
most prominent was Khalid al-ʿAdsani, whose father Sulaiman was mentioned by al-Saniʿ 
as one of Kuwait’s first Arab nationalists.184 As shall be seen, Khalid would become a 
prominent nationalist activist in his own right. At least one of these scholarship students, 
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ʿAbd al-Karim al-Badr, returned to teach in Kuwait’s schools.185 
 The scholarships were the project of al-Qinaʿi, who visited the Aʿzamiyya College 
and was impressed by it. 186  It was an Islamic modernist institution that, like the 
Ahmadiyya, combined religious and modern subjects. Its director was the religious scholar 
Nuʿman al-Aʿzami, who had anti-British tendencies and ties to Islamic modernist scholars 
including Kuwait’s ʿAbd Allah Khalaf Duhayyan.187 Al-Qinaʿi accompanied the students 
to Baghdad, personally paying their travel expenses and providing a financial guarantee to 
the college.188 It is unclear who paid the students’ fees, though al-Rushaid praises Shaykh 
Ahmad’s support for the scholarships, suggesting that he was responsible.189  
 The scholarships to Iraq represented the culmination of the Islamic modernists’ 
push for educational alignment with the Arab world, and realized a goal first advanced by 
the Arab Charitable Association in 1913. Along with the other developments in the 
modernization and “Arabization” of education in the 1920s, the scholarships were made 
possible by the favorable climate under Shaykh Ahmad al-Jabir. Towards the end of the 
decade, however, educational development ground to a halt following the virtual collapse 
of Kuwait’s economy. This was due to the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, a Saudi 
trade blockade of Kuwait (imposed in 1922 after a dispute over the collection of customs 
duties), and the decline of the pearl trade following the development of the cultured 
pearl.190  
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 As the economic crisis took its toll, merchant funding for charitable and educational 
projects gradually dried up, and financial support from the ruler remained limited. This led 
to a marked decline in the standard of education in the Mubarakiyya and Ahmadiyya 
schools,191 while the Saʿada School was forced to shut down altogether.192 Moreover, no 
further scholarships were provided until the late 1930s. In the subsequent decade, this 
situation would lead the merchants to mobilize in order to force the state to take 
responsibility for education and other aspects of public welfare. Before leaving the 1920s, 
however, it is necessary to place the development of education within the context of the 
broader cultural movement that occurred during the period of Islamic modernist 
ascendancy.  
Kuwait’s “Cultural Renaissance” 
 
 The educational projects of the 1920s were part of a broader flourishing of cultural 
and intellectual activity. As has been stated, both al-Raihani and al-Rushaid speak of 
education as part of a “cultural renaissance” in Kuwait that included other aspects. Among 
them were the establishment of the Ahliyya Library and the Literary Club (al-Nadi al-
Adabi) in 1923, and an increasing interaction with Arab intellectuals and the press. The 
latter development culminated in the establishment of the shaykhdom’s first periodical in 
1928. As in the case of education, these cultural pursuits were oriented towards and 
inspired by the Arab world. They were pioneered by the same Islamic modernist ʿulamaʾ 
and merchants involved in education. In addition, the youth began to play a more 
prominent role, leading to new, more secular ideological influences that contributed to the 
growth of Arab nationalism. Along with the educational developments discussed above, 
these activities support Chatterjee’s thesis that the cultural realm was central to the 																																																								
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emergence of nationalism. Furthermore, they clearly demonstrate that Kuwait’s links with 
Arab world long predate the 1930s as the aforementioned authors allege. The interpersonal 
networks that connected Kuwaitis to other Arabs during this period would influence the 
development of education in the coming decades.  
 The Ahliyya Library, founded in 1923, followed in the pattern of the other 
charitable establishments created by the merchants during this period. Some accounts credit 
al-Qinaʿi with the idea,193 while others attribute it to al-Kulaib and al-Saniʿ, the youth of 
the former Arab Charitable Association.194 Al-Qinaʿi was made president of the library, 
while both al-Kulaib and al-Saniʿ appear to have occupied the subordinate position of 
director at different times. A youth of the al-Rifaʿi family became the library’s treasurer.195 
Furthermore, an administrative committee was formed that included Sulaiman al-
ʿAdsani.196 Many of the participants in this project were thus younger men with Islamic 
modernist or Arab nationalist sympathies. The new library inherited the books of the Arab 
Charitable Association, and also received donations of books from the merchants.197 It also 
subscribed to Egyptian and Syrian journals.198  
Shortly after the library’s formation, a group of educated youth founded the Literary 
Club (al-Nadi al-Adabi), which represented a radical development for several reasons. 
Firstly, although more established figures such as al-Rushaid lent their support,199 the 
initiative was the first to be led by the youth, who were perhaps encouraged by their 
participation in the Ahliyya Library. The founders included students, reflecting the role of 
education in introducing modern ideas from the Arab world. The idea was proposed by 																																																								
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Khalid Sulaiman al-ʿAdsani, then a secondary school student who would shortly be sent to 
Iraq on scholarship.200 ʿAbd Allah al-Jabir al-Sabah, an educated young shaykh, became 
the club’s president. Young men occupied the remaining administrative positions.201 
According to al-ʿAdsani, the club had at least one hundred members drawn from the 
younger generation.202  
The Literary Club became a conduit for the importation of the latest ideological 
trends from the Arab world. These appear to have coexisted with the already established 
Islamic modernist current, for various Islamic modernist figures were invited to speak at 
the club. This accords with Dawn’s thesis of Arab nationalism emerging gradually from 
Islamic modernist foundations. Some members of the club already had Arab nationalist 
leanings, including ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Saniʿ and perhaps Khalid Sulaiman al-ʿAdsani, who 
may have inherited his father’s views. Others would become nationalist activists in the 
1930s. These include Sarhan al-Sarhan, Muhammad al-Barrak, and Muhammad Ahmad al-
Ghanim.203  
The periodical press was vital in the importation of new ideas; the Literary Club 
subscribed to numerous Arab journals, some of which were donated by the ruler.204 The 
club’s former president ʿAbd Allah al-Jabir recalls the particular impact of the Egyptian 
press, listing ten journals that were regularly read by the club members. These had such a 
hold on the members’ imaginations that they divided themselves into supporters of the 
three main Egyptian political parties: al-Wafd, al-Ahrar al-Dusturiyyun, and al-Hizb al-
Watani. The Wafd leader Saʿad Zaghlul was, he states, as popular among the members as 
																																																								
200 Al-Rushaid, 124; al-ʿAdsani, Mudhakkirat. 
201 These include ʿIsa bin Salih al-QinaʿI, Muhammad Ahmad al-Ghanim, and Rajab al-Rifaʿi. al-Rushaid, 
124; al-Rifaʿi, Interview by Milaiji, 47. 
202 Al-ʿAdsani, Mudhakkirat. 
203 Al-Hatim, 68-69.   
204 Al-Rushaid, 124. 
 81	
Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir would later become. Moreover, a law was issued requiring members to 
dress in the fashion of the Egyptian aristocracy: Western suits for club meetings, and 
smoking jackets for evening functions. Al-Jabir also recalls that the club came to support 
women’s emancipation due to the influence of Egyptian writers such as Qasim Amin, Huda 
Shaʿrawi, and Safiya Zaghlul.205 
A second means through which the Literary Club contributed to the dissemination 
of new ideas was the hosting of lectures by local and visiting intellectuals. The practice of 
delivering a lecture in a secular context, as opposed to a religious sermon, was an 
innovation. Al-Rushaid considers his opening lecture at the club to be the first in Kuwait,206 
and he went on to deliver others.207 The Egyptian teacher al-Khurashi also lectured at the 
club in 1926.208  
The club also took advantage of an increase in the number of visitors from the Arab 
world, holding receptions in their honor where lectures and speeches were delivered. In the 
spring of 1924, it hosted al-Shinqiti, who visited Kuwait for the first time since his 
expulsion by Shaykh Salim in 1919.209 The following year, the Tunisian Islamic modernist 
scholar and anti-imperialist activist ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Thaʿalibi arrived in the shaykhdom as 
a guest of the Al Khalid. He had been touring the region after being forced to flee his 
country by the French. According to al-Rushaid, al-Thaʿalibi’s speeches at the Literary 
Club and elsewhere over the course of his eighteen-day sojourn had a far-reaching impact 
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in the town.210  Al-Thaʿalibi returned to Kuwait in 1927, and the Saʿada School held a 
reception in his honor.211 
 Kuwait received other visitors from the Arab world during this period. Amin al-
Raihani’s arrival in 1923 has already been mentioned. The following year, Muhammad 
Amin al-Husaini, Mufti of Jerusalem and President of Palestine’s Supreme Muslim 
Council, arrived at the head of a delegation to raise funds for the restoration of Jerusalem’s 
holy sites. He was accompanied by the prominent Egyptian Arab nationalist Muhammad 
ʿAli ʿAlluba.212 Al-Husaini was a disciple of Muhammad Rashid Rida, having studied at 
Dar al-Daʿwa wa-l-Irshad between 1912 and 1913,213 and may have established contact 
with Kuwaitis through the Islamic modernist network. This encounter marked the start of a 
close relationship between Kuwait’s merchants and al-Husaini that would later have crucial 
consequences for the development of education. 
A further development that contributed to the rise of cultural and intellectual 
activity in Kuwait during the 1920s was an increased interaction with the Arab press, both 
in terms of consumption and production. During this time, Kuwaiti society apparently 
abandoned the conservative position that held periodicals to be anathema. Magazines and 
newspapers were now readily available through the Ahliyya Library, the Literary Club, and 
Kuwait’s first commercial bookshops, established in 1923 and 1926.214 In 1928, the 
Kuwait-Iraq Motor Transport Company introduced a much more efficient mail service. Al-
Rushaid remarked that it allowed “the Kuwaiti to read the newspapers and magazines of 
Egypt… three days after their publication, whereas previously they would arrive after ten 																																																								
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days.”215 Furthermore, the rapid development of the Iraqi press in the 1920s provided a 
more proximate source for periodicals.216  
The prevalence of periodicals not only allowed Kuwaitis to access the intellectual 
output of the Arab world, but it also permitted them to participate in this discourse. During 
the 1920s an increasing number of Kuwaitis began writing in Arab journals, often reporting 
and debating local developments, thus connecting Kuwaiti affairs with the Pan-Arab plane. 
Chief among them was al-Rushaid, who contributed to Iraqi and Egyptian journals and 
became the local correspondent and subscription agent for the Cairene al-Shura in around 
1925.217 Its editor was Muhammad ʿAli al-Tahir, a Palestinian Arab nationalist and a 
tireless campaigner on behalf of Palestine. The newspaper had a strongly anti-imperialist 
and transnational character, devoting a great deal of coverage to peripheral areas including 
the Gulf.218 These qualities made al-Shura popular in Kuwait, where numerous notables 
subscribed to it from 1925 including the ruler, who also made a donation to support its 
publication. A number of other Kuwaitis aside from al-Rushaid also wrote for the 
newspaper.219 This marked the start of a close connection between Kuwait and al-Tahir that 
would influence the development of education in the 1930s.  
Al-Rushaid’s journalistic activity led him to establish the first local periodical in 
1928: the monthly al-Kuwait magazine. Ami Ayalon classes al-Kuwait with other 
contemporary publications in the Arabian Peninsula, stating: “in these places… primitive 
imported equipment was utilized to produce embryonic sheets that circulated locally among 
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a tiny minority of educated males and probably had a negligible impact.”220 In fact, al-
Kuwait was a substantial publication printed in Cairo’s Arab Press, operated by the 
prominent Arab nationalist literary figure Khayr al-Din al-Zarkali.221 Though its circulation 
was not large (600 at the beginning of its second year),222 like other Islamic modernist 
organs it was very transnational. The magazine had subscription agents in Bahrain, Dubai, 
Qatar, Zubair, Baghdad, Basra, Mecca, and Bombay.223 It published letters from readers in 
the Gulf states, Iraq, Egypt, Bombay, and Singapore.224 To encourage al-Kuwait, ruling 
family members and merchants gifted subscriptions to the magazine to various clubs, 
schools, and prominent persons across the Islamic world.225 A variety of journals including 
al-Manar, al-Shura, and Muhib al-Din al-Khatib’s al-Zahraʾ published reviews of the 
magazine.226  
Al-Kuwait sought to introduce Islamic modernist ideas to the Gulf while at the same 
time increasing awareness of the Gulf among Arab readers, thus fostering connections 
between the two. It published the views of modernist scholars such as Rida, al-Alusi, and 
Shakib Arsalan,227 and introduced its readers to organizations such as the Young Men’s 
Muslim Association.228 In addition, each issue carried a segment in which Arabic journals 
from Egypt to Indonesia were reviewed, and readers were encouraged to subscribe to them. 
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The majority of the other articles dealt with the culture, history, and literature of the Gulf, 
and authors from this region penned much of this material. This drew them into the Pan-
Arab reading community as active participants and interlocutors. Kuwait’s first experiment 
with homegrown journalism proved short-lived. In 1928, al-Rushaid left Kuwait for 
Bahrain. He continued to publish al-Kuwait from there for another year, subsequently 
migrating to Java.229  
 By the end of the 1920s, the shaykhdom’s once tenuous connections with the more 
developed Arab countries were rapidly expanding. The Islamic modernist movement that 
had emerged among a minority of Kuwaiti merchants in the lead-up to the First World War 
had become robust and influential. Furthermore, this movement was showing signs of a 
gradual transition from Islamic modernist Arabism to secular Arab nationalism, particularly 
among its younger elements. Aside from some anti-British activity during the war and the 
formation of the 1921 advisory council, the activities of this movement were primarily 
cultural, centering on education. It established the first schools modelled on the modern 
educational systems of the Arab countries, strengthening educational ties to these states. 
The development of education in Kuwait was part and parcel of a larger cultural movement 
inspired by increasing contact with the Arab world and characterized by clear political 
overtones. The association between modern education in and political ideology in Kuwait 
would become more apparent with the transition from cultural to political activism in the 
1930s, and as the modernization and “Arabization” of Kuwait’s schools accelerated. 
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Chapter Two: Arab Nationalist Connections  
and the Birth of State Education, 1930-1942 
 
 In the 1910s and 1920s, Kuwait’s merchants commenced a process of cultural 
reorientation away from their Indian Ocean trading partners towards the Arab lands of the 
north and west. This process unfolded in a number of ways: through interaction with the 
Arab press, the strengthening of ties with Arab thinkers and activists, and the establishment 
of novel institutions through which Islamic modernist merchants and ʿulamaʾ sought to 
mold their society in the image of the progressive Arab states. Modern education was the 
most significant and revolutionary of these avant-garde imports. It shaped the worldview of 
an increasing proportion of Kuwait’s youth, brought progressive and often politically-
minded Arabs to Kuwait as teachers, and allowed students to more easily venture abroad to 
study.  
 In the 1930s, this process of reorientation reached new heights. During this decade, 
the increasing integration of the Arab peoples combined with demographic changes, the 
influence of Iraq, and the reverberations of events in Palestine to propel Arab nationalism 
to the forefront of regional politics. These factors had an impact on Kuwait, and brought it 
closer into the Arab fold. The shaykhdom acquired its own Arab nationalist movement that 
launched a sustained campaign of support for the Palestinian cause. This led the merchant 
activists to develop close ties to Arab nationalist circles in Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and 
Lebanon, significantly broadening their regional cultural and political networks. 
The nationalist merchants also sought to implement their progressive ideals 
domestically. No longer content with voluntary charitable activity, they sought to use the 
resources of the state to bring about reform through the creation of elected administrative 
councils. In 1938, the merchants’ experience of activism and administration combined with 
their disaffection with the existing regime led them to launch the Majlis Movement. It 
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resulted in the establishment of the powerful Legislative Council, which succeeded in 
implementing a host of modernizing reforms before being quashed by the ruler and his 
allies. Nevertheless, the ruler retained most of the administrative reforms brought about by 
the Legislative Council and the administrative councils before it. These formed the 
institutional basis of the emerging Kuwaiti state.  
In 1936, the reformist merchants established the Educational Council. This 
institution took over the schools established by the Islamic modernists and brought them 
under government control. This marked a turning point in the development of education in 
Kuwait, after which the extent of its modernization and “Arabization” would increase 
greatly. Several factors would lead to the rise of Arab nationalist influence in Kuwait’s 
nascent educational system. Firstly, many of the merchant members of the Educational 
Council were committed Arab nationalists for whom educational reform and political 
activism were closely associated. They drew upon their Pan-Arab networks to employ 
teachers to oversee Kuwait’s schools. This resulted in the arrival in 1936 of a deputation of 
teachers from Palestine’s Supreme Muslim Council. Palestinian administration of education 
in Kuwait, which continued until 1942, was the second factor behind the spread of Arab 
nationalist influence. It was the Palestinian teachers who brought about the third factor: the 
implementation of Iraq’s Arab nationalist curriculum in Kuwait.  
 Throughout this period, the “Arabization” of education in Kuwait, along with a new 
wave of scholarships that began in 1938, allowed growing numbers of Kuwaiti students to 
study in Arab countries. Here, they became drawn into pan-Arab cultural networks, and 
came to identify with Arab nationalism and the values of the effendiyya. Already by the late 
1930s, there existed a sufficient number of educated Kuwaitis or “proto-effendiyya” to have 
a local political impact.  
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Nationalism & Education in the Arab World 
 
 Educational institutions in Iraq and the Levant played a foundational role in the 
organizational and ideological development of Arab nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s. 
This can be attributed to several factors, namely: the educational legacy of the Islamic 
modernist movement, the influence of the Iraqi educational system, and the relatively 
liberal educational policy in the Arab Mandates. Education in Iraq provides a classic 
illustration of the top-down imposition of nationalist ideology, though the regional scope of 
its nation-building project sets it apart from the European model it emulated. In the other 
Mandates, colonial control over education was more strict, so Arab nationalist influence 
was disseminated in a grassroots manner by educators-cum-activists. Finally, the rise of 
nationalist influence within Arab educational systems coincided with the expansion of the 
effendiyya stratum. The nationalist environment within state educational systems shaped 
this new generation of effendiyya, which pioneered more radical forms of nationalist 
activism. The role of education in the fostering of nationalism in the Arab world can thus 
only be explained with reference to all three broad theoretical approaches previously 
discussed, namely: top-down, grassroots, and indirect.  
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the Islamic modernist movement was heavily 
involved in the development of modern education in the Arab world during the Ottoman 
period. As many Islamic modernists gradually adopted Arab nationalist ideology in the 
wake of the First World War, the educational institutions they oversaw were affected by 
this ideological shift. This applied particularly to schools that evaded direct control by the 
colonial authorities and were therefore able to maintain control over their curriculums. 
Examples include the influential Rawdat al-Maʿarif in Jerusalem and the Najah School in 
Nablus. Founded respectively in 1906 and 1918 as private Islamic modernist and Arabist 
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initiatives, these schools became strongholds of Arab nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Rather than submit to colonial control, they came to be administered by the semi-
governmental Supreme Muslim Council.1 Another example is the school network operated 
by Lebanon’s Jamʿiyyat al-Maqasid al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya (Islamic Society of 
Benevolent Intentions), which was established in the late nineteenth century and became 
associated with Arab nationalism in the colonial and post-independence periods.2 It will be 
argued that Kuwait’s schools were similar to the above in that Arab nationalist influence 
gradually came to eclipse that of Islamic modernism. 
 The second and perhaps most influential factor in forging a link between education 
and Arab nationalism was Iraq’s creation of an educational system centered upon the goal 
of Arab nationalist indoctrination. This policy was closely tied to the emergence of Iraq as 
a regional patron of Arab nationalism. Following the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans, 
Faisal bin Husain’s short-lived Arab Kingdom of Syria provided a focal point for Arab 
nationalists from across the region. 3  Faisal’s ouster by the French and subsequent 
installment as King of Iraq in 1921 caused this focal point to shift to Baghdad. The king 
aspired to regain his Syrian throne and extend his influence to other Arab lands, enlisting 
the support of nationalist activists. As a result, “the Iraqi capital became the center of a 
wide network of radical Arab nationalists,”4 many of whom looked upon Iraq as a 																																																								
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Piedmont or Prussia that could unite the various Arab states.5 Iraq’s independence in 1932 
enabled Faisal to “pursue, much more vigorously than in the past, his policy of Arab 
unity.”6  
 One of the areas in which the Iraqi government’s pan-Arab policy was most evident 
was in education. This was largely due to the efforts of Satiʿ al-Husri, who was arguably 
the earliest secular Arab nationalist thinker and the most influential of his generation.7 As 
Iraq’s first Director General of Education (1921-1927), he laid the foundation of the 
country’s educational system. He subsequently served in other senior educational and 
cultural posts until 1941.8  Al-Husri’s ideology of nationalist pedagogy was shaped by both 
the French educational model and German romantic nationalism, which held that “language 
and history are the two most important components of nationhood.”9 Although he saw the 
Arab nation as natural and perennial, he held that national awareness must be actively 
fostered.10 French-style education, “with its emphasis on language and national history to 
the exclusion of practical subjects,” was the ideal vehicle by which to spread this 
awareness.11  
 The Iraqi curriculum created by al-Husri closely followed the French model. 
History was made “the core of national education,”12 and was intended to “increase faith in 
the desirability and possibility of unity” through a selective reading of the past that 
highlighted the glories of the Arab nation. The history of nationalism in Europe was also 
taught as an example for the Arabs to follow.13 The “second element in al-Husri’s 																																																								
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nationalist philosophy” was instruction in Arabic language, the Arab nation’s lifeblood. 
Other “national subjects” such as geography, civics, and “physical education in the form of 
military drill” completed the students’ indoctrination.14 
 The educational system engineered by al-Husri, and perpetuated by his successors 
until 1941, also complemented the militaristic agenda pursued by the Iraqi government. Al-
Husri saw compulsory military conscription as an essential “adjunct to civil education” in 
the nation-building process.15 The introduction of conscription became a nationalist cause 
in Iraq, reflecting the growing prestige of the army, and was finally implemented despite 
British objections in 1934.16 King Faisal extended this militaristic ethos to the schools by 
instating paramilitary training for pupils. Al-Husri enthusiastically subscribed to this trend, 
supporting the development of the Boy Scouts, which he imbued with Arab nationalist 
symbolism, and the Futuwwa.17  The latter was a state-run paramilitary youth group 
established in the early 1930s that emulated the “imagery” of fascist youth groups in 
Europe.18 By the end of the 1930s, the Futuwwa had a system of military-style ranks and 
insignia, and both students and educators had to wear its uniform at all times.19  
 While the Iraqi case closely resembles the European model of top-down 
dissemination of nationalist ideology through centralized state education, it differs in one 
crucial respect: its nation-building project was not limited to Iraqi territory. As Reeva 
Simon points out, “Iraq’s ‘imagined community’ was that of the Arabs, rather than Iraqis or 
Mesopotamians.”20 Through the hosting of Arab teachers and students, the export of 
textbooks and curricula, and intergovernmental cooperation, the Iraqi educational system 																																																								
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spread Arab nationalist ideology throughout the Arab world. 
 Iraq’s Ministry of Education employed numerous nationalist intellectuals from 
across the region who did much to foster an Arab nationalist environment within the 
institution. Al-Husri and his successors made the employment of non-Iraqi Arabs a matter 
of policy due to the initial lack of qualified locals, and presumably also as a means by 
which to promote Arab nationalism. Prominent nationalists who worked for the ministry 
include the Palestinians Darwish al-Miqdadi and Akram Zuʿaitir, the Lebanese Anis al-
Nusuli, the Syrian ʿUthman al-Hawrani, and the Egyptian Mustafa al-Wakil.21 The ministry 
also adopted history textbooks authored by some of these men, as well as by Arab 
educators outside Iraq. Ernest Dawn argues that these works played a formative role in 
articulating Arab nationalist ideology.22 As well as harboring teachers, Iraq also provided 
scholarships to students from across the Arab world.23  
 As those who had worked or studied in Iraq returned to their countries or were 
employed elsewhere they spread its curriculum and style of nationalist pedagogy. In the 
words of Israel Gershoni, the Iraqi educational system “exported the revolution 
happenstantially.”24 Al-Husri also instated a policy of cultivating educational ties with 
other Arab states. Coordination with Egypt became particularly strong after a 1935 
agreement for the secondment of prominent Egyptian academics to Iraq. Gershoni and 
Jankowski cite educational exchange between Iraq and Egypt as a contributing factor to the 
rise of Arab nationalism in the latter during the 1930s.25 In this fashion, the influence of al-
Husri’s model of nationalist education extended far beyond the borders of Iraq. 																																																								
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 Al-Husri and other likeminded Arab educators were able to implement their 
nationalist agendas in the educational field due to a third factor: the Mandatory powers’ 
relatively hands-off policy towards the educational systems in Iraq, Palestine, and Syria. It 
is doubtful whether al-Husri could have realized many of his plans had the Mandatory 
government not relinquished control of Iraqi education in 1923, after which British advisers 
could only make nonbinding suggestions.26 A 1931 British report “mentions that in the 
substitution of Iraqi for British control, the Ministry of Education was ahead of all other 
departments.”27 Similar situations prevailed in Palestine and Syria. In comparison to Iraq, 
the British and the French exercised much greater control over education in these states, 
though here too they appear to have lacked the ability or motivation to curb the nationalist 
activism of educators. As in Iraq, the Palestinian and Syrian government educational 
institutions became major centers for Arab nationalist indoctrination, albeit without high-
level official support.28 
 Yoram Kahati attempts to account for the exceptional character of educational 
institutions under the Mandatory regimes. He argues that the colonial powers saw 
ministries of education as safe, apolitical zones where they could “prepare the new cadre of 
local civil servants who would learn to run their future state machinery.” Arabs hence 
became a numerical majority within these institutions, and represented the most educated 
and westernized elements in their societies. Drawing on Smith’s theory of the intelligentsia, 
Kahati holds that these employees became radicalized as the colonial authorities blocked 
their occupational advancement. They therefore formulated an oppositional nationalist 
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ideology. With the political arena closed to them, they relied upon the educational system 
to disseminate their ideas. Furthermore, the Mandatory authorities were not able to 
effectively counter the nationalists’ influence due to their “liberal-democratic approach to 
education” and reliance upon Arab staff.29  
 Harte provides a detailed account of the emergence of the Arab nationalist current 
within the educational system of Mandatory Palestine. The British Mandate’s Department 
of Education was “rigidly centralised” and excluded Palestinian Arabs from 
policymaking.30 However, the dominance of Arabs over the lower rungs of the educational 
hierarchy enabled them to transform Palestinian schools into “seminaries of Arab 
nationalism.”31 Since the medium of instruction was Arabic, Arab educators had significant 
leeway in the interpretation of British-imposed curricula and the translation and authoring 
of textbooks. Furthermore, nationalist teachers were able propagate their ideology through 
informal education and extracurricular activities.32  
 In contrast to Iraq’s top-down model, the Palestinian and Syrian cases highlight the 
role of grassroots dynamics in fostering Arab nationalist identification within educational 
systems. One explanation for this is provided by Anderson’s aforementioned portrayal of 
schools as sites of  “secular pilgrimages,” where people of diverse origins intermingle and 
form a common identity through a shared foundational experience. Hilary Falb Kalisman 
applies this concept to the experience of students from the Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan 
Mandates sent on scholarship to the AUB. Here, they intermingled with other Arab 
students, and “joined the same clubs, sang the same songs, kicked the same footballs and 
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participated in the same demonstrations.”33 As a result, they “forged a community and 
conception of national belonging across the proto-national boundaries of the Mandates.”34  
 In her study of the Arab nationalist movement in Jordan, Betty Anderson depicts 
similar “pilgrimages,” albeit occurring on two levels. The first is that of the Jordanian state, 
whose educational system was designed to cultivate a territorial identity. However, factors 
such as a dependence upon textbooks from other Arab states meant that “the 
interconnectedness of Arab history, language, and ethnicity” was simultaneously impressed 
upon students. Due to the lack of local facilities, students wishing to pursue higher 
education had to do so in Lebanon, Syria, or Egypt, where they undertook broader, pan-
Arab pilgrimages.35 Anderson argues that the dual nature of these pilgrimages was a factor 
in producing “competing territorial and Arab nationalisms” in Jordan.36 
 The interpersonal networks forged through “pilgrimages” often formed the basis for 
regional cooperation in education and Arab nationalist activism. Kalisman points out that 
scholarship recipients who graduated from the AUB 
played key roles in the formation of school systems, the composition of textbooks 
used throughout the Arabic speaking world, and the promotion of… a broad notion 
of pan-Arabism. An AUB degree guaranteed employability in the Arabic speaking 
world, allowing graduates to move freely from one Mandate to another and to rise 
through the ranks of each government’s bureaucracy.37 
 
Kahati similarly maintains that the Arab “educator-intellectuals” who came to dominate 
education under the Mandates “became the most important and influential group in the” 
Arab world, and organized themselves into a transnational “network of societies and clubs” 
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spanning the region.38  
 Many of the Arab nationalist organizations that were established throughout the 
region starting in the 1930s were founded on the basis of educational networks, whether 
local or transnational. Teachers and students at the Najah School, under the direction of the 
Arab nationalist educator Muhammad ʿIzzat Darwaza, played a leading role in the 
foundation of Palestine’s Hizb al-Istiqlal al-ʿArabi (the Arab Independence Party) in 
1932.39 Students and academics at Egyptian universities, many of them from other Arab 
countries, founded some of Egypt’s first Arab nationalist societies in the early 1930s.40  
 Educational networks were also fundamental to Baghdad’s Muthanna Club, which 
became one of the primary “foci for Iraqi pan-Arab activity” after its founding in 1935.41 
According to Cleveland, the club was initially founded as the Iraqi branch of the short-lived 
Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqafa al-ʿArabiyya (the Committee for the Spread of Arab Culture), 
formed by Egyptian and Iraqi academics “in 1931 to coordinate Arab cultural activities 
between Baghdad and Cairo.”42 The membership of the Muthanna Club was comprised 
primarily of teachers, students, and graduates. Prominent “educator-intellectuals” such al-
Husri and al-Miqdadi used it as a key outlet for the propagation of their views.43 
 One of the most prominent examples of an Arab nationalist political group that 
relied heavily on educational networks is the transnational secret society informally known 
as Jamaʿat al-Kitab al-Ahmar (the Red Book Group). A detailed discussion of this group’s 
formation is warranted both for its illustrative value and its centrality to the Arab nationalist 
networks within the Kuwaiti Department of Education.  In 1935, a group of Beirut-based 																																																								
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activists weary of local party politics sought to form a movement that would be truly pan-
Arab in its outlook, goals, and scope. They joined with Qustantin Zuraiq, history professor 
at the AUB, who became the group’s leader. 44  Owing to its extreme secrecy, the 
organization had no official name, deriving its appellation from the red colored books in 
which its program was printed.45 It is referred to elsewhere in the academic literature as the 
Arab Liberation Society46 and the Arab Nationalist Party.47 The group’s goals were to fight 
colonialism, undertake social reform, and establish a secular, federated Arab state.   
 The Red Book Group was an elitist organization that recruited only educated 
members, so it naturally included many students and teachers..48 Schools and universities 
were among the group’s main centers for recruitment and organization. The group’s main 
center in Beirut was the AUB, where Zuraiq influenced students from across the Arab 
world through his lectures on Arab nationalism. He was also advisor to the student group 
al-ʿUrwa al-Wuthqa (the Firmest Bond, a Qurʾanic term), which became a front for the 
group’s activities at the university. Another of the group’s leaders, Taqi al-Din al-Sulh, was 
a teacher at Beirut’s Grand Lycée Franco-Libanais, which also became a recruitment 
center.49   
 Educational networks served as one of the key channels for the Red Book Group’s 
extension beyond the borders of Lebanon. In 1935, Farid Zain al-Din, a Lebanese Red 
Book Group member and AUB graduate, became headmaster of the Najah School in 
Nablus. Not long after, he established a branch of the group in Palestine in conjunction with 																																																								
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fellow teachers and AUB alumni, with the Najah School as its main base of operations.50 In 
the 1930s, the Red Book Group gradually built up a presence in Iraq as a number of its 
Levantine members were employed as teachers in the government schools. Most prominent 
among these was the Palestinian Darwish al-Miqdadi. The first attempt to establish a 
formal branch in Iraq was made in 1939, when a delegation from the AUB’s al-ʿUrwa al-
Wuthqa student group visited the country at the invitation of the Iraqi Ministry of 
Education.51  Once established, the Iraqi branch quickly infiltrated and took over the 
Muthanna Club, a natural target given its popularity with teachers, students, and the 
educated.52 As shall be seen, the Red Book Group eventually established a branch in 
Kuwait, connecting the shaykhdom to Arab nationalist networks that would influence its 
educational system. Educational networks would again prove central in the emergence of 
the new wave of Arab nationalist organizations that emerged in the post-1948 period, as 
shall be seen later in the case of the Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN). 
 The rise of Arab nationalist influence within the educational systems of many Arab 
states coincided with another development: the expansion of the effendiyya stratum 
throughout the region. The decade of the 1930s was a watershed in this process, 
particularly in Iraq, Egypt, and Syria. This was in large part due to the expansion of state 
education, along with other factors such as rapid urbanization and the growth of 
bureaucracies and certain professions.53 As the product of state educational systems, the 
new generation of effendiyya was shaped by the increasingly Arab nationalist mood within 
them. Coupled with social and generational shifts, this made the members of this stratum 
more prone to radical nationalist activism. It is noteworthy that the 1930s witnessed the 
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formation of more extreme, youth-based nationalist groups throughout the region such as 
Palestine’s Istiqlal Party, ʿIsbat al-ʿAmal al-Qawmi (the League of Nationalist Action) in 
Syria and Lebanon, the Red Book Group, and Baghdad’s Muthanna Club.54 
 Peter Wien illustrates the influence of state education on the expanding effendiyya 
stratum in his discussion of Iraq’s “Young Effendiyya,” a subgroup that emerged in the 
1930s. Its members were the first to pass through Iraq’s nationalist educational system. 
They represented a more diverse demographic than the Ottoman-era effendiyya, and 
became disillusioned with the Iraqi political system and continued British occupation.55 
These factors “produced an inclination to authoritarian, totalitarian, and even fascist models 
of society organization” within the “Young Effendiyya,” pitting them against the more 
moderate Arab nationalist elite.56 Gershoni and Jankowski demonstrate that a similar 
process occurred even in Egypt, where state education encouraged a Westernized territorial 
nationalism opposed to Arab identity. The “new effendiyya” that emerged in the 1930s was 
“not as thoroughly Westernized and more attuned to Egypt’s Arab-Muslim heritage” due to 
its largely middle class profile and recent rural origin. The members of this group were 
therefore inclined towards “supra-Egyptian” forms of identity, most prominently Arab 
nationalism and Islamism, which came to eclipse the previously dominant Egyptian 
nationalism.57 
 The relationship between the effendiyya and educational systems was reciprocal, as 
the effendiyya produced by these systems were then employed within them, strengthening 
their nationalist character. As has already been stated, Kahati argues that Arab civil 
servants in Mandatory governments were most likely to work in educational departments. 
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The indirect, social effects of education were thus intimately tied to the top-down and 
grassroots modes of disseminating Arab nationalist ideology within educational systems.  
 The strong connection between Arab nationalist ideology and educational systems 
in the 1920s and 1930s was thus the result of multiple, interconnected processes that 
traversed the various states of the Arab world. It was within this highly transnational, 
multifaceted context that state education emerged in Kuwait. Beginning in 1936, a 
combination of Iraqi influence and activists with ties to regional networks led to the spread 
of Arab nationalist influence within the shaykhdom’s nascent educational system. This was 
the result of the increasing economic, political, and cultural integration of Kuwait into the 
Arab world, which reached a high point in the 1930s. One of the most significant effects of 
this integration was the emergence of an indigenous, merchant-based Arab nationalist 
movement. It will be argued that this movement was inextricably linked to the evolution of 
education in the shaykhdom, and therefore warrants an in-depth discussion.   
The Pan-Arab Connections of Kuwait’s Merchant Opposition, 1931-1940 
 
 It is unclear precisely when organized Arab nationalist activism first emerged in 
Kuwait. As stated in the previous chapter, there is evidence that a few Kuwaitis espoused 
Arab nationalist ideology around the time of the First World War. A further development in 
this direction was the emergence of Arab-oriented, secular (but not necessarily nationalist) 
inclinations among certain youth in the 1920s, which found expression in the Literary Club. 
It appears that a shift towards more organized activism occurred in the early 1930s, with 
the appearance of a group known as al-Shabiba al-Kuwaitiyya (the Kuwaiti Youth).  
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The Shabiba group is largely overlooked in existing literature, which tends to date 
the rise of Arab nationalism in Kuwait to the latter half of the 1930s.58 Its origins lie in the 
new wave of radical Arab nationalism emanating from neighboring Iraq, though it soon 
shifted its focus towards the Palestinian cause. With the eruption of the Arab Revolt in 
Palestine in 1936, the tenor of pro-Palestinian activism in Kuwait increased. It became a 
major factor in the mobilization of Kuwait’s merchants, contributing directly to the 
emergence of the Majlis Movement in 1938. Through this activism, Kuwait’s merchants 
strengthened their ties to nationalist circles in Iraq and the Levant, a development that led 
to the creation of a Kuwaiti branch of the transnational Red Book Group by the end of the 
decade.  
 The intensification of Kuwait’s ties to Iraq, Palestine, and the Levant occurred at a 
time of increasing physical and intellectual interconnection in the Arab world, which 
played a fundamental role in the growth of Arab nationalism. In the 1920s and 1930s, 
significant developments occurred in regional transport and communication that “helped to 
create a shared world of taste and ideas” among the Arabs.59 In the field of transport, “the 
most spectacular change was the conquest of the desert by the motor car.” A new network 
of roads spanning the Fertile Crescent emerged in the 1920s, reducing travel time between 
Iraq and Syria from a month to less than a day. Improved transportation in turn facilitated 
the distribution of periodicals and books, whose production increased during this period.60 
With the launch of the first official Arabic-language radio station in Egypt in 1934, there 
appeared a new medium that “[unified] the countries of the region even further in terms of 																																																								
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communications, as it could traverse boundaries more readily than written texts.”61 As 
Anderson notes, radio has played a similar role to print in the forging of imagined 
communities, with the added advantage that it has allowed the illiterate masses to be 
incorporated.62 The expansion of the media created “a universe of discourse which united 
educated Arabs more fully than the pilgrimage and the travels of scholars in search of 
learning had been able to do.”63 
 Kuwait was no exception to the revolution in transportation and communications 
sweeping the region. The opening of the Kuwait-Zubair motor route in 1928 and its role in 
vastly reducing travel and mail time have already been discussed in the first chapter, as has 
the increase in newspaper consumption in the shaykhdom during the 1920s. Kuwait’s 
exposure to Arab media increased greatly in the subsequent decade. The burgeoning Iraqi 
press was particularly influential. In 1935, the British Political Agent reported: “Nearly all 
the Iraq Newspapers are received here and are read with avidity.”64 The promotional 
activity of various Arab periodicals in Kuwait provides an indication of the expanding 
Kuwaiti readership. In 1931, a Syrian editor of several Arab nationalist periodicals made 
the first of three visits to the shaykhdom over the course of the 1930s in order to collect 
subscriptions.65 In 1937, free copies of an anti-British Egyptian newspaper were distributed 
in Kuwait in an effort to attract readers. This publication gave prominent coverage to events 
in Arabia,66 a tendency that the British observed in “the Arab Press as a whole” by the end 
of the decade.67 As shall be seen, the emerging interest in Arabian affairs within the Arab 
press led it to give prominent coverage and support to Kuwait’s Majlis Movement in 1938.  																																																								
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 The Kuwaitis were also quick to adopt the novel medium of the radio, which became 
very influential in cultivating Arab nationalist opinion. Shortly after the beginning of 
Arabic broadcasting in 1934, Shaykh Ahmad al-Jabir was given a radio set by the Kuwait 
Oil Company.68 Almost instantly, the owning of radios became very fashionable among 
Kuwaiti merchants.69 Popular cafes soon made this medium available to the common man, 
and in 1939 the Political Agent attributed a recent rise in political awareness among 
Kuwaiti sailors to “the radios which they hear in the coffee-shops.”70 As with the Arab 
press, radio would have a direct impact on political events in Kuwait in 1938. 
The Iraqi Connection 
 
 It is unsurprising that the spark of Arab nationalist activism in Kuwait was ignited 
from neighboring Iraq, where a more assertive Arab nationalist agenda was taking hold in 
the 1930s. Faisal’s pan-Arab expansionist policy was intensified under his successor Ghazi 
(1933-1939), who was more radical in his nationalism and closely aligned with the 
military.71 Parties such as Hizb al-Ikhaʾ al-Watani (Party of Patriotic Brotherhood), which 
espoused extreme Arab nationalism and militarism, also contributed to this environment. 
Despite its official alliance with Britain, Iraq “increasingly became a center for pan-Arab 
anti-British activity,” particularly after the Arab Revolt erupted in Palestine in 1936.72  
With its small size, backward government, historical ties to Basra, and access to the 
sea, Kuwait no doubt appeared a good starting point for Iraq’s project of Pan-Arab 
unification. Some in Baghdad also saw annexation as a solution to the longstanding 
problem of smuggling from Kuwait into Iraq, an issue that marred relations between the 																																																								
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two states in the 1920s and 1930s.73 According to Saeed Khalil Hashim, the first official 
Iraqi statement advocating unity with Kuwait was made in the al-Ikhaʾ Party’s newspaper 
in 1933, at a time when that party was in power.74 Over the following two years numerous 
articles advocating unity or annexation appeared in the Iraqi press, in addition to 
sympathetic Syrian and Palestinian publications. By 1935 these articles became so frequent 
that the British suspected the Iraqi “Ministry of Propaganda” of organizing them.75 This 
media campaign climaxed between 1938 and 1939 in association with the activities of the 
Majlis Movement in Kuwait.  
Despite political tensions, commercial ties between Kuwait and Iraq continued to 
flourish in the post-Ottoman period, allowing for the diffusion of Iraqi political influence 
among Kuwaiti merchants. Date plantations remained a key economic concern for both the 
Al Sabah and merchant families. In 1938 the Political Agent reported that “about 35 
Kuwait families have date-gardens of some size in ‘Iraq.”76 The most prominent of these 
were the Al Saqr, popularly known as the “Date Kings.”77 It will be remembered that the 
patriarch of this family, Hamad, headed the 1921 advisory council and became leader of the 
merchant opposition. Following his death in 1930, his son ʿAbd Allah inherited the mantle 
of leadership.78 Under ʿAbd Allah’s direction, the merchant opposition movement adopted 
a markedly Arab nationalist, pro-Iraqi orientation. Alongside the traditional date industry 
there also emerged new joint business ventures such as the aforementioned Kuwait-Iraq 
Motor Transport Company and the Kuwait-Iraq Electric Supply Company. The latter was 
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established in 1933 and directed by the Kuwaiti merchant and Islamic modernist activist 
Sultan al-Kulaib.79  
 As in the Ottoman period, Kuwaiti merchants travelled frequently to Basra or 
resided there for long periods, rendering them susceptible to ideological influence. As early 
as 1930, the British Political Agent in Kuwait warned of “the ever filtering in ‘Nationalist’ 
poison from ‘Iraq.” He believed that 
Important Basrawis who come down on visits, or who own property in Kuwait, are 
by order actively engaging themselves in anti-British propaganda as well as 
preaching the doctrine of the amalgamation of Kuwait with ‘Iraq. Similar preaching 
goes on in Basrah… among the big Kuwait business men and date garden owners.80 
 
Among the alleged disseminators of this propaganda was the prominent businessman 
Hamid al-Naqib, who featured in the previous chapter.81 A brother of Talib al-Naqib and an 
itinerant resident of both Kuwait and Basra, he served as a deputy in the Iraqi parliament 
and reportedly wanted “to see Kuwait absorbed into Iraq.”82 The Political Agent also 
accused “the rising generation of Kuwaitis brought up in Basrah,” i.e. sons of merchants 
and students, of engaging in this pro-Iraqi, Arab nationalist propaganda.83  
The first hint of the existence of organized Arab nationalist activism in Kuwait 
dates to 1931. In his annual report for that year, the British Political Agent made the first 
documented reference to “the ‘Shabiba’ or ‘Youths’ Party’ in Kuwait, a newly formed 
group which imbibes the Political views of some of the Iraq extremists.” In January, the 
group presented a petition to Shaykh Ahmad objecting to anti-Islamic preaching by an Arab 
member of the American Reform Church mission. The ruler reacted in a hostile manner and 
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warned the youth against future troublemaking.84 The missionaries’ account adds that the 
“Young Men of Kuwait” organized a boycott of their bible shop and school, and 
established “an all-Islamic, all-English day and night school” with a former student of the 
missionary school as teacher. The report adds that the “Arab school… flourished for a few 
months,” and “there was much talk about an Iraqi or Syrian teacher for the future.” 
However, the venture eventually failed due to internal disagreements.85 
It is telling that the first incidence of organized Arab nationalist activism in Kuwait 
was to large extent concerned with education. The “Shabiba” group’s opposition to the 
missionaries may be indicative of the continued influence of Islamic modernism, though 
even secular Arab nationalists during this period had reason to oppose missionary activity. 
Darwish al-Miqdadi, for example, argued that Western missionaries were an extension of 
colonialism, and served to distance Arabs from their cultural heritage and weaken their 
national sentiment.86  
The influence of Iraqi Arab nationalism, highlighted by the Political Agent, was no 
doubt the primary impetus behind the emergence of al-Shabiba al-Kuwaitiyya. A number of 
new youth groups were established in Iraq during the late 1920s and early 1930s, and it is 
thus understandable that this phenomenon would extend to Kuwait during this time.87 A 
reference to a similarly named group in Basra, Nadi al-Shabiba al-ʿIraqiyya (Iraqi Youths’ 
Club), appears in al-Kuwait in the summer of 1929.88 One of the most significant of these 
youth groups was Jamʿiyyat al-Jawwal al-ʿArabi (the Arab Rover Society). This fervently 
Arab nationalist, militaristic scouting organization was founded in the early 1930s 
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following the merger of two student groups. Most of the society’s founders and leaders 
were teachers, including the prominent Palestinian educator Darwish al-Miqdadi.89  
A former member of the Arab Rover Society recalls participating in a trip organized 
by some teachers (including al-Miqdadi) to Kuwait, Bahrain, and Muhammara in 1933.90 
The British records corroborate this information. In March 1933, a group of Boy Scouts 
and six teachers were allowed to visit Kuwait, even though the ruler and Political Agent 
suspected that the “object of… [their] visit to Kuwait is for anti-British or pan-Arab 
propaganda.”91 The Political Agent added: “just now there seems to be a recrudescence of 
the movement here, (emanating from Iraq, I think) to discredit the British and forward the 
pan Arab idea.”92 The troop spent two days in Kuwait “without untoward incident.”93 
An occurrence in August 1933 points to the existence of coordination between the 
nationalist activists in Kuwait and Iraq. During the conflict between the Iraqi army and 
Assyrian separatists, pamphlets attacking the Assyrians and the British were anonymously 
distributed in Kuwait’s suq.94 The conflict had no direct bearing on the shaykhdom but was 
wildly popular among Iraq’s Arab nationalists,95 suggesting that those who distributed the 
pamphlets in Kuwait adhered to this ideology. It is possible that they were members of al-
Shabiba al-Kuwaitiyya. 
The Palestinian Connection 
 
The activism of al-Shabiba al-Kuwaitiyya quickly came to focus on the Palestinian 
issue, which became an important “factor in the internal political development of Kuwait” 
																																																								
89 Fadil Husain, “Jamʿiyyat al-Jawwal: Fasl min Tarikh al-Qawmiyya al-ʿArabiyya fi al-ʿIraq al-Muʿasir,” 
Majallat Kulliyat al-Adab 33, no. 2 (Dec 1982), 246-249. 
90 Ibid., 282. 
91 IOR/R/15/5/126: Dickson to PR, 16/3/1933.   
92 IOR/R/15/5/126: Dickson to Special Service Officer, 16/3/1933.   
93 IOR/R/15/5/126: Dickson to PR, 28/3/1933.   
94 IOR/L/P&S/12/3757: Dickson to PR, 26/8/1933. 
95 Simon, Iraq Between, 112-113. 
 108	
over the coming years.96 At this time, the Palestinian issue was emerging as a rallying point 
for Arab nationalist opinion. Amin al-Husaini, Mufti of Jerusalem and President of the 
Supreme Muslim Council (SMC), began to appeal to Arab and Muslim countries in the 
1920s in order to counter the international support received by the Zionists.97 An early 
manifestation of this policy, discussed in the previous chapter, was the SMC’s sending of 
fundraising delegations to various countries including Kuwait in 1924.  
In November of 1933, the “’Shabibat Al Kuwaitiyeh’ (Youngmen of Kuwait)” sent 
a letter to the Political Agent. It expressed “sharp protest against His Majesty’s 
Government’s methods towards our brothers, the Arabs of Palestine,” and warned the 
British that they would incur the ill will of all Arabs and Muslims.98 The al-Shabiba group 
appears to have had a close relation with prominent notables, including both Islamic 
modernists and Arab nationalists. In early 1934, “some of the leading merchants and the 
‘shabeebat’ (youngmen) of Kuwait” held a fundraiser for “the ‘Distressed’ of Palestine” at 
the residence of the longtime Arab nationalist merchant ʿAbd al-Rahman Khalaf al-Naqib. 
The event angered Shaykh Ahmad, who had not been told about it, prompting him to order 
the return of the 2,500 rupees collected.99  
 In 1936 the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in Palestine shook the Arab world, leading 
to the intensification of pro-Palestinian, Arab nationalist activism in Kuwait. As Porath 
argues, “the effect of the developments in Palestine during the 1936-9 years stands as 
perhaps the single most important factor which contributed to the growth of Pan-Arab 
ideology.”100 The Palestinians formed the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) to lead the 
revolt, and elected Amin al-Husaini as its president. The committee requested support from 																																																								
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various Arab rulers, including the Shaykh of Kuwait. Zahlan explains that unlike other Gulf 
states, Britain’s treaty “with Kuwait… did not restrict the ruler there from corresponding 
with other powers.” This allowed Shaykh Ahmad to communicate freely with the 
Palestinian leadership.101  
 The Kuwaiti ruler, however, was at first not an enthusiastic supporter of the 
Palestinian cause, and it took the pressure of the merchant opposition to goad him into 
action. The campaign of the merchants was such that Kuwait became “the most active 
place” in the Gulf in supporting the Arab Revolt.102 Zahlan correctly attributes this to the 
merchants’ intensified connections to the Arab world. However, she portrays this as a new 
development that occurred in the 1930s, and appears unaware of the long history of 
interaction with Palestinian activists such as Amin al-Husaini and Muhammad ʿAli al-Tahir 
dating back to the 1920s.103  Both these figures continued to serve as key points of contact 
with the Kuwaitis, demonstrating the continuity and overlap between the Arab nationalist 
and Islamic modernist networks.  
In June of 1936, the Kuwaiti ruler received the first of many cables from the 
Palestinian leadership. Shaykh Ahmad turned down the appeal for funds,104 and prohibited 
his subjects from engaging in public subscriptions in support of the revolt. Nonetheless, a 
Basra newspaper announced in July that it had raised 200 Iraqi dinars in donations from 
Kuwait.105 In the same month, the AHC issued further appeals for assistance to the shaykh, 
who took no action.106 Amin al-Husaini again cabled the ruler in September inquiring if he 
would participate in mediating between the Palestinians and the British, to which “he 
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replied politely in non-committal sense.”  The Political Agent noted, however, that there 
was “much strong feeling and… sympathy” towards the Palestinians in Kuwait.107  
 In October, the merchants openly acted upon this “strong feeling,” flouting Shaykh 
Ahmad’s restrictions by forming a fundraising committee for Palestine. Its members were a 
mix of old and venerable notables and more youthful merchants: Yusuf bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi, 
Ahmad al-Humaiḍi, Muhammad Thunayyan al-Ghanim, ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Bahar, Sayyid 
ʿAli bin Sayyid Sulaiman al-Rifaʿi, and Muhammad Ahmad al-Ghanim. The committee 
convened a meeting of 150 people in which speeches were delivered. 7500 rupees were 
raised, and Iraqi lottery tickets for the assistance of the Palestinians were also sold. A 
daughter of the late opposition leader Hamad al-Saqr even donated a building she owned in 
the town suq.108 The Political Resident observed that the “Sheikh, who would have incurred 
serious odium had he tried to interfere, left for hunting shortly before the meeting.”109 
 Kuwaiti enthusiasm for the Palestinian cause was no doubt further stoked by the 
visit in December 1936 of a four-man AHC delegation, en route from Iraq to Riyadh. It was 
led by the prominent Arab nationalist Muhammad ʿIzzat Darwaza. During their three-day 
stay, the men met with the ruler, who expressed his sympathy for the Palestinian cause 
according to Darwaza. They also met with Kuwaiti notables and youth, whom Darwaza 
recalls “displayed intelligence and knowledge of letters and poetry,” and visited the 
Mubarakiyya School.110 
In July of 1937, the merchants resumed their campaign by sending telegrams to the 
League of Nations and British government protesting the Peel Commission’s 
recommendation to partition Palestine. According to the Political Agent, the telegrams were 																																																								
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signed by “Ash Shubab Al-Kuwait - the youth of Kuwait.”111 Both Zahlan and Al-Mdairis 
render this grammatically incorrect name as “Shabab al-Kuwait,” though it is safe to 
assume that it was in fact “al-Shabiba al-Kuwaitiyya.” Both authors appear to be unaware 
of the earlier activism carried out under this name.112 The twelve subscribers to the 
telegram included the members of the 1936 committee with the exception of Muhammad 
Ahmad al-Ghanim. They were joined by Sulaiman al-ʿAdsani, ʿAbd Allah al-Saqr, ʿAbd 
al-Muhsin al-Khrafi, Khalifa Shahin al-Ghanim, Ahmad al-Ghanim, Khalid al-Zaid, and 
Mashʿan al-Khudair. Again, the Political Agent observes that the ruler knew of the 
telegrams but chose not to intervene.113 
When the ruler received yet another appeal for help from the AHC in August, a 
deputation of merchants convinced him to personally voice his support for the cause. He 
sent a telegram protesting against the situation in Palestine to the British Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, and cables of support to the Saudi and Iraqi rulers, who were then 
preparing a joint Arab demarche on the Palestine issue.114 In October, Shaykh Ahmad once 
again proved obliging when he received a letter from Amin al-Husaini “inviting him to 
select from a list of names of Arab notables enclosed” a delegate to represent him at the 
Bludan Conference in Syria.115 This meeting was organized by al-Husaini and Syrian Arab 
nationalists to rally regional support for the Palestinian cause. Attempts to secure official 
participation by Arab governments largely failed.116 It was all the more notable, therefore, 
that the Kuwaiti ruler delegated the former Iraqi Prime Minister Naji al-Suwaidi, a 
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moderate Arab nationalist,117 to represent him. This led the Political Agent to reprimand 
him for exceeding his authority under the treaty of protection.118 That Shaykh Ahmad 
would thus risk his good relations with the British attests to the effectiveness of the 
merchants’ campaign, which succeeded over the course of a few years in forcing the once 
defiant ruler to bow to popular opinion on this issue.  
The merchants’ pro-Palestinian campaign between 1933 and 1937 represented a 
significant development in the evolution of political activism in Kuwait. Zahlan argues that 
it contributed directly to the emergence of the 1938 Majlis Movement by strengthening the 
merchant’s esprit de corps and intensifying their opposition to the ruler.119 The campaign 
also introduced new modes of activism such as mass meetings, cables of protest, and 
underground political organization. As occurred in the 1910s and 1920s, practical and 
organizational innovations accompanied the novel ideological influences percolating into 
the country.  
Cross-Regional Activism: The Kuwait Branch of the Red Book Group 
 
As the Kuwaiti merchants engaged in pro-Palestine activism, they developed 
organizational links with Arab nationalist activists elsewhere in the region. This eventually 
led to the establishment of a local branch of the Red Book Group, the transnational Arab 
nationalist organization based in Beirut and subsequently Baghdad. Kuwaiti membership of 
this avowedly secular group provides clear evidence for the Arab nationalist current’s 
independence from the pre-existing Islamic modernist movement. Furthermore, it 
demonstrates that the Kuwaiti merchants’ regional political networks had expanded beyond 
Iraq and Palestine to reach Syria and Lebanon. It is unclear how the merchants became 
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affiliated with the Red Book Group, and existing accounts date this membership to 
anywhere between the group’s founding in 1935 and 1940. However, it will be argued that 
this affiliation had become established by early 1938, when the Red Book Group’s 
Secretary General Kazim al-Sulh visited Kuwait.  
  Most accounts converge on the importance of Baghdad’s Muthanna Club as a point 
of contact between the Kuwaiti merchants and regional nationalist networks. As has been 
stated, Arab nationalist activists established this club in 1935 as a platform for 
disseminating their ideology. It played a key role in organizing Iraqi support for Palestine, 
and was closely tied to Arab émigré circles in Baghdad and Arab nationalist groups 
abroad.120 The club would have been easily accessible to Kuwaiti merchants and students in 
Iraq.  
One account presented by Hashim holds that ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Saniʿ, Sulaiman al-
ʿAdsani, and Hamid al-Naqib were the first Kuwaitis to establish ties with the Muthanna 
Club. They subsequently formed “a cell which opened communication between the 
nationalist groups in Iraq and the opposition movement in Kuwait in 1936.” Hashim bases 
this narrative on an interview with al-Saniʿ.121 Al-Mdairis, on the other hand, holds that the 
merchants’ ties to the club began following a trip by ʿAbd Allah al-Saqr and ʿAbd al-Latif 
Thunayyan al-Ghanim to Baghdad. The two opposition leaders then went on to visit the 
nationalist Arab Club of Damascus. Al-Mdairis bases this account largely on an interview 
he conducted with al-Ghanim. He does not provide a date for this visit, but places it 
sometime before the upsurge in pro-Palestinian activism in Kuwait in October 1936.122 
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However, given that the Arab Club of Damascus was not opened until early 1937, the trip 
probably in fact occurred after this date.123 
A third source on Kuwaiti contact with the Muthanna Club, and Arab nationalist 
networks more broadly, is H.R.P. Dickson, who served as British Political Agent (1929-
1936) and subsequently worked for the Kuwait Oil Company.124 Dickson’s tenure as 
Political Agent corresponds with the period of al-Shabiba al-Kuwaitiyya’s activity. It is 
perhaps for this reason that he appears to exaggerate its role, associating it with all cross-
regional Arab activism involving Kuwaitis. He relates that sometime before the onset of the 
Majlis Movement in 1938, Kuwaiti activists joined a transnational underground movement 
known as “Al Shabiba”. Established in Syria in the late 1920s, it later transferred its 
headquarters to Iraq, where it received government support and adopted the Muthanna Club 
as its headquarters. Al Shabiba sought to liberate the Arab states from colonialism and 
unify them. Mirroring the account of Al-Mdairis, Dickson states that Kuwaiti activists 
joined the group after a trip to Baghdad and Damascus. Upon returning, they became active 
in opposing the British presence and working for the Palestinian cause. Dickson also 
alleges that they received German support.125  
  Although Dickson’s transnational Shabiba movement is not mentioned in any of the 
literature on Arab nationalist groups, his description of it corresponds closely to the Red 
Book Group. Like Dickson’s Shabiba, the Red Book Group originated in the Levant (albeit 
in Lebanon rather than Syria) and then transferred its headquarters to Iraq. This occurred 
between late 1939 and early 1940.126 Furthermore, as in Dickson’s account, the group 
adopted the Muthanna Club as its headquarters and enjoyed close relations with the Iraqi 
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government.127 The only notable difference is that Dickson’s Shabiba movement was 
established around the late 1920s, whereas the Red Book Group was founded in 1935. 
Given the extreme secrecy of the latter, it would have been easy for Dickson to make such 
mistakes, and conflate the local branch of the Red Book Group with the pre-existing al-
Shabiba al-Kuwaitiyya.  
The publication of a study on the Red Book Group in 2004 by Shafiq Jeha, a former 
member of the organization and an AUB history professor, confirmed the existence of a 
Kuwaiti branch of the group. Internal party documents dating from around 1940 list ʿAbd 
Allah al-Saqr as head of the branch, while the remaining officers included (in order of 
rank): ʿAbd al-Latif Thunayyan al-Ghanim, Khalid Sulaiman al-ʿAdsani, and Sarhan al-
Sarhan.128 Yusuf al-Ghanim is listed as a member, as is a Muhammad al-Ghanim in Aden, 
who was probably a Kuwaiti merchant resident in that port.129 Jeha relates little else about 
the Kuwaiti branch apart from that it was established in 1940 (an improbable claim as shall 
be seen), and that the scanty references to it in the party documents suggest that it was 
small and inactive.130 There are reasons to doubt Jeha’s characterization. As Al-Mdairis 
observes, Jeha himself stresses that it is very hard to determine the full extent of the Red 
Book Group’s activities due to its extreme secrecy and the fact that the vast majority of its 
documents were destroyed. This applies especially to branches outside the Fertile Crescent, 
which he discusses only briefly.131 He dedicates by far the least attention to Kuwait, and 
demonstrates no awareness of internal developments within the shaykhdom at the time.  
Following the unearthing of the party documents on which Jeha based his work, 
certain scholars have drawn connections between the Arab nationalist activism that 																																																								
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occurred in Kuwait in the 1930s and the Red Book Group. Apparently, the first to do so 
was Youssef Choueiri. He seeks to explain Kuwaiti membership of the group through Al-
Mdairis’s account of the visits of al-Saqr and al-Ghanim to the Muthanna Club and the 
Arab Club of Damascus. These two “frontal societies” of the Red Book Group could have 
provided the avenue for the Kuwaiti merchants’ recruitment into the organization.132 In a 
later article, Al-Mdairis conjectures that the Kuwaiti branch of the group was responsible 
for the pro-Palestine activism carried out under the names of “Shabab al-Kuwait” and the 
October 1936 Committee. He points to the coincidence of the onset of this activism with 
the founding of the Red Book Group in Beirut 1935.133 Al-Mdairis, however, does not take 
into account the pre-existing al-Shabiba al-Kuwaitiyya, which commenced activism on 
behalf of Palestine in 1933, well before the Red Book Group was established.  
While it is unclear when the Kuwaiti merchants established a branch of the Red 
Book Group, it is clear that they established direct contact with its leadership by March 
1938, when a delegation comprised of Kazim al-Sulh and Fakhri al-Barudi visited Kuwait 
via Iraq to procure weapons for Palestine’s Arab Revolt.134  The former, a Lebanese, served 
as Secretary General of the Red Book Group throughout its existence.135 The latter was a 
leader of the principal Syrian opposition group, al-Kutla al-Wataniyya (the Patriotic Bloc), 
and though not a Red Book Group member, he had a similar ideological outlook and 
worked closely with some of its cadres.136 The British denied entry visas to at least two 
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other men, the Palestinian activists Akram Zuʿaitir and Rashad al-Shawwa.137 The latter 
was also a high-ranking member of the Red Book Group.138 
According to the Iraqi press, the Kuwaiti government banned a public meeting in 
honor of the guests that had been planned by young activists, arresting some of them when 
they insisted on carrying out their plan.139 The ruler also refused to allow Shaykh ʿAbd 
Allah al-Jabir “to be the President of a collecting committee.”140 Despite these setbacks, 
Zuʿaitir relates that the delegation achieved its goal of obtaining weapons, receiving the 
assistance of ʿAbd Allah al-Saqr and another merchant by the name of Muhammad Yusuf 
al-Ghanim.141 Perhaps as a result of merchant pressure, Shaykh Ahmad agreed to turn a 
blind eye to the purchase of the arms, and his secretaries Mulla Salih and ʿIzzat Jaʿfar 
actively helped the delegates.142 Al-Sulh’s interaction with al-Saqr and other Kuwaiti 
notables during this 1938 visit may have provided the opportunity for the establishment of 
the Red Book Group’s Kuwait branch.143  
 A further account suggests that the visit of al-Sulh and al-Barudi resulted in some 
form of organizational coordination between the Levantine and Kuwaiti activists, possibly 
under the umbrella of the Red Book Group. The son of the merchant Sultan al-Kulaib 
related in an interview that his father was approached by al-Sulh and al-Barudi in Kuwait. 
They proposed that a local committee be formed to collect funds and arms for Palestine. 
Al-Kulaib’s son appears to suggest that there had been prior contact between his father and 
the two men, as al-Kulaib had visited Lebanon and Syria, in addition to Cairo and 																																																								
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Palestine, after performing the hajj in 1934. A committee was formed with al-Kulaib and 
the merchants Yusuf Ahmad al-Ghanim and Nisf Yusuf al-Nisf as members. It collected 
donations and bought arms for the Palestinians from an Indian merchant.144 Though this 
account does not mention the Red Book Group, Jeha lists Yusuf al-Ghanim as a member of 
the organization. In addition, the former teacher and MAN activist Muhammad al-Saddah 
holds that al-Nisf was a member of the Red Book Group.145  
A final possibility is that the Kuwaiti Branch of the Red Book Group was founded 
in 1940 as Jeha asserts. Though he does not provide any justification for this argument, he 
probably bases it on the fact that the party documents he uses, which list the Kuwaiti 
members, date from around 1940.146 This would mean that the Kuwaiti merchants joined 
the group as exiles in Iraq following the ruler’s suppression of the Majlis Movement in 
March of 1939. Many Kuwaiti activists including al-Saqr and al-ʿAdsani subsequently 
sought refuge in Basra and Baghdad. They continued their activism there with the support 
of the Iraqi authorities and radical Arab nationalist activists, and were in close contact with 
the Muthanna Club.147 Jeha’s claim, however, is undermined by the fact that the second-in-
command within the Kuwaiti branch, ʿAbd al-Latif Thunayyan al-Ghanim, was imprisoned 
in Kuwait during the March 1939 crackdown.148 He was not released until April 1944, and 
thus could not have been in Iraq in 1940 to assume his position.149 It is thus most likely that 
the Kuwait branch of the Red Book Group was founded in early 1938 or sometime before 
that.  
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At the same time that the Kuwaiti merchants were engaging in their pan-Arab 
activism, they were closely involved in a domestic endeavour: the founding of elected 
administrative councils. Through these institutions, the merchants aimed to take charge of 
the development and modernization of the Kuwaiti state and follow in the footsteps of the 
more advanced Arab countries. The second of these councils, established in 1936, oversaw 
educational affairs. It will be argued that in developing and staffing Kuwait’s nascent 
educational infrastructure, the merchants relied upon the same regional nationalist networks 
through which they carried out their activism.  
The Birth of the Council System, 1930-1938  
 
 In the 1910s and 1920s, the novel ideological influence of Islamic modernism 
prompted a segment of Kuwait’s merchants to initiate an unprecedented wave of charitable 
activity. They established the first modern schools and other establishments such as the 
Arab Charitable Association and the Ahliyya Library. Merchant committees administered 
and financed these projects, which the ruling family largely regarded with indifference or 
even hostility. Although this changed with the accession of Shaykh Ahmad al-Jabir in 
1921, the merchants still contributed far more to these ventures than the ruler. The 
combined effect of the Great Depression, the collapse of the pearl trade, and the continued 
Saudi trade blockade of Kuwait rendered the merchants unable to sufficiently support these 
institutions, which went into decline. 
  As private funding for social welfare projects dried up, the merchants started to 
push the government to take responsibility for these functions. At the same time, they 
maintained and even expanded their administrative role through elected councils, starting 
with the Municipal Council of 1930 and the Educational Council of 1936. These 
institutions laid the foundations of the modern Kuwaiti state through the formation of 
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specialized government departments with legal regulations and independent budgets. This 
institutional infrastructure would remain in place even after the emergence of the rentier 
state, allowing the merchants to retain their administrative role well into the post-oil era.  
 The Educational Council in particular would remain a merchant stronghold until the 
mid 1950s. Arab nationalist and Islamic modernist merchants founded this institution with 
the goal of modernizing education on the model of the progressive Arab states, particularly 
Iraq. They relied upon their connections to various Arab activists and officials to develop 
Kuwait’s new state educational system. While the Educational Council broadly oversaw the 
development of education, direct administration of this field became the preserve of Arab 
expatriates. The phase of Arab control over education in Kuwait began in 1936 with the 
deputation of teachers by the Palestinian SMC. This led to the growth of Arab nationalist 
influence within education.   
 The merchant’s participation in the administrative councils, which occurred in 
parallel with their pro-Palestinian activism, also helped them to “[develop] a new sense of 
themselves as modern political actors.”150  The councils represented another step in the 
merchants’ quest to institutionalize their customary role in governance, and contributed 
directly to the emergence of the Majlis Movement in 1938.   
Kuwait’s Municipal Council was established in 1930 following a merchant 
campaign led by the Islamic modernist scholar Yusuf bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi and encouraged by 
the British Political Agent.151 It was the first institution of its kind in Kuwait, with twelve 
voluntary members elected every two years. The electorate, however, was confined to 
merchants and notables. The councilmen elected a Municipal Director (Mudīr al-
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Baladīyya) from amongst themselves, while the office of President (Raʾīs) was 
permanently occupied by Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Jabir (former head of the Literary Club). 
The institution was also the first in Kuwait with an independent budget, derived from a 
customs tariff and other taxes.152  
Between 1930 and 1934 the reformist merchants dominated the Municipal Council. 
The post of Municipal Director was occupied by the Arab nationalist Sulaiman al-
ʿAdsani.153 Many of the councilmen had been leaders of the cultural initiatives of the 1910s 
and 1920s, and would become activists in the pro-Palestine campaign. There was also 
significant overlap in membership with both the 1921 Advisory Council and the future 
Legislative Council of 1938, reflecting the institution’s importance in the evolution of 
participatory governance in Kuwait.154 The Municipal Council’s political effects were 
apparent from the year of its creation, when the Political Agent observed that it created 
“such a desire for improvements… that if anything it requires checking.”155 Khalid, son of 
Sulaiman al-ʿAdsani, states in his memoirs that “the nucleus of the later patriotic 
movements was first created” within this council. A segment of its members developed 
“bonds of camaraderie and unified goals,” and the institution resembled a “miniature 
parliament” due to its many responsibilities.156 The council also eventually fueled merchant 
opposition to the ruler when he started to intervene in its affairs. Following its 1934 
elections, he prevented Sulaiman al-ʿAdsani from being reelected as director, causing him 
to resign in protest.157 																																																								
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 In early 1936, the reformist merchants sought to extend the model of the Municipal 
Council to the field of education, which was suffering greatly from the economic downturn. 
They met and decided to petition the ruler to form an Educational Council. Those present 
were Yusuf bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi, Sulaiman al-ʿAdsani, Mashʿan al-Khudair, Sayyid ʿAli 
Sayyid Sulaiman, Muhammad Ahmad al-Ghanim, Sultan al-Kulaib, Mishari Hasan al-Badr, 
ʿAbd Allah al-ʿAsʿusi and the new Municipal Director Nisf Yusuf al-Nisf.158 Most were 
Islamic modernists or Arab nationalists. The ruler accepted the petition, and in the summer 
a large number of notables met at the Municipal Council to approve the measure.159   
 Elections to the Educational Council were held in October of 1936, with the 
reformists achieving a resounding victory. These were Yusuf bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi, ʿAbd Allah 
al-Saqr, Sulaiman al-ʿAdsani, Mashʿan al-Khudair, Sayyid ʿAli bin Sayyid Sulaiman, 
Mishari al-Badr, Sultan al-Kulaib, and Muhammad Ahmad al-Ghanim. Ahmad al-Mishari, 
a close friend of the Islamic modernist scholar al-Rushaid, can also be classified within this 
group. The remaining members were Nisf Yusuf al-Nisf and Yusuf al-ʿAdsani, who were 
close to the ruler, though the former was also an Arab nationalist as stated previously. 
Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Jabir again became president of the body, while al-Qinaʿi was 
appointed Director of Education.160 The Educational Council assumed control over what 
was left of the educational infrastructure established by the Islamic modernists: the 
Mubarakiyya and Ahmadiyya schools, the Ahliyya Library, and the funds and waqf 
properties supporting them.161 Like the Municipal Council, the Educational Council had an 
independent budget financed through a small tax on imported goods.162 In 1937, the council 
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acquired a more robust administrative apparatus and an internal law, marking the birth of 
the Educational Department (“Idarat al-Maʿarif,” later “Daʾirat al-Maʿarif”).163 
 The reformist merchants established the Educational Council with the intent of 
furthering the process of Arabization of education that had commenced in the 1910s and 
1920s. In his memoires, Khalid Sulaiman al-ʿAdsani ties the drive to establish the council 
to the influence of cultural and ideological developments in the Arab world. He states that 
ʿAbd Allah al-Saqr and Muhammad Ahmad al-Ghanim were among the most enthusiastic 
supporters of the project due to their close ties to Iraq.164 In April 1936, when preparations 
for the council were still underway, the British reported that the merchants were seeking to 
recruit teachers from Iraq. However, the ruler, along with the British, feared that Iraqi 
teachers would have a pernicious political influence. He proposed that Syrian teachers be 
employed instead.165 The Educational Council, however, was adamant that the teachers 
should be either Iraqi or Palestinian, and the ruler eventually assented to the employment of 
Palestinian teachers.166  
Drawing on their longstanding Islamic modernist/Arab nationalist connections, the 
Educational Council members requested Amin al-Husaini’s assistance in employing the 
teachers. 167  He promptly selected four men from the SMC’s school network, and 
dispatched them to Kuwait in November. The most qualified of the group, Ahmad Shihab 
al-Din, became Director of Studies and played a central role in creating Kuwait’s new 
educational system. This inaugurated a new phase in the development of education in 
Kuwait that will be treated in detail below.   																																																								
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 The accord between the ruler and the merchants that allowed for the formation of 
the Educational Council soon disintegrated in the face of the former’s renewed meddling in 
the councils. In the spring of 1937, a dispute took place within the Educational Council 
over demands to raise the pay of Kuwaiti teachers. Members of the ruler’s retinue took 
advantage of this to petition the ruler to dissolve the council. This he did, prompting the 
reformists on the Municipal Council and the committee in charge of the town’s public 
library to resign in solidarity. Unmoved, Shaykh Ahmad arranged for the election of 
replacements.168 He convinced the more politically conservative members to continue 
serving on the councils. Al-Qinaʿi was again appointed director of the Educational Council 
without elections being held. The remaining members, now reduced to six, were Sultan al-
Kulaib, Ahmad al-Humaiḍi, Ahmad al-Mishari, Nisf Yusuf al-Nisf, ʿAbd al-Rahman al-
Bahar, and ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-Khrafi.169  
 The final showdown between the merchants and the ruler over the councils occurred 
in early 1938, shortly before the Municipal Council elections were due to be held. The 
reformist merchants demanded that the ruler reform the council’s elections procedure. 
Shaykh Ahmad responded by forbidding those who had previously resigned from running. 
He then blatantly rigged the elections, and threatened those who protested.170 The ruler’s 
conduct not only violated the traditional principle of consultation, but also hindered the 
merchants from conducting their modernizing reforms. The councils had given the 
reformist merchants a taste of democratic governance, and it offered much more promise 
than the ruler’s corrupt and ineffectual administration. It was not long before the Majlis 
Movement emerged to demand the establishment of a council that would administer the 
entire country.  																																																								
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The Majlis Movement, 1938-1939 
 
In the spring of 1938, an organized movement demanding parliamentary rule 
emerged in Kuwait. In short order, it established the Gulf’s first elected legislative body, 
which virtually wrested power from the shaykh. Known as the Legislative Council (al-
Majlis al-Tashriʿi), it represented the high point of the reformist merchants’ activism. 
However, the opposition’s ascendancy proved fleeting. By mid-1939, the shaykh had 
dissolved the council and returned to autocratic rule, though he retained many of its 
modernizing reforms.   
Many accounts of the Majlis Movement treat it as a primarily internal development, 
disregarding the influence of Arab nationalism or relegating it to a mere footnote.171 These 
works cannot fully explain how such a revolutionary, modern movement emerged in a still 
largely traditional context. To be sure, domestic factors were central to the movement, and 
not all of its protagonists were nationalists. However, it cannot be denied that Arab 
nationalism was its guiding ideology, and the nationalist element was its vanguard. 
Moreover, the movement was clearly an extension of the Arab nationalist activism that had 
been mounting since the beginning of the decade. Rather than giving a detailed account of 
the events surrounding the Majlis Movement, which have been more or less thoroughly 
covered in the existing literature, this section will focus on its Arab nationalist dimensions. 
Furthermore, it will demonstrate the prominence of educational reform within the 
movement’s agenda.  
By early 1938, Shakh Ahmad’s rule was producing growing disaffection among 
Kuwait’s merchants. Despite receiving substantial revenue from the 1934 oil concession, 
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his administration was parsimonious and corrupt, and imposed burdensome taxes.172 He 
also became increasingly authoritarian. As well as meddling in the councils, he severely 
punished dissenters, particularly after the Kuwaiti reformists began airing their grievances 
in the Iraqi press in around 1937.173 Among them was ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Saniʿ, who in 
September of that year became Kuwait’s first political prisoner after he criticized the 
British Political Agent in a Basra newspaper.174 Another incident that aroused widespread 
indignation was the arrest and savage beating of the nationalist activist Muhammad al-
Barrak, accused of fomenting a strike by taxi drivers and writing subversive graffiti.175  
In the spring of 1938, a group of prominent merchants formed a secret society 
called the Patriotic Bloc (al-Kutla al-Wataniyya) with the goal of establishing 
parliamentary rule in Kuwait. Its twelve founding members were: ʿAbd Allah al-Saqr, ʿAbd 
al-ʿAziz al-Saqr, Mashʿan al-Khudair, Sayyid ʿAli bin Sayyid Sulaiman, Sulaiman al-
ʿAdsani, Khalid Sulaiman al-ʿAdsani, ʿAbd al-Latif Thunayyan al-Ghanim, Sultan al-
Kulaib, Yusuf al-Marzuq, Yusuf al-Humaiḍi, and Hamad al-Humaiḍi. The venerable 
merchant Muhammad Thunayyan al-Ghanim was appointed its president. Although Arab 
nationalist and reformist elements dominated the group, al-ʿAdsani accuses a few of its 
members of being motivated by personal interests.176  
The Patriotic Bloc put forth its demands through the Iraqi press and handbills that it 
printed in Basra.177 It enjoined the ruler to recognize the Kuwaiti people as the source of 
legitimacy, and form a council to aid him in governance. The people, it added, should 
control the state’s resources and use them for the public good, and the ruler’s corrupt 																																																								
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retinue must be excluded from the administration. The Bloc also demanded the 
modernization and reform of the state, and the provision of basic services such as free 
healthcare and education.178  
Educational reform figured prominently in the Patriotic Bloc’s agenda. In its initial 
list of demands, which was published in an Iraqi newspaper, the first point called for 
“spreading education [widely]… so that the people of Kuwait would be given the same 
opportunities for education” as other Arabs.179 A second list called for the provision of 
scholarships to Kuwaitis.180 Articles that the Kuwaiti reformists wrote anonymously in the 
Iraqi press also strongly criticized the state of education in Kuwait, which they attributed to 
the ruler’s neglect. One article was also careful to praise the efforts of the Palestinian 
teachers, pointing out that they had been employed at the initiative of the reformists in the 
Educational Council rather than the ruler.181 
Other demands advanced by the Bloc were clearly inspired by Arab nationalism. 
These included the adoption of Iraqi administration methods in finance and education to 
allow Kuwait to “take part in the Arab renaissance (nahḍa),” and the signing of defense 
agreements with Arab states. In response to the aforementioned incident in which the 
British denied entry to visiting Palestinian activists, the Bloc also demanded that Kuwait 
have the right to issue its own visas and grant Arabs free admission. Moreover, it advocated 
that restrictions be placed on the immigration and employment of “foreigners,”182 i.e. the 
many Persians who began migrating to Kuwait after the global economic downturn.183 Al-
ʿAdsani complained that they not only took Kuwaitis’ jobs, but also undermined the 
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country’s language, customs, and Arab “national spirit.”184 Conflict with Kuwait’s ethnic 
Persian community was to be a prominent feature of the Legislative Council’s career.  
 The Arab nationalist character of the Majlis Movement is also revealed by the 
strong support it received from the Arab press. In the case of Iraq, the press’s championing 
of the movement represented the culmination of the media campaign targeting Kuwait that 
had been ongoing since the early 1930s. However, support also came from further afield. A 
British report lists twenty-three Arabic newspapers that backed Kuwait’s reformists and 
attacked the ruler. In addition to Iraq, these publications hailed from Syria, Lebanon, 
Palestine, Egypt, and even Argentina.185 This list, moreover, is by no means exhaustive. 
Among the newspapers not included were Cairo’s al-Shabab and its successor al-ʿAlam, 
both of which enthusiastically supported the Majlis Movement.186 These were the latest 
periodicals published by the Palestinian journalist and activist Muhammad ʿAli al-Tahir, 
whose ties to Kuwait date back to the 1920s.  
It will be remembered that the modernist cleric al-Rushaid served as a 
correspondent for al-Tahir’s al-Shura, to which other Kuwaiti writers also contributed. 
Kuwait’s new generation of Arab nationalist activists appear to have maintained this 
relationship. This is indicated by al-Tahir’s receipt of a cable of congratulations from ʿAbd 
Allah al-Saqr following his launch of al-Shabab in 1937.187 As shall be seen, al-Tahir also 
helped recruit Palestinian teachers for Kuwait during the reign of the Legislative Council. 
The Arab press’s support for the Majlis Movement was thus not only the result of Iraqi 
expansionist policy but also of the Kuwaiti reformists’ own regional connections.  
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The Patriotic Bloc’s campaign received support from unexpected quarters. Shaykh 
Ahmad’s failure to delegate power to other members of the ruling family and the small 
salaries he paid them led some shaykhs to support the bloc’s demands.188 The leader of this 
faction was the ruler’s longstanding rival Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Salim, who the British 
described as a man of “modern ideas.”189 Secondly, the British authorities recognized the 
need for serious reform, and pressured the ruler to “associate himself more both with his 
family and his people in his administration.”190 However, they only had in mind a 
consultative council, and apparently did not appreciate the extent of the Patriotic Bloc’s 
ambitions and Arab nationalist inclinations.191 
 Under pressure from all sides, Shaykh Ahmad reluctantly acquiesced to the Patriotic 
Bloc’s demands.192 In late June 140 town notables were delegated to elect the fourteen-
member Legislative Council. The successful candidates were: Muhammad Shahin al-
Ghanim, Yusuf bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi, ʿAbd Allah al-Saqr, Mashʿan al-Khudair, Sulaiman al-
ʿAdsani, Sayyid ʿAli bin Sayyid Sulaiman, Mishari al-Badr, Sultan al-Kulaib, ʿAbd al-Latif 
Thunayyan al-Ghanim, Yusuf al-Humaidi, Salih al-Rashid, Yusuf al-Marzuq, Muhammad 
al-Marzuq, and Khalid al-Hamad. The council then elected Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Salim as 
its president. All members were tied to the Patriotic Bloc or sympathetic to it.193 Shaykh 
ʿAbd Allah al-Salim and the Patriotic Bloc took measures to exclude the ethnic Persians, 
both for nationalistic reasons and because of the community’s close ties to the ruler’s 
unpopular secretary Mulla Salih.194  																																																								
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The Legislative Council swiftly asserted virtually complete control of power in 
what the British described as a “coup d’état.”195 It introduced a Basic Law that held that the 
nation (umma), represented by its elected council, is the source of all powers. The 
document also stipulated that the council must authorize all treaties and concessions, and 
allocated to it both legislative and executive authority. 196  The council exercised its 
executive power by distributing departmental portfolios to some of its members, and also 
took control of the revenue derived from the oil company and customs.197 It also introduced 
a spate of reforms that aimed to modernize the state, cut corruption, and improve living 
standards.198 
 The Legislative Council also presided over a significant expansion in the 
educational system. Judging by the absence of any reference to the Educational Council 
during this period, it appears that the Legislative Council took over its functions, though 
this point is unclear. The council increased the Educational Department’s budget, allocating 
to it half the income of the Landing Department. This enabled it to introduce free 
education. Furthermore, it established three new government schools, including the first 
modern school for girls.199 Six additional Palestinian teachers, including two women, were 
employed to staff them. Al-ʿAdsani holds that this contradicted the wishes of the ruler, who 
intended to dispense with the Palestinian teachers.200 The council also obtained fully paid 
scholarships from the Iraqi and Egyptian governments, sending five students to Baghdad in 
late 1938 and four to Cairo in early 1939.201  																																																								
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The Legislative Council also displayed its Arab nationalist colors by creating 
Kuwait’s first officially sanctioned political organization: the Patriotic Youths’ Bloc 
(Kutlat al-Shabab al-Watani). Around two hundred young men joined the group, electing a 
ten-member administrative committee. Ahmad al-Sarhan (brother of the Red Book Group 
member Sarhan al-Sarhan) served as the bloc’s secretary, while the Legislative Council 
member ʿAbd al-Latif Thunayyan al-Ghanim was appointed its honorary president.202 The 
bloc’s charter affirmed the unity and self-determination of the Arab nation and proclaimed 
Kuwait an inseparable part of it. It listed the following goals: strengthening ties between 
Arab states, supporting all social and economic initiatives beneficial to the Arabs, 
“awakening the national spirit,” spreading “the spirit of Arab culture” in Kuwait, unifying 
the Kuwaiti youth, and supporting the “free and devoted among the Arabs.”203 The bloc 
formed committees for spreading Arab national awareness, holding literacy classes, and 
conducting charity work. It also had a club where it held weekly gatherings to “educate the 
masses about popular rights” and democracy.204 The bloc also actively supported the 
Legislative Council against the ruler.205  
 The establishment of the Patriotic Youths’ Bloc demonstrates the depth of the 
merchants’ engagement with nationalist politics in the Arab world. It occurred at a time 
when youth groups were in vogue throughout the region, and the bloc echoes other 
contemporary nationalist groups. Choueiri thus compares its “principles and aims” to those 
of the Red Book Group and Syria’s League of Nationalist Action.206 An even more striking 
resemblance is overlooked in the existing literature. Shortly after Fakhri al-Barudi of 																																																								
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Syria’s Patriotic Bloc (al-Kutla al-Wataniyya) visited Kuwait in March of 1938, the 
Kuwaiti merchant-activists adopted the same name for their underground group. Moreover, 
the Syrian Patriotic Bloc had a youth wing called the Patriotic Youth (al-Shabab al-
Watani), which grew in prominence in the mid-1930s. At this point, members of the Red 
Book Group became very influential within this youth wing (though not within the Patriotic 
Bloc itself). 207  The resemblance in nomenclature between the Syrian and Kuwaiti 
organizations is uncanny, and cannot be dismissed as coincidence in light of the Kuwaitis’ 
ties to al-Barudi and the Red Book Group. The Kuwaiti reformists appear to have been 
approaching the novel task of modern political organization by emulating the Syrian 
example.   
Despite its initial success, opposition to the Legislative Council gradually mounted 
as the ruler and his entourage rallied their allies. These included ruling family members 
alarmed at the sudden power shift, rival merchants, disaffected supporters of the council, 
and the Persian community.208 The council had spurned the latters’ demands for special 
legal and educational facilities for the Shiʿa, and for communal representation on the 
Legislative and Municipal Councils.209 Furthermore, the Persians felt threatened by certain 
actions and policies adopted by the council. These included a nationality law that restricted 
citizenship to those present in the country before the Great War, and a census that aimed to 
determine Kuwaitis from foreigners. Both measures were clearly aimed at recent migrants 
from Iran.210 
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It was the British reassessment of their position towards the Legislative Council that 
tipped the balance of power in favour of the ruler. The British authorities were concerned 
that the body had too much power and was coming under Iraqi influence.211 They also 
feared its regional impact after similar Majlis Movements sprang up in Dubai and 
Bahrain.212 On the 15th of December 1938, the Political Agent told Shaykh Ahmad that he 
would not oppose the dissolution of the council.213 Beginning the following day, a squabble 
over the arrest of one of the ruler’s supporters quickly escalated, leading the country to the 
brink of civil war. The Patriotic Youths’ Bloc and other council supporters occupied the 
town’s arsenal, while the ruler called in tribal forces from the desert and surrounding 
villages.214 The standoff eventually ended through arbitration, the two sides agreeing to 
dissolve the council and hold new elections. The ruler, however, would hold veto power 
over the new council.215  
Elections to the second Legislative Council were held towards the end of December, 
and yielded a reformist majority despite Shaykh Ahmad’s best efforts. Furthermore, the 
three anti-council merchants who were elected reconciled with the reformists. Of these, 
Muhammad Ahmad al-Ghanim and Nisf Yusuf al-Nisf were Arab nationalists who had 
participated in the merchants’ pro-Palestine activism.216 However, the ruler stipulated that 
the council could not assume its functions until he could agree with it on a new 
constitution. After much prevarication, Shaykh Ahmad refused the draft constitution 																																																								
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submitted by the council. He submitted a draft of his own with the intention of dissolving 
the council if it did not approve it. True to the ruler’s expectation, the council rejected his 
draft constitution.217  
At the same time as this wrangling over the constitution unfolded, the reformists 
decided to turn to Iraq for assistance. In January of 1939, the British reported that “extreme 
Arab nationalists from Kuwait, Bahrain and Zubair” founded a “Bureau for propaganda in 
the ‘Arabian Gulf’” in Basra. In early February, three of Kuwait’s leading Arab nationalist 
activists: ʿAbd Allah al-Saqr, ʿAbd al-Latif Thunayyan al-Ghanim, and Muhammad al-
Barrak, travelled to Iraq to rally support for their cause. They were warmly welcomed by 
the Iraqi government, and met with activists, politicians, and officials including Rashid ʿAli 
al-Kailani.218 After their arrival, the Iraqi newspapers and King Ghazi’s personal Qasr al-
Zuhur radio station intensified their propaganda in support of the Legislative Council and 
against the Kuwaiti ruler.219  
A British report holds that during their visit, al-Saqr and his comrades advocated 
unity between Kuwait and Iraq.220 Muhammad al-Barrak is also reported to have written an 
article in an Iraqi newspaper in which “he says that Iraq should take Kuwait under its 
protection,” adding “Kuwait is the natural harbour and the backbone of Iraq.”221 The Majlis 
Movement’s position on unity with Iraq has been a sensitive topic in contemporary 
scholarship. While some Kuwaiti scholars downplay or question the movement’s desire for 
unity,222 those from Iraq exaggerate it based on an uncritical reading of contemporary Iraqi 
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media accounts.223 It is clear that at least some key figures within the movement held this 
view. Al-Saqr appears to have held this position from early on; Akram Zuʿaitir’s diary 
entry on his attempted visit to Kuwait in March 1938 reports that al-Saqr “calls for unity 
between Kuwait and Iraq.”224  
What is unclear is the proportion of the Kuwaiti merchant opposition that shared 
this goal. The British estimated that only between ten and eighty Kuwaitis, led by al-Saqr, 
sought unity with Iraq.225 Al-ʿAdsani attests to the existence of a hard core of Arab 
nationalists within the Majlis Movement. He recalls that ʿAbd Allah al-Saqr, ʿAbd al-Latif 
al-Ghanim, and himself formed a “triad” of committed nationalists that met separately and 
was able to influence the rest of the movement.226 Even if not everyone in the Majlis 
Movement sought outright unity with Iraq, it is safe to say that a broad majority favored 
close cooperation with it. This is indicated by the fact that in early March, the Legislative 
Council sent letters to King Ghazi and Prime Minister Nuri al-Saʿid thanking them for their 
support.227  
On the 7th of March, the ruler permanently dissolved the Legislative Council, 
accusing its members of conspiring with Iraq.228 After this occurred, a council supporter, 
Muhammad al-Munayyis, arrived from Iraq and made a speech and distributed leaflets 
“declaring the Ruling family deposed.” When the ruler’s tribal retainers attempted to arrest 
him, the police officer Muhammad al-Qatami and the ex-council member Yusuf al-Marzuq 
fired upon them. The retainers returned fire, killing the former and wounding the latter. The 
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ruler executed al-Munayyis for treason and hung his body in the main square.229 He also 
imprisoned al-Marzuq and five council members, prompting many council supporters to 
flee to Iraq.230 These bloody events sealed the fate of the Majlis Movement, ending the first 
phase of organized Arab nationalist activism in Kuwait. 
Palestinian Teachers, Iraqi Curriculum, 1936-1942 
 
By God, oh prophets of culture, tell us: how is our sister, oh brothers? 
I mean Palestine, and how is her Amin and his soldiers, and the others? 
After the struggle, and after the Jews spread their evil throughout her, 
I heard her call, and the response of the lions among the sons of ʿAdnan, 
And the roar of the lion cubs of Arabism, the relentless sons of Ghassan  
 
- “Hayy al-Asatidha al-Kiram Tahiyya (Greetings to the 
Honorable Teachers),” Fahad al-ʿAskar, 1936231 
 
 In November of 1936, a group of Kuwaitis congregated in the northern village of 
Jahra to receive the shaykhdom’s first Palestinian teachers, who were arriving via motorcar 
from Iraq. In addition to educational officials and notables, the welcoming party included 
young activists such as Khalid al-ʿAdsani, Muhammad al-Barrak, and Ahmad al-Sarhan, all 
fervent Arab nationalists and future leaders of the Patriotic Youths’ Bloc.232  The prominent 
young poet Fahad al-ʿAskar composed a poem welcoming the teachers, a portion of which 
is quoted above. These verses indicate that the teachers were esteemed as educators or 
“prophets of culture,” i.e. the modern, progressive culture of the more advanced Arab 
countries. At the same time, they were welcomed as representatives of Amin al-Husaini, 
the Palestinian struggle, and the Arab nation. The dual capacity of the Palestinian teachers 
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in the poem represents the extent to which education and Pan-Arab politics were 
intertwined. Although this link was already apparent in the previous period, when Islamic 
modernists established Kuwait’s first modern schools, education became much more 
politicized under the new Palestinian administration.  
  Between 1936 and 1942, three factors contributed to an unprecedented rise in Arab 
nationalist influence within Kuwait’s nascent Educational Department. The first was the 
role of the nationalist merchant activists, who oversaw education through the Educational 
Council and the short-lived Legislative Council. Secondly, from 1936, the merchants 
largely delegated the technical and day-to-day administration of the Educational 
Department to the Palestinian teachers, who they recruited through their Arab nationalist 
networks. The Palestinian teachers increased awareness of Arab nationalism and the 
Palestinian cause through various means including Scouting, extracurricular activities, and 
social interaction with their students and colleagues. They were also responsible for the 
third primary factor behind the spread of Arab nationalist influence during this period: the 
importation of the Iraqi curriculum.   
 The creation of the Educational Council and the arrival of the Palestinian teachers in 
1936 represented a pivotal development in the “Arabization” and modernization of Kuwaiti 
education. Education now became officially regulated, undergoing increasing 
standardization and centralization. It expanded significantly as the resources of the state 
allowed for the introduction of free education and the building of new schools. 
Furthermore, control over education passed from the ʿulamaʾ to the secular, westernized 
effendiyya. Moreover, the appointment of a Palestinian Director of Studies in 1936 marked 
the start of a sixteen-year period when Arab expatriates largely oversaw the administration 
of education in Kuwait.  
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The manner in which the Educational Council employed its first Palestinian 
teachers, which has already been briefly outlined, clearly demonstrates the link between the 
merchants’ Arab nationalist activism and their educational endeavors. Their decision to 
request Amin al-Husaini’s assistance in October of 1936 was no doubt made in light of 
their longstanding ties to him, dating back to his 1924 visit to Kuwait. This relationship had 
been further strengthened through the merchants’ pro-Palestine activism, which was in full 
swing at the time. Moreover, al-Husaini was then gaining prominence across the region as 
an Arab nationalist, anti-imperialist leader. As president of the Arab Higher Committee 
since April 1936, he was at the head of the Arab Revolt then taking place against the 
British in Palestine.233 
 The Educational Council approached al-Husaini in his capacity as President of the 
SMC, an institution that simultaneously enjoyed nationalist legitimacy and British 
recognition. Seeking to placate the Palestinians with a limited form of self-government, the 
British Mandatory authorities established this popularly elected council in 1921 to oversee 
Muslim religious affairs. It was partly funded by the Mandatory government.234 Al-Husaini 
became the SMC’s first president in early 1922, and proceeded to use it as a base for his 
political activism.235 One of the activities within the SMC’s remit was religious education. 
Al-Husaini exploited this prerogative to create a substantial, “’national’ (waṭani)” system 
of education, which paralleled that of the Mandatory state. Uri Kupferschmidt argues that 
the SMC sought to thereby counter the highly developed and “largely autonomous” system 
of Zionist schools. In 1936 the number of schools maintained or subsidized by the SMC 
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stood at 24, and included the prestigious and Arab nationalist-oriented Rawdat al-Maʿarif 
of Jerusalem and the Najah School of Nablus.236  
 Given that the Arab Revolt was ongoing when the Educational Council contacted 
al-Husaini, it is surprising that the British had no objections to this exchange. However, 
Philip Mattar argues that contrary to his reputation as a militant nationalist, al-Husaini in 
fact cooperated with the Mandatory government until the eruption of the Arab Revolt in 
1936.237 His break with the British would therefore have been recent. More importantly, al-
Husaini remained president of the officially recognized SMC until September of 1937.238 
The teachers he sent were thus not only citizens of a British Mandate but also employees of 
an institution that was subordinate to the Mandatory administration. During the 
disagreement between the Kuwaiti Educational Council and the ruler over whether to 
employ Iraqi or Syrian teachers, the British Political Resident in fact believed that 
Palestinian teachers would be a good alternative.239 At around the same time, the British 
were also considering Palestine as a possible destination for Kuwaiti technical school 
students. The British authorities in Palestine even suggested the “Trade School of the 
Moslem Orphanage at Jerusalem,” an SMC institution, as a possible option.240  
 Nevertheless, the British did not let their guard down, and investigated the four 
teachers al-Husaini nominated to the Kuwaiti Educational Council. They refused to grant a 
visa to one of these, Dhu al-Kifl ʿAbd al-Latif, because he had been a leader of the 
“militia” youth wing of the Palestine Arab Party, headed by the al-Husaini family.241 																																																								
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237 Mattar, 141-147. 
238 Ibid., 83.  
239 IOR/R/15/5/195: Fowle to DeGaury, 30/5/1936. There is no evidence that the Political Resident’s 
preference, expressed to the Political Agent, had any bearing on the decision to employ Palestinian teachers.  
240 IOR/R/15/5/195: Secretariat, Jerusalem to PA, 19/12/1936; PA to Secretariat, Jerusalem, 5/10/1936; 
DeGaury to PR, 23/4/1936. On the Islamic Orphanage see Kupferschmidt, 141-142.  
241 IOR/R/15/5/195: Secretariat, Jerusalem to PA, 30/10/1936; PA to Secretariat, Jerusalem, 5/10/1936; 
Mattar, 69.  
 140	
Another teacher therefore replaced him. The head teacher in the group was Ahmad Shihab 
al-Din, a former classmate of ʿAbd al-Latif in Baghdad’s Dar al-Muʿalimin between 1932 
and 1934. The two had received scholarships provided by the Iraqi government to the 
SMC. Shihab al-Din then taught in Iraqi schools for two further years before returning to 
teach at the SMC’s Dar al-ʿUlum al-Islamiyya in Jaffa.242 The remaining teachers sent to 
Kuwait had just obtained their secondary school degrees from Rawdat al-Maʿarif, the 
flagship of the SMC’s educational system. These were Muhammad Jabir Hadid, 
Muhammad al-Maghribi, and Khamis Najm.243 The teachers were thus all graduates of 
institutions that were strongly Arab nationalist in character. Although the nature of their 
relationship to the SMC after arriving in Kuwait is unclear, Shihab al-Din states in an 
interview that they were seconded (muntadab).244   
 Almost immediately, the Palestinian teachers began transforming Kuwait’s 
educational system, greatly advancing the processes of modernization and “Arabization” 
that had been underway since the 1910s. Shihab al-Din was appointed Mudir al-Taʿlim 
(Director of Studies), and sat on the Educational Council. While the Council dealt with 
broad financial and administrative functions, Shihab al-Din undertook the day-to-day 
management of the schools, including the drafting of syllabi and timetables.245 He recalls 
that upon arriving, the Council tasked him with bringing Kuwaiti education in line with that 
of the Arab countries to enable graduates of local schools to study there.246 He held an 
examination for all the students, and determined that their standard did not surpass the 
fourth primary level according to the Iraqi system. Higher classes would gradually be 
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added to the Mubarakiyya School, where all the Palestinian teachers taught.247  
 Perhaps the most significant decision made by Shihab al-Din was the “wholesale” 
adoption of the Iraqi curriculum, with its “ambitious” array of subjects and emphasis on 
ideological indoctrination at the expense of practical instruction.248 Minor alterations were 
made in favor of other Arab curriculums, notably the Palestinian, whose English language 
curriculum was employed. 249  This was a clear case of what Gershoni describes as 
“exporting the revolution” of Iraqi Arab nationalist education through an Arab teacher 
educated and trained in Iraqi schools. It should also be noted that according to al-ʿAdsani, 
most members of the Educational Council already favored the adoption of the Iraqi 
curriculum even before deciding to employ the Palestinian teachers.250  The pro-Iraqi 
orientation of the councilmen al-Saqr and al-Ghanim has already been mentioned.  
 Kuwait’s adoption of the Iraqi curriculum also reflected its growing educational ties 
with its northern neighbor. As detailed in the previous chapter, the modernization of 
schooling in the 1910s and 1920s allowed increasing numbers of Kuwaiti youth, mostly 
sons of merchants, to continue their education in Baghdad and Basra. In 1925, Kuwait’s 
first scholarships were awarded to seven students to study in Iraq. The Legislative Council, 
it will be remembered, arranged for a further four scholarships to Baghdad in 1938. 
 By the end of the 1930s, Iraq hosted the majority of Kuwaiti students studying 
abroad. In mid-1938, the Political Agent reported that Kuwaitis studying at the expense of 
their families numbered thirteen in Iraq, four in Syria, six in India, and fourteen in Saudi 
Arabia.251 Early the following year he listed ten students in Iraq, two in Beirut, eight in 
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India, and one in Saudi Arabia, adding: “Iraq is already taking a dominant part in the 
education of the most intelligent Kuwait youths.”252 In 1940, the British Educational 
Adviser reported that “there are to my knowledge twenty-four Kuwaiti boys at present 
being educated abroad, most of them in ‘Iraq.”253 Furthermore, the few Kuwaiti teachers 
with formal training were virtually all graduates of Iraqi schools. An example from the 
1930s is Khalid al-Nasr Allah, who obtained his secondary degree from Iraq in 1934 and 
taught alongside the Palestinian teachers at the Mubarakiyya School in 1936.254   
 When the Legislative Council undertook its program of educational expansion in 
1938, it sought four additional male Palestinian teachers, this time with university degrees. 
It employed two graduates of Egypt’s Dar al-ʿUlum, Muhammad Mahmud Najm and ʿAbd 
al-Latif al-Salih, and two from the AUB, Zaki al-Dirhalli and ʿUmar al-Dajani. 255 
Furthermore, it engaged Wasifa ʿUda to take charge of the new girls’ school, aided by her 
sister Rafiqa. A third sister, Sukaina, joined them the following year.256 Although these 
teachers were engaged privately without the SMC’s assistance, the Educational Council 
members continued to rely on their Pan-Arab ties to recruit them. In an interview, the Dar 
al-ʿUlum graduate Najm states that it was Muhammad ʿAli al-Tahir who convinced him 
and his colleague al-Salih to take up their positions in Kuwait. Both men had close ties to 
this newspaper editor, whose longstanding ties to Kuwait and support for the Majlis 
Movement have already been mentioned. When a third wave of Palestinian teachers arrived 
in Kuwait in 1939, it included Muhammad ʿAli al-Tahir’s own nephew, Faisal Rashid al-
Tahir.257  
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 Between 1939 and 1942, the number of male Palestinian teachers in Kuwait appears 
to have fluctuated between eight and six as various teachers left the country and new ones 
were employed.258 This volatility in the staffing of the schools was mainly due to the lack 
of sufficient funding, which hampered the development of education in Kuwait.259 As shall 
be seen, a financial dispute was behind the departure of the Palestinian teachers from 
Kuwait in 1942. There is also evidence of disaffection and possible infighting. In the spring 
of 1941, the teachers Najm and al-Salih published a three-part open letter to the 
Educational Council in an Egyptian newspaper. In it, they complained of a range of 
educational and administrative shortcomings, and recommended a series of reforms.260 The 
female teachers, moreover, faced the added challenge of local cultural resistance to girls’ 
education.261 In the summer of 1940, a misunderstanding over issues of propriety led to the 
departure of the Palestinian sisters in charge of the female schools, who were replaced by 
teachers from Iraq and Syria.262   
 It is important to note that from 1939, the Palestinian teachers had to contend with 
increasing British intervention in Kuwaiti education, a response to the rise of Iraqi 
influence in the shaykhdom. The Political Resident articulated the British position in early 
1939:  
On the type and quality of… [local] education will largely depend whether the 
young Kuwaiti of the future will become a good citizen, or a discontented agitator, a 
thorn in the flesh of the Shaikh and or ourselves. Youth Movements… have already 																																																								
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began to show themselves in Kuwait, fanned by Iraqi propaganda.263 
 
He went on to argue that Britain should “make education in Kuwait itself as useful as 
possible and to try and inculcate the boys with pro-British ideas against Iraqi influence,” 
and also provide alternatives to higher education in Iraq.264 To this end, the British Council 
appointed an educational specialist, C.R.L. Adrian-Vallance, as Educational Adviser to the 
governments of Kuwait and Bahrain in late 1939. Although he was initially to be based in 
Kuwait, Adrian-Vallance was instead stationed in Bahrain and visited Kuwait 
periodically. 265  This was probably because Kuwait’s ruler, who had resisted the 
appointment of British advisers in the past,266 “was not too enthusiastic” about the idea.267  
 The British had mixed success in influencing education in Kuwait. Their most 
notable achievement during this period was stopping the ruler from accepting ten 
scholarships from the Iraqi government in 1940. Instead, they encouraged Shaykh Ahmad 
to send students to Bahrain,268 where Adrian-Vallance established a technical school. Four 
students were sent there at the Kuwaiti government’s expense in 1940, and the Kuwait Oil 
Company sponsored a further five the following year. 269  Other British attempts at 
intervention will be discussed below.  
 Despite numerous challenges and setbacks, the Palestinian teachers brought about 
several profound transformations in the state of Kuwaiti education during their six-year 
tenure. Firstly, their implementation of the Iraqi curriculum marked a watershed in the 
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modernization of education, and entailed the introduction of many new subjects including 
civics, the natural sciences, geometry, art, and physical education.270 The practices and 
trappings associated with education during this period also became more modernized and 
westernized. Students were made to sit at desks as opposed to mats on the floor,271 and 
wore Western dress for physical education and Scouting despite initial social resistance to 
this attire.272 Shihab al-Din even sought to encourage students to wear Western dress as 
their school uniform by providing free clothes at government expense. This policy failed, 
however, due to opposition from Kuwaiti society and the British Educational Adviser.273  
 Palestinian control of education also marked the beginning of the secularization of 
education in Kuwait, which had hitherto been the preserve of the ʿulamaʾ. As a mark of this 
transition, the Palestinian teachers instructed their pupils to address them as “effendi” 
instead of “mulla.”274 Furthermore, the Palestinian teachers raised the overall standard of 
education in Kuwait. Already by 1938, the British Political Agent reported that 
“preliminary education of a limited number of boys [has] been much improved by the 
Palestinian masters.”275  The following year, the British Educational Adviser credited 
Shihab al-Din with improving education in Kuwait. He described the teachers as 
“competent,” even while criticizing the overall standard of education.276 Shihab al-Din also 
functioned as inspector, overseeing the schools operated by local teachers.277 This entailed 
a degree of training for the Kuwaiti staff, most of which was educated at the Mubarakiyya 
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and Ahmadiyya schools.278 
 Finally, the Palestinian teachers also presided over the expansion of the educational 
system, which was driven by the Legislative Council’s decisions to abolish tuition fees and 
increase the number of schools.279 By the time the Palestinians left in the fall of 1942, the 
combined total of students in Kuwait’s four male schools was 1,080, with 415 in the more 
advanced Mubarakiyya School.280 By 1939, Kuwait’s first secondary-level classes had been 
added to this school.281 The number of female schools, moreover, expanded from one in 
1938 to three in 1942, with the number of schoolgirls increasing from one hundred to 
332.282   
 Several innovations introduced by the Palestinian teachers contributed to an 
increasing identification with Arab nationalism, namely: the Iraqi curriculum, Scouting and 
physical education, and extracurricular activities. As discussed previously, the Iraqi 
curriculum was designed to foster national awareness through the “national subjects” of 
history, Arabic, geography, civics, and physical education. As in Iraq, Kuwaiti students 
studied these subjects starting from the lower classes. The textbooks came from Iraq, and 
were criticized by Adrian-Vallance for focusing only on the Arab world. Geography books, 
he complained, “discuss merely the topography of the Middle East, with the emphasis on 
large towns like Damascus and Baghdad.”283 Regarding history, he remarked that while 
students were taught “nothing whatever about their own long history, or about our 150 
years’ protection of their shores and their liberties, they know… all about the struggles for 
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freedom of the various oppressed and ill-used Arab States.”284 
 Salih al-Shihab, who attended the Mubarakiyya between 1937 and 1940, 285 
identifies two of the history textbooks used during this period, both of which were authored 
by prominent Palestinian Arab nationalist intellectuals. Tarikh al-ʿArab wa-l-Islam (The 
History of the Arabs and Islam) by Muhammad ʿIzzat Darwaza was used during the sixth 
primary year, while Darwish al-Miqdadi’s Tarikh al-Umma al-ʿArabiyya (The History of 
the Arab Nation) was taught during the first year of the secondary level.286 Ernest Dawn 
considers the latter work to be among the most “comprehensive” early articulations of “the 
Arab nationalist self-view.”287 The components of this self-view, which underline al-
Miqdadi’s narrative of Arab history from antiquity to the time of publication, are anti-
imperialism, socialism, and what Dawn describes as “the Semito-Arab version of 
history.”288 The latter conceived of the Arabs as the heirs to the Semitic civilization, which 
has been locked in an age-old struggle with the Aryans, i.e. the Persians and Europeans. 
The former, driven by nationalist fervor, undermined the Arab-Islamic empire from within, 
while the latter have sought to subjugate the Arabs since the Crusades.289 Zionism is 
portrayed as the latest manifestation of Western imperial aggression.290  
 The didactic purpose of al-Miqdadi’s textbook is made clear in its introduction, 
which begins thus: “the goal of teaching national history in our schools is spreading the 
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nationalist idea, so that students are brought up believing they have an existence (kayān), a 
history, and a nation, and so that they respect their nation and traditions.”291 Furthermore, 
as Youssef Choueiri highlights, the text encourages pupils “to embrace the virtues of 
modern citizenship, national unity and service to the fatherland.”292 It also advances a 
“general modernist view,” particularly with regards to the status of women.293 True to the 
British adviser’s characterization, al-Miqdadi’s textbook does not cover the history of the 
Gulf. However, he does provide a very brief account of the history of Kuwait, stating that it 
was an Ottoman dependency until the British intervened. He adds: “Kuwait today is an 
emirate subject to British influence. It has an amir and an [independent] existence even 
though it is a small spot, and it would be better if it belonged to Najd or Iraq.”294 
 The character of history instruction in Kuwait’s schools is among the factors that 
led Adrian-Vallance to report to the ruler on the “necessity of cultivating in the school-
children… a patriotic feeling for Kuwait, rather than for the Arab world as a whole.”295 The 
British authorities even tried to convince Shaykh Ahmad to commission Adrian-Vallance to 
write a textbook on Kuwaiti history, but the ruler did not wish to pay the demanded 
£100.296 The adviser also objected to the schools’ distribution of “exercise books which 
bore on their covers the portrait of a foreign Ruler and the name of a foreign State,” i.e. Iraq 
and its king.297 This led the Educational Department to provide notebooks with Shaykh 
Ahmad’s picture, but in 1940 the adviser reported that some pupils still used “privately-
purchased books displaying…the portraits of Riza Khan or the boy-king of ‘Iraq.”298  
 A second means by which the Palestinian teachers disseminated Arab nationalist 																																																								
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ideology was through Scouting and physical education. Muhammad al-Maghribi, one of the 
first Palestinian teachers to arrive, had been an accomplished Scout while a student at the 
SMC’s Rawdat al-Maʿarif.299 Described by Adrian-Vallance as a man of “efficiency and 
enthusiasm,”300 al-Maghribi established Kuwait’s first Boy Scout troop at the Mubarakiyya 
School in late 1936. More than one hundred boys enrolled over the course of the following 
year.301 He also introduced physical education.302 As in Iraq, athletic teams and Scouting 
troops were named after historical Arab heroes.303 Al-Maghribi also appears to have 
imbued Scouting with a militaristic quality. He led his Scouts on marches around the town 
and they served as a “guard of honor” during festivals and public ceremonies.304  
 The political nature of Scouting activity in Kuwait is highlighted by an incident in 
1941 that aroused British concern. A troop of Kuwaiti Scouts visited Bahrain with their 
Palestinian and Kuwaiti teachers. At several functions, the troop insisted on singing about 
“Palestine, [and] the killing and ill-treatment of Arabs there.” In their view, the Kuwaiti 
Scouts were “making an attempt to imbue Bahrain schoolboys with undesirable Arab 
‘Jugend’ ideas.”305 Al-Shihab, who was one of the Kuwaiti Scouts present, adds that the 
troop’s orator vigorously attacked British colonialism and Zionism in several speeches. He 
also responds to the British account by pointing out that the Scouts’ Bahraini hosts were no 
less enthusiastic in their support for Palestine and Arab nationalism.306  
 Extracurricular activities introduced by the Palestinians also served to cultivate a 
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sense of Arab nationalism among students. An early example of such an activity occurred 
during the aforementioned visit by a Palestinian delegation to the Mubarakiyya School in 
late 1936. Muhammad ʿIzzat Darwaza recalls that he and his companions listened to the 
students recite poetry about Palestine and Arab nationalism under the supervision of their 
Palestinian teachers.307 While this was an exceptional event, the singing of Arab nationalist 
anthems during the morning lineup was a regular feature of school life. The anthems 
included “Ya Ayuha al-ʿArabi Qum (Oh Arab Awake)”, “Bilad al-ʿUrb Awtani (The Lands 
of the Arabs are my Homeland),” and “Mawtini (My Homeland).”308 Adrian-Vallance also 
objected to the use of the Syrian national anthem in Kuwaiti schools, prompting the 
teachers to substitute the word “Kuwait” for “Syria.”309  
 Najm and al-Salih, who were both Arabic teachers educated at Egypt’s Dar al-
ʿUlum, expanded extracurricular cultural activity following their arrival in 1938. They 
staged one of Kuwait’s earliest plays in the summer of 1939, the first of many that 
portrayed classical Arab and Islamic history. They also held public celebrations during 
religious holidays in which students recited speeches and poetry. 310  This activity 
occasionally became overtly political, as when the Palestinian teachers organized a 
ceremony at the Mubarakiyya School to mourn the death of Iraq’s King Ghazi in 1939. 
This incident angered Shaykh Ahmad, who withdrew his two sons from the school.311 
 Such extracurricular activities also allowed for close social interaction between the 
Palestinian teachers and their students, a factor that was as important as the formal 
curriculum in the spread of Arab nationalist ideas. This is evident in the case of Ahmad al-
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Khatib, who would cofound the MAN and lead Kuwait’s Arab nationalist opposition in the 
1950s. Al-Khatib credits his first stirrings of Arab national sentiment in the late 1930s to 
the influence of his Palestinian teachers. He and his classmates were particularly attached 
to Faisal al-Tahir, nephew of Muhammad ʿAli al-Tahir, who ran a summer camp and took 
the students on field trips. “Through him,” recalls al-Khatib, “we lived the tragedy of the 
Palestinians.” A chemistry teacher, Faisal al-Tahir taught his pupils how to make 
gunpowder and educated them about the Arab Revolt in Palestine.312 Al-Tahir would later 
die in a bomb making accident during the 1948 War.313  
 Al-Shihab similarly recalls that the students of the Mubarakiyya learned much about 
the revolt in Palestine from their Palestinian teachers. He states:  
Those teachers were our only source of information [on these events], as only a few 
people had radio sets. They inflamed our fervor and hostility towards the colonial 
powers’ conspiracy, which aimed to create a Zionist entity that would be a thorn in 
the side of the greater Arab homeland.314 
 
The Palestinian teachers’ social ties were not restricted to the students, and encompassed 
the Kuwaiti teachers and the wider public as well. Every Thursday, the Mubarakiyya 
School hosted a cultural salon attended by the Palestinian and Kuwaiti teachers as well as 
prominent local poets such as Fahad al-ʿAskar and Saqr al-Shabib. The Palestinian teachers 
also regularly attended the various dīwānīyyāt of Kuwait town, and were thus able to 
influence wider society.315  
 Within the space of around six years, the Palestinian teachers erected the basic 
structure of modern state education in Kuwait on solidly Arab nationalist foundations. 
Their legacy is among the main factors that ensured that Arab nationalist influence 
persisted within the Educational Department despite ongoing British efforts to eradicate it. 																																																								
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After 1948, many of these teachers would return to work in Kuwait, indicating that their 
dispute with the department and subsequent departure did not sever their ties to the country.  
Kuwaiti Students Abroad, 1938-1942  
 
 During the late 1930s and early 1940s, the rise in the number of Kuwaitis studying 
in Arab countries produced significant social and political repercussions in the shaykhdom. 
Gradually, the circle of those able to to study abroad was expanding, particularly as the 
Legislative Council sowed the seeds of what would become a government scholarship 
program. In Basra, Baghdad, and Cairo, the students underwent “pilgrimages” that 
reinforced their identification with a wider Arab homeland. Like the Islamic modernist 
ʿulamaʾ and cosmopolitan merchants before them, they became incorporated into 
transnational networks that later influenced their political and professional activities in 
Kuwait. 
 The Kuwaiti students’ “pilgrimages” also led them to identify with the effendiyya 
stratum in their host countries, adopting the habits and worldview of this social group. As 
pupils enrolled at modern institutions, clad in Western suits and the Iraqi sidāra or 
Egyptian fez, the young Kuwaitis would have been indistinguishable from their peers. In 
the context of Iraq and Egypt, they were effendiyya. Upon returning home, these young 
men retained many aspects of this distinctive identity. They were significant enough to 
have a political impact within the shaykhdom, as evinced by the their role in the 1938 
Majlis Movement. However, the as yet rudimentary nature of educational and bureaucratic 
institutions in Kuwait meant that they remained a tiny minority, and cannot be said to have 
formed a social stratum. These educated young men will therefore be described as “proto-
effendiyya.” 
 In late 1938, when five Kuwaiti scholarship students were about to depart for 
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Baghdad’s Dar al-Muʿalimin al-Rifiyya (Rural Teachers’ College), the British Political 
Agent anticipated the effects Iraqi education would have on the youths. “I deplore the idea 
that any more Kuwait boys should go to Bagdad,” he protested, “There is inculcated, not a 
healthy patriotism, but what I can only call a ‘half-baked’, anti-British, and virulent, 
nationalism.”316 He went on to warn of the city’s subversive press, “occasional coup 
d’etat,” and its rowdy and politicized students.317 This characterization was not inaccurate. 
Iraqi students were often encouraged to engage in anti-British protests and other activity in 
support of Pan-Arab causes. Their participation in various paramilitary youth groups has 
already been discussed.318  
 The Political Agent probably based his evaluation of Iraqi education on the growing 
numbers of Kuwaitis educated in Baghdad and Basra. By the late 1930s, they had become a 
conspicuous presence. During his visit to Kuwait in 1939, the Australian travel writer Alan 
Villiers took note of this group, which he termed “the intelligentsia.” An admirer of 
Kuwait’s traditional virtues, he scoffed at these “youths coming back in silk trousers from 
Iraq,” who complained of the “backwardness” of their shaykhdom “and spoke of the 
democracy of Iraq as an ideal to strive for.”319  
 Villiers arrived in Kuwait after the Legislative Council had been dissolved, and thus 
did not witness the prominent political role played by the proto-effendiyya in the Majlis 
Movement. This was most apparent in the Patriotic Youths’ Bloc, which constituted the 
ideological apparatus of the Legislative Council, and bore arms to defend it during the 
standoff with the ruler. Graduates of Iraqi schools occupied prominent positions within the 
Majlis Movement. Khalid Sulaiman al-ʿAdsani, a recipient of Kuwait’s first scholarship to 
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Iraq in 1925, served as secretary of the Legislative Council and one of the Majlis 
Movement’s most committed Arab nationalist activists. The Iraqi-educated teacher Khalid 
al-Nasr Allah was appointed to the Legislative Council’s Youth Committee, established to 
instruct and guide Kuwaiti youth.320 Both men were also members of the Patriotic Youths’ 
Bloc.321  
 Even Kuwaiti students still studying in Iraq were able to participate actively in the 
Majlis Movement and become key figures within the Patriotic Youths’ Bloc. A prominent 
example is Jasim Hamad al-Saqr. The younger brother of the opposition leader ʿAbd Allah, 
he moved to Basra in 1931 due to his family’s interests in date farming. He completed his 
primary, intermediate, and secondary education in the city. In 1939 he enrolled in 
Baghdad’s College of Law, from which he would graduate in 1943, becoming one of the 
first Kuwaitis to obtain a university degree.322 At the time of the Majlis Movement, Jasim 
was a seasoned member of Iraq’s paramilitary Futuwwa. Drawing on this experience, he 
volunteered to train Kuwait’s first modern police force, created by the Legislative 
Council.323 He also sat on the administrative committee of the Patriotic Youths’ Bloc.324 A 
British report described him thus: “Very fanatic and always carries an automatic pistol.”325  
 Another illustrative example is Ahmad al-Sayyid ʿUmar, the son of the Turkish 
cleric ʿUmar ʿAsim al-Izmiri who taught at the Mubarakiyya School. Ahmad was raised 
and educated in Kuwait, and moved to Basra to complete secondary school in 1934. It was 
there that he recalls becoming politically aware, reading various political literature. During 
a visit home in 1938, he joined the Patriotic Youths’ Bloc. At its inaugural party, he recited 
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a poem he had composed celebrating the departure of the ruler’s secretary Mulla Salih from 
Kuwait. The poem became well known, and almost led to his arrest after the Legislative 
Council’s dissolution.326 His poetry, which he published in various Iraqi newspapers, 
earned him the epithet “Poet of the Youth.”327Ahmad also participated in the popular 
protests in support of the Rashid ʿAli government in 1941. After its overthrow, the British 
imprisoned him in Basra for six months, where he claims he was tortured.328 
 In the case of the scholarship students sent to Iraq in 1938, it turned out that the 
Political Agent’s fears regarding their politicization were not misplaced. One of the pupils, 
ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Dusari, recalls how their Arab nationalist zeal drove them to undergo 
military training and participate in patriotic events such as the funeral of King Ghazi in 
1939. He and his fellow scholarship recipients, Khalid al-Musallam, Salih ʿAbd al-Malik 
al-Salih, ʿAbd Allah al-Mutawwaʿ, and Badr al-Sayyid Rajab al-Rifaʿi, later volunteered in 
the Civil Defense forces that supported the Rashid ʿAli regime against the British. For 
around a month, they worked all day long in the arsenals, where they loaded arms and 
ammunition onto military trucks.329  
 The four scholarship students sent to the secular branch of Cairo’s al-Azhar 
University in 1939 had similar experiences to their Baghdad-based compatriots. The youths 
arrived at a time when Egypt was building cultural and political bridges with the Arab 
countries, and Arab nationalist ideas were gaining ground, particularly in intellectual and 
educational circles.330 The four Kuwaiti pupils, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain, Ahmad al-ʿAdwani, 
Yusuf Mishari al-Badr, and Yusuf al-ʿUmar, were thoroughly exposed to Egyptian political 
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and cultural life. In an interview, Husain recalls how this “pilgrimage” experience led him 
and his classmates to develop a close association with the Egyptians.  
Wartime Egypt boasted a dynamic ideological environment…. We were truly 
dazzled by the lectures of Taha Husain and the writers of al-Risala magazine, and 
by Ahmad Amin and his comrades on the Committee of Authorship, Translation, 
and Publishing. We followed partisan politics, identifying with this party or that, 
unperturbed by the fact that the officials regarded us as “foreign” students. Our 
classmates and the general public, who treated us kindly and courteously, 
encouraged our attitude. These people did not have a clear conception of the idea of 
Arab nationalism, but their spontaneous emotions exceeded [ideological] formalities 
and formulas. For this reason, I (and perhaps most Arabs studying in Egypt) did not 
feel isolated from the issues of Egyptian society. Throughout the seven years of the 
war we experienced the same problems, and were moved by the very same 
events.331 
 
The Kuwaiti students became active participants in intellectual and political activity. At 
least two, Husain and al-Badr, already had a political background, having been members of 
the Patriotic Youth’s Bloc before leaving for Egypt.332  
 Al-Badr, the son of a Legislative Council member, frequented the salon of the 
Palestinian editor Muhammad ʿAli al-Tahir, which was a meeting place for anti-imperialist 
activists from across the region.333 This appears to have influenced him, for in 1941 he was 
arrested for “the circulation of anti-British propaganda” in Cairo. The British authorities 
imprisoned him in Palestine for around a year, and then deported him to Kuwait.334 Al-
ʿAdwani, in addition, recalls participating regularly in various protests, including some in 
support of the Palestinian cause and others directed against the British and Egyptian 
governments.335  
 Over the course of the 1940s, all the aforementioned Kuwaiti scholarship students 
would return to work for the Educational Department, playing a central role in reinforcing 																																																								
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its Arab nationalist character. They would also swell the ranks of the proto-effendiyya, 
which continued to expand as oil wealth allowed for the development of an ambitious 
scholarship program. As education and the state bureaucracy developed, a fully-fledged 
effendiyya stratum would gradually take shape in Kuwait in around the early 1950s, a  
subject that will be dealt with in a later chapter.
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Chapter Three: British Intervention, Egyptian Control,  
and Arab Nationalist Resistance, 1942-1950 
 
The arrival of the Palestinian teachers in 1936 inaugurated what would be 
sixteen years of increasing Arab control over education in Kuwait. After their departure 
in 1942, teachers from different Arab countries succeeded each other at the helm of 
Kuwait’s Educational Department in a process that one Kuwaiti student would later 
compare to the military coups of 1950s Syria.1 In the academic year 1942-1943, Syrian 
teachers and an official Egyptian Educational Mission served under a Bahraini Director 
of Education. The following year saw the Egyptian mission assert control over 
education, which it would maintain until the 1949-1950 school year. This “coup” was 
facilitated by the British, who sought to co-opt members of the mission in order to 
assert greater control over education and replace the Arab nationalist Iraqi curriculum 
with that of Egypt. 
The British scheme, however, was resisted and largely foiled by an Arab 
nationalist current that emerged among the Kuwaiti teachers, supported by certain 
influential members of the Educational Council. During the 1940s, the Educational 
Department in fact became the primary base for Arab nationalist activism in Kuwait and 
the growing number of “proto-effendiyya.” In 1948, Palestinian teachers also began 
returning to Kuwait, strengthening the Arab nationalist current and eventually clashing 
with the department’s Egyptian administration. The 1940s was thus characterized by 
both increased Arab control over education and greater contestation over its Arab 
nationalist character. However, the most significant impact of Egyptian control over 
Kuwaiti education was that it allowed for a dramatic increase in the number of 
scholarships to Cairo, a development that had far-reaching socio-political implications 
for Kuwait. This period concluded with a third “coup” in 1950, which ended the period 
of Egyptian ascendancy.  																																																								
1 Hamid ʿAbd al-Salam, “Araʾ al-Nas,” al-Biʿtha, September 1951, 260. 
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A Transitional Period, 1942-1943 
 
 The establishment of state education in Kuwait under the aegis of the 
Educational Council occurred against the backdrop of mounting Arab nationalist 
activism. The early 1940s, by contrast, presented a markedly different environment. 
Following the dissolution of the Legislative Council in 1939, Kuwait’s Arab nationalists 
pinned their hopes on the Rashid ʿAli Revolt, with those present in Iraq actively 
supporting it. The British invasion of Iraq in 1941 destroyed a vital base of support for 
Kuwait’s nationalist movement. With the movement’s leaders imprisoned or in exile, its 
future appeared bleak.2 The scope for political and cultural activity in Kuwait became 
severely restricted, and would remain so throughout the decade.3  
 Remarkably, Arab nationalist influence within the Educational Department 
persisted despite this inhospitable climate. This can be attributed to several actors, 
namely: the Educational Council, Arab expatriate teachers, and a rising Arab nationalist 
current among the Kuwaiti teachers. At the same time, the British stepped up their 
efforts to undermine the nationalist character of education. The year 1942-1943 
represents a transitional period during which the first “coup” in the Educational 
Department took place. Command passed from the Palestinian teachers to a joint 
administration composed of a Bahraini Director of Education and a Syro-Egyptian 
faculty. The new regime was staunchly nationalist, and therefore met fierce British 
resistance.   
 The first actor within Kuwait’s educational administration that favored the 
continuation of Arab nationalist influence was the Educational Council. As has been 
stated, the fate of this body under the Legislative Council is uncertain, but it appears 
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again in the documentary record in October 1940.4 It is unclear whether it had survived 
throughout this period or if the ruler resurrected it. Although Shaykh Ahmad al-Jabir 
greatly strengthened his position after quashing the Majlis Movement, he felt the need 
to normalize relations with the merchants and co-opt them within his administration. In 
1944, he freed the imprisoned leaders of the Majlis Movement and declared an amnesty 
for the vast majority of exiles.5 As part of this reconciliation process, leading merchants 
served on a variety of government institutions. Alongside the appointed Shura Council 
that replaced the dissolved Legislative Council, the ruler perpetuated and even 
expanded the administrative council system of the 1930s. However, councilmen were 
no longer elected but appointed by the ruler. In addition to the Municipal and 
Educational Councils, the ruler formed the Health Council in 1943,6 the Awqaf Council 
in 1949,7 and a variety of temporary, ad hoc councils throughout the 1940s.8  
  The ruler’s conciliatory attitude ensured a great deal of continuity in 
membership between the Educational Council of the 1930s and that of the 1940s, 
ensuring that nationalist merchants retained a great deal of influence over education in 
Kuwait. A 1942 document, which provides the first mention of the body’s members in 
the 1940s, reveals that half of them had been on the last council in 1937. These were: 
the former Director of Education Yusuf bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi, Nisf Yusuf al-Nisf, ʿAbd al-
Muhsin al-Khrafi, and Ahmad al-Mishari.9 Of these men, al-Nisf had particularly strong 
Arab nationalist tendencies despite his loyalist position during the Majlis Movement. As 
has been stated, he is reported to have been a Red Book Group member and to have 
aided in smuggling weapons to Palestine. Al-Qinaʿi and al-Khrafi had also participated 
actively in the pro-Palestine activism of the 1930s. 																																																								
4 IOR/R/15/5/196: Vallance to Galloway, 1/10/1940.  
5 IOR/L/P&S/12/3758: Intelligence Summary, 16-30 April 1944. 
6 Al-Rumi, 96-97. 
7 “Huna al-Kuwait,” al-Biʿtha, February 1949, 59.  
8 IOR/L/P&S/12/3759A: Intelligence Summary, 16-30 September 1947; Intelligence Summary, 1-15 
March 1947; Intelligence Summary, August and September 1946.  
9 IOR/R/15/5/196: Wakelin’s Report, November 1942.  
 161	
 Surprisingly, the reformist opposition was also represented on the council by the 
former political prisoner and devoted Arab nationalist ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Saniʿ. Nothing 
is known of the remaining two councilmen. 10  The nationalist character of the 
Educational Council seemed to be at least partially apparent to the British Political 
Agent, who described its members as “for the most part mildly anti-foreign in their 
sympathies and not particularly pro-Shaikh.” He reserved special criticism for al-Qinaʿi, 
calling him “a double dealing bigoted old scoundrel with distinctly anti-British 
views.”11 
 In 1942, there was a dramatic change in the Educational Department’s staff, the 
reasons for which were described by the Political Agent as “somewhat obscure.”12 At 
the end of the academic year 1941-1942, the Educational Council reduced the 
Palestinian teachers’ salaries, prompting all but one to resign.13 F.J. Wakelin, who 
succeeded Adrian-Vallance as British Educational Adviser in October 1941,14 portrays 
this decision as purely financial. The council learned of the Egyptian government’s 
willingness to second teachers to Arab countries and subsidize their salaries, and thus 
wished to dispense with the Palestinians. 15  It has already been stated that the 
Educational Department was going through financial troubles at the time.  
 According to al-Shihab, there were also rumors that the council’s action arose 
from British pressure on the ruler to “change the educational policy and the character of 
the curriculum.”16 The British were clearly unhappy with the Iraqi curriculum, and 
Adrian-Vallance saw the appointment of a “foreign Director” as the only way to change 																																																								
10 Ibid. These were ʿAbd Allah al-Zaid and Yusuf al-ʿAbd al-Razzaq.  
11 IOR/R/15/5/196: Hickinbotham to PR, 18/11/1942.  
12 IOR/R/15/1/719: Administration Report 1942, 6.   
13 IOR/R/15/5/196: Wakelin’s Report, November 1942. The exception was ʿAbd al-Latif al-Salih, who 
stayed on for one more year. Al-Shihab says he elected to stay because he had studied alongside the new 
Director of Education, ʿAbd al-Latif al-Shamlan, at Dar al-ʿUlum. S. al-Shihab Vol. 2, 61. 
14 IOR/R/15/5/196: Secretary of State to PR, 22/4/1942; PR to PA, 23/3/1942. 
15 IOR/R/15/5/196: Wakelin’s Report, November 1942; S. al-Shihab Vol. 2, 59-61. The Political Agent 
holds that the Palestinian teachers were let go after asking for increased salaries. IOR/R/15/1/719: 
Administration Report 1942, 6. 
16 S. al-Shihab Vol. 2, 60.  
 162	
it.17 However, there is no evidence of a British role in the Palestinians’ departure. 
Finally, it is also possible that the aforementioned administrative instability and decline 
in academic standards contributed to the council’s desire for new staff.  
 In place of al-Qinaʿi, the Educational Council appointed the Bahraini ʿAbd al-
Latif al-Shamlan as Director of Education. Al-Shamlan had just graduated from Cairo’s 
Dar al-ʿUlum when he befriended the newly arrived Kuwaiti scholarship students in 
1939. One of the students, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain, wrote to the Kuwaiti authorities and 
recommended that they employ al-Shamlan as a teacher. They agreed, and al-Shamlan 
taught for around a year at the Mubarakiyya School before becoming director.18  
 Al-Shamlan had a strong Arab nationalist and anti-British background. As a 
child, he lived for a number of years in Bombay, where the British had exiled his father 
Saʿad on charges of sedition. ʿAbd al-Latif’s brother ʿAbd al-ʿAziz would become a 
principal leader of the Bahraini opposition in the 1950s, leading the British to imprison 
him on St Helena.19 ʿAbd al-Latif previously taught alongside Arab nationalist teachers 
like the Syrian ʿUthman al-Hurani at Bahrain’s al-Hidaya al-Khalifiyya School in the 
1920s. He was compelled to quit after the British-backed educational authorities took 
over this school. He then founded his own private school, which he eventually closed 
due to British pressure, moving to Egypt to continue his education in 1931.20 As shall 
be seen, his trouble with the British would continue in Kuwait.  
 The Educational Council tasked ʿAbd al-Latif al-Shamlan with securing 
educational assistance from Cairo, which was then cementing its status as the cultural 
and educational hub of the Arab world. The Arab nationalist trend that emerged in 
Egypt in the 1930s developed further in the 1940s. Arab nationalism penetrated the 
political establishment, increasingly influencing both the palace-backed factions and the 																																																								
17 IOR/R/15/5/196: Vallance to Galloway, 1/10/1940.  
18 ʿAbd al-Latif al-Shamlan, Interview by Milaiji, Asatidha fi Maidan Akhar, 263; ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain, 
“Min Kuttab al-Muttawaʿ ila al-Jamiʿa,” Interview by Junaidi Khalaf Allah, al-Kuwait, October 1980, 51. 
19 Khalid al-Bassam, Shakhsiyyat Bahrainiyya (Beirut: Jadawel, 2011), 49-60.    
20 S. al-Shihab Vol. 2, 51, 54.  
 163	
opposition Wafd Party from the late 1930s. 21  At the same time, the Egyptian 
intellectuals who had been at the forefront of cultural exchange with the Arab countries 
called upon their country to lead efforts to forge Arab unity in education.22 These calls 
became particularly pertinent in the early 1940s, when the British occupation of Iraq 
ended that state’s role as the primary patron of Pan-Arab educational cooperation.23  
 Late in 1941, the Egyptian government announced its intention to launch a 
“programme aiming at strengthening the cultural ties between the Arab countries.”24 
This project expanded under the subsequent Wafdist government, which was anxious to 
prove its Arab nationalist credentials after having been imposed by the British. In 1943, 
the Prime Minister Mustafa al-Nahhas embarked upon the pan-Arab talks that would 
lead to the formation of the Arab League.25 Cultural coordination was thus subsumed 
within a wider scheme of Arab unification. As part of its bid for pan-Arab leadership, 
the Egyptian government sought “to demonstrate its cultural ascendancy” by 
disseminating educational assistance to various Arab states.26 It was out of this context 
that Egyptian educational assistance to Kuwait emerged.    
 In approaching Egypt’s educational authorities, ʿAbd al-Latif al-Shamlan relied 
on the connections he had established while studying there. He sought the intercession 
of the “prominent pan-Arabist”27 and intellectual ʿAbd al-Wahhab ʿAzzam. Together, 
they approached Taha Husain, then a technical adviser to the Wafdist government, and 
Prime Minister al-Nahhas. Al-Shamlan recalls that both men were extremely 
welcoming. They quickly agreed to depute four teachers to Kuwait and subsidize half 
their salaries, and to provide scholarships to ten or eleven Kuwaiti students to complete 
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their secondary education in Egypt.28 According to al-Shihab, al-Shamlan was allowed 
to handpick the teachers. He chose his former classmate at Dar al-ʿUlum ʿAli Haikal, 
and relied on him to select the rest.29 These teachers comprised an official Egyptian 
Educational Mission (biʿtha taʿlīmīyya) to Kuwait.30 
 On the same trip, al-Shamlan visited Damascus, where he attempted to arrive at 
a similar arrangement with the Syrian authorities. The Syrian teacher Faisal al-ʿAzma 
recalls this visit in his memoire. He was then a fresh law graduate, and was 
disappointed to hear that the Syrian Ministry of Education had refused al-Shamlan’s 
request. A committed Arab nationalist, he took it upon himself to organize a group of 
Syrians, numbering three apart from himself, who agreed to teach in Kuwait at the low 
salaries that the Educational Department was able to offer.31 The de facto head of the 
group was the professional teacher Kamil Binqisli,32 who appears to have had activist 
tendencies. He had participated in a nationalist-inspired aid scheme for Syrian villages 
that the Red Book Group had supported.33  
 Although the Egyptian Educational Mission would dominate education in Kuwait 
in the long run, the Syrian teachers initially had the upper hand, imbuing the educational 
system with a strong Arab nationalist character. Binqisli replaced the Palestinian Shihab 
al-Din as Director of Studies, also becoming headmaster of the Mubarakiyya School. 
The department retained the nationalist Iraqi curriculum, though some textbooks from 
Syria and Egypt were also used.34  
 Al-ʿAzma, who became headmaster of the Sharqiyya School, appears to have 																																																								
28 Al-Shamlan, Interview by Milaiji, 263-264; IOR/R/15/5/196: Wakelin’s Report, November 1942. 
Earlier British reports mention ten scholarships (IOR/R/15/5/196: Wakelin to PA, 27/3/1943; Wakelin’s 
Report, November 1942), but later reports mention eleven (IOR/R/15/5/197: Wakelin to Hilali Pasha, 
22/11/1943; IOR/R/15/5/196: Wakelin to Highwood, 3/12/1943). It is not clear if the early reports were 
incorrect or if the eleventh student was added subsequently.  
29 S. al-Shihab Vol. 2, 62.  
30 IOR/R/15/5/196: Wakelin’s Report, November 1942. 
31 Al-ʿAzma, 7-12; S. al-Shihab Vol. 2, 2, 149-151. 
32 IOR/R/15/5/196: Wakelin’s Report, November 1942. 
33 Jeha, 137.  
34 IOR/R/15/5/196: Wakelin’s Report, November 1942. 
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been particularly influential. Khalid Khalaf, a former student of his, describes him as “a 
great person and an Arab nationalist.” Al-Shihab, who taught at al-ʿAzma’s school, 
recalls the comradely relationship between the headmaster and his Kuwaiti staff. He 
adds that the Syrian “worked hard to instill [his students with]… nationalist feeling and 
belonging to the Arab nation, emphasizing the importance of Arab unity and discarding 
the yoke of colonialism.” Both men recall that al-ʿAzma frequently enjoined his 
students to sing nationalist and martial anthems, including the aforementioned “The 
Lands of the Arabs are My Homeland” and “Lahat Ruʾus al-Hirab (The Spearheads are 
Glinting).” According to al-Shihab, he also delivered rousing speeches “filled with 
glorification of the Arabs and Arabism.”35 
 The Syrian teachers, and al-ʿAzma in particular, placed great emphasis on 
Scouting and physical education with a strongly Arab nationalist flavor.36 Wakelin 
reported that in 1942, all four boys’ schools in Kuwait town had Boy Scout troops, 
which “concentrate[d] chiefly on drill and marching.” 37  The Scouts sang Arab 
nationalist anthems from Syria during their excursions, as well as during the public ʿId 
celebrations at the ruler’s palace.38 Al-ʿAzma also took his students on jogs around the 
town every morning. As they passed the British Political Agency, they defiantly belted 
out nationalist anthems. 39  The Syrians also injected political symbolism into the 
Educational Department’s annual sports day by having the students carry banners with 
the colors of the Pan-Arab flag. This flag was also displayed at various school 
celebrations.40 Finally, the Syrian teachers also sought to disseminate Arab nationalist 
ideas to society at large through visiting dīwānīyyāt in Kuwait town and even rural 
																																																								
35 Khalid Khalaf, “Hanin: Khalid Khalaf Yuqallib Safahat al-Madi 1/2,” Interview by Fawzi Jad al-
Karim, al-Nahar August 29, 2010, 16; S. al-Shihab Vol 2., 155-159.  
36 Al-ʿAzma, 117.  
37 IOR/R/15/5/196: Wakelin’s Report, November 1942. 
38 Al-ʿAzma, 36, 104.  
39 S. al-Shihab Vol. 2, 158. 
40 Al-ʿAzma, 118-119. 
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villages during Scouting trips.41 
 The Syrian teachers were not the only actors who fostered an Arab nationalist 
environment in the schools during this period; an Arab nationalist current was also 
growing among Kuwaiti teachers. With their political movement obliterated, Kuwait’s 
nationalists retreated to what Chatterjee describes as the “spiritual domain,” focusing on 
cultural activity whose political character was nonetheless evident. In the absence of 
other channels, the Educational Department served as the primary base for this activity, 
particularly as it employed a large proportion of Kuwait’s proto-effendiyya. Indeed, 
unless nationalist activity within the educational field is taken into account, 1940s 
Kuwait appears to be virtually devoid of grassroots politics.  
 Kuwaiti teachers who had studied in Arab countries were at the forefront of this 
nationalist current. In 1942, the five Kuwaitis sent on scholarship to Baghdad’s Rural 
Teachers’ College graduated and returned home,42 bringing the radical Arab nationalist 
ideology they had absorbed back with them. They were contractually obliged to become 
teachers in the government schools.43 Among them was Khalid al-Musallam, who 
taught his students the rousing anti-imperialist anthems that he and his classmates sang 
during the Rashid ʿAli Revolt.44 Another example is the aforementioned scholarship 
student in Egypt Yusuf al-Badr, who returned to become “one of the more promising 
local teachers” after his release from prison in Palestine.45 Over the course of the 1940s, 
increasing numbers of politicized graduates would return to work as teachers.  
 Kuwaiti teachers did not need to be educated abroad to espouse nationalist ideas. 
A case in point is ʿAbd Allah Zakaria al-Ansari, who graduated from the Mubarakiyya 
																																																								
41 Ibid., 37, 104, 109-110. 
42 ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Dusari, Interview by Milaiji, Rijal wa-Tarikh, 73; ʿAbd al-Latif al-Musallam, 
Interview by Milaiji, Rijal wa-Tarikh, 141; Salih ʿAbd al-Malik al-Salih, Interview by Milaiji, Asatidha fi 
Maidan Akhar, 36; ʿAbd Allah al-Muttawaʿ, Interview by Milaiji, Asatidha fi Maidan Akhar, 200; S. al-
Shihab Vol. 1, 237-238, 242-243.   
43 Husain, Interview by Khalaf Allah, 50; al-Khrafi, 810-811.  
44 S. al-Shihab Vol. 1, 239. 
45 IOR/R/15/5/197: Wakelin to Pelly, 27/1/1944.  
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and taught at his father’s private school before joining the Educational Department. In a 
later interview, he recalls his efforts to instill his students with a “patriotic and 
nationalist spirit.” On one occasion, he brought them to tears by speaking about the 
“Arab nation and its backwardness, and its persecution at the hands of colonialism.”46 
Al-Ansari also authored a highly nationalistic poem entitled “Arab Unity” to welcome 
the Syrian teachers to Kuwait.47 
 The activities of these Arab nationalist teachers were not limited to the classroom. 
Al-Musallam and al-Ansari each had dīwānīyyāt that served as cultural salons. Al-
ʿAzma describes them as successors of the by now defunct Literary Club, and recalls 
that they were “specialized in modern literature, and hardly a book is published in Syria, 
Iraq, or Egypt without the youth of these dīwānīyyāt knowing about it.” These forums 
were attended by “a new class of youth possessing modern culture (thaqāfa),” i.e. the 
proto-effendiyya, who kept in touch with intellectual developments in the Arab world 
through the press.48 
 While Arab nationalist influence within the Educational Department was initially 
strong, it was not long before British interference began to undermine it. Following a 
visit by the Educational Adviser Wakelin to Kuwait in November 1942, the British 
authorities were unhappy to learn that the Educational Department had dealt directly 
with the Egyptian government, apparently considering this a violation of Kuwait’s 
treaty obligations. However, the arrival of the Egyptian Educational Mission presented 
them with a fait accompli.49 When the British challenged the ruler on this point, he 
stated that al-Shamlan was instructed to engage teachers privately and “did not have the 
right of approaching any foreign government.”50 The Political Agent was incredulous, 
stating that he was certain that the Educational Council had full knowledge of al-																																																								
46 ʿAbd Allah Zakaria al-Ansari, Interview by Milaiji, Asatidha fi Maidan Akhar, 8-11.  
47 Al-Wuqayyan, al-Qadiyya al-ʿArabiyya, 151-152.   
48 Al-ʿAzma, 109-110.   
49 IOR/R/15/5/196: Hickinbotham to PR, 18/11/1942; Wakelin’s Report, November 1942.  
50 IOR/R/15/5/196: Ruler to PA, 30/1/1943. 
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Shamlan’s mission, and it was probable that the ruler did as well.51  
 The British nevertheless placed all blame for this transgression on al-Shamlan, 
who they also considered to be unqualified, and pressured the ruler to dismiss him as 
Director of Education. Shaykh Ahmad agreed but prevaricated, retaining al-Shamlan as 
director for the duration of the 1942-1943 academic year. At the outset of the following 
year, al-Shamlan was moved to another position within the Educational Department, 
retaining the same salary. This did not satisfy the British, who compelled the ruler to 
remove al-Shamlan from the department altogether. They also caused his Lebanese wife 
to be discharged from her job as headmistress of one of the girls’ schools.52  
 British interference may have also contributed to the decision of all Syrian 
teachers but one to leave Kuwait after only one year. Al-ʿAzma states that Wakelin 
employed a “colonial” approach to education in Kuwait, viewing it as merely a means 
for creating employees. This contradicted with the Syrians’ “nationalist, progressive 
plan” that sought to raise a new generation of moral, fit, and principled Arabs. Al-
ʿAzma states that this disagreement was one of several factors that prevented the Syrian 
teachers from renewing their contracts.53  
 The departure of al-Shamlan and the Syrian teachers meant that the positions of 
Director of Education and Director of Studies were now empty. The British were quick 
to take advantage of this vacuum in leadership to impose greater control over the 
department and dilute its Arab nationalist orientation. After failing to halt Kuwait’s 
burgeoning educational ties to Egypt, they decided to pursue their goals in collaboration 
with the Egyptian Educational Mission.  
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British Control & Nationalist Resistance, 1943-1945 
 
 While the British authorities recognized the value of the Egyptian teachers and 
scholarships,54 they were wary of the political implications of official Egyptian funding 
for them. Over the course of the 1942-1943 school year, they lobbied the British 
Council to take over responsibility for subsidizing teachers and funding scholarships for 
Kuwait. They also requested that the Council appoint a full-time Director of Education 
for Kuwait, preferably an Englishman. A lack of funding combined with time and 
bureaucratic constraints meant that these proposals came to naught.55 Wakelin therefore 
employed an alternative strategy, working in coordination with the Egyptian authorities 
to take control of education in Kuwait. While this strategy was at first remarkably 
successful, it met with staunch opposition from the grassroots Arab nationalist current, 
which eventually influenced the Educational Council.  
 Under the guise of assisting Kuwait’s Educational Council, Wakelin inserted 
himself as an intermediary between it and the Egyptian authorities. He travelled to 
Cairo himself to engage new teachers and arrange accommodation for the Kuwaiti 
scholarship students. The teachers continued to be seconded and subsidized by the 
Egyptian government.56 However, Wakelin handpicked the new crop, which included a 
female teacher and an Azharite cleric who he engaged privately and were not seconded 
from Cairo. Two teachers also carried on from the previous year, one of which was ʿAli 
Haikal, the former classmate of al-Shamlan. Wakelin also inserted a clause into the 
teachers’ contracts preventing them from “correspond[ing] with the Ministry of 
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Education or any official body in Egypt except through” himself.57 
 During the summer, the Kuwaiti Educational Council declared its intention to 
appoint Haikal as Director of Education.58 Wakelin was quick to win him over and 
subject him to his authority. While still in Cairo, the two men met and agreed on a plan 
to drastically change both the administrative and educational systems within the 
Educational Department. 59  After the conclusion of this agreement, Wakelin 
recommended that the Kuwaiti Educational Council raise Haikal’s salary,60 and that the 
Egyptian Ministry of Education promote him.61 He also praised him in his reports,62 and 
invited him to visit Bahrain in the Spring of 1944 to study its educational system.63 
Finally, it is noteworthy that Haikal was appointed Director of Education, whereas in 
the past the senior Palestinian and Syrian teachers occupied the subordinate post of 
Director of Studies. The latter position was abolished. Haikal thus became second in 
command within the department, preceded only by its President Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-
Jabir. Although the reason for this is unclear, it is possible that it was part of Wakelin’s 
scheme of administrative centralization.  
 The plan agreed upon by Wakelin and Haikal clearly aimed to undermine Arab 
nationalist influence within the department. Its main points were “the replacement of all 
Syrian teachers in the boys’ schools by Egyptians or local staff… a unified control of all 
schools, [and] a remodelling of the entire syllabus.”64 The latter point entailed replacing 
the Arab nationalist Iraqi curriculum with that of Egypt, which was based on Egyptian 
territorial nationalism and focused less on Arabic language and Islamic studies. The 
character of the Egyptian curriculum will be discussed in detail below. This was not 																																																								
57 IOR/R/15/5/197: Wakelin to PR, 2/12/1943; IOR/R/15/5/196: Wakelin to PR, 15/9/1943; Wakelin to 
PA, 8/9/1943; Ambassador Cairo to PA, 8/9/1943. 
58 IOR/R/15/5/196: PA to Wakelin, 7/9/1943; PA to Wakelin, 29/8/1943.  
59 IOR/R/15/5/197: Wakelin to PR, 2/12/1943. 
60 IOR/R/15/5/197: Wakelin to Education Committee, 18/11/1943 
61 IOR/R/15/5/197: Wakelin to Hilali Pasha, 22/11/1943.   
62 IOR/R/15/5/197: Wakelin to PR, 4/12/1943; Wakelin to PR, 2/12/1943. 
63 IOR/R/15/5/197: Wakelin to Ruler, 26/3/1944; Wakelin to Ruler, 15/11/1943. 
64 IOR/R/15/5/197: Wakelin to PR, 2/12/1943.  
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sufficient for Wakelin. While establishing the Director of Education’s sole authority 
over pedagogical affairs, he also made himself the ultimate arbiter of “problems arising 
from the choice of syllabus, books used in the schools method of teaching etc.”65 He 
exercised this authority by vetting the textbooks he imported from Egypt via the British 
Council in conjunction with the Political Agent, excluding those deemed “politically 
undesirable.”66 Wakelin also sought to diminish the Educational Council’s influence by 
limiting its authority to financial matters.67 
 Secondly, by employing only Egyptian teachers and centralizing authority within 
the hands of the director, Wakelin aimed to limit factionalism within the staff and 
prevent particular schools from diverging from the official line. Wakelin issued a 
document outlining the rules all teachers had to follow. These affirmed the director’s 
authority over all schools and headmasters and prevented any changes from being made 
without his written consent. Moreover, all staff members were forbidden from engaging 
“in any political activities.” Finally, the document also reiterated the ban on any 
Egyptian teacher communicating directly with the Ministry of Education in Cairo.68 
 In December 1943, Wakelin boasted that he had “established real control of 
Koweit education.”69 However, by April 1944, he reported that “all was not well within 
the Department… [and] there was serious trouble among the staff.” In Wakelin’s 
version of events, two factions had emerged among the Egyptian teachers in November. 
One was led by Haikal and another by a headmaster and “mischief maker” named 
Muhammad ʿAbd al-Munʿim al-Najmi.70 Motivated by petty jealousies, each faction 
sought to discredit the other, enlisting “the help of influential people and the local 
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staff.”71 However, it is clear from numerous accounts by Kuwaitis who were involved 
in the events that Wakelin was either oblivious to the true nature of the unrest or did not 
wish to admit it.  
 While varying slightly, the local accounts agree that the dispute began when a 
group of Kuwaiti teachers opposed Haikal for his subservience to Wakelin and his 
colonial British agenda.72 Most of the accounts specify the reason for the opposition as 
the replacement of the Iraqi curriculum, which the teachers considered to be “Arab-
Islamic”73 and “serving the causes of the Arab nation.”74 The group, which numbered 
ten to twelve teachers, included all five graduates of the 1938 scholarship to Iraq, in 
addition to al-Ansari, al-Shihab, and other locally educated teachers. A few educated 
youth who were not teachers were also involved. The men held secret meetings and 
distributed handbills attacking Haikal.  
 In January 1944, the British Political Agent reported: “certain intrigues [are] afoot 
in the local schools against the Director of Education and his staff... The intriguers are 
reported to be Kuwait teachers and some outsiders.”75 On February 2nd, eight Kuwaitis 
were arrested, some of whom were trying to escape to Iraq. The President of the 
Educational Department had two of them publicly beaten in the Mubarakiyya 
schoolyard.76 The local accounts add that some were also imprisoned, though prominent 
individuals soon interceded to have them released. There also occurred a student strike; 
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some sources state that the teachers led it,77 while others maintain that it was held in 
protest at their imprisonment.78 The Egyptian headmaster al-Najmi is also said to have 
supported the teachers’ opposition to Haikal, thus tying it to the intra-Egyptian 
factionalism reported by Wakelin.79  
 Soon after cracking down on the teachers’ opposition, Kuwait’s educational 
authorities turned against Haikal after discovering that he had doctored examination 
results so as to discredit his rivals.80 The Educational Council decided to fire him and 
asked Wakelin to find a successor. In his subsequent report on the events, which he 
submitted to the ruler, Wakelin agreed that “Haikal must go,” but also recommended in 
very strong terms that his rival al-Najmi be dismissed. He acknowledged that the 
Educational Council opposed the latter’s dismissal, but insisted upon it nonetheless.81 
The council interpreted Wakelin’s report as a statement that al-Najmi would be 
dismissed regardless of its opposition, and now turned on the British adviser as well. It 
stated that Wakelin’s recommendation contradicted an earlier agreement with him that 
al-Najmi would be retained for the duration of the academic year.82  
 The Educational Council also now objected to Wakelin’s title of “Educational 
Adviser.” The Political Agent stated that this was “possibly because it was thought that 
this opened the way to further administrative penetration on our side.”83 This is 
confirmed by Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Jabir’s account, in which he states that the British 
“wanted to have a prominent role in administering education as in Bahrain, and wanted 
to appoint Wakelin as an adviser with the right to actively intervene in education, but 
we refused.”84 After the Political Agent pressed the ruler to dismiss al-Najmi on several 
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occasions, he replied that he could not do so “without incurring the charge of allowing 
himself to be dictated by the Educational Adviser.”85 
 By overplaying his hand, Wakelin did irreparable damage to the prestige of his 
position and to the British ability to influence education in Kuwait. There is no evidence 
that he sought to intervene to the same degree following this incident. His only major 
scheme was the creation of a hostel in Cairo for Kuwaiti scholarship students. However, 
as shall be seen, the institution that actually emerged differed drastically from the one 
he envisioned. In the fall of 1944, Wakelin chose Sadiq Hamdi as a replacement for 
Haikal,86 though it appears that both the local and Egyptian authorities became more 
vigilant towards British interference after the Haikal incident. In the summer of 1946, 
the Egyptian Ministry of Education fired Hamdi because “of suspicion that he was too 
friendly with the British.”87 Unfortunately, further information regarding this incident is 
lacking. British plans to directly control education in Kuwait were dealt a deathblow 
when Wakelin’s term ended in June 1945, and a successor was not appointed. The 
position of Educational Adviser was in effect abolished.88  
Education Under Egyptian Control, 1945-1950 
 
 With the departure of the Syrian teachers and the British Educational Adviser, 
Egyptian control over Kuwait’s Educational Department became virtually complete. 
The curriculum and textbooks were imported from Cairo, as was virtually all non-local 
staff. Perhaps ironically, this thorough Arabization of Kuwaiti education did not 
reinforce its Arab nationalist character. Although some individual Egyptian teachers 																																																								
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had Arab nationalist inclinations, the same cannot be said of the particularistic, 
Europhile Egyptian curriculum. During this phase, Arab nationalism ceased to be 
inculcated in a top-down manner in Kuwaiti schools. Rather, it spread on the grassroots 
level through local teachers, and from 1948, a growing Palestinian staff. These groups 
challenged Egyptian hegemony, leading to factional struggles within the department. 
Furthermore, with the political arena severely restricted, the educational sector became 
the primary base for nationalist activity in the country, and served as a launching pad 
for several cultural-cum-political ventures.  
 A number of incidents and developments attest to the increased Egyptian control 
over education in Kuwait after 1945. For instance, the aforementioned replacement of 
the allegedly pro-British Director of Education in 1946 reportedly occurred “without 
any kind of consultation with the [Kuwaiti] State authorities.”89 In 1947, the succeeding 
director held a “sumptuous tea party” on King Faruq’s birthday, to which he invited 
local and foreign dignitaries.90 The schools were given a half day off, and a Kuwaiti 
observer remarked that this was the first time that a foreign ruler apart from the British 
monarch was honored in this manner.91 The King of Egypt’s birthday continued to be 
celebrated in the department in subsequent years.92  
 Egyptian influence increased in tandem with the expansion of Kuwait’s 
educational system. This was made possible by the shaykhdom’s increasing wealth 
following the beginning of oil exports in 1946.93 The number of boys’ and girls’ schools 
climbed from eight in the academic year 1945-1946 to seventeen in 1949-1950, while 
the sum total of students in Kuwait town rose from 1,902 to 4,649 in the same period.94 
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A key milestone in this expansion was the Educational Department’s introduction of an 
ambitious development plan in 1947-1948, which entailed the building of new schools 
and facilities and necessitated the quadrupling of the department’s budget.95 
 The plan included the establishment of a Religious Academy under the direction 
of two clerics seconded by al-Azhar University.96 The academy, which opened in late 
1947, followed al-Azhar’s curriculum, allowing its top graduates to be sent on 
scholarship to the university.97 Its popularity necessitated the secondment of two further 
Azharite clerics the following year.98 Also in 1947, the Egyptian authorities seconded a 
female inspector to take charge of the girls’ schools,99 though for unknown reasons she 
resigned towards the end of the 1947-1948 school year.100 The number of Egyptian 
teachers gradually increased from twelve males and one female in 1943-1944 to fifteen 
males and eight females in 1948-1949,101 before jumping to 38 males and 17 females 
the following year.102  
 As Egyptian educational assistance to Kuwait increased and diversified, it 
branched out into other fields, spreading Egyptian influence to other state institutions. 
Shortly after work began on the Educational Department’s development plan in mid-
1947, the Egyptian government sent a Medical Mission to Kuwait. Its head became 
Director of the Health Department.103 However, this mission was terminated in the fall 
of 1948 under unclear circumstances.104 A more enduring project was the secondment 
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of a qadi by al-Azhar to head Kuwait’s shariʿa courts in early 1949.105 By the end of the 
year, the university had seconded two further qadis to Kuwait,106 and in 1950 it was 
reported that the Egyptian Ministry of Justice would also second a state prosecutor 
(though it is not clear if this actually occurred).107 In the subsequent decade, Egyptian 
technical assistance to the Kuwaiti government would expand greatly.  
 Yet another marker of Cairo’s dominance over education in Kuwait was that 
Egypt became virtually the sole destination for the shaykhdom’s growing scholarship 
program. As has been stated, the Egyptian government provided scholarships to eleven 
Kuwait students in 1942. These students arrived in Egypt in 1943, along with six others 
funded by their families and overseen by the Kuwaiti authorities.108 In 1945, the 
Egyptian authorities accepted a further 37 students.109 Smaller groups of scholarship 
students continued to be sent to Egypt throughout the decade.110 Kuwaiti scholarship 
students in Egypt totalled 55 in 1946 and 1947, 49 in 1948, 52 in 1949,111 and 53 in 
1950.112 In 1947, it was reported that their number was the largest of any Arab country 
relative to its population.113  
 As the Kuwaiti Educational Department’s resources increased, it appears to have 
taken over financial responsibility for the scholarships from the Egyptian 
government.114 Nevertheless, several factors ensured that Egypt remained practically 
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the only destination for Kuwaiti scholarships in the 1940s. Firstly, Kuwait’s 
Educational Department was unable to offer a complete five years of secondary 
education throughout the 1940s.115  Students wishing to complete their secondary 
education thus had to do so abroad. The vast majority of Kuwaiti scholarship students in 
Egypt were in fact enrolled in secondary schools. In the spring of 1948, only eight were 
attending universities.116  
 Secondly, the fact that Kuwaiti schools were under Egyptian administration made 
Egypt the most logical and convenient destination for secondary school students. 
Throughout the decade, the Egyptian curriculum was followed in Kuwait with only 
“slight modifications” to certain history and geography textbooks to include matter on 
Kuwait and the Gulf. A report by the Egyptian Ministry of Education emphasized that 
these modifications were made “under the direction of” the Egyptian Director of 
Education.117 This coordination allowed the ministry to recognize the Kuwaiti fourth-
year secondary certificate in the late 1940s, which further facilitated the study of 
Kuwaitis in Egypt.118  
 Finally, Egypt’s cultural prestige in the region was a key factor that made it, in the 
words of one pupil, “the Kaʿba of Kuwaiti students.”119 Another Kuwaiti scholarship 
student describes Egypt as “a mother to the Arab countries, which derive their 
civilization from it. It is thus no surprise that the Nile valley is a qibla to the sons of 
Arabism (ʿUrūba) who aspire to drink from the fountains of science and knowledge.” 
He goes on to highlight the importance of the Egyptian media in enhancing this 
prestige, stating: “I encountered Egypt twice, the first time while still in my country 
through books, the press, and the radio, and it captivated my imagination.” 120 
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Addressing Egyptian teachers seconded to Kuwait, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain, then director 
of the Kuwaiti students’ hostel in Cairo (see below), states:  
The Kuwaitis know you well from afar, they know you as the educators and 
leaders of the Arab people… [They] know you through your apostles who arrive 
each year bearing the fruits of the mind… They know Egypt thoroughly through 
its literature and press, which they imbibe. You will find that they know 
everything about your country.121 
 
An editorial in the student magazine al-Biʿtha similarly describes Egypt as “the artery 
that supplies [the Arab] states with the most important means of attaining culture 
(thaqāfa), particularly at this juncture in their history, when they have started to… unify 
the means of their social and cultural lives.”122  
 Despite Egypt’s cultural prominence in the Arab world, the Egyptian 
administration of Kuwait’s Educational Department had an ambivalent effect on Arab 
nationalist influence within this institution. On the one hand, Egyptian educational 
assistance to Kuwait was framed in Arab nationalist terms, reflecting Cairo’s bid for 
Pan-Arab leadership. At the celebration of King Faruq’s birthday in 1947, the Egyptian 
Director of Education spoke of the monarch’s efforts to aid the Arab states, calling him 
“the greatest mujāhid in the way of Islam and Arabism (ʿUrūba).” He also referred to 
the Kuwaitis as “brothers in Arabism.”123 The director later employed similar rhetoric 
while addressing a new group of Egyptian teachers seconded to Kuwait. He proclaimed 
that Faruq, “the king of Arabism and the preeminent Arab (ʿaẓīm al-ʿArab),” dispatched 
these educational missions with the intention of “strengthening cultural ties between 
Egypt and the Arab states.”124  
 On the other hand, the Educational Department under the Egyptian Educational 
Mission did not inculcate Arab nationalist ideology in a structured, top-down manner as 
under the Syrians and Palestinians. This was mainly due to the character of the Egyptian 																																																								
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curriculum, which continued to emphasize Egyptian territorial nationalism and 
Pharaonic identity despite the growing Arab nationalist mood in Egypt.125 Moreover, it 
focused on “Western-derived, ‘modern’ subject-matter” at the expense of Arabic 
language and Islamic studies, thus separating students “from their Arab-Muslim 
heritage.”126 There is also no evidence that Scouting and physical education in Kuwait 
retained their nationalist character under the Egyptian administration.  
 While disseminating Arab nationalist ideology was thus not a matter of policy 
for the Egyptian Educational Mission, some of its members did hold nationalist views. 
Information on most individual Egyptian teachers in Kuwait is sketchy, as in the case of 
the Arabic teacher Ahmad al-Anbabi, who arrived in Kuwait in 1947-1948 and was 
described by a colleague as “an eloquent orator and an enthusiast of Arab unity.” Al-
Anbabi was a graduate of Cairo’s Dar al-ʿUlum.127 This training college for teachers of 
Arabic and religion differed markedly from Egypt’s Westernized universities in 
combining modern and traditional education. It is argued to have shaped the ideologies 
of those who studied there, particularly leading Islamists such as Hasan al-Banna.128  
  The most prominent Arab nationalist among the Egyptian teachers in Kuwait, 
Ahmad ʿAnbar, was also a graduate of Dar al-ʿUlum and a teacher of Arabic. In 
contrast to most of his colleagues, whose presence in Kuwait was transient, ʿAnbar 
settled in the country and eventually gained citizenship. For this reason, along with his 
poetry and his active participation in scholastic and public events, there is much more 
information on him. ʿAnbar taught in Kuwait between the 1946-1947 and 1950-1951 
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school years, but returned in 1952-1953 and remained thereafter.129 In a 1947 article, he 
recalls that he was motivated to teach in Kuwait because he considered himself “a 
soldier in the service of our greater Arab homeland.”130  
 The themes of Arab unity, rebirth, and resistance to foreign aggression dominate 
the numerous poems ʿAnbar wrote in Kuwait in the late 1940s, most of which he 
delivered at public functions.131 For example, at a homecoming reception for Shaykh 
Ahmad al-Jabir in 1947, he addressed the following lines to the Kuwaiti people:   
 And my heart loves you, for we are one tribe, 
 united by the glory of Arabism and by our origin.  
 We here are [as] in Egypt, there is no difference between us; 
 The sons of the Arabs are at home anywhere in their homeland.132   
 
During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, ʿAnbar participated in a series of fundraising 
meetings held by a committee of Kuwaiti merchants. He recited several poems that 
called on the Arabs to unite in support of Palestine and urged the audience to donate 
generously.133 Furthermore, he extended his pro-Palestinian activity to the educational 
sphere by writing a play that was performed at the secondary school. It portrays Jewish 
immigrants deceiving and betraying the Palestinians, who rise up and seek the help of 
their Arab brothers. Fighters from various Arab countries, including Kuwait, arrive to 
save the day.134 ʿAnbar also recited poems at school events such as the Prophet’s 
birthday celebrations, but none of these could be located.135 
 Towards the end of the 1940s, the Egyptianization of education in Kuwait gave 
rise to British worries. Following Wakelin’s departure, British Council representatives 
from outside the Gulf occasionally visited Kuwait to monitor the state of its 
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education.136 Some of their reports, as well as those of the local British authorities, 
voiced concern over the excessive degree of control exercised by the Egyptian 
Educational Mission.137 Others praised the Egyptian teachers’ effectiveness, with one 
arguing that while they “naturally” engaged in “pro-Egyptian propaganda,” this was not 
“subversive” or “anti-British.”138 However, developments in nearby Bahrain, where 
Egyptian teachers were apparently more politicized, influenced the British to encourage 
the training of local teachers with the goal of reducing dependence upon Egyptian 
staff.139 This policy does not seem to have had any effect in Kuwait. In addition, 
Kuwait’s Educational Council rebuffed proposals by the British Council to employ 
Englishmen as teachers.140 In the case of Kuwait, the British were most concerned about 
the students studying in Egypt on scholarship, and focused their efforts on this issue. 
This will be discussed in detail shortly.  
Local Teachers: The New Nationalist Vanguard 
 
 During the mid-1940s, it was not Arab expatriates but local teachers who were 
most forceful and consistent in pursuing an Arab nationalist educational agenda. The 
current received a new leader with the arrival of the zealous Arab nationalist teacher 
and poet Ahmad al-Saqqaf. A native of the Sultanate of Lahj, he received a scholarship 
to undergo secondary education in Baghdad in 1936 or 1937, later joining the Law 
College.141 Through school activities, the Muthanna Club, and gatherings hosted by his 
Syrian teacher ʿUthman al-Hurani, he mingled with prominent Arab nationalists such as 
Satiʿ al-Husri, Darwish al-Miqdadi, Kazim al-Sulh, and Yunus al-Sabʿawi.142 Most of 
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these men were members of the Red Book Group, which al-Saqqaf joined.143  
 While in secondary school, al-Saqqaf also cofounded an Arab nationalist student 
group called Jamʿiyyat al-Ḍād,144 whose activities included holding lectures on Arab 
nationalism and fundraising for Palestine’s Arab Revolt.145 During the Rashid ʿAli 
Revolt, he enlisted in a student militia formed by the Iraqi minister and Red Book 
Group leader Yunus al-Sabʿawi and led by the Palestinian fighter ʿAbd al-Qadir al-
Husaini. He was wounded while fighting the British, and was apparently unable to 
complete his law degree following the British occupation.146 
 In the academic year 1944-1945, al-Saqqaf moved to Kuwait, where he became 
an Arabic teacher.147 The reasons behind this move are unclear. However, a possible 
explanation is provided by Muhammad al-Saddah, who became a teacher in 1949 and 
collaborated with al-Saqqaf in nationalist activism. He maintains that the Educational 
Council member Nisf Yusuf al-Nisf engaged al-Saqqaf due to their common 
membership of the Red Book Group.148 The group had all but disintegrated at the time 
of al-Saqqaf’s arrival in Kuwait.149 However, al-Saqqaf was the first of many former 
members of the group to work for or collaborate with Kuwait’s Educational 
Department, indicating that the interpersonal networks forged within the organization 
persisted after its demise.  
 Al-Saqqaf soon became a dynamo of Arab nationalist cultural activity in 
Kuwait, both within the educational sphere and outside it. His leadership of the local 
Arab nationalist current was facilitated by his swift integration into Kuwaiti society; by 
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around 1946 he had already married a Kuwaiti.150 Within the classroom, al-Saqqaf 
recalls that his students often asked him to talk about the Palestinian cause, with which 
he was well acquainted due to his association with leading Palestinian activists in 
Iraq.151 In 1948, he also took advantage of the Educational Department’s celebrations of 
religious events to recite rousing Arab nationalist poems on Palestine.152 Al-Saqqaf also 
recalls that in the 1947-1948 academic year, he led a group of secondary schoolboys in 
a pro-Palestine demonstration, which left the schoolyard and marched through nearby 
streets.153 It is unclear if this is the same incident referred to in a British report from 
December 1947, which states that students were planning to protest against the partition 
of Palestine but ceased after the ruler threatened to flog the ringleaders.154  
 Al-Saqqaf’s influence on his students is clear in the case of ʿAbd Allah Ahmad 
Husain (al-Rumi),155 who went on to become a teacher, poet, and prominent Arab 
nationalist. Husain describes his former teacher as the “most effective of those who 
implanted nationalist ideology [within me], having come from revolutionary Iraq.”156 
However, Husain had already began assimilating Arab nationalist ideas before al-
Saqqaf’s arrival, showing that the latter was building on the work of the pre-existing 
nationalist current within the Educational Department. Husain recalls that as a sixth 
primary year student in 1943, he published his first article on “the state of the Arab 
nation” in a wall magazine edited by his Kuwaiti teacher.157  
 ʿAbd Allah Ahmad Husain went on to study in Egypt on scholarship, though he 																																																								
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returned in 1947 before completing his secondary degree and became a teacher.158 Like 
his mentor al-Saqqaf, he influenced others to espouse Arab nationalism. The nationalist 
Muhammad al-Saddah, who became a teacher in 1949 after completing his second year 
of secondary school, recalls that Husain left an impression on him as a student and a 
young teacher. He refers to him as “my instructor in nationalist activism and attending 
to Arab causes and culture.”159 This demonstrates the extent to which, in the 1940s, 
grassroots nationalist networks took root in Kuwaiti schools and became endogenous.  
 With the arrival of al-Saqqaf, the Arab nationalist current based within the 
Educational Department made several attempts to engage in cultural activity beyond the 
schools. It was al-Saqqaf who initiated the first of these attempts by organizing an 
“itinerant literary club” in late 1945, which entailed holding seminars at a different 
dīwānīyya each week. Various notables and teachers hosted the seminars, including the 
Educational Council member Nisf Yusuf al-Nisf.160 Al-Saqqaf recalls that the “club” 
brought together Kuwait’s nationalist youth, and was “a source of nationalist ideas.”161 
It continued until the summer of 1946, after which the ruler decided that the seminars 
were too political and ordered them stopped. According to al-Saqqaf, al-Nisf defended 
the “club” to the ruler, lending credence to al-Saddah’s claim regarding the existence of 
ties between the two men.162 
 Al-Saqqaf’s roving literary seminar whetted the appetites of Kuwait’s educated 
youth for a bona fide cultural club. The impetus to establish such a club originated with 
Kuwaiti students studying at the AUB, who will be discussed in detail below. In the 
spring of 1946, they broached the idea to their friends in Kuwait (including the ex-
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teacher ʿAbd Allah Zakaria al-Ansari163) and their compatriots studying in Egypt.164 
The idea was well received by the teachers and other educated youth in Kuwait, who 
held a meeting to elect the club’s board in the fall of 1946.165 Among the participants 
were seven of those who had opposed the changing of the curriculum in 1943-1944,166 
as well as Ahmad al-Sarhan, former secretary of the Patriotic Youths’ Bloc. Al-Ansari 
was elected director of the club, the Iraq graduate al-Salih became secretary, and 
Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Jabir was appointed president.167 The club’s founders secured the 
ruler’s assent through the intercession of Yusuf Ahmad al-Ghanim, father of one of the 
aforementioned AUB students and a former member of the Red Book Group.168 
However, a squabble over leadership positions caused the club to shut down before it 
could commence its activity.169 
 The failed attempts to form a cultural club in Kuwait gave rise to a new cultural 
project that was far more successful: Kazima magazine (1948-1949). This endeavor was 
the result of cooperation between the teacher-based nationalist current and likeminded 
members of the Educational Council. This cooperation was already evident in al-Nisf’s 
hosting and defense of al-Saqqaf’s “itinerant literary club.” The key nationalist 
councilmen, al-Nisf and al-Saniʿ, not only retained their seats on the Educational 
Council in the second half of the decade,170 but also greatly increased their influence 
within the government. In 1946, the ruler appointed both men to the Shura Council,171 
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and made al-Saniʿ Director of the Municipality. 172  Al-Nisf, meanwhile, became 
Director of the Health Department in 1948.173 
 When in 1947 the Educational Department established the first ever printing 
press in the country, al-Saqqaf seized the opportunity to propose the publication of a 
literary magazine in conjunction with ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Saniʿ. The latter secured the 
Educational Council’s approval and became the magazine’s license holder, while the 
former became its editor. Kazima was the second magazine to be published locally.174 
Named after a historic Islamic settlement in Kuwait, it adopted a strongly Arab 
nationalist tone, particularly in championing the Palestinian cause. It featured 
contributions from local teachers and intellectuals, Arab expatriate teachers, Kuwaiti 
students studying abroad, and, significantly, women.175 
 Kazima reveals the extent to which cultural activity in 1940s Kuwait served 
political, Arab nationalist ends. In an editorial, al-Saqqaf stresses the key role played by 
poets and writers in the struggle of the Arab nation.176 Indeed, Kazima contains a great 
deal of rousing nationalist poetry, much of it composed by the editor.177 ʿAbd al-Razzaq 
al-Basir, a religious scholar and writer who had been a leading member of the Patriotic 
Youths’ Bloc in the 1930s,178 similarly states: “it is the jihad of the writer that is the 
most beneficial and effective because he disseminates culture (thaqāfa) within his 
nation, and culture is the cure for all ills.”179 ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Gharaballi, a teacher who 
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had just been appointed Secretary of the Educational Department,180 writes on the role 
of literature (adab) in morally uplifting the nation. He argues that the best form is 
“nationalist literature, which represents national pride, the traits of heroism, and the 
beauty of sacrifice.”181 Finally, the nationalist writer ʿAbd Allah ʿAli al-Saniʿ defends 
his focus on classical Arab history by emphasizing the centrality of historical 
consciousness to national awareness and strength, a principle demonstrated by the 
Arabs’ Zionist enemies.182 
 It was not long before Kazima became too overtly political for the ruler, who 
closed it down after its February 1949 issue. Moreover, its editor was dismissed from 
his teaching job, but was allowed to return after a short while. According to al-Saqqaf, 
the ruler’s ire was provoked by an editorial that criticized the Arab states for failing 
Palestine, and argued that protests and fundraising were not enough.183 Despite its short 
lifespan, Muhammad al-Saddah recalls Kazima’s importance “in raising patriotic and 
national awareness and connecting the Kuwaiti people to Arab causes.”184 Moreover, 
alongside the other limited attempts to forge a cultural sphere in the 1940s, the 
publication provided a foundation for much more substantial activism in the subsequent 
decade.  
The Palestinian Threat to Egyptian Hegemony  
 
 In 1948, the Arab nationalist current within Kuwait’s Educational Department 
was strengthened by the arrival of a new element. With the Arab-Israeli War ongoing, 
the Educational Council decided to employ Palestinian teachers at the outset of the 
1948-1949 academic year.185 The Palestinian Khayri Abu al-Jubayn, who became a 
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teacher in Kuwait that year, states the council was motivated by sympathy for the 
Palestinians. He recalls that the councilman Nisf Yusuf al-Nisf was particularly 
enthusiastic, and personally travelled to Damascus to engage the new teachers.186  
 Among this first group of eighteen Palestinian teachers was ʿAbd al-Latif al-Salih, 
who had previously taught in Kuwait between 1939 and 1943.187 He was the first of a 
number of Kuwait veterans to return that year. In November, a further three Palestinian 
teachers arrived from Egypt, including al-Salih’s former colleague and fellow Dar al-
ʿUlum graduate Muhammad Najm. Trapped in a refugee camp, he had made contact 
with the Kuwaiti Educational Department, which promptly reengaged him.188 Another 
factor that encouraged the hiring of Palestinian teachers was the appointment of the 
Lebanese ʿAbd al-Latif al-Habbal, a former employee of the Palestine Mandate’s 
Educational Department, as General Inspector of Kuwait’s schools.189 He arrived from 
Lebanon with yet another group of Palestinian teachers in November.190 The total 
number of Palestinian teachers thus reached 21 by January 1949,191 and Abu al-Jubayn 
lists a total of 28 for the 1948-1949 academic year.192 
 Within less than a year, the Palestinian teachers came to outnumber the 21-strong 
Egyptian Educational Mission. What’s more, they were not the only new arrivals. In the 
summer of 1948, the Educational Department reengaged Iqbal al-Habbal, wife of the 
former director ʿAbd al-Latif al-Shamlan, as Inspector of Girls’ Schools. She replaced 
the female inspector seconded by the Egyptian government, who had resigned under 
unclear circumstances the previous spring. Iqbal engaged eleven female teachers from 
Lebanon for the 1948-1949 academic year.193 By contrast, the number of female 
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Egyptian teachers stood at six.194 It is not clear whether Iqbal al-Habbal was related to 
ʿAbd al-Latif al-Habbal and had a hand in engaging him, but this highly probable. That 
two of the departments’ top posts were now in Lebanese hands no doubt threatened 
Egyptian control. Furthermore, in January 1949, a Palestinian was appointed “Technical 
Inspector” of the department’s newly established printing press.195  
 According to Abu al-Jubayn, the Egyptian Educational Mission also felt 
threatened by the widespread Kuwaiti sympathy for the Palestinians in the wake of the 
Nakba.196 This sentiment is apparent in Kazima’s statements, one of which described 
the appointment of Palestinians as “a national duty.”197 For their part, the Palestinians 
contributed to local Arab nationalist activity. Some, such as ʿAbd al-Latif al-Salih and 
the nationalist Ribhi al-ʿArif, delivered stirring speeches on Palestine and Arab 
nationalism at school celebrations.198 Another teacher, Muhammad al-Zaʿbalawi, wrote 
about his experience studying at the AUB in Kazima. His article focuses on the role of 
Qustantin Zuraiq and other professors in instilling their students with Arab national 
awareness, which the students express through strikes and demonstrations on behalf of 
various Arab causes.199  
 As might be expected, the Palestinian teachers’ nationalist activity also extended 
to the classroom. Khayri Abu al-Jubayn recalls teaching his students numerous Arab 
nationalist anthems. One day, the Egyptian Director of Education Taha al-Suwaifi 
happened to hear him leading his students in song, and requested that he teach these 
anthems to all primary school students. Abu al-Jubayn agreed, and visited a different 
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school each day for this purpose.200 This incident suggests that tension between the 
Egyptian and Palestinian teachers developed only gradually, and that the Egyptian 
administration was not immune to the sentiments of Arab brotherhood that prevailed 
following the Nakba.  
 One possible explanation for the change in the Egyptian attitude is the 
cooperation that emerged between Palestinian and local teachers to alter the Egyptian 
curriculum. In August 1948, Kazima announced that the Educational Council had 
decided, in consultation with the Director of Education, to “comprehensively change” 
the curriculum. The subjects of history, geography, and science would be specifically 
targeted.201 The background behind this decision is not known. However, not long after 
it was announced, al-Saqqaf published an editorial in Kazima in which he argued for 
“nationalist guidance” in Kuwaiti education. This entailed altering the curriculum and 
screening textbooks so as to expunge any content antithetical to nationalism (perhaps a 
veiled reference to the Egyptian textbooks).202 
 Although the Palestinian teachers were engaged after the Educational Council 
decided to change the curriculum, they came to play a dominant role in implementing 
this policy. In December, the Educational Council formed a committee to draft the new 
curriculum. It included three Palestinian teachers, the Lebanese General Inspector, 
Ahmad al-Saqqaf, and only one Egyptian headmaster. Kazima’s report added that the 
committee was studying the curriculums of various Arab countries, indicating that the 
abandonment of the Egyptian curriculum was a possibility.203 Al-Saqqaf’s membership 
also suggests that Arab nationalism would have been emphasized. This was probably 
more than the Egyptian administration had bargained for when it agreed to alter the 
curriculum. After all, the use of the Egyptian curriculum in Kuwait was one of the key 																																																								
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sources of its influence. Kazima continued to report on the curriculum committee’s 
progress until its last issue in March 1949, when it announced that the curriculums for 
certain subjects had been completed.204  
 While the fate of the curricular reform scheme is unknown, it was probably 
derailed by the factional struggle that emerged between the Egyptian and Palestinian 
teachers and the dismissal of a number of the curriculum committee’s members. The 
details of this struggle are also unclear. Abu al-Jubayn states that the Egyptian press 
began publishing articles criticizing the Palestinian teachers. The Director of Education 
al-Suwaifi subsequently recommended, on “technical” grounds, that the Educational 
Council dismiss more than half the Palestinian teachers. According to Abu al-Jubayn, 
the council assented, also replacing the General Inspector ʿAbd al-Latif al-Habbal with 
an Egyptian. However, the council later fired al-Suwaifi because of “doubts relating to 
the importation of books and stationary to Kuwait from Egypt.”205 The British Political 
Resident provides a different account based on a conversation he had with the President 
of the Educational Department. He states that the “director had to leave because of 
trouble between him and some Palestinian teachers and… the Kuwait authorities 
therefore decided to employ no foreign teachers other than Egyptians.” The department 
was also engaging two Egyptian inspectors because “it was much easier for them to 
control their fellow nationals.”206  
 In the academic year 1949-1950, the Egyptian Educational Mission reestablished 
its dominance within the department with a total of 55 teachers under a new director, 
Ahmad Darwish Yusuf.207 The fate of the Palestinian teachers is not clear. Abu al-
Jubayn states that only seven Palestinian teachers remained.208 However, al-Biʿtha 
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reported the existence of 25 Palestinian teachers in December,209 and an article by the 
Secretary of the Educational Department in March 1950 put their number at 28.210 It is 
possible that the number of Palestinian teachers was drastically cut at the beginning of 
the year but that new teachers were then hired over the course of the year. The number 
of Lebanese female teachers was also reduced from eleven to three.211 
 By the end of the school year, however, the pendulum again swung in the other 
direction when the Egyptian Educational Mission left Kuwait following a dispute with 
the Educational Council. It began when the Egyptian teachers protested against having 
both morning and afternoon shifts, as their colleagues in Egypt and Iraq only taught in 
the morning. They threatened to resign en masse unless their demand was met. After 
initial reluctance, the council abolished the afternoon shift. The Egyptians, however, 
had not anticipated that the council would give in so quickly, and had already sent 
letters of protest to Egyptian newspapers.212 One letter published in al-Musawwar under 
the signature of the Egyptian Director of Education in Kuwait complained: “the Kuwaiti 
authorities go out of their way to harass all members of the Egyptian mission in every 
conceivable way.”213  
 Kuwait’s Educational Council published denials of these allegations,214 and after 
various investigations the Egyptian director apologized. 215  However, the council 
decided not to renew the Egyptian teachers’ contracts.216 Its decision was perhaps 
facilitated by the Egyptian Ministry of Education’s ending of subsidies to its teachers in 
Kuwait at the outset of the school year.217 Cairo did not lose all its influence in Kuwait, 
for al-Azhar continued to depute teachers to the religious academy, in addition to 																																																								
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qadis.218 However, the era of absolute Egyptian control over Kuwaiti education had 
ended.  
Kuwaiti Students Abroad, 1943-1950  
 
 When ʿAbd al-Latif al-Shamlan obtained scholarships from the Egyptian 
government in 1942, he effectively derailed the British scheme of redirecting Kuwait’s 
scholarships to the more secure environment of Bahrain. Following this development, 
the number of Kuwaiti students sent to Arab countries, particularly Egypt, increased 
exponentially. Rising oil rents further fuelled this trend, allowing the Kuwaiti 
government to develop an extensive scholarship program. A much larger proportion of 
Kuwaitis now participated in the “pilgrimages” that were previously the preserve of a 
privileged few, and developed profound cultural and political ties to their host societies. 
When most of these students returned to Kuwait in the early 1950s, they formed the 
basis for a new social stratum known in the Arab world as the effendiyya, and in Kuwait 
at the time as the muthaqqafīn.    
 In the same year he secured the Egyptian scholarships, al-Shamlan decided to 
send two of Kuwait’s top high-schoolers on scholarship to the AUB, but the university 
would only accept one pupil as a test case. This pupil was Ahmad al-Khatib.219 
Although he was the only Kuwaiti scholarship student to attend the AUB in the 1940s, 
his experience stands out as perhaps the most noteworthy and impactful example of 
Pan-Arab pilgrimage. This is due to the fact that while in Beirut, al-Khatib cofounded 
what would become the Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN), a prominent regional 
political group and the backbone of Kuwait’s opposition movement in the 1950s and 
1960s. After completing his first year of secondary study in Kuwait in 1943, al-Khatib 
was sent to International College (IC), the AUB’s preparatory school. He completed his 
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secondary education in less than three years and then enrolled in the university’s 
medical faculty.220 Al-Khatib recalls that studying at the IC and AUB allowed him to 
interact with Arab students of diverse faiths and political inclinations, an experience 
that molded his outlook and character. At the same time, he maintained close contact 
with Kuwaiti students, all of whom were sons of merchants. Some would also become 
Arab nationalist activists, like ʿAbd Allah Yusuf al-Ghanim, al-Khatib’s classmate at 
the IC.221  
 It was Khalifa al-Ghunaim, the son of a Kuwaiti merchant family who had just 
graduated from the AUB, who initiated al-Khatib into the university’s Arab nationalist 
network. Al-Ghunaim had been part of a study circle run by the history professor, Arab 
nationalist thinker, and former Red Book Group leader Qustantin Zuraiq, and 
nominated al-Khatib for admission. Together with his close friend, the Palestinian 
Wadiʿ Haddad, al-Khatib also joined al-ʿUrwa al-Wuthqa. Zuraiq had advised this Arab 
nationalist student society since the 1930s, when the Red Book Group controlled it. 
Through the society, al-Khatib and Haddad befriended other Arab students, most 
notably the Palestinian George Habash.222 Al-Khatib, Haddad, and Habash, all medical 
students, formed the core of the future MAN.223  
The Palestinian Nakba precipitated the three students’ transition to organized 
Arab nationalist activism. They volunteered to treat the refugees, and were deeply 
moved by this experience. Al-Khatib states: “I lived the Nakba in all its tragedy. I saw it 
with my own eyes and touched it with my hands, and it was inscribed onto my memory 
forever.” He and his comrades subsequently formed a group called al-Shabab al-Qawmi 
(the Nationalist Youth), and took control of al-ʿUrwa al-Wuthqa.224 Al-Khatib was 
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elected to the student society’s board in the 1948-1949 school year, became vice 
president in 1949-1950, and president in 1950-1951.225 The Nationalist Youth’s activity 
spread beyond the AUB and Lebanon itself as it forged ties with likeminded 
organizations across the region. For instance, al-Khatib headed a delegation 
representing al-ʿUrwa that visited Iraq with the goal of contacting other young 
nationalists.226  
The Nationalist Youth also led demonstrations on behalf of pan-Arab causes. 
After one such demonstration in which protesters clashed with police, al-Khatib and 
Haddad became wanted men until Lebanese political groups intervened to have them 
pardoned. The two returned to the AUB to find that its president had expelled them. 
However, he was forced to reinstate them after widespread students protests and 
pressure from local Arab nationalist politicians.227 In 1951, the Nationalist Youth began 
building a more structured political organization. Its key members, including al-Khatib, 
graduated the following year. As they moved to various Arab countries, they established 
branches of their organization. Later in the decade, the group adopted the name 
“Movement of Arab Nationalists.”228  
 Although al-Khatib’s individual experience would have a far-reaching impact on 
Kuwait’s political history, Beirut was a minor pilgrimage site in comparison to Cairo, 
“the Kaʿba of Kuwaiti students.” As in the case of Kuwaiti students in Iraq in the 1930s, 
the British authorities were mindful of the political implications of Kuwaitis studying in 
Egypt. In 1943, Wakelin met the Kuwaiti students upon their arrival to Cairo to ensure 
they were accommoda ted in boarding schools where they would be adequately 
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supervised. He also tasked the British Council with keeping an eye on them.229 Wakelin 
also proposed that the British Council establish a hostel for scholarship students from 
the Gulf that would protect their “characters,” 230  though this scheme proved 
impracticable.231  
 When in 1944 the Egyptian authorities declined to accept further Kuwaiti 
scholarship students because they could not house them, Wakelin proposed that the 
Kuwaiti government establish its own hostel.232 Kuwait’s Educational Council agreed, 
but declined the “offer of the British Council to provide an Englishman as Supervisor.” 
Wakelin attributed this position to the Educational Council’s “policy of aiming at 
preserving its independence of action and at the same time reaping what benefit it can 
from outside sources.”233 The British Council, however, did assist in establishing the 
hostel, which opened its doors in the fall of 1945.234  It came to be called Bait al-Kuwait 
(Kuwait House).  
 After around a year, the British authorities persuaded the Educational Council to 
allow the British Council to oversee Bait al-Kuwait’s finances. The Political Agent had 
urged that the Kuwaitis be approached tactfully on this issue, as they “are very jealous 
of their right to direct their own affairs.”235 This arrangement does not appear to have 
significantly increased British influence over the hostel’s operation. In 1949, Bait al-
Kuwait’s magazine al-Biʿtha responded to queries about the hostel’s relationship with 
the British Council by stating that this was confined to financial management. It 
emphasized that “pedagogical and cultural direction are of course the concern of the 
house’s administration,” which acted upon the direct orders of Kuwait’s Educational 
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Council.236 Shortly afterwards, the British Council discontinued its financial oversight 
of Bait al-Kuwait. One of its representatives cited “difficulties… in the administration 
of the money, and how our advice had often resulted in action being taken directly 
opposed to what we advised.”237 
Rather than appoint an Englishman to direct Bait al-Kuwait as Wakelin 
suggested, Kuwait’s Educational Council appointed its previous scholarship student 
ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain, who had been studying in Cairo since 1939.238 After attending 
al-Azhar, Husain enrolled in Cairo’s Higher Educational Institute, from which he 
graduated in 1945.239 Under his direction, Bait al-Kuwait became a radically different 
institution to that envisaged by Wakelin. Rather than isolating Kuwaiti students, it 
immersed them in Egypt’s cultural and intellectual life. Husain recalls: 
When it was decided to establish Bait al-Kuwait… the decision-maker’s 
conception of its role and tasks differed in a number of ways from the conception 
of those who actually oversaw it. The latter did not believe that this institution’s 
purpose was merely to ensure that students graduated from Egyptian academies… 
In their view, Bait al-Kuwait should undertake greater tasks such as acquainting 
[the Egyptians] with Kuwait, establishing intellectual ties with Egypt, and 
ensuring that Egypt fulfilled Kuwait’s needs in numerous fields.240 
        
Drawing on the connections he had cultivated in Egypt over the previous six years, 
Husain organized an intensive program of activities for the students. It involved regular 
seminars, celebrations of religious holidays (including speeches and plays performed by 
the students), and field trips to museums, factories, newspapers, and other sites.241  
 Hamad al-Rujaib, who commenced his studies in Egypt in 1945 and became 
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Husain’s assistant in 1947,242 recalls that the students considered Bait al-Kuwait’s 
seminars to be “sacred” and never missed them.243 Another of the hostel’s students, 
ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Sarʿawi, states that Bait al-Kuwait was like a school in its own right, 
adding “we were open to the intellectual and social currents flowing through Egypt at 
the time.” At the hostel’s seminars and celebrations, pupils met cultural luminaries such 
as Zaki Mubarak, Ahmad Amin, Muhammad Farid Abu Hadid, and the Azharite cleric 
ʿAbd al-Latif Draz.244 Through these events, the Kuwaitis forged lasting ties with 
Egyptians. A notable example is Ahmad al-Shirbasi, who consistently participated in 
Bait al-Kuwait’s activities and wrote for its magazine. A former classmate of Husain at 
al-Azhar, he was active in the Young Men’s Muslim Association and had ties to the 
Muslim Brotherhood. His close connection to Kuwait led him to teach in the country in 
the 1952-1953 school year, and he later wrote a book about Kuwait based on his 
experience.245 
 The activities of Bait al-Kuwait not only allowed its residents to absorb Egyptian 
influences, but also provided them an avenue for creative expression, which often took 
on a political coloring. For example, during the hostel’s celebration of the Prophet’s 
birthday in February 1948, the students Hamad al-Rujaib and Ahmad al-ʿAdwani staged 
a performance of a play they had co-written. Entitled “A Farce Through and Through,” 
it depicted through thinly veiled symbolism the cowardice and corruption of the Arab 
leaders during the 1948 War. The play proved popular, leading Bait al-Kuwait to print it 
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as a book and sell it through a Kuwaiti bookstore.246 Bait al-Kuwait’s residents also 
collected donations for Palestine.247  
 The most significant of Bait al-Kuwait’s activities was the publication of its 
monthly magazine al-Biʿtha (The Mission) from late 1946. Though published from 
Cairo, it is considered the second periodical in Kuwait’s history.248 As ʿAbd al-ʿAziz 
Husain stressed in a 1949 editorial, the magazine’s main goal was “to present Kuwait to 
the Arab countries generally and Egypt specifically, knowing that the Arab countries’ 
awareness of one another is the first step towards unity.” At the same time, it sought to 
“carry bursts of Egypt’s culture to Kuwait” and encourage journalism and cultural 
production in the country.249 Al-Biʿtha published articles by Kuwaiti students, former 
and current members of the Egyptian Educational Mission to Kuwait, and both Kuwaiti 
and Egyptian men of letters. It often adopted critical stances towards Kuwaiti affairs, 
and many articles adopted an Arab nationalist tone, which intensified over time.250 
 Finally, Bait al-Kuwait also played an important role in broadening the Kuwaiti 
Educational Department’s transnational networks, becoming something of an unofficial 
consulate. According to a 1949 article in al-Biʿtha appraising Bait al-Kuwait’s 
achievements, the hostel “has become recognized by the Egyptian authorities as a center 
for Kuwait.” It served as a source of information on Kuwait, at times correcting 
inaccurate reports on the shaykhdom in the Egyptian media. Furthermore, it assisted 
private Kuwaiti individuals visiting Egypt, and carried out tasks for Kuwait government 
departments.251 As Director of Bait al-Kuwait, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain also played a 																																																								
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much broader role than that set out in his job description. When he left the post in 1950, 
al-Biʿtha stated that he “did not confine himself to the limits of Bait al-Kuwait and its 
affairs but went beyond them to become the technical adviser of the Educational 
Department.”252 As shall be seen, upon Kuwait’s independence in 1961, Bait al-Kuwait 
was transformed into an embassy, and Husain was appointed ambassador.  
 It was not only through the controlled environment of Bait al-Kuwait that Kuwaiti 
students interacted with Egyptian society. The expansion of Kuwait’s scholarship 
program beginning in 1945 coincided with the rise of a violent protest movement in 
Egypt. Students played a central role in this movement in association with radical, 
extra-parliamentary forces such as the Muslim Brotherhood, leftist groups, and the 
fascist-inspired Young Egypt. Student protests, which erupted periodically until the end 
of the decade, were variously directed at the British, the local authorities, and the 
situation in Palestine.253 It was hard for Kuwaiti students to avoid them. ʿAbd al-ʿAziz 
al-Sarʿawi recalls an incident that took place shortly after he arrived in Egypt in 1943, 
when an anti-British demonstration erupted at his secondary school. Though al-Sarʿawi 
and his compatriots wanted to join in, they had been warned by the Kuwaiti authorities 
not to engage in political activity. Seeing the Kuwaiti students’ inaction, their Egyptian 
classmates started pointing at them, chanting: “Down with the cowards! Down with the 
collaborators!” According to al-Sarʿawi, this experience left a lasting impact on the 
Kuwaiti pupils.254  
 Al-Sarʿawi states that the Kuwaiti students soon overcame their inhibitions 
towards demonstrations. He recalls participating in many, particularly those of “a 
nationalist [qawmī] character and against the English.”  On one occasion, the Egyptian 
protesters mistook a Kuwaiti student for a Sudanese due to his dark complexion. Since 																																																								
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the cause of Egyptian-Sudanese unity was popular at the time, the Egyptians hoisted the 
Kuwaiti student on their shoulders. When confronted by the police, the protestors fled, 
throwing the student to the ground. The police then apprehended him and beat him 
thoroughly. However, the student remained silent for fear that he would be discovered 
to be Kuwaiti, and that word of his demonstrating might thus get back to the Kuwaiti 
authorities.255 
 Brushes with the law did not stop Kuwaiti students from engaging in political 
activities. Hamad al-Rujaib recalls participating in a protest every week or two, in the 
process of which he received numerous beatings from the police. Cairo, he states, was 
“simmering with patriotic and nationalist sentiment,” and Palestine “was the main 
preoccupation of Egyptian and Arab youth.”256 Khalid Khalaf narrowly averted arrest 
twice, once while demonstrating and another time during a public speech by Young 
Egypt’s leader Ahmad Husain.257  
 In addition to protests, the Kuwaiti students also interacted with organized 
political groups. Jasim al-Qatami, al-Rujaib, and Khalaf all recall attending lectures by 
Hasan al-Banna at the Muslim Brotherhood’s general headquarters. In Khalaf’s case, an 
Egyptian classmate of his introduced him to al-Banna during a seminar. The 
Brotherhood leader then asked Khalaf to speak about Kuwait, and praised him after he 
gave an overview of his country’s history. The ensuing conversation lasted until late at 
night.258 Al-Qatami also “made contacts with” other Egyptian parties such as Young 
Egypt.259 Surprisingly, no Kuwaiti students are known to have joined a political group 
while in Egypt, and all three who attended al-Banna’s lectures later developed Arab 
nationalist affiliations. Al-Qatami in particular became a leader of the MAN in Kuwait.  																																																								
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 By the late 1940s, Egypt’s increasingly turbulent politics led the British to 
pressure the Kuwaiti authorities to refrain from sending scholarship students there.260 
This was tied to British opposition towards the Egyptian control of education in Kuwait, 
as discussed earlier. However, British leverage over Kuwaiti education was limited at 
this point. As shall be seen, though Kuwait’s scholarships to Egypt did briefly halt in 
the early 1950s for reasons unrelated to British pressure, they would soon resume. 
Kuwaiti students would continue their pilgrimages to Cairo unimpeded for years to 
come. 
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Chapter Four: Arab Nationalism Resurgent, 1950-1956 
 
 The departure of the Egyptian Educational Mission, which had dominated 
education in Kuwait for almost a decade, allowed for significant change within the 
department. Between 1950 and 1952, the prominent Arab nationalist ideologue Darwish 
al-Miqdadi was at the helm of the department, and sought to break once and for all with 
the Egyptian legacy by introducing a national curriculum based on both Kuwaiti 
patriotism and Arab nationalism. Although al-Miqdadi had been employed as a result of 
the Educational Council’s Pan-Arab connections, conservative elements within the 
council opposed his agenda, and sought to rebuild educational ties with Egypt. This 
resulted in the return of the Egyptian Educational Mission in 1952. A rising trend of 
Kuwaiti particularism also led to al-Miqdadi’s demotion to Assistant Director of 
Education in the same year. Although al-Miqdadi was unable to implement his 
curricular reforms during his directorship, he continued to pursue them and reinforce 
the department’s Arab nationalist character for the rest of the decade. 
 The force that unseated al-Miqdadi was the Kuwaiti muthaqqafīn, a new social 
stratum that took shape in the early 1950s as a result of the expansion of education. 
Though many of its members were Arab nationalists, an influential group of 
muthaqqafīn based in the Educational Department advocated a policy of “Kuwait for 
the Kuwaitis,” and sought a Kuwaiti Director of Education. This post was filled by 
ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain in 1952. Ironically, the department’s Arab nationalist character 
would increase following this shift, partly due to the continuing influence of al-
Miqdadi. In 1956, Kuwait’s first national curriculum was drafted with the goal of 
spreading Arab national awareness, marking the return of the “top-down” approach of 
nationalist inculcation.  
The Educational Department Under Darwish al-Miqdadi, 1950-1952  
 
 In the summer of 1950, Kuwait’s Educational Council decided to hire a 
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Palestinian educator to occupy the position of Director of Education, vacated following 
the departure of the Egyptian Educational Mission earlier that year. According to 
Khayri Abu al-Jubayn, a Palestinian who was then a teacher in Kuwait, the candidates 
for this position included Mustafa Murad al-Dabbagh, Ahmad al-Khalifa, and Mahmud 
al-Hut.1 All had been high-ranking inspectors within the educational system of the 
Palestine Mandate. 2  The council’s choice, however, fell on the prominent Arab 
nationalist ideologue Darwish al-Miqdadi, even though he had occupied less senior 
positions than the other candidates. Al-Miqdadi assumed his duties in Kuwait in July of 
1950.3  
 The decision to hire al-Miqdadi must be considered in light of his long career of 
combining education with Arab nationalist indoctrination and political organization. 
After graduating from the AUB in 1922, al-Miqdadi returned to Palestine to teach 
history. In addition to inculcating his pupils with Arab nationalist ideology, he 
organized student protests and strikes and attempted to form an independent nationalist 
Scouting association. After repeated clashes with British educational administrators, al-
Miqdadi was either fired or resigned on his own accord in 1926.4  
 Shortly afterwards, al-Miqdadi moved to Iraq at the invitation of Satiʿ al-Husri. 
Iraq became the main stage for his educational cum political activities, which fit well 
with the Arab nationalist agenda of the Ministry of Education. In addition to serving as 
a teacher and headmaster at prestigious institutions in Baghdad,5 he wrote history 
textbooks for the ministry. The most important was his aforementioned History of the 
Arab Nation, which contributed to the ideological development of Arab nationalism. 
Furthermore, al-Miqdadi realized his project of employing Scouting for nationalist 
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indoctrination and mobilization. As mentioned previously, he cofounded the Arab 
Rover Society in the early 1930s. Subsequently, he became involved in the government-
sponsored Futuwwa youth group after its founding in 1935.6 During the 1941 Rashid 
ʿAli Revolt, he also oversaw Kataʾib al-Shabab (the Youth Brigades), a paramilitary 
force of college students that fought the invading British forces.7  
 Al-Miqdadi also played an important role in Iraq’s Arab nationalist politics. He 
cofounded the highly influential Muthanna Club in 1935, and was also active within the 
Palestine Defense Committee.8 Most significantly, he was a leading member of the Iraqi 
branch of the Red Book Group, briefly becoming president of the transnational 
organization between August 1939 and March 1940 when its headquarters was 
transferred from Beirut to Baghdad.9 In the late 1930s, al-Miqdadi and his comrades 
transformed nationalist organizations such as the Muthanna Club and the Arab Rover 
Society into fronts for their clandestine movement.10 
 Al-Miqdadi is also frequently remembered for his connection to Nazi Germany. 
He was a major figure within the radical, fascist-influenced strain of Arab nationalism 
that became prominent in Iraq in the 1930s. This trend culminated in the 1941 al-
Kaylani government, which allied with Germany against Britain. Much of the literature 
on this strand of Arab nationalism exaggerates its ideological affinity with Nazism due 
to its reliance on alarmist British reports.11 It is primarily on the basis of these 
problematic sources, in addition to Israeli archival material, that al-Miqdadi is portrayed 
as an enthusiastic Nazi sympathizer.12 Even with that in mind, al-Miqdadi’s Nazi 
connections were clearly stronger than most contemporary Arab nationalist activists. He 
pursued a PhD at the University of Berlin between 1936 and 1939, which he could not 																																																								
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complete due to the war. During this time, he was active in Arab student groups 
sponsored by the Nazi regime.13 After occupying Iraq in 1941, the British imprisoned 
al-Miqdadi for four years due to his role in the Rashid ʿAli Revolt.14 He returned to 
Palestine upon his release, but fled to Damascus after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli 
War, becoming a lecturer at the Syrian University.15 
 There is evidence that political affinity and even past organizational ties 
between al-Miqdadi and certain members of Kuwait’s Educational Council played a key 
role in his appointment. Abu al-Jubayn attributes the council’s decision to the 
admiration of some of its members for al-Miqdadi’s professional background and his 
“glorious political history.”16 There is no doubt that al-Miqdadi was known to at least 
some of the councilmen. As detailed in the second chapter, he visited Kuwait in 1933 
on a trip organized by the Arab Rover Society, and at least one of his textbooks was 
used in Kuwaiti schools between 1936 and 1942. Kuwait’s Arab nationalist merchants 
also had ties to the Muthanna Club, which he cofounded.  
 Ahmad al-Khatib is more specific regarding the connection between al-Miqdadi 
and the councilmen, arguing that the Palestinian educator was chosen due to his 
membership of the Red Book Group. 17  Muhammad al-Saddah echoes this view, 
maintaining that as in the case of al-Saqqaf, it was the former Red Book Group member 
and councilman Nisf Yusuf al-Nisf who was responsible for employing al-Miqdadi.18 
The memoires of al-Miqdadi’s wife Rabiha lend support to this account. She recalls that 
a delegation from the Kuwaiti Educational Department, headed by al-Nisf, visited 
Damascus, where al-Miqdadi was teaching. Al-Nisf met with al-Miqdadi multiple times 
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and convinced him to take up the position of Director of Education.19 Elsewhere, 
Rabiha emphasizes al-Nisf’s support for the Palestinian cause, and states that he became 
al-Miqdadi’s “right hand” in the implementation of pro-Palestinian charitable projects 
throughout the 1950s.20 As shall be seen, more former members of the Red Book Group 
would be employed by the Educational Department following al-Miqdadi’s 
appointment as director, highlighting the importance of this network.  
 A second member of the Educational Council who could have had a hand in 
hiring al-Miqdadi was the prominent Arab nationalist ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Saniʿ. As has 
been stated, al-Saniʿ held that he was one of the first Kuwaitis to make contact with the 
Muthanna Club in the mid-1930s. He may have come to know al-Miqdadi in this 
manner. In addition, he published Kazima in partnership with the former Red Book 
Group member Ahmad al-Saqqaf. While other merchants active in nationalist politics in 
the 1930s later became much more conservative, this does not appear to be the case for 
al-Nisf and al-Saniʿ. Al-Khatib recalls that the two men were among the principal 
merchant supporters of the nationalist opposition in the 1950s.21 Other councilmen may 
have also had Arab nationalist leanings, including Yusuf al-Humaiḍi, a former 
Legislative Council member, and ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-Khrafi, who was a member of the 
Educational Council in the 1930s and participated in pro-Palestine activism.22  
 Remarkably, the British did not object to al-Miqdadi’s employment despite 
knowledge of his political history. This can be attributed to several factors, namely: al-
Miqdadi’s efforts to reassure his erstwhile enemies, British opposition to Egyptian 
domination of Kuwaiti education, and the British policy of indirectly influencing 
education in Kuwait. After inquiring about al-Miqdadi, the Political Agent concluded: 																																																								
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“he does not look an extremely happy choice for this job in Kuwait, although he 
expressed a warm desire to co-operate with the Agency.”23 Shortly afterwards, the 
Political Agent reported on a visit paid to him by al-Miqdadi: 
He was… quite frank in saying that one reason for coming was to say that he did 
not doubt that his past record might have caused us some suspicions... He 
assured us that in the first place he did not intend to mix up politics in education, 
and secondly that although in the past he had been anti-British, he now 
considered that British friendship and support were necessary.24 
 
The Political Agent was favourably impressed, adding that he had “no reason to 
disbelieve these assurances.”25  
 In September, the Political Agent reported on another well-received visit by al-
Miqdadi to the British Council office in Beirut, and informed the Foreign Office that 
further research into the new director’s political background would be unnecessary.26 A 
British Council report in October was even more enthusiastic, praising the new 
director’s “professional integrity” and “long experience of administration in education.” 
It went on to note “the complete change of atmosphere [in the Educational Department] 
since the appointment of” al-Miqdadi.27 A British Council official elaborated on this 
point, stating: “the effect of the new relationship with the Education Department at 
Kuwait is to cause a considerable increase in demand for advice and materials such as 
books, films etc.”28 
 Al-Miqdadi’s successful courtship of the British was facilitated by their 
common opposition towards Egyptian control of education in Kuwait. As detailed in the 
previous chapter, the British opposed sending Kuwaiti students to Egypt. As shall be 
seen, scholarships to Egypt were stopped under al-Miqdadi due to the ongoing dispute 
between the educational authorities in Kuwait and Cairo and the director’s personal bias 
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against Egyptian education. When al-Miqdadi was replaced in 1952 and the Egyptian 
Educational Mission returned, a British official lamented: “we had hoped that Egyptian 
influence had been virtually eliminated two years ago with the departure of the 
Egyptian teachers and the appointment of Miqdadi.”29 
 Finally, at the time of al-Miqdadi’s arrival in Kuwait, the British authorities 
were committed to a policy of influencing education by indirect means as opposed to 
direct intervention. As stated in the previous chapter, the departure of the Educational 
Adviser Wakelin in 1945 ended the more intrusive British efforts to control education in 
Kuwait. In subsequent years, British oversight was limited to occasional visits by 
British Council officials from neighboring states. Although Britain’s interest in 
Kuwait’s educational affairs increased in the early 1950s as the country’s oil industry 
boomed,30 the authorities in the Gulf recognized that a new approach was needed.  
The director of the British Council Center in Basra, who conducted visits to the 
Gulf, thus argued in late 1949: “if we are to promote the British way of education in the 
Persian Gulf, we can only hope to do it through the existing administration for I think 
that the time has gone when the governments will accept education administrators.”31 
The Political Resident approved this approach in 1950, stating: “I fully agree… that 
constant interference by a permanent adviser would likely be resented.” He added: “the 
Kuwait Government are very jealous of their independence in educational matters and 
have to be handled very carefully.”32 The appointment of the seemingly friendly al-
Miqdadi therefore led a British Council official to remark: “it is particularly satisfactory 
that the new Director of Education should have been found by the Kuwaitis on their 
own and yet he is co-operative with us.”33  
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Al-Miqdadi’s Educational-Political Philosophy 
 
 Whatever al-Miqdadi’s motives behind his rapprochement with the British, it 
did not mean that he had abandoned his Arab nationalist principles. From the offset, he 
demonstrated independence from the British by representing Kuwait at an Arab League 
educational conference in Egypt in October 1950. The Political Resident complained 
that while the Bahraini Director of Education informed the British authorities of his 
participation, al-Miqdadi did not.34  
 Despite his assurances not to “mix up politics in education,” al-Miqdadi also 
continued to strongly advocate the teaching of Arab nationalism in schools. In early 
1953, around six months after his demotion to Assistant Director of Education, al-
Miqdadi began writing in al-Iman, organ of Kuwait’s National Cultural Club. Existing 
studies of al-Miqdadi’s ideology and writings are restricted to the period before the 
collapse of Iraq’s Arab nationalist system of education in 1941.35 His articles in al-Iman 
provide a rare glimpse into how his ideas developed in the subsequent phase of his 
career. They reveal that al-Miqdadi still viewed the educational systems of the fascist 
states as a model when it came to the inculcation of nationalism. At the same time, he 
sought to incorporate elements of British and American pedagogy, and was critical of 
preexisting Arab educational systems.  
 For al-Miqdadi, education is the key to the liberation and advancement of the 
Arab nation, leading him to proclaim: “the future of the Arabs depends on the awaited 
Arab school.”36 In his view, centuries of tyrannical rule afflicted Arab society with 
ignorance, fractiousness, and corruption, and only state education can ensure that the 
coming generations will be purged of these ills.37 He states: 
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For this reason, emerging countries that pursue governance at the hands of a 
benevolent despot [mustabid ʿādil] expend a great deal of effort in rearing 
[tarbīyyat] the youth… through the schools under their control. In this way, they 
aim to guarantee their future by creating a generation of youth that believe in 
their message, as the Nazis did in Germany.  
 
Al-Miqdadi then quotes a member of the Hitler Youth who, even in defeat, proclaims 
his everlasting loyalty to the Nazi creed.38 The author goes on to state that from “the 
awaited Arab school,” the Arabs’ own “awaited leader [zaʿīm] and benevolent despot” 
will likely emerge. He will then reform education throughout the Arab nation, thereby 
“achieving complete revolution, liberating the homeland, and eradicating the ignorance, 
superstition, poverty, and disease within it.”39  
 Al-Miqdadi’s belief in the ability of state education to bring about a national 
renaissance through the forging of a new generation was shared by Satiʿ al-Husri, who 
engineered the Iraqi educational system upon this very principle. The two men had a 
close personal relationship.40 Al-Husri derived this idea from the German philosophers 
Herder and Fichte.41 Al-Miqdadi also appears to have been inspired by the German 
romantic tradition. He cites the example of Fichte in an article entitled “For Teachers: 
The School and the Liberation Movement in Germany.” Here, he outlines Prussia’s use 
of state education to fight French occupation through the spreading of national 
awareness. He highlights the role of Fichte and other educators in making the 
University of Berlin a “center for the resistance movement against Napoleon.”42 Al-
Miqdadi’s writings in the 1950s thus reveal a great deal of continuity with the German-
influenced Arab nationalism of the 1930s.  
 Al-Miqdadi, however, does not to seek to blindly imitate the Iraqi Arab 
educational system designed by al-Husri. He maintains that with few exceptions, 
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“education has failed in the last thirty years” in the Arab states including Iraq.43 The 
main reason behind this is that their educational systems overwhelmingly rely on the 
rote learning of abstract knowledge.44 It will be recalled that al-Husri’s educational 
system privileged the teaching of language and history over practical subjects. For al-
Miqdadi, practical and technical education is the missing element that allowed Japan to 
develop into a world power while the Arab world stagnated.45 It was also a key element 
in the Nazi system of education, and is at the forefront of recent educational 
developments in Britain and America.46  
 A second field in which the existing Arab educational systems have failed is 
what al-Miqdadi terms “spiritual cultivation [tarbīyya rūḥiyya]… [which is] the pillar of 
our personality and nationalism.”47 By this he means not only instruction in nationalist 
subjects, but also character building. The first deficiency in this regard has been the 
tendency to treat the teacher as a mere employee, when he is in fact the “only one who 
can instil the new message in the spirits of the students.” The state must accord respect 
and responsibility to teachers, while at the same time making sure that they become 
agents of its “revolutionary movement.”48 Students, secondly, must also be free to 
express themselves and be creative so that they can become men of strong character. 
The educational system must allow pupils to pursue various tracks and specializations 
according to their inclinations and abilities, while at the same time imposing discipline 
and a common national culture.49  
To al-Miqdadi, the ideal Arab system of education should balance between two 
pedagogical models. The first is the individualist model practiced in the UK and USA, 
which is “based upon freedom.” The second is the collectivist model exemplified by 																																																								
43 Al-Miqdadi, “al-Nizam,” 565.  
44 Ibid., 567.  
45 Darwish al-Miqdadi, “Nahdat al-Yaban,” al-Iman, February 1953, 82; al-Miqdadi, “al-Nizam,” 567.  
46 Al-Miqdadi, “al-Nizam,” 575-576. 
47 Ibid., 568. 
48 Ibid., 569. 
49 Ibid., 565-566, 571-573.  
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communist Russia and fascist Germany and Italy, which prioritizes order. Much of the 
article is devoted to praising the individualist mode of education for the freedom it 
accords to both teachers and students, and for the attention it provides to the needs and 
inclinations of individual pupils.50 Indeed, al-Miqdadi holds that “the leading men of the 
Arabs” graduated not from Arab government schools, but from local missionary 
institutions and academies in Europe and the USA.51 Nevertheless, the many social ills 
and external dangers faced by the Arab nation necessitate that “we follow a common 
policy and believe in a single creed.” Only by emulating the collectivist model can Arab 
educators enforce the required national unity and discipline.52  
Al-Miqdadi’s writings in al-Iman also reveal his particular aversion towards the 
Egyptian system of education. In a 1954 article, he praises the post-revolution 
educational reforms implemented by the Egyptian Minister of Education Ismaʿil 
Qabbani in 1953. The previous educational system, in his view, was built on a 
colonialist and classist basis, with separate tracks for urban and rural areas. The latter, 
more advanced track was designed to produce “servile” government clerks, and was 
overly theoretical and academic in nature.53 Al-Miqdadi elaborated on this point in a 
conversation with the British Political Agent following the return of the Egyptian 
Educational Mission in 1952. The latter reports: “He was very critical of Egyptian 
methods generally, aiming at cramming facts and passing examinations, not interested 
in the broader aspects of education, with the health and discipline which should go with 
it.”54  
A second key failing of the Egyptian curriculum according to al-Miqdadi was its 
focus on Egypt to the exclusion of the wider Arab nation. In a 1952 educational report, 
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he criticizes the 1947 Egyptian secondary school curriculum, then in use in Kuwait, for 
focusing solely on the history and geography of Egypt and Sudan.55 Al-Miqdadi’s 1954 
article praises the new curriculum introduced by Qabbani for placing greater emphasis 
on Islamic studies and Arabic. However, he adds: “despite the many virtues of the new 
educational laws, they require further changes to become suitable to the new Arab spirit 
that has begun to spread in every Arab state.” He criticizes in particular the teaching of 
“Egyptian Society” as a subject in secondary school, insisting that students “must be 
taught about Arab society in general, and Egyptian society specifically on the basis that 
it is part of Arab society.” Moreover, more attention must be paid to the Palestinian 
issue and the dangers of Zionism.56  
Al-Miqdadi’s Educational Policies 
 
Al-Miqdadi’s positions in al-Iman clearly underpinned many of the policies he 
pursued as Director of Education between 1950 and 1952, and subsequently as 
Assistant Director until 1961. Al-Miqdadi set out his main goals in an educational 
report he authored at the end of his tenure. These were the introduction of practical 
education and the cultivation of an Arab-Islamic identity.57 During his two years in 
office, however, his ability to implement his reforms was severely hindered by 
resistance from the Educational Council. Historically, this body rarely involved itself in 
pedagogical matters. However, the council appears to have assumed a greater role in 
this field following the disputes between it and the Egyptian Educational Mission in the 
late 1940s. As shall be seen, the relationship between al-Miqdadi and the Educational 
Council would deteriorate considerably after it acquired new members in 1952.   
 One of the most noteworthy aspects of al-Miqdadi’s policy as Director of 
Education was the ending of Kuwait’s exclusive reliance on Egypt for its educational 																																																								
55 Darwish Al-Miqdadi, Maʿarif al-Kuwait fi ʿAmain 1950-1951, 1951-1952 (Kuwait: 1952), 61-62.  
56 Al-Miqdadi, “Misr,” 23-27.  
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needs, instead pursuing partnerships with a broader range of Arab governments and 
institutions. Between 1950 and 1952, Egypt ceased to be a significant source of 
educational personnel and technical assistance, while scholarships to Egypt were 
severely curtailed. Al-Miqdadi also attempted to abandon the Egyptian curriculum, 
though this would not be completely realized during his tenure. In its place, he sought to 
create a national curriculum that would simultaneously cultivate Kuwaiti patriotism and 
Arab nationalism.  
Upon assuming his post, al-Miqdadi hired an overwhelmingly Palestinian staff 
to fill the positions vacated by the Egyptian teachers. In the academic year 1950-1951, 
the expatriate Arab teachers included 131 Palestinians (71 male and 60 female), 14 
Egyptians (11 male and 3 female), 9 Iraqis (male), 6 Syrians (3 male and 3 female), and 
2 Lebanese (female).58 The 11 male Egyptian teachers were the ʿulamaʾ seconded by al-
Azhar to Kuwait’s religious academy, and were the only officially sponsored teachers to 
return that year.59 In the summer of 1950, al-Miqdadi had in fact met with the Egyptian 
Minister of Education Taha Husain and requested the secondment of further teachers. 
Husain, however, refused on the basis that the Kuwaiti Educational Department had 
appointed a non-Egyptian Director of Education without consulting the Egyptian 
authorities.60 Al-Miqdadi probably welcomed this response, for in 1952 he confided to 
the British Political Agent “that he was personally not against Egyptians and would be 
quite prepared to engage them, in the same way as he took on Syrians, Palestinians and 
Iraqis; but not such people as the Egyptian Government would send-- they would 
certainly not be good men.”61  
Palestinians came to occupy the vast majority of senior positions within the 
Educational Department, including all inspectors and the headmaster of the 																																																								
58 “Ihsaʾ ʿAm ʿAn al-Maʿahid wa-l-Madaris wa-l-Hayʾat al-Taʿlimiyya fi al-Kuwait 1950-1951,” al-
Biʿtha, December 1951, 395. 
59 “Huna al-Kuwait,” al-Biʿtha, August 1950, 228.  
60 MEC: S1, 3/10/1950.  
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Mubarakiyya School.62 An exception was Najlaʾ Abu ʿIz al-Din, the Director of Girls’ 
Schools.63 A Lebanese Druze, she is said to have been the first woman from an Arab 
country to attain a PhD, awarded to her by the University of Chicago in 1934.64 
Crucially, she was also a former member of the Red Book Group, and this connection 
must have had some bearing on her appointment.65 As a result of her efforts, the first 
girls’ secondary class was established in the academic year 1951-1952, paving the way 
for the first female scholarships to Egypt in 1955.66 
The Kuwaiti Educational Department’s break with Cairo also allowed al-
Miqdadi to seek new regional partners in the fields of technical assistance and 
scholarships. His policies in this respect were shaped by the desire of the Educational 
Council to provide a complete secondary education in Kuwait, and to provide 
scholarships abroad solely for tertiary study. This required the addition of the fifth and 
final year of secondary study, after which students could progress to the university 
level. At the same time, it was also necessary to attain regional recognition for the 
Kuwaiti secondary school diploma, so that graduates would be able to study in Arab 
universities.  
The Educational Council’s plans for the development of secondary education in 
Kuwait predated the arrival of al-Miqdadi. At the beginning of the academic year 1949-
1950, the Council attempted to introduce the fifth year, and did not send the fourth year 
graduates to Egypt. However, it appears that this plan was impracticable, and the 
students were belatedly enrolled in Egyptian secondary schools.67 In the fall of 1949, 
the Council also informed the British that it would cease sending students to Egypt for 																																																								
62 BW/114/11: Notes, Keight, 12-14 November 1951; Report, Keight, 15-22 October 1950; MEC: S27, 
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secondary education, and the Bait al-Kuwait hostel would therefore be closed.68 After 
al-Miqdadi assumed his post, the department officially inaugurated the fifth year. 
However, al-Miqdadi reports that the grade was “completed” in the following year.69 In 
May 1951, the Council also decreed that Bait al-Kuwait in Cairo would cease 
functioning as a hostel and would serve only as an administrative office.70  
At the start of his appointment, the Educational Council tasked al-Miqdadi with 
obtaining recognition for the Kuwaiti secondary school diploma from Arab 
governments and universities. The new director first turned to his alma mater, the 
AUB.71 After a visit by the university’s President Stephen Penrose to Kuwait in 
February 1951,72 the AUB recognized the Kuwaiti secondary school diploma and made 
provisions for the acceptance of Kuwaiti students.73 In the fall of 1951, the Educational 
Department sent three secondary school graduates on scholarship to the university.74 
Penrose also recommended that Kuwaiti teachers be enrolled in summer courses at the 
AUB to improve their standard.75  
The AUB’s recognition of the Kuwaiti secondary school diploma inaugurated a 
close relationship between the university and Kuwait’s Educational Department. In the 
summer of 1951, the department enrolled the first group of 35 Kuwaiti teachers in a 
specially designed summer course at the AUB, and promised to increase the salaries of 
those who successfully completed it.76 A further twelve teachers were signed up the 
following summer,77 in addition to nine graduates of the Mubarakiyya School’s teacher 
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training classes.78 The AUB would continue to organize summer courses for Kuwaiti 
teachers throughout the 1950s.79  
 The second institution to recognize the Kuwaiti secondary school diploma was 
the American University in Cairo (AUC) in January 1952.80 The man responsible for 
this was ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Nuʿmani, a Lebanese academic who became director of Bait 
al-Kuwait in October 1950, and was also a faculty member at the AUC.81 At the same 
time, al-Nuʿmani also reopened talks with the Egyptian Ministry of Education with the 
goal of obtaining its recognition of the Kuwaiti diploma.82 As shall be seen below, this 
proved to be a very important development.   
Al-Miqdadi next sought recognition from the Iraqi Ministry of Education, 
another institution with which he had longstanding ties. In April 1952, he travelled to 
Baghdad to request the secondment of a committee of experts to oversee the final 
examinations for the fourth and fifth secondary years. The ministry complied, 
despatching the requested committee to Kuwait in May of that year.83 At its head was 
Salim al-Naʿimi,84 a former comrade of al-Miqdadi in both the Red Book Group and the 
Arab Rover Society. He had even participated with al-Miqdadi in the Rovers’ 1933 trip 
to Kuwait.85 Al-Miqdadi may have used his nationalist political connections to facilitate 
cooperation with the Iraqi authorities. As part of this arrangement, Iraq’s Ministry of 
Education recognized the Kuwaiti secondary school diploma at the start of the academic 
year 1952-1953.86  
In the same year, the first Kuwaiti scholarship students were sent to Iraq since 
1938. Two students went to the Baghdad Teacher’s College, and seven others who 																																																								
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failed the fifth year examinations repeated the year in Iraqi schools. The Iraqi 
government also offered six scholarships to Kuwaiti students, though it is not clear if 
they were accepted.87 The resurgence of Iraqi influence over Kuwaiti education was, 
however, cut short by the return of the Egyptian Educational Mission. The latter took 
over the supervision of Kuwait’s secondary school examinations in the 1952-1953 
school year.88 Egyptian influence ensured that educational cooperation between Kuwait 
and Iraq remained limited throughout the decade, particularly as bitter geopolitical 
rivalry emerged between Cairo and Baghdad from the mid-1950s.89 
 It was also under al-Miqdadi that the Kuwaiti Educational Department offered 
its first scholarships to Great Britain. The first group of Kuwaiti scholarship students 
enrolled in British secondary schools and universities towards the end of 1950.90 By the 
summer of 1952, they numbered 28.91 Along with their pressure to refrain from sending 
scholarships to Egypt, the British also appear to have pushed Kuwait’s educational 
authorities to send scholarships to the UK. When approached by the Political Agent in 
late 1949, an unnamed “prominent member” of the Educational Council promised to 
divert scholarships from Egypt to the UK after the introduction of the fifth year of 
secondary education in Kuwait.92 British pressure was not the only factor behind these 
scholarships. In 1950, the British-educated Palestinian headmaster of the Mubarakiyya 
School also recommended that secondary school graduates be sent to the UK.93 
Furthermore, in early 1951, the KOC started providing an annual grant to the 
department for scholarships to the UK.94  
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 Although the Educational Department was prepared to send students to the UK, 
it was wary of accepting further British educational assistance. It has already been 
stated that the British Council assisted al-Miqdadi in obtaining textbooks and other 
material when he was first appointed. The British Council’s center in Beirut also 
continued to help the department recruit teachers – a practice dating to the 1940s – and 
helped organize the AUB summer courses for Kuwaiti teachers. 95  However, the 
Educational Council rejected any measures that would allow the British to assert control 
over education. It thus rejected a proposal by the British government to place Kuwaiti 
scholarships to the UK under its supervision.96 Instead, it relied on the ruler’s personal 
representative in London, who cooperated with a private educational agency.97 The 
British Council, supported by the British Foreign Office, also took advantage of the 
departure of the Egyptian Educational Mission to push for the employment of British 
teachers and an inspector of English.98 However, a British Council official lamented 
that the department was “adamant in its refusal to employ… British teachers,”99 and the 
Political Resident added that they “show little readiness to accept” British assistance.100  
 Along with his efforts to broaden the regional ties of Kuwait’s Educational 
Department, al-Miqdadi also sought to end its dependence on the Egyptian curriculum 
that he so opposed. To replace it, he sought to create an independent Kuwaiti 
curriculum that would simultaneously emphasize local identity and Arab national 
belonging. This is in line with his “flexible” ideological stance, which holds local 
patriotism and Arab nationalism “to be complementary rather than mutually 
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exclusive.”101 However, he faced opposition from the Educational Council, which 
hoped to resume educational ties with Egypt and was therefore reluctant to abandon the 
Egyptian curriculum. Despite the council’s resistance, al-Miqdadi was able to achieve a 
limited degree of curricular reform, as a result of which instruction in Arab nationalism 
was reintroduced to Kuwaiti schools for the first time since the Iraqi curriculum was 
abandoned in 1943.   
Al-Miqdadi first proposed changing the curriculum at several Educational 
Council meetings in December 1950. He argued that the curricula and textbooks of 
certain subjects were “weak” and required replacing. The council was at first reluctant, 
but later agreed that all curricula must be “strengthened” and inadequate textbooks 
replaced.102 In a meeting in early January 1951, al-Miqdadi made a more ambitious 
proposal, aided by the Palestinian inspector Hasan al-Dabbagh. The latter presented a 
detailed argument for the creation of “a strong domestic curriculum suited to the local 
environment” to replace that of Egypt. He also revealed that the department had already 
begun to gradually alter the Egyptian curriculum by adding supplementary material. 
This time, a number of councilmen defended the Egyptian curriculum. They included 
Khalid al-Zaid, who declared:  
It is my view that the Egyptian curriculum must be maintained, albeit with the 
strengthening of its weak points… due to our cultural relations with Egypt. 
Moreover, we must emulate this largest and most sophisticated of Arab and 
Muslim nations, which has for long bestowed its services upon all Arab 
countries in the field of education.103 
 
This statement suggests that Egypt’s cultural prestige was a factor influencing the 
council’s attitude. The council decreed that the Egyptian curriculum be preserved as 
Kuwait’s “official, fixed” curriculum, and that only textbooks approved by Egypt’s 
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Ministry of Education could be used.104 Al-Miqdadi later attempted to convince the 
council to reconsider its decision but was unsuccessful.105 
 In the face of the council’s obstinacy, al-Miqdadi sought to effect the changes he 
desired while nominally adhering to the Egyptian curriculum. He introduced a host of 
curricular reforms that took effect in the academic year 1951-1952.106 His 1952 report 
set out the rationale behind them. He argued that at the primary level, variations in 
practice across schools and grades meant that the Egyptian curriculum was already not 
strictly implemented in Kuwait. Furthermore, “Kuwait, like any other Arab country, has 
particular circumstances which justify the introduction of certain alterations that do not 
effect the core of the curriculum.”  He added that the new primary school curriculum, 
which was printed and distributed to all schools, “is not, strictly speaking, a new 
curriculum. Rather, it merely modifies and strengthens the previous curriculum.”107 
Regarding the secondary level, al-Miqdadi maintained that the 1947 Egyptian 
curriculum was to be followed, albeit “with some modification, expansion, and 
strengthening of certain areas according to the [local] circumstances and 
environment.”108  
Although al-Miqdadi does not explicitly mention nationalist indoctrination as a 
goal of his curricular reform scheme, his 1952 report elsewhere lists the fostering of 
“national awareness” as an objective of education.109 It was the first department 
document to do so. The report also states that the alterations to the Egyptian primary 
school curriculum specifically targeted the subjects of history and geography. Though it 
does not detail the changes made, the report argues that these subjects “must differ 
across [Arab] states,” suggesting that more focus was placed on Kuwait. Furthermore, 
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unlike the Egyptian curriculum, the subjects of history, geography, and Islamic studies 
were included in the final examinations for the primary school diploma, thus giving 
them greater weight.110  
 It appears that in practice, the modified primary school curriculum drew heavily 
on the curriculum of Mandatory Palestine. The Palestinian teacher Khayri Abu al-
Jubayn recalls that the Egyptian curriculum was largely restricted to the secondary 
level. On the primary level, he states, the curriculum was almost wholly Palestinian.111 
Muhammad al-Saddah, who was a primary school teacher at the time, similarly 
recollects that the curriculum was in practice Palestinian, with only a few Egyptian 
textbooks.112 
 Though al-Miqdadi’s alterations to the secondary level curriculum were less 
comprehensive, their Arab nationalist dimensions are more readily apparent. The most 
extensive changes were made to the subjects of history and geography, which 
previously only covered Egypt and Sudan. In the history curriculum for the first 
secondary year, the study of ancient Egypt was supplemented with Mesopotamian, 
Greek, and Roman history. The curriculum for the third year, which previously dealt 
only with Egypt in the Islamic period, was broadened to include the other Arab 
countries, Islamic Spain, the Crusades, and an introduction to medieval Europe. Finally, 
“the reawakening of [Arab] national awareness, the patriotic movements, and political 
developments in the Arab east from the mid-nineteenth century” were added to the 
study of modern Egyptian history in the fourth year. In the geography curriculum, the 
study of the Nile Valley was dropped in favor of “the countries of the Arab east, 
especially Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.”113  
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 In January 1952, new elections produced an Educational Council that was more 
hostile towards al-Miqdadi and his attempts to dilute the Egyptian curriculum. The 
political background behind this position will be discussed in detail below. In its first 
month, the council raised concerns over why a particular Arabic grammar textbook not 
approved by Egypt’s Ministry of Education was being used in Kuwaiti schools. It 
formed a “monitoring committee to investigate the issue of textbooks and observe 
administrative proceedings” within the department.114  
 The development that ultimately put an end to al-Miqdadi’s new curriculum was 
the resumption of educational cooperation with Cairo in the summer of 1952. As has 
been stated, the director of Bait al-Kuwait approached Egypt’s Ministry of Education in 
the summer of 1951 regarding its recognition of the Kuwaiti secondary school diploma. 
In December of that year, the ministry informed him that it was prepared to dispatch a 
committee of specialists to assess Kuwait’s educational system and determine whether 
its diploma could be recognized. The Kuwaiti Educational Council readily agreed,115 
and a committee comprised of Egyptian educators Muhammad ʿAli Rida and Hafiz 
Ahmad Hamdi arrived in Kuwait in May 1952. During their three-week visit, they 
compiled a report assessing the extent to which the Kuwaiti system of education 
complied with that of Egypt.116 
 The Rida-Hamdi report focused to a large extent on the local curriculum, 
highlighting its deviations from that of Egypt. It pointed out shortcomings in numerous 
subjects, particularly on the primary level, and also highlighted the omission of civic 
education (tarbīyya waṭanīyya). Given this subject’s exclusively Egyptian focus, it is 
little wonder that al-Miqdadi left it out.117 The report even questioned the Educational 
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Department’s decision to allow the fourth year secondary school class to graduate 
because it had not completed the curriculum.118  
The Rida-Hamdi report focused much of its criticism on al-Miqdadi’s history 
and geography curriculums. Although it stated that their “general Arab character and 
attention to Kuwait” are warranted, it deemed that the subject matter was not chosen 
based on careful study. It also held the history curriculum to be overly ambitious. 
Moreover, the report pointed to the “peculiar mix” of Egyptian and non-Egyptian 
textbooks, describing some as outdated.119 Rida and Hamdi thus effectively questioned 
al-Miqdadi’s expertise in his field of specialization. The report concluded by 
recommending that the curriculum be reconsidered and “provided with a solid 
foundation.” This would be achieved through establishing committees of Egyptian 
experts to ensure that each subject conformed to Egyptian standards. At the same time, 
they would strive to accommodate the “circumstances of the Kuwaiti environment,” 
particularly in the subjects of history, geography, civic education, and Islamic 
studies.120  
Although this scheme did not materialize, the Rida-Hamdi report nevertheless 
heralded the end of al-Miqdadi’s first attempt to create an Arab nationalist Kuwaiti 
curriculum. As shall be seen, with the return of the Egyptian Mission, Egypt’s 
curriculum would once again be closely followed. This did not stop al-Miqdadi from 
continuing to pursue an Arab nationalist curriculum for Kuwait, and in 1954 he would 
again pursue curricular reform, this time more successfully. In addition, his continued 
influence would be apparent in the role played by former Red Book Group members in 
the department’s activities. Before addressing the circumstances behind al-Miqdadi’s 
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demotion, it is first necessary to examine the background of the educated young 
Kuwaitis who sought to replace him.   
The Rise of Kuwait’s Muthaqqafīn: 
 
 In the 1950s, the political, cultural, and administrative fields in Kuwait were 
radically transformed by the emergence of a new social stratum, known elsewhere in the 
Arab world as the effendiyya. In Kuwait, no single term was used to designate this 
group, which was composed of those who had received a modern, Western-style 
education. Of the various terms used by these individuals to describe themselves, 
perhaps the most common was “muthaqqafīn” (“cultured” or “educated”).121 Although 
the existing historical literature mentions the “intelligentsia” in the context of 1950s 
Kuwaiti politics, it largely fails to investigate the group’s origins and internal 
makeup.122 Moreover, the more specialized studies of Arab nationalism in Kuwait 
generally fail to discuss the social underpinnings of the political groups upon which 
they focus.123 
 By virtually ignoring the role of the muthaqqafīn in Kuwait’s political 
development during the 1950s and 1960s, the existing literature reinforces an 
exaggerated conception of Gulf exceptionalism. The Gulf is thus portrayed as 
untouched by the socio-political dynamics experienced not only in the Arab region, 
where the rise of the effendiyya was a central development in twentieth century history, 
but the world at large, where the intelligentsia formed the backbone of nationalist 
movements. It is therefore necessary to discuss the development, composition, and 
political orientation of the muthaqqafīn in Kuwait before examining their impact within 																																																								
121 See for example: “Khawatir,” al-Taliʿa, August 1962; Hamad al-ʿIsa, “Hadha Huwa al-Tariq,” al-
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Biʿtha, December 1951, 376; ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain, “Rida al-Nas,” al-Biʿtha, May 1950, 163; “Hadith 
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122 Zahlan, The Making, 41; S. Smith, 70; Crystal, 81-83.  
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the educational sector.  
 In the spring of 1950, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain, one of Kuwait’s pioneering and 
preeminent muthaqqafīn, wrote: “a conscious segment [fiʾa wāʿīyya] has taken shape in 
Kuwait, possessing a significant degree of education.”124 It was around this time that the 
muthaqqafīn began to coalesce into a discrete social stratum within Kuwaiti society, the 
product of the expansion of Kuwait’s scholarship program, local education, and the 
state bureaucracy in the 1940s and 1950s. The stratum was composed primarily of the 
middle class, though the sons of merchants remained an important constituent. The 
muthaqqafīn were also overwhelmingly young men, lending a generational aspect to 
their corporate identity. They generally shared a modernistic outlook and a belief in 
their role as the vanguard of social and political reform in a largely traditional, illiterate 
society. However, they adhered to various political ideologies, of which Arab 
nationalism would become by far the most prevalent by the mid-1950s. As a result of 
their prominent position within the state bureaucracy and their control over the clubs 
and the press, the muthaqqafīn were able to exercise an inordinate degree of influence 
over Kuwait’s political development in the 1950s and early 1960s.   
 A 1962 article in the MAN mouthpiece al-Taliʿa gives a more detailed picture 
of which groups made up the muthaqqafīn. The article takes stock of the proportion of 
the population that can be deemed “wāʿī” (politically aware or conscious). At the head 
of this segment were the graduates of Arab and Western universities. Next came the 
Kuwaiti teachers and secondary school students. The largest component, finally, were 
“the informed youth working in government ministries and private businesses.”125 A 
number of developments in the 1940s and 1950s led to the growth of each of these 
constituent elements of the muthaqqafīn.  
 In the early 1950s, increasing numbers of Kuwaiti university graduates who had 																																																								
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been sent to Egypt in the previous decade began to return home. Al-Biʿtha magazine 
reported the return of eight such graduates to Kuwait in 1950.126 Their numbers 
increased as the Kuwaiti scholarship program expanded. The first Kuwaiti census held 
in 1957 recorded 51 native university graduates out of a total population of 107246 
Kuwaiti citizens. 127  Though representing a small proportion of the muthaqqafīn, 
university graduates served as a leading element, occupying prominent positions within 
the bureaucracy and serving as leaders of clubs and political groups and editors of 
periodicals.128 Multiple examples will be provided below.  
 Most scholarship students sent to Egypt in the 1940s returned to Kuwait after 
attaining their secondary school diplomas and did not pursue tertiary study.129 These 
diplomas also carried great prestige in Kuwait at the time, as evinced by the creation of 
the Graduates’ Club in 1953, which restricted its membership to those who had 
completed secondary school. 130  After Kuwait’s secondary school began awarding 
diplomas in 1952, the number of secondary school graduates increased, reaching 197 by 
the time of the 1957 census.131  
 A second development that contributed to the emergence of the muthaqqafīn as 
a social stratum was the rapid expansion of education in Kuwait in the 1940s and 1950s, 
which increased the number of both secondary school students and local teachers. 
Speaking of the region as a whole, Eppel argues: “the most important, central, and 
active portion of the effendiyya was that of the students in secondary schools and 
institutions of higher education.”132 As higher classes were added and the demand for 
education grew, the number of secondary school students in Kuwait rose from 55 in the 
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academic year 1946-1947,133 to 163 in 1950-1951,134 307 in 1952-1953,135 and 670 in 
1955-1956.136  
 The expansion of education in Kuwait also resulted in a need for more teachers, 
which the Educational Department addressed through the creation of teacher-training 
classes beginning in the academic year 1947-1948.137 Between 1948-1949 and 1952-
1953, the number of male Kuwaiti teachers increased from 88 to 121.138 The total 
number of Kuwaiti teachers in fact peaked either in 1952-1953 or 1953-1954, dwindling 
over the rest of the decade as educated Kuwaitis sought more profitable avenues of 
employment.139 It must be noted that the majority of Kuwaiti teachers during the early 
1950s had qualifications below the secondary level, including a few years of secondary 
study and primary school diplomas.140  
 A third development that contributed to the growth of the muthaqqafīn was the 
expansion of the state bureaucracy in the period between the mid-1940s and mid-1950s, 
when oil revenues rose dramatically, leading to increases in immigration, trade, and 
urban development. New departments formed during this period include Public Works 
in 1947,141 Awqaf in 1949,142 Electricity in 1951,143 Press and Publishing in 1954, 
Social Affairs in 1955,144 and Telegraph and Telephones in 1956.145 A primary goal of 
Kuwait’s scholarship program was to create native bureaucrats and technicians, and 
from at least 1948, scholarship regulations required that graduates work in government 																																																								
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jobs for a specified period.146 The government also offered high salaries to attract 
educated Kuwaitis away from the more profitable private sector.147 
 Many muthaqqafīn quickly rose to prominent positions within the bureaucracy. 
The British anthropologist Peter Lienhardt, who visited Kuwait in the early 1950s, 
observed that a dual system of authority had emerged within the government 
departments. 
As well as having a shaikh as its head (ra’is), each department had a chief 
administrator, a civil servant entitled the director (mudir). These civil servants 
were middle-class Kuwaitis who thus, after the shaikhs, formed a further layer in 
the management of affairs.148 
 
The bureaucracy also employed much larger numbers of Kuwaitis with lower levels of 
education, who would have comprised the rank and file of the muthaqqafīn. It is 
difficult to estimate their number as the 1957 census provides no information on 
government employment. However, it lists 1077 primary school graduates within the 
native population.149 It also must be noted that the Kuwaiti muthaqqafīn probably 
differed from the effendiyya elsewhere in the region in that a large proportion of them 
worked in private trade, a time-honored occupation in Kuwait made all the more 
profitable by the oil boom.150 The aforementioned article in al-Taliʿa places the number 
of “informed youth” in both the public and private sector at around 10,000 in 1962.151  
 As the above analysis suggests, the muthaqqafīn represented a very small 
proportion of Kuwaiti society throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. The 1962 article in 
al-Taliʿa estimated that the “conscious” segment of society amounted to no more than 
10% of the total native population.152 Their proportion was certainly much smaller in 
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the early 1950s. It was precisely this position as an elite minority that gave the 
muthaqqafīn their identity and status within the largely traditional Kuwaiti society. As 
Eppel argues, the effendiyya were the product of the stark inequalities in education and 
modernization that characterized Arab societies at particular points in their 
development.153 Kuwait’s 1957 census reports a 47% illiteracy rate among citizens.154  
 Other characteristics such as class composition and generational profile also 
reinforced the corporate identity of the Kuwaiti muthaqqafīn. The same developments 
that led to the appearance of the stratum, namely: scholarships, the growth of domestic 
education, and the expansion of the bureaucracy, enabled an unprecedented degree of 
social mobility in Kuwait. Al-Naqeeb argues that from the early 1950s, state welfare 
policies and “increased bureaucratization” began to produce a politically assertive, 
white-collar middle class that challenged the traditional social and political order.155 Its 
members were drawn primarily from the middling classes within the traditional 
economy, which included minor merchants, mullas, clerks, shopkeepers, and artisans.156 
Whereas the proto-effendiyya of the 1930s and 1940s were largely sons of merchants, 
the middle class dominated the new stratum of muthaqqafīn. Writing in 1958, the 
British Council’s representative in Kuwait attributed the country’s Arab nationalist 
activism to the middle class “of professional men, officers, school-teachers, artisans, 
clerks and merchants all relying on their acquired skills.” He also noted the political 
prominence of this class in Kuwait in comparison to other Gulf states.157 
 The largely middle class profile of the muthaqqafīn is also apparent in the 
backgrounds of prominent members of this stratum. The example par excellence of the 
upwardly mobile muthaqqaf is the aforementioned Ahmad al-Khatib, who cofounded 
the MAN as a scholarship student at the AUB and became Kuwait’s first native medical 																																																								
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doctor.158 Al-Khatib hailed from the lower class neighbourhood of al-Dihla in Kuwait 
Town. His father had worked for the Al Sabah as an armed retainer, but lost his modest 
job after being maimed in battle, plunging his family into poverty.159 The Kuwaiti 
teacher and MAN activist Muhammad al-Saddah also recalls growing up in poverty. 
His father took to pearl diving after the collapse of his family’s trade, and later became 
a leather craftsman.160 ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain, who headed Bait al-Kuwait in Cairo in the 
1940s and the Educational Department in the 1950s, provides another example. He was 
the son of a mulla and minor merchant, and derived from the hwila, migrants from Iran 
who were largely excluded from the political and economic establishment in Kuwait.161  
 Although the social profile of the muthaqqafīn was primarily middle class, the 
sons of merchant families remained prominent within the stratum. Sons of merchants 
studied alongside those of a middle class background in Kuwait and abroad, and thus 
came to share a common culture and outlook. Some abandoned trade for positions 
within the bureaucracy. As Wien argues in the case of the Iraqi “Young Effendiyya,” 
the Kuwaiti muthaqqafīn were “a group of young men with a common ‘social 
experience,’ refering to culture, education, dress, and behavior.” “Interaction and 
experience” were thus more important than class dynamics in the formation of the 
stratum.162  
 One of the most prominent mercantile muthaqqafīn was Jasim al-Qatami, who 
was sent on scholarship to Cairo in 1947, where he joined the police academy. After 
completing a one year course at Scotland Yard, he returned to Kuwait in 1954 as the 
country’s first trained police officer,163 and was appointed Director of Police. When 
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popular protests erupted during the 1956 Suez Crisis, al-Qatami resigned his post rather 
than obey orders to suppress the demonstrations.164 He subsequently became a key 
leader of the MAN. Jasim’s elder brother Muhammad had been a high-ranking officer 
in the police force created by the Legislative Council, and was killed in a scuffle with 
the ruler’s retainers in 1939 (see chapter two).165 Jasim al-Qatami thus illustrates how 
muthaqqafīn of a merchant class background often provided a direct connection to the 
previous merchant-led nationalist movement.  
 One trait that almost all muthaqqafīn shared in common was their youth, such 
that it virtually became a defining characteristic of the stratum alongside Western-style 
education. Once again, a parallel can be drawn with the effendiyya in 1930s Iraq. Wien 
holds that “the experience of being the first age cohort enjoying state supervised 
nationalist education created a sense of being elite and distinction from the elders and 
their Ottoman background among the Young Effendiyya.”166 “Youth” thus became “a 
distinguished social category,” and generational conflict became a central feature of 
Iraqi politics during this period.167   
 A similar dynamic emerged in Kuwait in the early 1950s, when modern 
education set an increasing proportion of the youth apart from their traditionally 
educated elders. Youth was equated with education, progressiveness, and modernity in 
many of the writings of the muthaqqafīn. A Kuwaiti scholarship student in Egypt, 
Khalid al-Khrafi, thus affirms that only the youth can reform Kuwait by introducing 
Western civilization and obliterating those traditions standing in the way of progress.168 
The Kuwaiti teacher Muhammad al-Fawzan speaks of a struggle between the old and 
the young over the importance of education and the will to reform. He states: “the old 
generation considers luck to be an important factor in success, while the new generation 																																																								
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believes that the enlightened and cultured (muthaqqaf) man forces luck to submit to and 
serve him.”169 These generational divisions often manifested themselves politically. 
During the Suez Crisis, the KOC reported that Arab nationalist activists were 
intimidating merchants into boycotting British and French companies. It observed that, 
“in many cases, the young nationalists are the sons of the self-same merchants who are 
being intimidated.”170 
 The stark disparity in education between the Kuwaiti muthaqqafīn and wider 
society led them to develop an “elite-consciousness” that transcended political divisions 
within the stratum, as in the case of the Syrian muthaqqafīn described by Schumann.171  
Their writings reveal that they saw themselves as a vanguard whose education entitled 
them to political leadership and made them responsible for their society’s welfare. ʿAbd 
al-ʿAziz Husain thus proclaims: 
The people by nature fear all that is new, and it is difficult for them to change 
what they are familiar with. The burden therefore falls solely upon the 
enlightened class of the population that works to transform the nation, 
unperturbed by the anger and hostility they may be met with, for the masses do 
not know what is good for them.172  
 
The Secretary of the Educational Department ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Gharaballi presents a 
similar argument. In his view, Kuwait has long been mired in rajʿīyya (backwardness or 
reaction), and only the educated can comprehend and resolve their country’s problems. 
Moreover, they are obliged to spread their knowledge and culture to the rest of 
society.173  
 The muthaqqafīn’s “elite-consciousness” motivated them to seek a greater role 
in politics and administration, a development that inevitably led to conflict with the 
established elites, particularly the ruling family. This accords with Smith’s 
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aforementioned theory of the intelligentsia, which holds that this stratum’s meritocratic 
and rationalist ethos leads to a “conflict of cultures” with traditional elites. When elite 
resistance thwarts the intelligentsia’s aspirations for upward mobility, the stratum 
becomes “radicalized” and espouses nationalist ideology. 174  A 1957 KOC report 
suggests that a similar dynamic was at play in Kuwait. It states:  
Many Kuwaiti students who are studying abroad… criticise the shaikhs for 
monopolising the highest offices… They do not hide their intention to try to take 
over these bigger offices in due course. As one of them said – “When one of us 
graduates in engineering, social affairs, etc., he will expect to hold an office 
commensurate with his education. The people in place will oppose us. There 
might be a fight. We will be ready for it.”175 
 
As early as 1950, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain articulated this sentiment in an al-Biʿtha 
editorial: 
[Some] see in these scholarships and energetic young men a threat to their 
influence and positions. Thus, rather than looking for those who are more 
capable and qualified than themselves, they try to maintain the status quo. 
However, they fail to see that in so doing, they try to stop time from passing.176 
 
The Kuwaiti headmaster and MAN activist ʿAbd Allah Ahmad Husain put it more 
forcefully in the nationalist al-Iman,177 stating: “We want to banish the illiterate and 
semi-literate from the departments.”178 As shall be seen, the muthaqqafīn’s bid for 
political leadership became clear with the emergence of a popular protest movement in 
1956.  
Markers & Practices of Modernity  
 
 The Kuwaiti muthaqqafīn further emphasized the distinction between 
themselves and the traditional masses by adopting conspicuous markers and practices 
associated with modernity. In the early 1950s, many followed the example of the 
effendiyya in Egypt, the Levant, and Iraq by adopting Western dress. The anthropologist 
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Lienhardt observed that “the European fashion seemed to be spreading because students 
returning for holidays would often continue to wear the suits they had been wearing 
abroad.” At first, those who wore suits “also wore Arab head-dress since it was 
undignified to appear bareheaded in public.”179 Fatima Husain, one of the first Kuwaiti 
women to study in Egypt on scholarship in 1955, similarly recalls that returning 
graduates continued to wear suits. This practice, she states, extended “to all those who 
worked in education, followed by the doctors and engineers, until trousers became the 
marker of the educated and the graduate.”180 
 For Kuwait’s muthaqqafīn, Western attire was not a fashion statement but an 
integral component of modern culture. In December 1951, Darwish al-Miqdadi 
convinced the reluctant Educational Council to introduce Western school uniforms. The 
department provided all students with two suits free of charge, which they had to wear 
“in keeping with the spirit of progress and modernization.”181 In May 1952, the council 
also approved the awarding of a clothing allowance to every Kuwaiti teacher willing to 
regularly wear a Western suit.182  Pressure by the muthaqqafīn may have encouraged 
this decision. Ahmad al-ʿAdwani, who had become a teacher after returning from 
Egypt,183 authored an editorial in 1950 attacking the conservatism that prevented 
Kuwaitis from adopting modern practices. These included the donning of Western 
clothes, which “are worn by all civilized nations… [and] are one of the desirable 
features of modern civilization (madanīyya).” He demanded that the Educational 
Department impose this attire on both students and teachers.184  
 Al-Raʾid, organ of the Teachers’ Club, celebrated the department’s decision to 
introduce the uniforms. A 1952 article criticized the disheveled appearance of students 
																																																								
179 Lienhardt, 49. 
180 Fatima Husain, 153.  
181 MEC: S4, 3/12/1951; S1, 3/10/1950.  
182 MEC: S31, 3/5/1952; S30, 24/4/1952.  
183 Al-Khrafi, 796.  
184 Ahmad al-ʿAdwani, “Taqalid,” al-Baʿth, August 1950, 3-4.   
 238	
in traditional dress, arguing that Western clothing “is not specific to any nation. It is one 
of the conventions of modern civilization and is more conducive to vitality and work 
than Eastern robes.”185 In the same year, a scholarship student who graduated from 
Egypt similarly extolled the aesthetic merits and health benefits of Western dress, and 
demanded that teachers be made to wear suits as well.186 ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain recalls 
that when he took charge of the Educational Department in 1952, he insisted on wearing 
suits in order to set an example. Even after Western attire fell out of fashion among 
educated Kuwaiti men, Husain continued to oppose the traditional dishdāsha. He 
provided cultural legitimation for his modernism by arguing that trousers represent the 
original historic costume of the Arabs. At the same time, suits are more practical than 
the dishdāsha and “better for work life,” and the whole world is bound to adopt them.187  
 It appears that in the early 1950s, the wearing of Western suits became an elite 
status symbol that was aspired to by educated Kuwaitis from various backgrounds. In 
May of 1952, the parents of students in the tribal village of al-Fuhaihil petitioned the 
Educational Council to apply the new school uniform regulations introduced in Kuwait 
City to their school.188 A similar incident occurred in 1954, when the student union at 
Kuwait’s Religious Academy requested that their uniform be changed to “the European 
suit (al-badla al-ifrinjīyya).”189  
  Some Kuwaiti graduates who returned home in the early 1950s went even 
further in their emulation of social practices in the more modern Arab societies. They 
continued to speak in the dialects of the countries in which they had studied, which for 
the vast majority would have been Egypt. Judging from the criticism of this practice in 
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al-Biʿtha, it does not appear to have been the norm.190 Nevertheless, it is indicative of 
the extent to which the Kuwaiti muthaqqafīn associated modernity and progressiveness 
with the cultures of the more developed Arab countries.  
The Politics of the Muthaqqafīn  
 
 Despite their minority status, the muthaqqafīn exerted a disproportionately large 
influence within Kuwaiti politics through their control of the clubs and the press, and 
their dominance over certain segments of the bureaucracy. This was one of the key 
factors behind the salience of Arab nationalist ideas in Kuwait on both the popular and 
official levels in the 1950s. However, it must be noted that as in Smith’s theory of the 
intelligentsia, the muthaqqafīn did not act alone in forming the nationalist movement 
but were reliant upon support from other social groups.191 These included petty traders, 
oil workers, the merchant class, Arab expatriates, and even certain shaykhs of the ruling 
family.192 The role of some of these groups, particularly the last three, will be discussed 
below.  
 In the early 1950s, the establishment of a variety of political movements 
heralded the arrival of the muthaqqafīn onto the political scene. Kuwaiti graduates of 
Arab schools and universities established the principal factions. Their return coincided 
with the introduction of liberalizing measures by Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Salim al-Sabah, 
who succeeded Ahmad al-Jabir in February of 1950.193 This led to a mushrooming of 
sporting and cultural clubs, many of which served as fronts for underground political 
groups. In addition, most clubs published journals that, along with a few independent 
publications, comprised the first national press.194  
 At around the same time, there occurred an influx of politically active Arab 																																																								
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migrants, particularly from Palestine. In the wake of the 1948 defeat, many Palestinians 
joined radical transnational political movements. At first, the communists and the 
Muslim Brotherhood were the most popular, though Arab nationalist groups became 
increasingly dominant starting in the 1950s. Although Fatah, which espoused a more 
particularistic Palestinian identity, was established in Kuwait in 1957 or 1959, Arab 
nationalist groups such as the MAN and the Baʿth Party remained dominant among 
Palestinians until the mid to late 1960s.195  
 Cordial relations and cultural affinity with the local population enabled 
Palestinian expatriates to play an active role in the new political activism. The majority 
of the Palestinians who migrated to Kuwait in the late 1940s and early 1950s were 
effendiyya,196 and thus had much in common with their Kuwaiti counterparts in terms of 
culture and outlook. Moreover, “the 1950s and 1960s were a honeymoon period for the 
Kuwaitis and the Palestinians, as both communities were swept up in the Arab 
nationalist fervor of the time.”197 It was only later, especially in the 1970s, that a 
“politics of exclusion” crystallized in Kuwait, separating the privileged citizenry from 
the disenfranchised migrant population.198 This cordial relationship allowed Palestinians 
and other Arab expatriates to participate in both the underground political groups and 
the clubs and press.199  
 Although Arab nationalism would become the dominant political ideology 
among the muthaqqafīn by the mid-1950s, at the start of the decade it faced stiff 
competition from other ideological movements. Between 1952 and 1953, numerous 
articles in al-Biʿtha commented on the intense factionalism and rivalry between the 
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various clubs, political groupings, and cliques of educated Kuwaiti youth.200 The 
Egyptian cleric Ahmad al-Shirbasi, who taught at Kuwait’s Religious Academy in 
1952-1953, identified four political currents in Kuwait: the Islamists, the “humanistic 
current,” the Arab nationalists, and “the current of regional interest.”201 The latter two 
were the most influential within the educational field.  
 The primary representative of the Islamist current was the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Kuwaiti merchants with ties to Iraq and Egypt established a local branch of the 
organization in the late 1940s,202 and formed Jamʿiyyat al-Irshad al-Islamiyya (the 
Islamic Guidance Society) in May 1952.203 The group had a strong presence in the 
schools, and included Arab expatriate teachers.204 It must be noted that prior to the 1954 
split between Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the division 
between Islamists and Arab nationalists was not as pronounced as it would later 
become.205  
 The second political movement listed by al-Shirbasi is “the humanistic current,” 
which he describes as those who oppose national and sectarian divisions, and advocate 
common human values and the principle of citizenship.206 Al-Shirbasi is probably 
referring to the communists, as their internationalist position was a key factor separating 
them from the Arab nationalists. Communist oil workers from Iraq and Iran began 
organizing in Kuwait in the late 1940s and early 1950s, influencing local workers. The 
communists’ popularity among the working class rather than the muthaqqafīn set them 																																																								
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apart from the other movements. Rather than operating through clubs, they organized 
themselves into small, underground political groups.207 However, there were communist 
teachers, mostly Arab expatriates, who propagated their ideology in the schools.208  
 The early 1950s also saw the reemergence of an organized Arab nationalist 
movement in Kuwait for the first time since the late 1930s. This time, however, it was 
the muthaqqafīn rather than the merchants who led it. The first of the new generation of 
nationalist groups to appear in Kuwait was the Baʿth Party in 1951. Its early cells were 
made up exclusively of Arab expatriates. The party faced difficulty attracting support 
from Kuwaitis and therefore remained marginal throughout the decade. It was the 
Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN) that became by far the most dominant Arab 
nationalist faction in Kuwait in the 1950s and 1960s.209 One reason for the group’s 
popularity was its charismatic Kuwaiti cofounder, Ahmad al-Khatib, who returned in 
early 1952210 to establish what were possibly the first MAN cells outside of Lebanon.211  
 Al-Khatib and his associates first pursued their activities through the cultural 
committee of al-Ahli Sports Club.212 In the spring of 1952, al-Khatib met with a number 
of independent Arab nationalists to form a new cultural club. The majority of the latter 
worked in the educational sector: the Kuwaiti headmaster ʿAbd Allah Ahmad Husain, in 
whose school the meeting was held, the South Arabian (by now naturalized) headmaster 
Ahmad al-Saqqaf, and the newly elected member of the Educational Council ʿAbd 
Allah ʿAli al-Saniʿ. The meeting resulted in the establishment of al-Nadi al-Thaqafi al-
Qawmi (the National Cultural Club [NCC]) in April of 1952.213 Although the NCC 
included independents and Baʿthists, it was firmly controlled by the MAN. After the 
Baʿthists tried and failed to take control of the club, they established their own Nadi al-																																																								
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Ittihad al-ʿArabi (Arab Union Club) in 1957.214 As shall be discussed below, MAN 
control later extended to the Graduates’ and Teachers’ Clubs.  
 From the offset, the Arab nationalists formed one of the most prominent of the 
muthaqqafīn factions, and their presence in the educational sector was therefore 
significant. As detailed in the previous chapter, teachers such as al-Saqqaf, ʿAbd Allah 
Husain, and Muhammad al-Saddah had been actively promoting nationalist ideology 
since the 1940s. They now conducted their activism through organized channels: 
Husain and al-Saddah became prominent members of the MAN,215 while al-Saqqaf 
served as a leader of the NCC and editor of its publications (without joining any 
party).216 According to al-Saddah, the number of Kuwaiti teachers who joined the MAN 
in the 1950s did not exceed ten or twelve, though many more sympathized with the 
movement.217  
 Palestinian teachers also played a vital role in this educational activism. In the 
early 1950s, the vast majority of Arab nationalist Palestinian teachers lacked party 
affiliation.218 A notable example was Ribhi al-ʿArif, who had been active in the 1940s 
and now participated in the clubs and wrote articles on Arab nationalism for the NCC’s 
al-Iman.219 As the MAN was founded at a relatively late date and its members were 
mostly university students, it took some time for Palestinian members of the group to 
reach Kuwait.220 The most prominent was Ghassan Kanafani, who taught in Kuwait 
between 1955 and 1960.221 Palestinians and other Arab expatriates were well integrated 
into the nationalist movement. Unlike other clubs, the NCC granted full membership to 																																																								
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non-Kuwaiti Arabs who had resided in Kuwait for two years.222 Kanafani and other 
Palestinians served on the club’s board.223 The Arab expatriates introduced new forms 
of political activism and developed the local press.224 Kanafani, for example, edited the 
Graduate Club’s weekly al-Fajr (The Dawn) after it came under MAN control.225 
 The final political movement identified by al-Shirbasi was that devoted to 
“regional interest [al-maslaḥa al-iqlīmīyya],” which focused on Kuwaiti affairs, and 
maintained that “the wealth of Kuwait belongs to its sons.”226 Another contemporary 
observer dubbed this movement “Kuwait for the Kuwaitis,”227 while al-Khatib describes 
it in his memoires as a “regionalist current opposed to the [Arab] nationalist 
orientation.”228 Most accounts hold the primary representatives of this movement to be 
a group of graduates who returned from Egypt and established the Teachers’ Club in 
early 1951.229 Notable among them were Hamad al-Rujaib, Ahmad al-ʿAdwani, and 
Fahad al-Duwairi, who served on the club’s board and edited its monthly journal al-
Raʾid (The Pioneer) from March 1952.230  
 It is not known by which term these proponents of Kuwaiti particularism 
referred to themselves. The term iqlīmīyya, or regionalism, was coined by Arab 
nationalists “to denote a reprehensible feeling of loyalty toward a part rather than 
toward the whole.”231 Hamad al-Rujaib repudiates this label in his memoires: 
There were those who said we were regionalists and only liked Kuwaitis… 
There was a group among us [i.e. educated Kuwaiti youth] who fought us and 
made this claim. We were members of the Teachers’ Club, and they used to say 
that the members of the club hate non-Kuwaitis. They went to the Palestinians 
and spread these lies about us in order to fight us. However, they were exposed 																																																								
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later on, and it came to be known that we serve and help all those who serve this 
country with dedication.232 
 
It must be taken into account that al-Rujaib penned his memoires decades after the 
events in question, and that he, like most members of this group, would become a 
staunch Nasserist by the mid-1950s. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of the so-called 
regionalists referring to themselves as such.  
 What is clear is that the regionalist movement was not based on a refined notion 
of Kuwaiti nationalism; rather, it was largely a reaction to mass immigration and the 
disadvantaged position of Kuwaiti employees in the Educational Department. The 
Kuwaiti regionalists made no attempt to articulate an ideology of territorial nationalism 
to rival Arab nationalism as occurred in other Arab states.233 Al-Raʾid makes frequent 
references to the Kuwaiti waṭan (homeland) and waṭanīyya (patriotism),234 which in 
contrast to “iqlīmīyya” denote an acceptable form of subnational loyalty within the Arab 
nationalist lexicon.235 The magazine at times argues that the prioritization of Kuwait’s 
interests does not conflict with its Arab identity,236 while a few articles even adopt 
explicitly Arab nationalist rhetoric.237 Furthermore, although occasional references to 
Kuwaiti traditions occur,238 the regionalists’ writings are thoroughly modernist in tone. 
This is apparent in their attitude towards the emancipation of women,239 and Western 
dress as discussed above.   
 The main bone of contention between the regionalists and the Arab nationalists 
appears to have been immigration, which was a salient topic in al-Raʾid. Indeed, this is 
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true of most Kuwaiti publications in the early 1950s, which were flooded with articles 
on the dangers of the growing migrant population. The Arab nationalists directed their 
hostility towards immigration from Iran specifically. They portrayed it as a threat to the 
Arab identity of Kuwait and even as a conspiracy by the Iranian government to take 
over the Arab states of the Gulf. At the same time, they welcomed immigration from 
Arab countries.240 By contrast, no distinction between non-Arab and Arab immigration 
is evident in the articles of al-Raʾid.241 The regionalists also emphasized that the 
migrants’ presence in Kuwait was temporary, and that Kuwaitis should take over their 
positions. Fahad al-Duwairi thus argued that the Bedouin of Kuwait should be 
sedentarized and employed as an alternative to migrant labor.242 
 A second, related argument advanced by the regionalists was that Kuwaiti 
employees in the bureaucracy were disadvantaged vis-à-vis foreigners. They charged 
that locals were not allowed to advance to higher positions, which were reserved for 
non-Kuwaitis. The latter enjoyed all the perquisites of these jobs including high salaries 
and free housing. 243  The regionalists asserted that not only were Kuwaitis more 
deserving of their country’s bounties, but they were also better able to comprehend and 
solve its problems, and more committed to its welfare.244  
 This attitude appears to have originated among Kuwaiti teachers specifically, 
who had always played second fiddle to expatriate Arabs. This perception of 
subordination among Kuwaiti teachers coincided with a marked increase in their 
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numbers between the late 1940s and early 1950s as stated earlier. Soon after the 
Egyptian Educational Mission departed, a number of Kuwaitis were appointed to high-
level positions within the Educational Department. A group of local teachers were made 
headmasters of primary schools at the outset of the academic year 1950-1951.245 At 
around the same time, ʿIsa al-Hamad became supervisor of physical education and 
Scouting. He was a fresh graduate of an Egyptian university who had previously 
worked as a teacher in Kuwait.246 Al-Hamad was promoted to inspector the following 
year, becoming the first Kuwaiti to occupy this position.247 Furthermore, prior to the 
academic year 1951-1952, the Educational Council ruled that Kuwaitis should be given 
priority when appointing headmasters to newly established schools.248 
 Rather than placating the Kuwaiti teachers, these appointments appear to have 
ignited a current of activism among them. Shortly after their promotion, the Kuwaiti 
headmasters successfully petitioned the Educational Council to raise the salaries of 
local teachers.249 Despite periodic raises,250 the local press continued to criticize these 
salaries for comparing badly with other government jobs.251 In January 1951, the same 
group of Kuwaiti headmasters requested permission from the Educational Council to 
establish the Teachers’ Club. The Council assented, and approved a further request for 
monetary support in April.252 The founders of the Teachers’ Club included the Arab 
nationalists al-Saqqaf, ʿAbd Allah Husain, and al-Saddah, but they soon shifted to the 
NCC, leaving the field open for the regionalists.253 
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 The Kuwaiti teachers’ efforts to improve their position within the Educational 
Department soon led to rivalry between them and the more senior and qualified 
Palestinians.254 Excerpts from the memoirs of Ahmad Bishr al-Rumi, a member of the 
1952 Educational Council, provide an example of this. In March 1952, the Council was 
planning a trip of secondary school students to Iraq and wanted a Kuwaiti to oversee the 
party.255 It insisted on appointing al-Rumi in this role, though he initially refused, partly 
because he did not want to cause tension between the Kuwaiti and Palestinian teachers. 
Such tension did in fact arise over which teachers would accompany the students on the 
trip. The Palestinian teachers maintained that only they, as teachers of the secondary 
school students, should be allowed to go. The Kuwaiti teachers, on the other hand, 
demanded that all teachers be given the opportunity to participate. Al-Rumi ultimately 
convinced the Palestinians to allow four Kuwaiti primary school headmasters to 
attend.256 
 The regionalist current among the Kuwaiti teachers was strengthened by the 
election of a largely sympathetic Educational Council in January 1952. These elections, 
which were also held for the Municipal, Health, and Awqaf Councils, were yet another 
liberalizing policy introduced by the new ruler Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Salim.257 They 
provided Kuwait’s budding political movements with a new arena for contention. 
However, since the franchise was limited to merchants and the muthaqqafīn were 
mostly too young to run, the latter could only support their preferred candidates.258   
 Despite the election of the staunch Arab nationalist and NCC cofounder al-
Saniʿ, al-Khatib states that the Educational Council came under the control of the 
																																																								
254 Al-Khatib, 189.  
255 MEC: S21, 3/3/1952.  
256 Qtd. in Yaʿqub al-Ghunaim, Introduction to Ahmad Bishr al-Rumi: Qiraʾa fi Awraqihi al-Khasa, 54-
56.  
257 “PR to Sarell, 8/1/1952,” Diaries, Vol. 19, 172; “PR to Furlonge, 1/12/1951,” Diaries, Vol. 19, 156.  
258 Al-Khatib, 187-188. 
 249	
regionalists.259 The regionalist sympathies of the majority were made clear when the 
NCC submitted its basic law to the Council for approval. Some members objected to the 
clause allowing non-Kuwaiti Arabs to become full members of the club. Khalid al-Zaid 
thus declared: “The Kuwaiti clubs must be for Kuwaitis only, and there is no need to 
include foreigners within this field.” The Council supported this position,260 though it 
was apparently unable to force the NCC to change its law. On the other hand, the new 
Council strongly supported the Teachers’ Club. In the same month as it was elected, the 
Council approved a 1000 rupee monthly subvention to the club for the publication of al-
Raʾid,261 which it raised to 2000 rupees two months later.262 
 According to Al-Mdairis, the regionalist movement also initially dominated the 
Graduates’ Club,263 which was established in December 1953.264 However, this club 
displayed a similar ambiguity towards Arab nationalism as the Teachers’ Club. Among 
the goals listed in its basic law was “the spread of Arab national awareness and the 
contribution, alongside other Arab organizations, to freedom, independence, and unity.” 
At the same time, the club differed markedly from the NCC in that it excluded non-
Kuwaitis from membership.265 
 After a period of intense rivalry with the Arab nationalists, the Kuwaiti 
regionalist movement seems to have disappeared from the political scene. In 1954, an 
Arab nationalist list unseated the regionalists in the Teachers’ Club elections,266 and the 
MAN won control of the Graduates’ Club soon afterwards.267 By the time of the 1956 
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Suez Crisis, the principal leaders of the regionalist movement, such as al-Rujaib and al-
ʿAdwani, would be incorporated into the Arab nationalist opposition.   
 The speed with which the so-called regionalist movement dissipated supports 
the position that it was not based on a firm ideological basis, and that personal and 
factional differences among the muthaqqafīn played a role in the split. The latter point 
is suggested by the following comment published in al-Biʿtha in 1952: 
There are two factions in Kuwait engaged in a tug of war. Each faction attacks 
the morality of the other, and claims that they are nationalist and the other is 
regionalist! It is obvious to the neutral observer that neither is in fact nationalist 
or regionalist, but that both are merely engaging in blind factionalism.268 
 
The article goes on to state that “each faction supports a particular Arab state,”269 
suggesting that this division might have been tied to the rivalry between Egyptians and 
Palestinians in the Educational Department.270 This is supported by the cooperation 
between the Kuwaiti regionalists and the Egyptian Ministry of Education in pushing for 
the replacement of the Palestinian Darwish al-Miqdadi as Director of Education. This 
point will be discussed in greater detail below. It is thus possible that the regionalists’ 
combination of Kuwaiti patriotism with Arab nationalist rhetoric was inspired by the 
example of Egypt, where territorial identity remained strong despite the infiltration of 
Arab nationalist ideas. This might explain why these “Egyptophile” Kuwaitis merged so 
readily with the Arab nationalist movement after the rise of Nasserism in Egypt.  
 The Educational Department became a primary arena of competition between 
the various political movements of the muthaqqafīn. This rivalry played out on two 
levels: the grassroots and the administrative. Al-Shirbasi relates an incident that 
demonstrates how these movements used the schools to disseminate their ideologies on 
the grassroots level, independent of the department’s policies. In December 1952, the 
Sharqiyya School held a celebration of the Prophet’s birthday. The speakers at the event 																																																								
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were the school’s headmaster Ahmad al-Saqqaf, the Palestinian teacher Ribhi al-ʿArif, 
and another teacher probably from Egypt.271 ʿAbd Allah Ahmad Husain and Ahmad al-
Khatib were also invited to speak, even though the latter had no connection to the 
Educational Department. According to al-Shirbasi, the speakers commemorated the 
occasion in secular, Arab nationalist terms. A play portraying a battle between the 
Muslims and Byzantines was also “more Arab than Islamic in tone.”272  
 In response, the Islamists held their own celebration four days later at the 
Murqab School, located in a particularly conservative neighborhood of Kuwait Town. 
Apparently intending to provoke the nationalists, an Azharite religious teacher at the 
school condemned the pre-Islamic history of the Arabs in his speech.273 Three days 
later, ʿAbd Allah Ahmad Husain gave a lecture on the local radio entitled 
“Shuʿubiyya274 Among the Arabs,” which was directed against the Azharite teacher and 
the Egyptian Educational Mission more broadly.275 It thus appears that in the early 
1950s, particular schools came under the influence of various political groups. Al-
Saqqaf thus recalls that he emphasized “nationalist guidance (al-tawjīh al-qawmī)” after 
he was appointed headmaster of the Sharqiyya School.276 A report on the school’s 
activities in the academic year 1952-1953 lists other nationalistic activities, including a 
weekly wall magazine on the “affairs of the Arab homeland,” and a picture gallery on 
the theme of “Arab heroism.”277  
 The various political movements of the early 1950s also competed with each 
other to secure assistance for their clubs and periodicals from the Educational 
Department. The latter supported these activities in the absence of other government 																																																								
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institutions dealing with cultural and social affairs. The department assisted local 
periodicals through subscribing to large numbers of issues, which were then 
disseminated to schools and libraries. For example, it subscribed to sixty issues per 
month of the satirical al-Fukaha (Humor), established in 1950.278 After the department 
first provided financial assistance to the Teachers’ Club in April 1951, the other newly 
established clubs began to ask for equal treatment, drawing upon their educational 
connections to put pressure on the Educational Council. 
 The Arab nationalists secured support for the al-Ahli Club and the NCC through 
the offices of the nationalist Educational Council member ʿAbd Allah ʿAli al-Saniʿ. In 
December 1951, the council approved a petition by the newly licensed al-Ahli Club for 
monetary assistance.279 It allocated a 5000 rupee subvention to the club in February 
1952, but al-Saniʿ interceded and trebled the amount.280 In June, the council allocated 
the same amount to the NCC, but declined a request to subsidize the club’s magazine.281 
The Muslim Brotherhood was able to rely on Yusuf bin ʿIsa al-Qinaʿi, the influential 
former Director of Education and honorary president of the Islamic Guidance Society, 
to obtain assistance. Al-Qinaʿi wrote to the council in October 1952 requesting 
stationary and books for the Society’s literacy program, and the council complied.282 
The amount of assistance provided to the clubs would increase significantly over the 
coming years.  
 In 1952, the Educational Department became the focus of a much larger struggle 
as the regionalists in the Teachers’ Club sought to win control of the institution for 
Kuwait’s muthaqqafīn. Their success marked the rising influence of this dynamic and 
ambitious social stratum, ushering in a new era in the department’s history.  
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The Educational Department Under ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain: A Tripartite 
Administration, 1952-1956 
 
 The Educational Department’s final “coup” occurred with the appointment of 
the Kuwaiti ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain as Director of Education in the summer of 1952. 
Pedagogical administration thus came under Kuwaiti control for the first time since the 
arrival of the first Palestinian teachers in 1936. Ironically, however, the department’s 
dependence upon Arab expatriate staff in fact increased over the decade as Kuwaitis 
abandoned the teaching profession. The Palestinian teachers, represented most 
prominently by al-Miqdadi, and the newly returned Egyptian Educational Mission 
continued to wield a great deal of influence within the department. Educational policy 
under Husain thus reflected the influence of all three groups: Kuwaiti muthaqqafīn, 
Palestinians, and Egyptians.  
 In the first half of 1952, several forces converged to replace Darwish al-Miqdadi 
with ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain as Director of Education, namely: the Educational Council, 
the Teachers’ Club, and Egyptian Ministry of Education. Regionalist tendencies 
motivated both the Educational Council and the Teachers’ Club to seek the 
“Kuwaitization” of the Educational Department’s leadership.283 They also accused al-
Miqdadi’s administration of mismanaging the department. It has already been stated 
that in its first month, the newly elected Educational Council raised questions regarding 
al-Miqdadi’s implementation of the Egyptian curriculum, instating a committee to 
investigate the issue. At the same time, the council also criticized the department’s 
methods of inspection.284  
 Other criticisms of al-Miqdadi’s administration were also brought before the 
council. An excerpt from the memoires of the Educational Council member Ahmad 
Bishr al-Rumi reveals that he met with the Palestinian teachers Muhammad Najim and 
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ʿAbd al-Latif al-Salih in February 1952. Both had taught in Kuwait in the 1930s. 
Another councilman and Ahmad al-ʿAdwani, a leader of the Teachers’ Club, were also 
present. Al-Rumi reports that the two Palestinian teachers accused al-Miqdadi and his 
associates of favoritism and mismanagement.285 According to al-Rujaib’s memoires, the 
Teachers’ Club made similar accusations in a letter to the Educational Council. Al-
Rujaib recalls that the decision to send the letter was made in a meeting attended by 
himself, al-ʿAdwani, and a number of Kuwaiti headmasters.286 The letter concluded by 
arguing that only a Kuwaiti could solve the problems plaguing the Educational 
Department.287 It is not clear if the letter specifically requested the appointment of ʿAbd 
al-ʿAziz Husain, who had strong ties to the leadership of the Teachers’ Club.   
 The Egyptian Ministry of Education’s Rida-Hamdi committee also added its 
voice to the accusations against al-Miqdadi. In addition to its aforementioned criticisms 
of the curriculum, the committee faulted the department’s provisions for inspection and 
examinations. It also questioned the qualifications of some Palestinian teachers.288 As 
has been argued, the Rida-Hamdi report was clearly intended to denounce al-Miqdadi’s 
administration. It is possible that the Egyptian Ministry of Education wished to see him 
removed due to his reluctance to cooperate with it and his low opinion of the Egyptian 
educational system.   
 It is also highly possible that the Egyptians supported the Educational Council’s 
decision to appoint ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain as Director of Education. The council took 
this decision on May 18th, when the Rida-Hamdi committee was still in the country. 
Moreover, Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Jabir, the President of the Educational Department, 
wrote to the Egyptian Minister of Education Taha Husain informing him of the 
decision. Al-Jabir expressed his hope that ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain’s appointment would 																																																								
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“usher in a new, blessed era of cooperation” between the educational authorities of 
Egypt and Kuwait.289 ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain had acquired extensive connections in 
Cairo while Director of Bait al-Kuwait, making him well placed to mediate between the 
Egyptian and Kuwaiti authorities. He later stated in an interview that his intention upon 
assuming the directorship was to pursue educational cooperation with Egypt.290 A 1953 
British Council report described him as “impregnated with Egyptian ideas.”291 
 Husain’s appointment as Director of Education was by no means a surprise. In 
September 1949, he stepped down as Director of Bait al-Kuwait.292 As early as April 
1950, Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Jabir described Husain to a British Council representative 
“as the future Director of Education.”293 In May, the shaykh added that he wished for 
Husain to study in Great Britain for two years before his appointment. By this time, 
Husain had already been awarded a two-year scholarship by the British Council to 
pursue a diploma at the University of London’s Institute of Education. As part of his 
studies, he wrote a dissertation entitled “English Educational Thought and Practice,”294 
also travelling to Scotland and Sweden to study the educational systems there.295 Upon 
completing his studies, Husain returned to Kuwait to become director in June 1952.296   
 The plan to appoint Husain as director thus preceded the employment of al-
Miqdadi, and it possibly would have been implemented regardless of the regionalists’ 
pressure and al-Miqdadi’s alleged shortcomings. However, some British documents 
mention plans to appoint Husain as assistant director. 297  This suggests that the 
aforementioned factors may have expedited Husain’s appointment to the position of full 																																																								
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director.  
 While Husain would emerge as a staunch Nasserist by the time of the 1956 Suez 
Crisis, it is difficult to pinpoint his political orientation when he first took charge of the 
Educational Department. His editorials in al-Biʿtha between 1948 and 1950 reveal a 
zealously modernistic and reformist outlook, but apart from a single article written 
during the 1948 Palestine War, they are virtually devoid of Arab nationalist rhetoric.298 
He was also very close to the regionalist leaders like his former classmate at al-Azhar 
Ahmad al-ʿAdwani and his deputy at Bait al-Kuwait Hamad al-Rujaib. After Husain’s 
appointment, the Teachers’ Club held a celebration in which al-Rujaib declared that the 
decision “restored dignity to patriotism.” He added that a country may draw upon 
foreign experts, but its “loyal sons” should always be in a position of control.299  
 It appears that, like the other “Egyptophile” leaders of the Teachers’ Club, ʿAbd 
al-ʿAziz Husain’s Arab nationalist views became stronger as the Nasserist government 
gradually came to adopt this ideology around the mid-1950s. In his report for the 
academic year 1955-1956, published a few months before the eruption of the Suez 
Crisis, the British Council stated with regards to Husain:  
I have come across indications that he may not only be idealistically “Arab-
Nationalist” but more deeply involved with Egypt. For example when the 
Egyptian head-master of the biggest primary school recently visited Bahrain on 
the eve of the riots there, he went with personal introductions to the 
Revolutionary Council [i.e. the Bahraini opposition’s High Executive 
Committee] from the Director of Education… I was told this by the Director 
himself.300 
 
The Egyptian headmaster in question was in fact expelled from Bahrain for making an 
inflammatory speech at an opposition rally.301 As shall be seen, it was also during 1955-
1956 that the Educational Department adopted the first national Kuwaiti curriculum, 
with the spread of Arab national awareness as one of its goals.  																																																								
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 Husain’s personal views were by no means the only factor that determined the 
ideological climate within the Educational Department. During his tenure, three distinct 
groups governed the institution and shaped its policies: the Palestinian teachers, the 
Egyptian Educational Mission, and the Kuwaiti muthaqqafīn. Unlike earlier “coups” 
within the department, Husain’s administration did not completely break with the 
ancien régime. This was due to the fact that after initial reluctance,302 Darwish al-
Miqdadi agreed to stay on as Assistant Director of Education “with most of the 
privileges and powers which he formerly had.”303 In a conversation with the Political 
Agent, al-Miqdadi criticized the impatience and fickleness of Kuwait’s educational 
authorities. However, he stated “that he sympathised with the desire to have Kuwaitis at 
the heads of the departments, and indeed had always taken the line that he and the other 
Palestinians were there to train the Kuwaitis to take up these jobs.”304 As shall be seen, 
al-Miqdadi would continue to pursue his agenda of curricular reform from his new 
position.  
 Most of al-Miqdadi’s appointees, however, did not stay on. Apart from the 
Inspector of English Hasan al-Dabbagh, the remaining inspectors and the headmaster of 
the secondary school were demoted to the rank of teachers and therefore apparently 
chose to quit. Although Najlaʾ Abu ʿIz al-Din was retained as Director of Girls’ 
Education,305 this was to be her final year in Kuwait. She later confided to her former 
student Fatima Husain that she faced a great deal of opposition from within the 
department. Moreover, she was falsely accused of fomenting a strike carried out by the 
female secondary school students, who objected to the replacement of their Palestinian 
teachers by Egyptians. 306  An Egyptian replaced ʿIz al-Din as inspector of girl’s 
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education in 1953-1954.307 Numerous Palestinian teachers were also discharged in the 
summer of 1952 after an Educational Council subcommittee ruled that they lacked the 
proper qualifications, an issue raised in the Rida-Hamdi report.308 Most notably, over 
seventy female Palestinian teachers were let go. 309  Nevertheless, the Educational 
Department continued to engage Palestinian teachers in large numbers, and they 
continued to form by far the largest contingent within the department throughout the 
decade. Between the academic years 1955-1956 and 1961-1962, they comprised around 
half of male teachers and a slightly larger proportion of female teachers.310  
 The Egyptian Educational Mission, which returned to Kuwait at the start of the 
academic year 1952-1953, occupied most of the senior positions vacated by the 
Palestinians. However, while the heads of previous missions occupied the position of 
Director of Education, the new mission’s administrator ʿAbd al-Majid Mustafa became 
headmaster of the new Shuwaikh Secondary School.311 Mustafa had previously been 
deputed to Kuwait in 1946,312 and in 1947 he occupied the position of headmaster of the 
short-lived Sharqiyya Secondary School. 313  The new mission also included other 
Kuwait veterans such as the aforementioned Arab nationalist poet Ahmad ʿAnbar.314 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Egyptians would not form the majority of teachers in 
Kuwait as they did in the 1940s. Rather, between 1955-1956 and 1961-1962, they 
formed roughly 30% of teachers in both boys’ and girls’ schools. This made them the 
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second most prevalent nationality within the department after the Palestinians.315 
 The Egyptian mission’s influence within the Educational Department 
nevertheless remained strong owing to the positions occupied by its members. They 
comprised the majority of inspectors, as well as the headmasters of the male and female 
secondary schools, the Technical School, and the Religious Academy.316 Egyptians also 
occupied the vast majority of teaching positions within these advanced institutions. In 
1955-1956, Egyptians formed 70.3% of teachers at the male secondary school and 
83.3% of teachers at the female secondary school. A similar disparity can be seen in the 
geographic distribution of teachers, with a much larger proportion of Palestinians 
serving in village schools in comparison to Egyptians. Out of a total of 97 male and 72 
female Egyptian primary school teachers in 1955-1956, only one male and one female 
taught at village schools. By contrast, 29.6% (99/334) of male Palestinian primary 
school teachers and 21.6% (52/241) of females were assigned to villages.317  
 Egyptian influence in education must also be considered as part of Cairo’s 
overall influence within the Kuwaiti bureaucracy. It has already been stated that 
Egyptian technical assistance began to extend beyond the Educational Department in 
the late 1940s, most notably in the courts. This assistance increased after the 
Educational Mission returned. By 1955, the Egyptian government had placed advisers 
and technicians in the Police, Finance, Social Affairs, and Press and Publishing 
departments.318 In June 1954, Egypt submitted a request to Great Britain to open a 
consulate in Kuwait, a privilege then afforded only to the US.319 When the British later 
asked the Egyptians to justify this request, they replied that they had a “special 																																																								
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position” in Kuwait because of the many Egyptian missions there.320 A month after this 
request, a British report stated that Egyptian personnel in Kuwait (primarily teachers) 
served as the “main channel” for the penetration of Cairo’s influence into the country. 
Egypt’s widely popular press and Voice of the Arabs radio station played a secondary 
role. The report deemed that the Egyptian influence in Kuwait was the strongest out of 
all the Gulf states.321  
 The resumption of Egypt’s Educational Mission to Kuwait greatly worried the 
British. In their view, it undermined their own recent gains in influencing Kuwaiti 
education, particularly with regards to sending scholarships to the UK. 322  More 
importantly, they suspected the Egyptian teachers of playing a political role, whether 
through propagandizing in the classroom or even organizing on behalf of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.323 The Egyptians’ return was a primary motivation behind the opening of 
a British Council center in Kuwait in 1955.324  
 After the Palestinian and Egyptian teachers, the third element that governed 
education in Kuwait was the indigenous muthaqqafīn, with which control over the 
department ultimately resided. When ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain assumed the helm of the 
department in 1952-1953, the total number of Kuwaiti teachers was at its peak. There 
were 121, forming a respectable 44.3% of male teachers.325 However, their numbers 
declined rapidly. By 1956-1957 they dwindled to 96, a mere 11% of the male teaching 
staff.326 They reached a low of 58, or 4.6%, in 1960-1961.327 As oil income increased 
throughout the 1950s, high-income jobs and business opportunities became increasingly 
available to educated Kuwaitis, and teaching became less attractive. The men’s teacher 																																																								
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training classes were closed due to lack of interest between 1953 and 1955, and the few 
remaining trainees were sent abroad on scholarships.328 The Educational Department’s 
dependence on expatriate Arab teachers was thus reinforced, a factor that may have 
contributed to the regionalist movement’s decline and a corresponding rise in Arab 
nationalism among Kuwaiti muthaqqafīn in the educational field. 
 Despite the decline in local teachers, the Kuwaiti muthaqqafīn remained an 
influential element within the Educational Department. One guarantee of their 
continued presence was the scholarship regulations, which required Kuwaiti graduates 
to work for the government for a number of years. In the early 1950s, all graduates 
served in the Educational Department.329 At some point in the decade, they began to be 
appointed to other departments, but the Educational Department continued to control 
their appointment. It was not until 1961 that the Educational Council decided it would 
employ only those graduates specialized in education.330  
 In addition, some Kuwaiti teachers did not in fact leave the department but were 
promoted to administrative positions within it. The department’s reports unfortunately 
provide no statistical data regarding these positions, but this trend is observed in the 
case of a number of teachers. For example, the long serving teacher Ahmad al-ʿAdwani 
was promoted to the position of financial and administrative secretary of the 
Educational Department in 1954.331 Fresh graduates also rose to the administrative level 
after teaching only briefly. In 1952, Khalid al-Khrafi obtained a degree in business from 
Cairo and returned to teach commercial education. He shortly became an accountant in 
the department and later assistant to the financial director before leaving the department 
in 1957.332 Other graduates were directly appointed as administrators. Faisal al-Salih, 
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for example, was employed as Supervisor of Foreign Scholarships upon graduating 
from the University of Cairo in 1954. After five years he became Assistant to the 
Director of Cultural Affairs, and in 1961 Assistant Undersecretary of the department.333  
 While Husain’s initial appointment as Director of Education can be seen as 
inimical to Arab nationalist influence within the department, this influence would in 
fact reach unprecedented levels during his tenure. This partly reflects the influence of 
other elements, namely al-Miqdadi and the post-revolutionary Egyptian Educational 
Mission. It also reflects Husain’s own growing drift towards Arab nationalism, a trend 
that occurred throughout the muthaqqafīn stratum.  
The Rise of the Educational Department’s Nationalist Policies, 1952-1956:  
 
 While it was following the Suez Crisis that Arab nationalist influence reached its 
peak in the Educational Department, the institution in fact pursued a deliberate Arab 
nationalist agenda from near the beginning of Husain’s directorship. While the British 
would later ascribe the department’s nationalist policies to Egyptian influence, an 
examination of the beginnings of these policies reveals that al-Miqdadi and Husain were 
the main initial drivers behind them. Two of the department’s most prominent policies 
in the period prior to the Suez Crisis were the introduction of the first national 
curriculum, and the introduction of a program of popular acculturation. 
 The return of the Egyptian Educational Mission brought Kuwait’s curriculum 
closer in line with that of Egypt, undoing the modifications introduced by al-Miqdadi.334 
However, the situation soon came to favor a return to al-Miqdadi’s project of forming a 
national curriculum, which had been previously rejected by the Educational Council. 
This shift in attitude within the Educational Department can be attributed to a number of 
factors.  
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 Firstly, beginning in the early 1950s, Kuwait’s regionalist, Arab nationalist, and 
Islamist movements converged in opposing the Egyptian curriculum’s inward, Egypt-
centric focus. The local press criticized the curriculum’s failure to deal with Kuwaiti 
history, geography, and literature.335 Even the seconded Egyptian teacher Ahmad al-
Shirbasi, in an interview with local radio in November 1952, called for textbooks “that 
provide the Kuwaiti student with a sense of his environment and homeland.”336 The 
Arab nationalists, meanwhile, demanded that the curriculum focus on Arab rather than 
Pharaonic history. A 1955 article in al-Iman states: “the curriculum makes the student 
in his early years know more about Khufu and Khafra than the eternal heroes of 
Arabism, and we consider this one of the factors that cause the student to deviate from 
the correct Arab path.” 337  Others called for greater attention to religion in the 
curriculum.338 
  A second factor that facilitated the alteration of Kuwait’s curriculum was the 
Free Officer’s implementation of far-reaching curricular reform in 1953. As has been 
stated, the new curriculum engineered by Minister of Education Ismaʿil Qabbani 
emphasized Arabic language and religion, and was prasied by al-Miqdadi even though 
it stopped short of incorporating Arab nationalist ideology. Kuwait continued to follow 
the old curriculum, which was now outmoded. The Egyptian curricular reform therefore 
paved the way for a similar action in Kuwait. 
 Crucially, there was also broad agreement among Kuwait’s educational 
authorities on the necessity of curricular reform. This included ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain 
despite his pro-Egyptian inclinations. In March 1952, while still in Britain, Husain 
participated in a radio debate on the subject of unifying education in the Arab world. He 																																																								
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agreed with the other participants that while the educational systems of Arab countries 
should share the same principles, a degree of difference was necessary, particularly 
when it came to subjects such as history, geography, and civic education.339  
 Husain put these views into practice soon after his appointment as director, 
commissioning the first locally authored and printed textbooks for the kindergarten and 
elementary levels in 1953.340 The authors were locally based Palestinian, Egyptian, and 
Kuwaiti teachers. Eleven textbooks were published by the spring of 1955: five for 
Arabic, one for math, two for geography, three for history, and one for civic 
education.341  The latter three subjects were those most criticized in the Egyptian 
curriculum for their parochial focus. While the new geography textbooks deal with 
world geography and the discipline of geography,342 the history and civic education 
textbooks focus on Kuwait and the Arab world, and were thus clearly intended to 
remedy the Egypt-centric character of the existing textbooks. They also reveal the 
influence of Arab nationalism while simultaneously emphasizing Kuwaiti patriotism.  
 The earliest of the history textbooks appears to be Mudhakkirat al-Tarikh li-l-
Sana al-Thaniyya al-Ibtidaʾiyya (History Aides-Memoires for the Second Elementary 
Year), published in 1953.343 Two of its authors, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Hindawi and Husain 
ʿAbd al-Hamid, were secondary school teachers of the Egyptian Educational 
Mission.344 The third, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Furaih, was a Kuwaiti primary level teacher and a 
graduate of Baghdad’s Teacher Training College.345 The textbook is made up of stories 
set in various periods extending from prehistory to ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, the 
time of Alexander the Great, the Islamic period, and pre-oil Kuwait.  																																																								
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 A more substantial work is Mukhtasar Tarikh al-ʿArab li-l-Sana al-Thalitha al-
Ibtidaʾiyya (A Brief History of the Arabs for the Third Elementary Year).346 The copy 
consulted is the fourth edition, published in 1954. It is not known when it was first 
published, and no author is listed. This work presents a typical Arab nationalist 
narrative with echoes of al-Miqdadi’s History of the Arab Nation, portraying Islamic 
history as essentially Arab history. The “Arabs” rather than the “Muslims” are the 
protagonists, and the Islamic conquests are portrayed as ethnic conflicts between Arabs 
and Jews, Persians, and Romans. The conquering Arabs thus transform Persia into “an 
Arab province,”347 and the Persians and Jews are blamed for instigating the infighting 
that occurred during the Rightly Guided Caliphate.348 Furthermore, the Umayyads are 
praised for their role in spreading the Arabic language, “preserving Arab morals and 
traditions, Arabizing the diwans, and depending on Arab elements.”349 The Abbasids, 
on the other hand, experience political decline after “ajānib (foreigners),” i.e. Persians 
and Turks, assume the reigns of power.350 
 A more explicit Arab nationalist narrative can found in Mudhakkirat al-Tarikh 
li-l-Sana al-Rabiʿa al-Ibtidaʾiyya (History Aides-Memoires for the Fourth Elementary 
Year). Published in 1953,351 it deals with modern Arab history. Both of its authors were 
primary school teachers: Mustafa Shaʿban Shaʿira, an Egyptian,352 and Hasan Anis 
Ibrahim, a Palestinian freshly graduated from the AUB.353 The textbook provides an 
account of the Arab “nahḍa” or renaissance, starting with the rebellions of the 
Wahhabis and Egypt’s Muhammad ʿAli Pasha against the backward and unjust Turkish 
rule. The European powers are portrayed as the Turks’ allies in oppressing the Arabs. 																																																								
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The book moves on to discuss the Arab nationalist secret societies al-ʿAhd and al-Fatat 
and Sharif Husain’s Arab Revolt. It then turns to the West’s betrayal of the Arabs and 
its imposition of colonialism, and lists the various uprisings against colonial rule 
throughout the Arab world.354  
 Following this general outline, a number of Arab countries are presented 
individually in short chapters that mostly emphasize the same themes of Ottoman 
degeneration, Arab rebirth, and Western colonialism. These are Kuwait, Iraq, Bilad al-
Sham (Greater Syria encompassing Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan), Saudi 
Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt.355 Kuwait’s history is thus presented in parallel with that of 
the other Arab countries. Although the chapter on Kuwait avoids the issue of 
colonialism, much attention is devoted to the recent advancements in the economy and 
education, placed under the heading “ʿaṣr al-nahḍa” (the age of renaissance).356 
Kuwait’s oil-fuelled development is thus portrayed as part of the Arab national 
reawakening.  
 The last of the textbooks in question is Mudhakkirat al-Tarbiyya al-Wataniyya 
li-l-Sana al-Rabiʿa al-Ibtidaʾiyya (Civic Education Aides-Memoires for the Fourth 
Elementary Year). 357  Its authors represent the three dominant elements in the 
Educational Department: Qasim ʿAbd al-ʿAziz, an Egyptian secondary school 
teacher,358 Sulaiman Abu Ghosh, a long serving Palestinian teacher who was then a 
primary school headmaster, 359  and the Kuwaiti Hamad al-Rujaib. Although no 
publication date is provided, al-Rujaib is listed as a headmaster, a position he occupied 
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until being appointed to head the Educational Department’s Social Division in 
November 1954. The textbook must therefore have been published before this date. 
 The book is largely concerned with defining basic political concepts such as 
umma (nation), waṭan and waṭanīyya (patrie and patriotism), and state and government. 
The nation is defined as “a group of people usually descended from a single origin and 
usually united by the same language, customs, interests, and ambitions.” The students 
are taught that nations may be divided politically but retain their essential unity, as in 
the case of the Arab nation. Moreover, in discussing the role of “ambitions” in unifying 
nations, the book states that these “can be purely material as with the competition 
between [nations]… to sell their goods on the world market, or they can be old 
ambitions such as the ambition of the Arabs to form a unified Arab state.”360 A final 
chapter provides an overview of the various departments of the Kuwaiti government.361 
 The content of these textbooks reveals that the incorporation of Arab nationalist 
ideology into the curriculum was already occurring in a piecemeal fashion when 
Darwish al-Miqdadi revived his project of curricular reform. In a meeting of the 
Educational Council in June 1954, al-Miqdadi argued that the Educational Department 
“should have an outlined policy and a clear plan in which the goals of education are set 
out.” The council agreed to engage some Arab experts to help draft such a plan.362 In 
October, the council resolved to invite the former Egyptian Minister of Education 
Ismaʿil Qabbani and the prominent Iraqi Christian educator Matta ʿAqrawi, then 
working for UNESCO.363  
The composition of this expert committee reflected the dual influence of the 
Egyptian Educational Mission and the Palestinian teachers, headed by al-Miqdadi. As 
stated earlier, Qabbani was the architect of Egypt’s post-revolutionary curricular 																																																								
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reforms. ʿAqrawi, on the other hand, was clearly al-Miqdadi’s choice. The two men had 
studied together at the AUB and subsequently became colleagues at the Iraqi Ministry 
of Education. They went on to cofound the militaristic scouting group known as the 
Arab Rover Society in the early 1930s, both serving as its president at different times. 
Subsequently, they both joined the Red Book Group.364 ʿAqrawi’s invitation is the first 
indication that the network associated with the defunct Red Book Group continued to 
influence Kuwaiti education even after al-Miqdadi’s demotion. ʿAqrawi went on to 
receive a PhD from Columbia University and became Director General of Higher 
Education in Iraq in the 1940s.365 
It is unclear when Qabbani and ʿAqrawi arrived in Kuwait, but they were there 
by early February 1955, when they both participated in the Educational Department’s 
cultural season, which will be discussed below. While ʿAqrawi gave a broad and 
technical lecture on contemporary educational trends,366 Qabbani’s talk provides insight 
into his ideological inclinations and perhaps an emerging Arab nationalist trend among 
Egyptian educators. In addition to emphasizing Arabic and Islamic studies in his 1953 
curricular reforms, the former minister had also increased the proportion of Arab history 
at the expense of European history within Egypt’s curriculum.367 However, as has been 
stated, he did not incorporate Arab nationalist ideas, and the influence of Egyptian 
territorial nationalism persisted.368 Secondary school students continued to be taught the 
subject of “Egyptian Society,” which al-Miqdadi criticized for its exclusion of the Arab 
world.  
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The development of the Egyptian curriculum in the 1950s remains 
understudied.369 However, existing works on the subject indicate that it was not until 
after the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958 that the Egyptian 
curriculum systematically incorporated Arab nationalism as a key theme. 370  For 
example, it was at this time that the subject of “Egyptian Society” was refashioned as 
“Arab Society,”371 and certain history books were broadened to cover the Arab nation 
rather than just Egypt.372 This reflects the fact that the Nasserist regime espoused Arab 
nationalist ideology only gradually. Arab nationalist rhetoric began to appear in Jamal 
ʿAbd al-Nasir’s speeches between 1954 and 1956, and was at first mainly intended for 
regional rather than domestic consumption.373 
In light of the limited influence of Arab nationalist ideology within the Egyptian 
curriculum, it is surprising that Qabbani’s speech is saturated with it. His nationalist 
rhetoric may indicate a trend among Egyptian educators, particularly those active on the 
Pan-Arab level, which preceded the top-down imposition of Arab nationalism on 
Egyptian education after 1958. Over the course of the 1950s, Egypt hosted and 
participated in numerous pan-Arab educational conferences, and in 1957 it signed the 
Arab League’s Cultural Unity Agreement. These developments have been pointed to as 
factors behind the spread of Arab nationalist influence among Egyptian educators.374 It 
is thus possible that, as with ʿAbd al-Nasir’s speeches, Arab nationalist rhetoric among 
Egyptian educators was initially directed outwards rather than inwards, but further 
research is required to verify this.   																																																								
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In his speech entitled “The Goals of Education in the Arab Countries,” Qabbani 
begins by affirming the centrality of education to the current Arab nahḍa. This nahḍa 
must be founded upon a “spiritual message,” whose source is “national culture, i.e. the 
Arab-Islamic cultural heritage.” The Arabs must strike a balance between this national 
culture and Western modernity.375 One of the most important ways in which this 
spiritual foundation can be laid is through making national culture “the axis of all 
education,” thus “providing pupils with a patriotic and religious upbringing that will 
inspire pride in their nationality and faith in their homeland.”376 All subjects must be 
infused with elements of the national culture, including those imported from the West. 
For example, when the concept of democracy is taught, reference should be made to the 
Rightly Guided Caliphate as an exemplar of democratic principles. The Western 
concept of democracy can thus be internalized within the national culture. Qabbani 
claims that this approach underlaid his 1953 reforms.377 The latter half of his speech 
calls for an emphasis upon progressive and practical education.378  
While in Kuwait, Qabbani and ʿAqrawi naturally met with the Educational 
Department’s administrators. In one such meeting attended by Qabbani in late February, 
a key issue discussed was the “desire to find a compromise between the Egyptian and 
Kuwaiti curriculums that would accord with the requirements of the local 
environment.”379 This demonstrates the centrality of the issue of political identity in the 
push towards educational reform in Kuwait. It also reveals that, as in the case of the 
aforementioned textbooks, the emphasis upon Arab nationalism and Kuwaiti identity 
went hand in hand. 
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Qabbani and ʿAqrawi submitted their report to the Educational Department in 
March 1955. It reiterates the main themes in Qabbani’s speech. At the same time, it 
resembles al-Miqdadi’s educational project, particularly in its emphasis on Kuwaiti 
identity and Arab nationalism, as well as technical education and progressive practices. 
The document begins by affirming that as Kuwait modernizes, it must be careful to 
retain its Arab and Islamic identity, thus bringing about a synthesis between “the 
Western and Arab civilizations.” Education, the report states, is one of the best ways to 
achieve this.380 After analyzing the nature of Kuwaiti society and the challenges it 
faces,381 the document sets out a number of goals for Kuwait’s educational system, 
starting with the eradication of illiteracy. The second and third goals deal directly with 
Arab identity:  
2- Spreading the teachings of religion and implanting the moral principles 
derived from religion and the best of Arab customs and traditions… 
3- The propagation of the spirit of citizenship (muwāṭana) to Kuwait specifically 
and to Arabism (ʿUrūba) generally, the propagation of the Arab national spirit, 
getting to know the Arab national legacy and preserving, developing, and 
modernizing it according to the spirit of the age, and mastering the Arabic 
literature and language.382 
 
The remaining goals call for the fostering of “the democratic spirit,” health awareness, 
“an inclination towards productive handiwork,” sports and scouting, and the creative 
arts. The report goes on to make a series of detailed recommendations including the 
introduction of a new educational ladder with an intermediate level, mandatory 
education, and the development of teacher training and technical education.383  
 Some of the Qabbani-ʿAqrawi report’s key recommendations concern curricular 
reform. It begins its discussion of this issue by noting the close similarity between the 
Egyptian curriculum and that used in Kuwait. This resemblance is positive in that it has 
facilitated educational relations between Kuwait and Egypt, and it is “one of the goals 																																																								
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of the Arab countries” to bring their curriculums closer together.384 However, the report 
holds that Kuwait has surpassed even the 1953 Egyptian curriculum in its emphasis 
upon “Arab culture and the subjects that strengthen the national spirit,” i.e. Arabic and 
religious studies. The report recommends that this emphasis should continue, and even 
calls for further religious studies lessons at the secondary level.385 The strength of 
Arabic and religious studies in Kuwait reveals that the local curriculum had already 
changed significantly from that of Egypt since Husain’s appointment.  
Secondly, the Qabbani-ʿAqrawi report recommends that along with the Pan-
Arab perspective, each Arab country must “emphasize its own history and geography.” 
The segments of the Egyptian curriculum that deal exclusively with Egypt should be 
replaced, and history, geography, and civic education should focus on Kuwait and the 
Arabian Peninsula.386 An additional suggestion calls for a select number of Kuwaiti 
schools to adopt the progressive curriculum used in certain “model schools” in Egypt.387  
 The publication of the Qabbani-ʿAqrawi report marked a turning point in the 
development of Kuwait’s educational system. The Educational Department accepted the 
report’s primary recommendations, particularly those concerning the educational ladder 
and the curriculum, and decided to implement them gradually over the academic years 
1955-1956 and 1956-1957.388 In 1955-1956, the department created a committee of 
inspectors to draft Kuwait’s first national curriculums for the primary and intermediate 
levels and prepare new textbooks. The department’s annual report for this year states 
that the new curriculums “closely resemble those of Egypt in essence, but place greater 
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emphasis on religion and the English language, and ensure that subject material is suited 
to the local environment and in accordance with the department’s goals.”389  
With regards to the secondary level, the department elected to retain the 
Egyptian curriculum, though Qabbani’s 1953 version replaced that of 1947. 390 
However, even in this case, changes were made to the “social subjects” (presumably 
history and geography) in order to “reflect the local environment.”391 It appears that 
changes were also made to introduce a Pan-Arab perspective. The Educational 
Department’s 1955-1956 annual report states the following regarding the secondary 
school curriculum:  
The study plan in the new curriculums focuses on highlighting the Arab 
nationalist aspect in history lessons and considers each event in Arab history in 
whatever Arab country to be interconnected links in a single chain. The goal 
behind this is to clarify to the Arab student that the vast area in which the Arab 
nation resides is a single, indivisible waṭan with an indivisible history. The same 
is true of the geography lessons, which highlight the formative elements of Arab 
unity and their historical and geographical foundations.392    
 
Although the 1953 Egyptian secondary school curriculum did place greater emphasis on 
Arab history as a supplement to the history of Egypt, there is no evidence that history 
and geography were taught in Arab nationalist terms. The report is unclear on this point, 
but it appears that this Arab nationalist orientation was the result of changes introduced 
by the Kuwaiti Educational Department. Evidence of these changes from the late 1950s 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 The Qabbani-ʿAqrawi report was the primary stimulus behind the adoption of 
Arab nationalism as a key theme of the Kuwaiti curriculum in the second half of the 
1950s. The report set down the “propagation of the Arab national spirit” as a principal 
goal of education in Kuwait, and by accepting the report the Educational Department 
was committing itself to this goal. When the department began publishing more 																																																								
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substantial annual reports in the academic year 1956-1957, these documents would 
outline the method of fostering Arab national awareness in an emphatic and detailed 
manner. The curriculum’s Arab nationalist character would also be reflected in the new 
series of local textbooks that began to be written in 1955-1956. Both the annual reports 
and textbooks will be analyzed in detail subsequently.  
 Remarkably, the Qabbani-ʿAqrawi report began the process of incorporating 
Arab nationalist guidance into the Kuwaiti curriculum at a time when Egypt itself had 
yet to do so. The report’s publication and adoption even predated the Suez Crisis, which 
made Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir a Pan-Arab hero. Given the British preoccupation with 
Egyptian influence over education in Kuwait, it is important to note that Egypt’s role in 
introducing Arab nationalism to the curriculum was in fact secondary. Rather, the main 
drivers behind curricular reform were Darwish al-Miqdadi and ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain. 
The former pushed for such measures from the early 1950s and proposed forming the 
Qabbani-ʿAqrawi committee, while the latter began the process by commissioning the 
first locally authored textbooks in 1953. This demonstrates the importance of the 
Palestinians and the Kuwaiti muthaqqafīn in spreading Arab nationalist influence within 
the Educational Department.  
 A second policy adopted by the Educational Department during the first years of 
ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain’s directorship was a drive to disseminate thaqāfa, i.e. the modern 
knowledge of the muthaqqafīn, beyond the classroom to society at large. As has been 
argued, this missionary attitude towards modern education was a feature of the 
muthaqqafīn mindset. Ministries of culture, social affairs, or information would 
normally have conducted much of the Educational Department’s activity in this field. 
However, the fluid, rudimentary, and decentralized nature of Kuwait’s state institutions, 
coupled with the Educational Department’s extensive resources and capable leadership, 
allowed it to broaden its purview. The department gradually ceded control over some of 
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these activities to the departments of Social Affairs and Press and Publishing as they 
developed.  
 The most prominent program through which the Educational Department sought 
to edify society was its annual cultural season. It was first proposed by Husain in mid 
1954, launched in February 1955, and held annually thereafter.393 The department’s 
report for 1955-1956 places the lecture series under the rubric of “popular acculturation 
(al-thaqāfa al-shaʿbīyya).” It states that “the Educational Department is keen to transfer 
modern culture (al-thaqāfa al-ʿasrīyya) to the members of the public in various ways,” 
including literacy programs, vocational training, and the cultural season. 394  The 
motivation behind the season are further clarified in the introduction to the book in 
which the first season’s lectures were compiled. It lists the following goals for the 
season: “strengthening literary and scientific ties between rising Kuwait and its big 
sisters,” “spreading cultural awareness… among the people of Kuwait, especially the 
increasing numbers of educated youth (muthaqqafīn),” and confirming “the close bond 
between the notable Arab intellectuals and their Kuwaiti pupils and brothers.”395 The 
next season’s book was more emphatic in outlining the event’s nationalist goals, stating: 
“a unified direction in culture and opinion… is the primary pillar upon which 
comprehensive unity will be based.”396 
 Arab nationalism was the central theme of the cultural season. The British 
Political Resident complained that some of the 1955 season’s lectures “were the 
occasion for the expression in public of a good deal of violent Arab nationalism.” The 
following year, the “season’s course of lectures… released similar emotions.”397 The 
resident added that while commenting on the lectures, the head of the Egyptian 
Educational Mission made “objectionable references to Western activity in the Arab 																																																								
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World in general and to the Bagdad Pact in particular.” The Political Agent therefore 
protested the event’s “undesirable anti-Western and political tone” to Kuwait’s ruler.398 
 Most of the season’s lecturers either had Arab nationalist associations or spoke 
on topics related to Arab identity. Former members of the Red Book Group participated 
in both the 1955 and 1956 seasons, suggesting the involvement of Darwish al-Miqdadi. 
In 1955 these were Matta ʿAqrawi and the Iraqi Jabir ʿUmar, both of whom were also 
former members of the Arab Rover Society.399 Those who participated in 1956 were the 
Syrian Amjad al-Trabulsi and none other than Qustantin Zuraiq, spiritual leader of both 
the Red Book Group and the MAN. While al-Trabulsi spoke on Arab nationalism in 
Levantine poetry, Zuraiq delivered a lecture entitled “The Arabs and Modern Culture” 
and another on the importance of historical study in the Arab nation’s current 
situation.400 Members of the Red Book Group network would continue to participate in 
the season in coming years.  
Other speakers in 1955 included the Iraqi historian ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Duri, a 
prominent Arab nationalist, who lectured on Arab history. Qadri Tuqan, the headmaster 
of the nationalist influenced al-Najah School of Palestine, spoke on the contributions of 
the Arabs to science.401 Notable speakers in 1956 included the Lebanese academic 
Niqula Ziyada, who spoke on the Maghreb, and the Iraqi Arab nationalist ʿAbd al-
Rahman al-Bazzaz. The latter lectured on the cultivation of Arab nationalist feeling 
through education and other means.402 Remarkably, both men had been pupils of al-
Miqdadi, the former in Palestine and the latter in Iraq, and continued to be his close 
friends. Al-Bazzaz had also been a leader, alongside al-Miqdadi, of the Arab Rover 
																																																								
398 “Burrows to Riches, 17/3/1956,” Diaries, Vol. 20, 100. 
399 Al-Mawsim al-Thaqafi 1955, 223; Jeha, 444; Fadil Husain, 247, 260, 263, 300.  
400 Al-Mawsim al-Thaqafi 1956, 294-335; Jeha, 442. 
401 Al-Mawsim al-Thaqafi 1955, 9, 95. 
402 Al-Mawsim al-Thaqafi 1956, 10, 26, 218. 
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Society, the Muthanna Club, and the paramilitary Youth Brigades, and was imprisoned 
with him for participating in the Rashid ʿAli Revolt.403 
 Egyptian influence was also apparent within the cultural season. Three out of 
nine lecturers were Egyptian in 1955 and four out of nine in 1956. Most were 
government officials: the head of the Egyptian Medical Mission to Kuwait, two 
educational administrators (apart from Qabbani), and the undersecretary of the Ministry 
of National Guidance.404 Furthermore, the senior members of the Egyptian Educational 
Mission played a prominent role in organizing and moderating the lectures, a point that 
the British Council’s representative noted with concern.405 As in the case of Kuwait’s 
curriculum, the cultural season thus bore the marks of the three dominant groups within 
the Educational Department. While it was Husain who conceived of the event, al-
Miqdadi and the Egyptian Educational Mission each clearly influenced its content. All 
contributed to the event’s Arab nationalist character, which would persist despite British 
objections.  
 Supporting clubs and periodicals was a second method by which the Educational 
Department under Husain disseminated the culture of the muthaqqafīn to broader 
society. As stated previously, during al-Miqdadi’s tenure, the Educational Council 
assented to the requests of various clubs for monetary support, also supporting local 
periodicals. These practices expanded greatly following the appointment of Husain as 
director. The clubs continued to petition the department for assistance, and once a 
request was granted to one club, the rest demanded equal treatment. By 1954, the 
department had committed to providing the large clubs (Teachers’, al-Ahli, National 
Cultural, and Graduates’) with a wide range of services and allowances. Each was 
																																																								
403 Kahati, “Leading Arab Educators,” 167, 169, 240, 242-243, 471; Rabiha al-Miqdadi, 363. Kahati 
entertains the possibility that al-Miqdadi invited al-Bazzaz to the cultural season. Kahati, “Leading Arab 
Educators,” 527.  
404 Al-Mawsim al-Thaqafi 1955, 125, 135, 203; al-Mawsim al-Thaqafi 1956, 47, 72, 242.  
405 BW/114/6: Annual Report, 1955-1956, 3; al-Mawsim al-Thaqafi 1956, 6; al-Mawsim al-Thaqafi 1955, 
7.  
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entitled to an annual 15,000 rupee subvention and 2000 rupees per month to cover the 
costs of a periodical. The department also paid for the clubhouses’ rent, electricity, 
furniture, and various renovations.406 The Social Guidance Society, Kuwait Sports 
Union, and a number of less significant sports clubs also received smaller monthly 
allowances and/or one-time payments.407   
 The Educational Department’s oversight of Kuwait’s clubs persisted until 
January 1955, when the newly established Department of Social Affairs took over this 
responsibility. 408  This did not apply to local periodicals, which the Educational 
Department continued to support. In 1955, it allocated 1000 rupees per mensem to those 
clubs publishing weekly newspapers (Graduates’, Teachers’, and NCC),409 and granted 
a 500 rupee monthly allowance to an independent newspaper.410 In May 1957, the 
Educational Department finally relinquished its role in subsidizing Kuwait’s periodicals 
in favor of the Press and Publishing Department. 411  By this time, however, the 
department had already expanded its efforts to enlighten the populace to other areas, 
which will be detailed in the subsequent chapter.  
 
																																																								
406 MEC: S8, 14/6/1954; S5, 21/5/1954; S4, 8/5/1954; S77, 20/12/1953; S75, 17/11/1953; S64, 
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Chapter Five: The Educational Department  
in the Arab Nationalist Heyday, 1956-1961 
 
 The Suez Crisis marked a turning point in the development of the Educational 
Department and Kuwaiti politics more generally. The muthaqqafīn took over the role of 
the merchants as leaders of the opposition, and led a popular movement centred on Arab 
nationalist issues. This included the muthaqqafīn at the helm of the Educational 
Department, most notably ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain. They took advantage of the 
independence granted to them by Kuwait’s decentralized political system and their 
thorough control over the department to break with state policy and join ranks with the 
opposition. Not only did the Educational Department directly support oppositional 
activity in 1956, but it also adopted a more radical nationalist pedagogical agenda. 
Although the origins of the department’s nationalist policies lie in the previous period, 
the impact of the Suez Crisis caused them to reach unprecedented heights. Bellicose 
Nasserist rhetoric came to dominate textbooks, classroom instruction, extracurricular 
activities, and the department’s program of popular acculturation. In 1959, however, the 
rhetoric at an event co-organized by the Educational Department and the opposition 
proved too aggressive for the ruler’s tastes, prompting him to crack down on nationalist 
activism throughout the country. This led to a decline in Arab nationalist influence 
within the department. Other developments would have an even greater impact in this 
regard, namely growing state centralization and the transfer of the department’s top 
cadres to other government institutions.   
The Educational Department & the State: An “Island of Arab Nationalism” 
  
 The Educational Department’s remarkable independence of action during the 
1956 events can be accounted for by examining its position within the Kuwaiti state at 
the time. Perhaps the greatest contribution of the Kuwaiti muthaqqafīn to the 
department’s Arab nationalist environment was to grant the institution a special 
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character and independence, enabling it to freely implement its nationalist agenda. 
Unlike Arab expatriates, the muthaqqafīn were leaders of a burgeoning opposition 
movement with strong popular support, and were thus able to stand up to the shaykhs in 
the institutions under their control. They were aided by the high level of 
decentralization within the Kuwaiti state in the 1950s, as well as by the support of 
certain progressive-minded ruling family members. The Educational Department 
became the primary stronghold of the muthaqqafīn within the state. It also served as an 
incubator for other departments that were initially attached to it, such as Social Affairs 
and Press and Publishing, which also emerged as bastions of Arab nationalism and 
progressivism.  
 Kuwait’s Educational Department resembled the “islands of efficiency” 
described by Steffen Hertog in his study of state formation in Saudi Arabia. Hertog 
demonstrates that contrary to the “idealized assumptions of state coherence” prevalent 
in rentier state theory, the modern Saudi state created with the influx of oil wealth in the 
1950s was highly decentralized and variegated. This is primarily attributable to the 
influence of elite decisions. Hertog holds that “oil income… increased the menu of 
institutional options available to the” Saudi princes, who tended “to add ever more 
organizations to the state apparatus to address both political and administrative 
problems.” Competing princes carved out their own institutional fiefdoms in which they 
indulged in corruption and clientelism, but at the same time created autonomous 
agencies staffed by Western-educated technocrats to handle vital sectors such as oil and 
state finance.1  These various government departments function independently and 
seldom coordinate with one another, and even “operate on different rules and report to 
different principals.”2  
																																																								
1 Steffen Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2010), 
3-7. 
2 Ibid., 14.   
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 The pre-independence Kuwaiti state resembled that of Saudi Arabia in the extent 
of its decentralization and variegation. In the 1940s and 1950s, competing ruling family 
members established control over various departments, with the most powerful “turning 
administrative fiefdoms into virtual empires.”3 The most prominent of the latter were 
shaykhs Fahad al-Salim, who headed the departments of Health, Public Works, the 
Municipality, and the Development Board, and ʿAbd Allah al-Mubarak, President of the 
Public Security Department. Both men resisted any external oversight over their 
departments, and those of Shaykh Fahad were especially notorious for corruption and 
mismanagement. In the early 1950s, increased oil revenue prompted the British to 
attempt to increase their control over Kuwait’s internal administration through 
appointing advisers to certain departments. This further divided and complicated the 
administration, particularly as the aggressively independent Shaykh Fahad engaged in 
“open warfare” with these British advisers.4 
 The decentralization of the Kuwaiti state gave a great degree of independence to 
individual departments. In 1961, a leading bureaucrat and muthaqqaf described the 
situation that prevailed throughout much of the 1950s: “Each department was like an 
independent state within the state, with its own laws, organization, and interpretations.”5 
This situation also applied to the departments’ finances. As Crystal observes, “each 
department, financially independent, answered directly to the ruler and received lump 
sums at his discretion.”6 Pressured by the British, the ruler repeatedly attempted to 
impose centralized financial control, but largely failed throughout the 1950s.7 He also 
sought to create a central government apparatus that could rein in the various 
departments. In March 1954, he responded to a merchant petition for administrative 
																																																								
3 Crystal, 59-65. 
4 Ibid., 68-69; S. Smith, 41-43, 98-99, 139.  
5 Hamad Yusuf al-ʿIsa, al-Kuwait wa-l-Mustaqbal (N.p.: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1961), 67.  
6 Crystal, 68-69.   
7 “Kuwait Diary, December 24 – January 28, 1957,” Diaries, Vol. 20, 312-316; “Kuwait Diary, June 26 – 
July 30,” Diaries, Vol. 20, 159; “PR to Ross, 16/10/1952,” Diaries, Vol. 19, 323.  
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reform by creating the Higher Executive Committee (HEC). Comprised primarily of 
young shaykhs, it was unable to impose its authority on shaykhs Fahad and ʿAbd Allah. 
In December 1955, the ruler replaced it with the Supreme Council, a “protocabinet” that 
included most of the shaykhs presiding over government departments.8 It was only 
gradually that this institution was able to impose a semblance of central authority, a 
process not completed until after independence in 1961.9  
 As in the Saudi case, the Kuwaiti state’s decentralization allowed not only for 
the creation of shaykhly fiefdoms but also pockets of efficiency and progressivism, 
most notably the Departments of Education, Social Affairs, and Press and Publishing. In 
the Kuwaiti case, these institutions were also characterized by strong Arab nationalist 
influence. This division between departments was obvious to British observers. In 1958 
the Political Agent remarked: 
Those Departments which have shaped well from the beginning have gained in 
experience and efficiency with the passage of time (notably the Departments of 
Education, Social Affairs, Press and Publishing, Telegraph and Telephones), 
[while] those which were bad at the start are to-day even worse than before… 
namely the Public Security and the Public Works Department, and to a lesser 
extent, the Department of Health.10  
 
It is noteworthy that the latter departments were those of shaykhs Fahad al-Salim and 
ʿAbd Allah al-Mubarak.  
The British also perceived that the more efficient departments were associated 
with a particular ideological position. In 1960 the Political Agent observed that the 
Department of Social Affairs “has… prided itself since the earliest days on being, with 
the Education Department, in the van of the renaissance of ‘true Arabism.’”11 He later 
elaborated on the Educational Department, describing it as “one of the older established 
and the more efficient of the Departments of the Kuwait Government”: 																																																								
8 Crystal, 71; al-Khatib, 197; FO/371/120550: Bell to Riches, 17/4/1956; Confidential Annex to Kuwait 
Diary, 23 January – 26 February 1956. 
9 Crystal, 94-96; al-ʿIsa, 67-68.  
10 FO/371/132757: Halford to Burrows, 5/1/1958.  
11 FO/371/148912: Richmond to Earl of Home, 18/10/1960.  
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The Department, like its equally progressive colleague, the Department of Social 
Affairs and Labour… has a keen sense of public relations… It is not, however, 
possible to generalize about the Department’s standing in Kuwaiti eyes. If a man 
inclines towards reformist ideas, he will welcome it as a progressive; if he is of a 
traditional bent of mind (as most Kuwaitis are) he will deplore it as a hotbed of 
dangerous foreign ideas.12 
 
Terms such as “Arabism,” “progressive,” and “reformist” continually appear in British 
descriptions of the Departments of Education and Social Affairs.  
 While the dynamics of state formation in Kuwait resembled those of Saudi 
Arabia in some respects, there were also crucial distinctions between the two cases, 
particularly with regards to the influence of the pre-oil legacy and the nature of state-
society relations. Hertog argues that the “pre-oil social structures” of Saudi Arabia 
provided a foundation for the patrimonialist and clientelistic nature of the modern 
rentier state. Features of the modern Saudi state, such as “patrimonial traditions in the 
elite, clientelist expectations of new bureaucratic recruits and… the absence of an 
established distinction between public and private” are all rooted in the traditional 
socio-political order. At the same time, the “largely illiterate Saudi society offered few 
potential ‘Weberian’ bureaucrats to recruit.”13 
 Although similar patrimonial tribalism formed part of Kuwait’s pre-oil legacy, it 
was not the only feature. As has been argued, modern institutions inspired by and 
oriented towards the Arab world emerged in the shaykhdom from the early 1930s, years 
before the discovery of oil. The Educational Department, presided over by reformist 
merchants and administered by Arab expatriates, is the primary example. In this case, 
path dependency served to reinforce the department’s efficiency and progressivism in 
the post-oil period. Sean Yom applies a similar argument to explain the relative 
liberality of Kuwait’s political system after the rise of the rentier state. He contends that 
the legacy of the 1930s Majlis Movement, which reinforced the traditional pact of 
																																																								
12 FO/371/162937: Richmond to Earl of Home, 5/1/1962.  
13 Hertog, 15-16.  
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cooperation between the ruling family and the merchants, led to the emergence of a 
more participatory system he terms “popular rentierism.”14 
 The second key difference between the Saudi and Kuwaiti cases lies in the 
nature of the relationship between state and society and its impact on the formation of 
state institutions. In the Saudi case, the royal family was the only force strong enough to 
shape the state, while other societal groups were incorporated within state institutions as 
clients or agents. 15  Princes thus created islands of efficiency by giving “their 
technocratic agents in specific, insulated areas clear incentives to produce efficient 
outcomes and the authority to bypass the rest of the bureaucracy.”16 Hertog also 
provides a vital critique of rentier state theory’s assumption of “a clear state-society 
divide,”17 arguing that societal forces can indeed influence state policy. However, in 
Saudi Arabia, this influence is limited to the “micro-level” of specific institutions, 
where clientelistic bureaucrats can obstruct particular policies that they oppose.18 
 In the case of 1950s Kuwait, the muthaqqafīn who dominated the state’s 
“islands of efficiency” were not passive, royally appointed agents but the leaders of a 
flourishing opposition movement with ambitions to control the state. Nor was this a 
recent phenomenon, for the muthaqqafīn were the heirs to the merchants who had 
forged the Educational Department in the midst of their own opposition movement, and 
continued to dominate it until the early 1950s. The merchants’ role within the 
bureaucracy declined precipitously after the administrative councils resigned en masse 
in March 1954, after the ruler refused their demand for an elected advisory council.19 
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18 Ibid., 20.  
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No further elections to these bodies would be held.20 
 While the demise of the councils represented a setback for participatory 
governance, it probably allowed the muthaqqafīn to assert greater control within their 
departmental strongholds.  British observers noted the correlation between the 
efficiency and progressiveness of particular departments and the extent of the 
muthaqqafīn’s influence. The Political Agent thus states of the Social Affairs 
Department: 
There exists… in the Department an unusually large proportion of modestly 
enthusiastic and progressive-minded young Kuwaiti graduates... Because of its 
active liaison with the educational authorities, the Department has been sure of a 
cut of the best graduates returning to Kuwait each year.21  
 
The Educational Department, moreover, “is well served… by some young Kuwaiti 
graduates, who are more enthusiastic and less committed to their personal interests than 
their colleagues in other Departments.”22  
 This is not to say that the character and preferences of ruling family members 
were not important in the formation of “islands of efficiency” in Kuwait. Certain Al 
Sabah shaykhs had progressive tendencies and ties to the Arab nationalist movement, 
and thus allowed the muthaqqafīn greater freedom in their respective spheres of 
authority. For some shaykhs, such stances were little more than pretense, as in the case 
of ʿAbd Allah al-Mubarak, whose “flirtations with the reformists… never fooled 
anyone.”23 The progressive views of other shaykhs are widely regarded to have been 
genuine. Chief among these is the ruler ʿAbd Allah al-Salim, who presided over the 
1938 Legislative Council and adopted an anti-British stance during this period. 
Contemporaries and academics alike frequently describe him as liberally inclined and/or 
sympathetic to the Arab nationalists. Examples of this include his toleration of 
opposition activity, the Arab nationalist mood within the government in the second half 																																																								
20 FO/371/132757: PA to FO, 1/4/1958; FO/371/126899: Burrows to FO, 11/10/1957.  
21 FO/371/148912: Richmond to Earl of Home, 18/10/1960.    
22 FO/371/162937: Richmond to Earl of Home, 5/1/1962.   
23 FO/371/140081: FO Minute, Adams, 18/2/1959.   
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of the 1950s, and especially the constitution and parliament introduced following 
Kuwait’s independence.24 It is doubtful whether the muthaqqafīn’s islands of efficiency 
could have had the same progressive, Arab nationalist character under a more 
autocratic, repressive, and pro-British ruler.  
 Arab nationalist and progressive views could also be found among a group of 
young shaykhs who became increasingly influential in the 1950s, the ruler relying upon 
them to counter shaykhs Fahad al-Salim and ʿAbd Allah al-Mubarak.25 The most 
prominent was Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad, the ruler’s representative in the oil town of 
Ahmadi and subsequently President of the Finance Department.26 In the words of the 
British Political Agent, “he is an Arab nationalist in sympathy and is known to be held 
in good regard by the reformists.”27 The British considered his brother Sabah to be the 
most Arab nationalist and pro-Egyptian of the shaykhs. KOC and British officials 
reported that he had “a strong Arab unity attitude,”28 and that he “looks and behaves 
like an effendi.”29 As shall be discussed below, Sabah al-Ahmad would come to head 
the Social Affairs and Press and Publishing departments, both progressive strongholds 
of the muthaqqafīn. 
A final example of a ruling family member with progressive tendencies is 
Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Jabir, President of the Educational Department. Along with the 
ruler, with whom he was very close, he was one of the few learned shaykhs of the older 
generation.30 It will be remembered that he headed the Literary Club in the 1920s and 
championed female education in the 1930s. His close ties to Egypt began in 1953, when 																																																								
24 Ahmad al-Khatib, Interview by Talal Al-Rashoud, Personal Interview, Kuwait, January 15, 2013; al-
Khatib, 111; al-Saddah, Interview by Al-Rashoud; Michael Herb, The Wages of Oil: Parliaments and 
Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2014), 66, 
96-97; Hashim, 109, 291, 480-481. 
25 KOC/106845: Situation Notes, 25 March – 8 April, 1957; Situation Report, 25 January – 2 February, 
1957; FO/371/114588: Bell to Fry, 15/8/1955; “Kuwait Diary, June 29 – July 20,” Diaires, Vol. 19, 617. 
26 FO/371/140081: Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office, 17/2/1959; 
FO/371/126870: Leading Personalities. 
27 FO/371/140081: Halford to Middleton, 11/2/1959.  
28 KOC/106961: General Manager to Managing Director, 11/5/1957.  
29 FO/371/140081: Internal Situation in Kuwait, Riches, 6/2/1959.  
30 FO/371/126870: Leading Personalities; al-Khatib, Interview by Al-Rashoud.  
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he made a high profile visit to Cairo and was received by President Muhammad Najib, 
Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir, and other Free Officers, as well as leaders of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. While there, he was invited to mediate between the two groups. The 
shaykh also visited the headquarters of the Brotherhood and the state party Hayʾat al-
Tahrir (the Liberation Rally), making donations to both. Both he and his companions 
also became members of the Rally, and founded a symbolic branch in Kuwait upon 
returning.31 Later, the KOC described Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Jabir as “a great admirer 
and personal friend of Col. Jamal Abdul Nasir.”32  
Although Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Jabir engaged in his share of corruption,33 this 
does not appear to have effected his administration of the Educational Department, 
which the British described as “enlightened.” 34  He appears to have handled the 
department with benign neglect, delegating administration to Husain. The Political 
Agent thus stated in 1962 that the department “has long been presided over by Shaikh 
Abdullah al-Jabir as Sabah… and in practice run by Sayyid Abdul Aziz Husain.”35 In 
1959, another Political Agent complained that the shaykh’s “ambitious, Nasserite 
Director, Abdul Aziz Husain, disregards him completely.”36 He also lamented that “the 
Education Department under his presidency has been allowed to run riot in the direction 
of revolutionary pan-Arabism.”37  
 In the absence of centralized control, Kuwait’s ever-increasing oil wealth had 
the effect of augmenting the Educational Department’s administrative independence. 
The department’s budget increased exponentially from £2.4 million when Husain took 
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over in 1952-1953 to just over £16 million in 1960-1961.38 In 1957-1958, the British 
Council representative observed: “the Kuwait Department of Education by itself spends 
three times as much as the whole government revenue of Bahrain.”39 The budget 
increased most dramatically between 1954-1955 and 1955-1956, rising by 79%, and by 
a further 59% the following year. This increase partly reflects the department’s 
reassertion of control over its building program in 1955-1956,40 which had been ceded 
to the Public Works Department in 1953.41 The Educational Department retained 
control of this program until it was again transferred to Public Works in 1960-1961. The 
department’s autonomy in this area meant that it was able to build a higher number of 
schools.42 These were “some of the best in the world” in terms of facilities and quality 
of construction.43  The department even formed its own public parks authority, which 
was later transferred to the Public Works Department.44  
 The Educational Department’s high level of efficiency and ample resources 
meant that it often took on administrative duties outside its purview. In some cases, this 
led to the birth of new state institutions that were essentially “offshoots” of the 
department.45 The most prominent were the departments of Social Affairs, and Press 
and Publishing, which also emerged as islands of efficiency and Arab nationalism 
within the Kuwaiti state. The Educational Department thus effectively exported its 
ideology to other sectors of the bureaucracy and expanded the domain of the 
muthaqqafīn.  
 The origins of the Social Affairs Department date to December 1952, when a 
delegation from the Educational Department led by ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain attended the 																																																								
38 Taqrir 1961-1962, 17. 
39  BW/114/6: Annual Report, 1957-1958, 5.  
40 Taqrir 1956-1957, 11-12.  
41 “Al-Kuwait fi Shahr,” al-Raʾid, January 1953, 764; MEC: S55, 15/1/1953.  
42 FO/371/162937: Richmond to Earl of Home, 5/1/1962. 
43 BW/114/6: Annual Report, 1963-1964, 2; Annual Report, 1960-1961, 5.  
44 ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain, Interview, al-Anbaʾ, October 29, 1985. 
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Arab League’s Social Affairs Conference in Damascus. The delegation subsequently 
recommended the formation of a social affairs department in Kuwait.46 In November 
1954, the Educational Department created a Social Division comprised of former 
teachers after the HEC tasked it with creating an agency to oversee foreign workers. 
The division’s head was Hamad al-Rujaib, the former headmaster and close associate of 
ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain. In early 1955, the HEC upgraded the Social Division to a 
department.47 
 From the outset, the Arab role within the Social Affairs Department was 
prominent. A month before forming its Social Division, the Educational Department 
conducted an agreement with the Arab League for the secondment of technicians to 
help establish the new department.48 The Egyptian government seconded an advisor for 
this purpose in February 1955,49 and in 1956 several Kuwaiti administrators travelled to 
Cairo to study the work of the Ministries of Social Affairs and National Guidance.50 
The department’s remit quickly expanded from overseeing foreign workers to include 
various social services, vocational and literacy training, and statistics gathering. It also 
engaged in more ideologically oriented activities such as supporting clubs, female 
emancipation, engaging prominent Egyptian playwright Zaki Tulaimat to oversee the 
development of the local theater, and censoring films including those denigrating “the 
dignity of Arabism.” The Political Agent observed that the department’s “inspiration is 
almost entirely post-revolutionary Egyptian,” and marveled that “such an alien plant… 
has taken so apparently firm a root in arid soil.”51  
 A third bastion of the muthaqqafīn after the Educational and Social Affairs 
departments was the Department of Press and Publishing. The roots of this institution 																																																								
46 “Halqat al-Dirasat al-Ijtimaʿiyya li-l-Duwwal al-ʿArabiyya,” al-Raʾid, January 1953, 786-787; MEC: 
S49, 21/10/1952.  
47 FO/371/114588: Pelly to Eden, 31/1/1955; MEC: S7, 13/11/1954; al-Rujaib, 206. 
48 MEC: S5, 30/10/1954.   
49 “Taqrir Daʾirat al-Shuʾun al-Ijtimaʿiyya,” al-Kuwait al-Yawm, May 21, 955, 10; al-Rujaib, 207.  
50 “Ifad Muwazafi al-Shuʾun al-Ijtimaʿiyya,” al-Kuwait al-Yawm, September 15, 1956, 13.  
51 FO/371/148912: Richmond to Earl of Home, 18/10/1960; al-Rujaib, 213-221.   
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lie in the idea of publishing an official gazette, which was first proposed by a teacher in 
1951 and taken up by Darwish al-Miqdadi. It was intermittently discussed in the 
Educational Department until September 1954, 52  when the department’s financial 
secretary proposed the idea to the newly established HEC. The HEC approved and 
made the secretary, Badr Khalid al-Badr, editor of the new publication.53 At around the 
same time, the HEC ordered the suspension of all local periodicals until a mechanism 
for their oversight could be established. It delegated this responsibility to the 
Educational Department. After studying the issue, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain argued that his 
department could not adequately deal with this task, and therefore recommended the 
creation of a separate department.54 
 The Press and Publishing Department was founded in December 1954, and 
charged with overseeing the official gazette al-Kuwait al-Yawm (Kuwait Today), 
printing government documents, and censoring the local press.55 The gazette’s editor al-
Badr recruited other cadres from the Educational Department including the young 
graduate Fadil Khalaf, who became the publication’s secretary,56  and the former 
headmaster Ahmad al-Saqqaf, who joined as Assistant Director of the Press and 
Publishing Department in 1956.57 The latter is credited with making the department a 
center of Arab nationalist influence through the recruitment of fellow nationalists, both 
Kuwaiti and expatriate, including MAN members.58 
 Like the Social Affairs Department, Press and Publishing acquired an Egyptian 
advisor in 1955 following a visit by al-Badr to Cairo.59 Employees were also sent to 																																																								
52 MEC: S60, 5/3/1953; S15, 28/1/1952; S12, 14/1/1952; S20, 14/4/1951.  
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57 Al-Kuwait al-Yawm, November 18, 1956, 4.  
58 Al-Khatib, Interview by Al-Rashoud; Abu al-Jubayn, Interview by Al-Rashoud; Abu al-Jubayn 275.  
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Egypt for training.60 Moreover, the department also expanded its activities. In March 
1958, it launched two cultural projects designed for the Pan-Arab stage. The first was 
the printing of classical Arabic manuscripts. The second, more significant endeavor was 
the publication of a cultural magazine intended for circulation throughout the Arab 
countries.61 In late 1957, al-Saqqaf engaged the prominent Egyptian intellectual Ahmad 
Zaki as its editor.62 As its title of al-ʿArabi (The Arab) suggests, it was markedly Arab 
nationalist in tone.63 
 A marker of the muthaqqafīn’s control over these departments was that neither 
had a president until Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad was appointed to head them both in the 
summer of 1956.64 According to al-Rujaib, when he heard that Shaykh Fahad al-Salim 
was seeking to absorb his department into the Municipality, he approached Shaykh 
Sabah to become its president. Al-Rujaib states that he chose the shaykh because he was 
the honorary president of the Teachers’ Club, and the two men had a close 
relationship.65 It was therefore no accident that Shaykh Sabah, with his nationalist views 
and ties to the muthaqqafīn, came to head two of Kuwait’s most progressive 
departments.  
 The greatest testament to the independence and progressivism of the 
muthaqqafīn’s “islands of Arab nationalism” was the role played by the Educational 
Department and its offshoots during the Suez Crisis. As shall be seen below, for a 
certain period, the department would function as a virtually independent entity, more 
closely aligned with the opposition than the ruling family.  
The Suez Crisis and the Educational Department’s Politicization, 1956-1959 
 
 In July of 1956, the Egyptian President Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir nationalized the Suez 																																																								
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64 Al-Kuwait al-Yawm, June 9, 1956, 1. 
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Canal, thus igniting a political crisis that would send shockwaves throughout the Arab 
world.66 The impact of these events was acutely felt in Kuwait, where they marked a 
watershed in local political development. Led by the muthaqqafīn, the Arab nationalist 
movement mounted a series of strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts that represented a 
more popular and confrontational form of activism unfamiliar in Kuwait.67 Moreover, 
while the merchant class traditionally spearheaded opposition to the ruling family, this 
would no longer be the case. As al-Khatib recalls, the 1956 events inaugurated “a new 
phase in the history of patriotic activism in Kuwait, in which leadership transferred to 
the new class of muthaqqafīn drawn from all classes: minor merchants, employees, 
workers, and artisans.”68  
 In the face of what was seen as an existential struggle for the Arab nation, the 
boundaries between state institutions and the opposition movement in Kuwait eroded. 
Nowhere was this more apparent than in the Educational Department, which went much 
further than other government departments in supporting the grassroots movement. This 
was made possible by the department’s institutional independence, which afforded an 
almost free reign to its muthaqqafīn administration. Cairo’s new Arab nationalist line 
also led to a shift in the attitude of the Egyptian Educational Mission in Kuwait, which 
now contributed much more to the department’s Arab nationalist atmosphere.    
 The first manifestations of popular support for Egypt in Kuwait occurred during 
the schools’ summer holidays, and the Educational Department was thus not involved. 
In mid-August 1956, President ʿAbd al-Nasir called for strikes to be held throughout the 
Arab world to support his country in the face of British and French claims. On August 
14th, Lajnat al-Andiyya al-Kuwaitiyya (the Committee of Kuwaiti Clubs [CKC]) 
convened a “popular conference” at the National Cultural Club in order to plan a 
																																																								
66 Jankowski, 68.  
67 Al-Khatib, 158. 
68 Ibid., 163. 
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response.69 The National Cultural, Teachers’, and Graduates’ Clubs had formed the 
CKC in March in order to take a joint position on the contentious issue of importing 
fresh water from Iraq.70 Its formation completed the consolidation of the various 
muthaqqafīn factions under the leadership of the MAN, and marked “a more serious co-
ordination of the hitherto rather diffuse reformist activities.”71  
 The CKC resolved to mount a general strike on August 16th, a decision it upheld 
even though the public security forces violently dispersed its conference. The strike led 
to the closure of most shops, but government departments continued to function. The 
public security forces forcefully put down demonstrations, causing two deaths, 
numerous injuries, and much damage to property.72 In response, the CKC sent a 
message of protest to the ruler,73  which moved the authorities to adopt a more 
conciliatory attitude. This became evident in October, when the Liaison Committee of 
the Arab Popular Conference in Cairo invited Kuwait’s ruler to observe a general strike. 
Its purpose was to protest France’s arrest of five leaders of the Algerian National 
Liberation Front.74 
 With the government’s blessing, the CKC and the Educational Department jointly 
called for a general strike in support of Algeria on October 28th. It was at this stage that 
the department started to play a major role in supporting the protest movement. 
Government departments, schools, and the oil company were shut down. Although the 
government banned demonstrations and gatherings in the clubs, it allowed the CKC and 
the Educational Department to convene a public meeting at Shuwaikh Secondary 
School. The department provided school buses to transport the spectators, who 																																																								
69 “Kuwait Diary, July 31 - August 26 1956,” Diaries, Vol. 20, 169; al-Khatib, 137-138. 
70 Khalid al-Masʿud, Interview by ʿIsam al-Jamal, Rihla fi Raʾs Hadha al-Rajul, 47; “Burrows to 
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exceeded 4000. Ahmad al-Khatib, two Algerian scholarship students, and Kuwaiti, 
Palestinian, and Egyptian teachers delivered speeches condemning France and Britain 
and glorifying the Algerian revolution and Arab nationalism. A resolution was also 
passed calling for the boycott of French goods. Shaykhs ʿAbd Allah al-Jabir and ʿAbd 
Allah al-Mubarak, then serving as Acting Ruler, both attended and made large 
donations to the Algerian revolutionaries. Boy Scouts also collected donations from the 
public.75 The meeting concluded “with the Algerian National Anthem sung by sixteen 
Algerian students in Boy Scouts’ Uniform.”76 
 While the Educational Department’s initial support of the protest movement was 
officially sanctioned, popular indignation towards the Tripartite Aggression on Egypt 
led it to act independently and in opposition to general government policy. After the 
attacks began in November, the CKC sought government permission for a general strike 
and demonstration. It first approached the President of the Educational Department, 
Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Jabir, requesting that students be allowed to participate. The 
latter sought authorization from the Acting Ruler, Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Mubarak, who 
resolutely refused.77 Undaunted, the CKC called for a general strike and demonstration 
to take place on November 3rd despite police warnings.78  
 The strike succeeded in closing down the markets, though government 
departments and schools remained open. The CKC also held a mass demonstration that 
clashed with security forces. At the end of the day, the CKC announced the formation 
of four subcommittees: one to organize further strikes, another to fundraise for Egypt, a 
third to enlist volunteers for the Egyptian Army, and a fourth to coordinate an economic 
boycott of Great Britain and France. The protests forced the government to negotiate, 
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and on the same day the CKC’s leaders began meeting with the ruler to request 
government approval for the subcommittees’ activities. The ruler agreed to sanction all 
subcommittees but refused certain demands relating to the boycott, namely the 
cancellation of government contracts with British companies, the dismissal of British 
state employees, and the stoppage of oil exports to Britain.79 
 At this point, the Educational Department’s role became more noticeable. 
According to the British Political Agency, representatives of the department were 
involved in supporting the CKC’s demands during these negotiations. Moreover, the 
CKC’s subcommittees were “assisted by many elements in the Department including 
the Director, Abdul Aziz Husain.”80 At around the same time, the British Council’s 
representative in Kuwait reported that Husain was a prominent figure within the CKC.81 
He later added “the people who were active on these [sub]committees were very largely 
drawn from the staffs of the Education Department and from its offshoot, the Social 
Affairs Department and included both Directors.”82 In an interview, Husain recalls 
participating in the subcommittee in charge of fundraising for Egypt.83  
 Husain’s stance during this period is further elucidated by a KOC report, which 
details a meeting between him and an unnamed British observer in November:  
He noted the very strong pro-Egyptian attitude of the Director, and the very 
widespread pro-Egyptian feeling throughout the Education Department… Mr. 
Hussein has come out into the open as one of the leaders of the nationalist anti-
Sabah movement in Kuwait… He explained, during the course of the 
conversation, that in actual fact the clubs and the national movement were the 
power in the country, and not the Government. In explanation of this statement, 
he mentioned that the clubs called for a closure of shops, etc., and that although 
the Government had ordered the shops to open, the shopkeepers preferred to 
follow the instructions of the clubs.84 
 
Other employees of the Educational Department were even more active within the 																																																								
79 “Kuwait Diary, 28 October – 28 November 1956,” Diaries, Vol. 20, 252; al-Khatib, 160-162.  
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CKC, serving on the body’s coordinating committee. These were the headmasters 
Khalid al-Masʿud (the CKC’s secretary) and ʿAbd Allah Ahmad Husain, and the 
Assistant Financial Director Khalid al-Khrafi.85 The Supervisor of Foreign Scholarships 
Faisal al-Salih is also reported to have played a prominent role in the body at this 
stage.86 
 The high degree of decentralization within the Kuwaiti state at the time enabled 
the Educational Department under the muthaqqafīn to break with general government 
policy, participating in the CKC’s strikes when other departments did not. Following 
the success of the strike on November 3rd, the CKC called for it to continue the 
following day. The strike spread beyond the suq to the schools, several of which closed. 
The British suspected that this action was taken “with the approval if not on the direct 
instructions of the Education Department, in which pro-Egyptian and reformist 
elements play a strong role.”87 The MAN member al-Saddah, who at the time was 
deputy headmaster of al-Najah Primary School, clarifies that it was the staff of the 
respective schools who decided to strike. He recalls agreeing on this action with the 
headmaster of his school, ʿAbd Allah Ahmad Husain. The headmaster and CKC 
Secretary Khalid al-Masʿud also decided to close his school. Al-Saddah adds that while 
the Educational Department had no role in this action, it did not object to it.88 On the 
same day, however, the department officially sanctioned the strike. The director 
announced: “In view of the present situation in Egypt all schools will be closed from 
Monday, 5th November 1956, until further notice.” They would remain closed until 
November 10th. 89  The Educational Department thus became the only government 
department to observe the strike with the exception of the Electricity Department under 
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Shaykh Jabir al-ʿAli al-Sabah,90 who was personally sympathetic to Egypt at the time.91 
 After the strikes of November came to an end, the CKC focused its efforts on 
maintaining the activities of its subcommittees, most notably fundraising for Egypt and 
the economic boycott of France and Great Britain. The Educational Department 
participated enthusiastically in both these campaigns. In December, it held fundraising 
drives for employees and students, collecting around 1.3 million rupees for the CKC’s 
Fund for Struggling Egypt. Although many shaykhs donated extensively to this fund at 
the ruler’s request,92  the Educational Department appears to have been the only 
government institution to do so.93 The department also facilitated the activities of the 
CKC’s Boycott Committee by allowing it to hold a large meeting of prominent 
merchants in one of its schools.94  
 More significantly, the Educational Department became the only government 
department to cancel its contracts with British companies as demanded by the CKC, a 
provision that the ruler had earlier rejected. The department sent the following circular 
to its suppliers in the UK: “Due to the Anglo-French aggressive attack on our Arabian 
sister country Egypt, we have decided to discontinue our business connections with 
your organization.”95 In addition, although the department did not go so far as to 
dismiss its British employees as requested by the CKC, it was reported in November 
that these employees were not “permitted to attend their offices.”96 
 The Educational Department’s policy of non-cooperation with British companies 
and institutions also extended to the field of cultural relations. The British Council’s 																																																								
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representative commented on the difficulties he faced in dealing with the department 
after the Suez Crisis, stating “there is no doubt that the Education Department is 
politically active and hostile to Britain.” Writing in the summer of 1957, he added that 
the department formed “to some extent, an isolated community in which the dark 
outlook of last November has persisted longer than elsewhere. There is still a great deal 
of moral pressure on its members not to have dealings with the British.”97 The 
department demonstrated this attitude during its Boy Scout jamboree in March 1957, to 
which it invited the various Arab states. During the event, local officials held a meeting 
with representatives from Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, Lebanon, and Tunisia, and 
decided to collectively boycott the forthcoming jamboree in England.98 
 The Educational Department dealt with the KOC in a similar manner. The 
company’s public relations officials reported that while dealings with many government 
departments became difficult during the Suez Crisis, the atmosphere in the Social 
Affairs and Educational Departments was particularly unfriendly. The latter was the last 
department with which the KOC resumed contact in early December 1956.99 It took 
months, however, before the company’s relationship with the department returned to 
normal. When a KOC employee and his guest attempted to visit the Shuwaikh 
Secondary School in January 1957, the Egyptian headmaster denied them entry “on the 
grounds that a British visit could not be tolerated.”100 Moreover, the KOC reported in 
April that visits by schoolchildren to its facilities, which ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain had 
halted during the crisis, had not resumed “in spite of repeated invitations.”101 
 Even after the CKC’s fundraising and boycott activities ceased, the Educational 
Department continued to cooperate with the opposition-dominated clubs in holding 																																																								
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Arab nationalist activities in the months and years following the Suez Crisis. For 
example, the department and the clubs jointly hosted the Egyptian Police and Port Said 
football teams in January and May of 1957 respectively.102 In November 1957, the 
department again allowed the CKC to stage a rally at the Shuwaikh Secondary School 
to commemorate the start of the Algerian Revolution. 103  As shall be seen, the 
Educational Department would continue to support the clubs and involve them in its 
public activities for the rest of the decade.  
Education After the Suez Crisis, 1956-1959  	
 The significance of the Suez Crisis in the eyes of the Educational Department’s 
administrators compelled them to engage in activities outside their purview, such as 
strikes, fundraising, and boycotts. However, the crisis also had a deep and more lasting 
impact on the educational field. In the months following the strike of November 1956, 
students were constantly reminded of Egypt and the Arab nation’s struggle against 
imperialism. In a meeting in late November, the Educational Council decided to name a 
school after Port Said to “commemorate the heroism” of its people in defending 
Egypt.104 In December and January, the Boy Scouts collected clothing for victims of the 
war in Gaza and Jordan with the support of the CKC.105  In the spring of 1957 ʿAbd al-
ʿAziz Husain was reprimanded, presumably by a leading shaykh, “for allowing a film of 
the attack on Port Said to be shown to school children.”106 This remembrance of the 
Suez events was associated with the glorification of Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir. In April 1957, 
a KOC report observed that “the schools are full of” his portraits.107 The department 
also showed solidarity with Nasserist movements elsewhere in the Arab world. In 																																																								
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December 1956, “a period of two minutes’ silence was observed in some of the schools 
in honour of those Iraqi students who had been arrested by the government of Nuri 
Saʿid.”108 
 The increase of Arab nationalist sentiment and activism in the schools post-Suez 
was not merely a short-lived reaction; rather, it represented a turning point in the rise of 
a more radical and assertive Arab nationalist agenda within the Educational 
Department. This shift was apparent in the politicization of classroom instruction and 
extracurricular activities, the increased prominence of Arab nationalism in the 
curriculum and local textbooks, the department’s program of popular acculturation, and 
the mass meetings held on sports days and nationalist occasions.  
 Before discussing the Educational Department specifically, it must be emphasized 
that it was not the only government institution to be caught up in the Arab nationalist 
fervor that gripped the country after the Suez Crisis. While the Educational Department 
was undoubtedly the primary bastion of Arab nationalist influence, an increased 
nationalist mood can be observed within the state as a whole. Examples of this include 
the establishment of an Israel Boycott Office within the Customs Department in 
1957,109 the launch of a government-sponsored fundraising campaign for the Algerian 
revolution in 1958, 110  and the official gazette’s pronouncements on regional 
developments.111 A thorough analysis of nationalist influence across all state institutions 
in this period is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, this influence can be 
broadly attributed to developments discussed previously, namely the impact of the 
popular movement that emerged in 1956, the flirtation with nationalist ideas by certain 
Al Sabah shaykhs, and the influence of Egyptians, Palestinians, and indigenous 
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muthaqqaffīn in certain departments.  
 Beyond the overall nationalist mood within the Kuwaiti state, two primary factors 
can account for the shift towards a more extreme Arab nationalist position in the 
Educational Department specifically. An obvious cause was the radicalization of its 
muthaqqafīn administrators, led by ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain. A 1957 profile of Husain 
identifies the Suez Crisis as a turning point after which he “became violently opposed to 
British policy.”112 While British documents previously described the director as partial 
towards Egypt, those written after 1956 identify him in much more certain terms as a 
“Nasserite”113 and a “fervent Arab nationalist.”114 They also discern the impact of his 
new ideological stance on department policy. A KOC official thus reports in 1958 that 
Husain “is endeavouring to make Kuwait a centre for training and discussion of Arab 
culture and Nationalism.”115 In 1959, the Political Agent accused the director of 
“[breeding] ill-educated nationalistic perverts” through the educational system.116  
 The second key factor behind the department’s more radical tendencies was the 
unprecedented politicization of its Egyptian teachers and their increasing influence.  It 
is this factor that British sources stress the most, to the point of exaggeration. As 
detailed above, British fears regarding Egyptian teachers in Kuwait date to the late 
1940s and were a key factor behind the establishment of a British Council center in the 
country. These fears rose to new heights following the Suez Crisis. In the late 1950s, 
British officials often portrayed the Educational Department and its director as 
“completely” and “wholly” subservient to Egypt.117 Moreover, they went so far as to 
claim that Egyptian teachers indoctrinated and even directed the Kuwaiti activists of the 
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clubs, and served as “the most articulate leaders” of the local nationalist movement.118 
A report by the British Council’s representative in Kuwait reveals the conspiratorial 
nature of British fears. He alleged that the Egyptian Educational Missions in the Gulf 
functioned as a “single unit,” controlling local educational departments and even the 
Baʿth Party.119 In 1958, the British Political Resident urged the Kuwaiti ruler to restrict 
Egyptian propaganda in the schools and employ teachers from other Arab countries.120 
 In attributing all Arab nationalist influence in the Kuwaiti Educational 
Department to Egyptian machinations, the British disregarded the already well-
established Arab nationalist tendency within the institution. The more radical nationalist 
policies of the post-Suez period, while owing much to the rising tide of Nasserism, must 
also be seen as a continuation of the ongoing efforts of al-Miqdadi and his Palestinian 
associates and the Kuwaiti muthaqqafīn. As has been stated, it was they who led the 
department to adopt a curriculum designed to foster Arab nationalist awareness well 
before Egypt itself. Moreover, the Egyptian teachers’ absence from the clubs and 
underground nationalist groups was conspicuous, and they were not known for their 
Arab nationalist orientation prior to the Suez Crisis. For example, there is no indication 
that they played a significant role in the activism that occurred in Kuwait in 1956. 
British officials at times demonstrated an awareness of this fact, with one of them 
admitting: “our experience of Egyptian teachers is that they are less troublesome than 
other foreign Arabs; the Egyptian Government appear to prefer Palestinians and Syrians 
as their agents rather than their own people.”121 
 This is not to say that Kuwait’s Educational Department and the Egyptian 
government did not become very closely aligned in the post-1956 period, and that the 
influence and activism of Egyptian teachers in Kuwait did not greatly increase. In 1958, 																																																								
118 FO/371/140082: FO Minute, Beaumont, 10/4/1959. See also: FO/371/162937: Richmond to Home, 
5/1/1962; KOC/106845: Situation Notes, 8-30 April 1957. 
119 BW/114/6: Annual Report, 1958-1959, 13. 
120 “Persian Gulf Monthly Report, April 30 – June 2, 1958,” Diaries, Vol. 20, 629. 
121 FO/371/126998: Given to Walmsley, 11/10/1957; See also BW/114/6: Annual Report, 1956-1957, 1. 
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ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain declared to a Syrian newspaper that the course of education in 
Kuwait “is consistent with the sound emancipatory orientation of educational policy in 
the United Arab Republic,” and seeks to imbue the youth with a “strong nationalist 
spirit.”122 The Egyptian media also spoke of Kuwaiti education in glowing terms. In 
1959, the state-owned al-Jumhuriyya, mouthpiece of the revolutionary government, 
published a special issue on the “Educational Renaissance in Kuwait.”123 It’s headlines 
proclaimed: “An Educational Revolution in Kuwait: Arab Nationalism and Unified 
Arab Homeland at the Heart of Curricula,”124  and “A Glorious Record of Arab 
Resurrection (Baʿth): Education in Kuwait Guides the People in an Arab and 
Humanitarian Direction.”125 The newspaper extolled the cultural ties between Kuwait 
and the UAR, which were “forging Arab unity in thought and culture,”126 and praised 
the shaykhdom as “a stronghold of pure Arabism worthy… of being in the vanguard of 
free Arabs working for greater Arab unity.”127 In 1960, Cairo’s Voice of the Arabs radio 
station praised Kuwaiti plans to establish a university, adding: “Kuwait has always been 
the centre whence knowledge and nationalism radiate to the rest of the Arab amirates in 
the Gulf area.”128  
 The marked increase in the Egyptian teachers’ influence after 1956 is indicated 
by the steady rise in their numbers, and the importance of the positions they occupied in 
comparison to Palestinian teachers. While Egyptian teachers already squarely 
dominated the secondary level in 1955-1956, by 1960-1961 their percentage increased 
by a further 15% in the male secondary school and 4.4% in the female, reaching 85.3% 																																																								
122 ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain, “Hadith Mudir Maʿarif al-Kuwait li-l-Faihaʾ: Risalat al-Taʿlim al-Muthla fi al-
Kuwait,” Interview, al-Faihaʾ, August 22, 1958.  
123 The issue is undated but al-Raʾis dates it to 1959. al-Raʾis, 13, 245.  
124 “Thawra Taʿlimiyya fi al-Kuwait, Jawhar al-Manahij: al-Qawmiyya al-ʿArabiyya wa-l-Watan al-
ʿArabi al-Wahid,” ʿAdad Khas min Jaridat al-Jumhuriyya ʿan al-Nahda al-Taʿlimiyya fi al-Kuwait, ND, 
12.   
125 Ahmad Najib Hashim, “Sijjil Hafil min al-Baʿth al-ʿArabi: al-Taʿlim fi al-Kuwait Yuwajjih al-Shaʿb 
Wijha ʿArabiyya Insaniyya,” al-Jumhuriyya, ND, 9.  
126 Salah Salim, “al-Taʿlim fi al-Kuwait li-Kul al-ʿArab,” al-Jumhuriyya, ND, 8.  
127 Hashim, “Sijjil Hafil,” 9.  
128 FO/371/149140: Transcript, Voice of the Arabs, 13/2/1960.  
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and 89.7% respectively. The increase came at the expense of Palestinian teachers.129 
Egyptian dominance also soon extended to the new intermediate level, which was added 
in the academic year 1956-1957.130  By 1957-1958, the total number of Egyptian 
teachers in intermediate schools exceeded that of Palestinian teachers. 131  Their 
proportion increased steadily thereafter at the expense of the Palestinians. The vast 
majority of Palestinian teachers were thus relegated to elementary schools, and they 
also dominated the kindergartens.132  
 The increasing intimacy of the relationship between the Educational Department 
and Egypt was also apparent in other areas. For example, the head of the Egyptian 
Educational Mission was appointed as one of three delegates representing Kuwait at 
UNESCO in the 1958-1959 academic year. 133  More significantly, the number of 
Kuwaiti students studying in Egypt on scholarship increased by a remarkable 61% after 
the Suez Crisis, from 86 in 1955-1956 to 139 in 1956-1957.134 Egypt remained by far 
the most popular destination for Kuwaiti scholarship students throughout the decade, 
and by 1960-1961 their numbers had risen to 248.135 
Indoctrination in the Classroom 	
 Influenced by the more radical Arab nationalist line in Cairo, Egyptian teachers in 
Kuwait became much more active in disseminating Nasserist ideology in the schools. 
Egyptian domination of the intermediate and secondary schools, where students were 
more capable of comprehending politics, facilitated this activity. A 1958 issue of the 
Shuwaikh Secondary School’s magazine al-Yaqza highlights how Egyptian teachers 
were able to spread their message among students both in the classroom and through 																																																								
129 Taqrir 1960-1961, 283.  
130 Al-Kuwait wa-Nahdatuha 1955-1956, 17.   
131 Taqrir 1957-1958, 93.  
132 Taqrir 1961-1962, 282; Taqrir 1960-1961, 283; Taqrir 1959-1960, 292; Taqrir 1958-1959, 170; 
Taqrir 1957-1958, 161. 
133 BW/114/6: Annual Report, 1958-1959, 13.  
134 Taqrir 1956-1957, 145-146; al-Kuwait wa-Nahdatuha 1955-1956, 20. 
135 Taqrir 1960-1961, 152.  
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extracurricular activities. For example, the magazine contains excerpts from the 
newsletters that each class was required to write in coordination with its Arabic teacher. 
The vast majority of the articles listed are political in nature, and include three on the 
concept of Arab unity, three on the UAR, two on resistance to colonialism, and one 
each on Palestine, Algeria, and the Bandung Conference.136 Al-Yaqza adds that the titles 
of these newsletters “reflect the patriotism and nationalism of the students,” and, it may 
be added, the influence of their teachers. They included: al-ʿUruba (Arabism), al-
Wihda (Unity), al-Baʿth (Resurrection), al-Kifah (Struggle), al-Taliʿa (The Vanguard), 
and Jul Jamal (the name of a martyr of the Suez Crisis).137 
 Al-Yaqza also lists a wide array of student clubs, each overseen by one or more 
Egyptian teachers. Arab nationalist politics featured prominently in the activities of a 
number of these, such as the Oratory and Debate Club. Lectures in its program included 
“Aspects of the Struggle in Algeria,” “Wounded Palestine,” “Palestine and the Human 
Conscience,” “What the Arabs Will Gain From the Birth of the UAR,” and “Our Duty 
Towards the Nascent UAR.” The magazine reports that the headmaster gave one 
student special commendation for a lecture entitled “Arab Nationalism Past and 
Present.”  Members of the club also delivered a weekly program on the school radio 
entitled “The Arab Maghreb.”138 Another example is provided by the Geography Club, 
which informs readers that it is working on projects concerning the Afro-Asian Peoples’ 
Solidarity Conference in Cairo, the Suez Canal, and Arab nationalism and Palestine.139 
The Drama Club, moreover, reports that it is preparing a play for the upcoming 
celebration of the UAR’s anniversary (see below).140 
 The most prominent example of an Arab nationalist extracurricular activity is al-
																																																								
136 “Muqtatafat min Majalat al-Fusul,” al-Yaqaza, Vol. 5, 1958, 34-36. No month or issue number listed. 
All subsequent citations are from the same issue.  
137 “Majalat al-Fusul,” al-Yaqaza, 32. 
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139 Ibid., 22. 
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Yaqza itself, which was written and edited by students and teachers at the secondary 
school. The 1958 issue is saturated with nationalist rhetoric, with the editorial statement 
reminding students that Arab nationalism is the path to “unity, the ending of 
colonialism, and the removal of barriers and borders” between Arab states.141 Its articles 
cover subjects such the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference,142 the Algerian 
freedom fighter Jamila Buhirad,143 British colonial policy in Trucial Oman,144 and the 
Iranian claim to “Arab Bahrain.”145 It also features a “Girls’ Corner,” which includes a 
short story by a female Kuwaiti student that glorifies the Arab commandos fighting 
Israel.146 The magazine’s final pages are devoted to articles published by the English 
Club, including the following short piece by a Kuwaiti student: 
We must know the way to acquire independence. It is necessary to start military 
training to be prepared for struggle. Let us line up hand in hand to face our 
enemies. Let us depend on our own resources. We will never kneel to ask for 
mercy. We are aware of imperialists’ plans. Our motto will always be, “No 
despair, no surrender.”147 
 
Two other English articles also deal with the familiar theme of the Afro-Asian Peoples’ 
Solidarity Conference, indicating the pervasive influence of Nasserism.148  
 It is important to point out that Kuwaiti secondary school students were not 
merely passive consumers of their Egyptian teachers’ propaganda; rather, they actively 
contributed to the nationalist character of school life. By the late 1950s, years of 
nationalist education coupled with the growth of the opposition movement in Kuwait 
led to the emergence of an activist current among secondary school students. This 
became clear in February 1958, when Baʿthist Kuwaiti students at the Shuwaikh 
																																																								
141 “Kalimat al-Tahrir,” al-Yaqaza, 3. 
142 Muhammad ʿIsa, “Adwaʾ ʿala Muʾtamar al-Shuʿub al-ʿArabiyya al-Ifriqiyya fi al-Qahira,” al-Yaqaza,  
41.  
143 Muhammad al-Hadiri, “Jamila Buhirad Amama al-Mishnaqa,” al-Yaqaza, 42-43.  
144 Salim al-Humud, “ʿUman Bayn al-Madi wa-l-Hadir,” al-Yaqaza, 46-47.  
145 Talib ʿArabi, “al-Bahrain al-ʿArabiyya wa-Iran,” al-Yaqaza, 48-49.  
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Secondary School founded the Kuwait Student Union.149 The union played a key role in 
organizing the celebration of the UAR’s establishment in February 1958 (see below). 
Moreover, its president (the Baʿthist Faisal al-Saniʿ) and another of its members sat on 
al-Yaqza’s editorial board.150 Although the union was dissolved along with the rest of 
Kuwait’s clubs in February 1959,151 student activism continued to develop. By the early 
1960s student protests became common and sometimes violent.152 In 1961 students at 
the Girls’ Secondary School went on strike in support of Algeria “and then assaulted 
their (Egyptian) headmistress,” leading the British Ambassador to remark: “[this] would 
suggest that it is now the pupils and not the teachers who make the running.”153 
 Egyptian teachers by no means held a monopoly over nationalist indoctrination in 
schools, a point highlighted by the May 1959 issue of the Mutanabbi Intermediate 
School’s magazine. The school’s headmaster was the veteran Kuwaiti Arab nationalist 
ʿAbd Allah Ahmad Husain.154 A Syrian teacher edited its magazine. The latter wrote an 
article on the duty of teachers to “prepare students for life” through offering them 
guidance on “nationalist, social, and cultural” issues. As an example of this, he cites a 
classroom discussion on what the Arabs can do to liberate Palestine.155 Another teacher 
penned an article entitled “Arab Nationalism Emerged for the Sake of World Peace.” 
Student-authored articles include: “The Joy of the Arabs Over the Unity of the Arabs,” 
“The Duty of Arab Youth Towards Their Homeland,” “Arab Nationalism,” “Jul Jamal,” 
“The Suez War,” and “Palestine.” Articles entitled “This is Communism” and “Fortunes 
and Martyrs in Iraq” reflect the ongoing struggle between Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir and the 																																																								
149 Tarikh Thanawiyyat al-Shuwaikh 1953-1973 (Kuwait: Wizarat al-Tarbiyya, 2005), 186; Al-Mdairis, 
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Iraqi President ʿAbd al-Karim Qasim. 156  In a further article, a Kuwaiti student 
condemns the double standards of Western countries that celebrate Human Rights Day 
while at the same time conducting oppressive colonial wars in Algeria and Oman.157 It 
is highly doubtful that intermediate school students could acquire this level of political 
awareness without their teachers’ concerted encouragement.   
 It appears that nationalist indoctrination even took place among kindergarten 
students. In 1959, a journalist for an Egyptian newspaper published an article describing 
his or her visit to al-Mansur kindergarten, where Palestinian teachers were dominant.158 
The journalist reports visiting a classroom in which the children brandished toy rifles 
and chorused: “Oh Jews I will destroy you, and with my weapon I will show you, I will 
erase your country with my hand, and bring victory to Arabism over you.” In a second 
classroom, students sang an anthem beginning with the following lines: “I am the 
mighty genie who has emerged from the bottle, to destroy France and Britain, and 
defeat Israel, I am Arab nationalism!”159 While this display may have been staged or 
exaggerated by the journalist for propaganda purposes, it nevertheless suggests that very 
young students were not isolated from the more radical Arab nationalist spirit 
permeating the schools.  
Arab Nationalism in the Curriculum 	
  The Suez Crisis occurred shortly after the Educational Department began to 
develop its first national curriculum for the primary and intermediate levels on the basis 
of the Qabbani-ʿAqrawi report. While this report was the direct stimulus behind the 
adoption of Arab nationalist guidance as a goal of education, it is also highly probable 
that the atmosphere generated by the Suez Crisis served to reinforce the curriculum’s 
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Arab nationalist character. The Educational Department first began to provide a 
systematic outline of its new curriculum and its method of promoting Arab national 
awareness in its annual report for 1956-1957, which was far more substantial than 
previous reports. The report’s format and contents changed little throughout the 1950s 
and the early 1960s. The document makes it clear that the goal behind introducing the 
new curriculum is to achieve a “balance between… the system followed by the Arab 
countries generally and the features of the Kuwaiti environment specifically.” This 
balance facilitates learning while at the same time enabling the educated to “live up to 
the ideals of Arab nationalism.” It was to attain this goal that the advice of the Qabbani-
ʿAqrawi committee was sought.160 
The report states that the new curriculum gives increased attention to “the 
nationalist aspect” on the primary level.161 However, it is on the intermediate level that 
the majority of nationalist inculcation takes place. The report affirms that this level 
“pays special care to a category of knowledge that feeds [the student’s] Arab spirit and 
Islamic sentiment, evokes his [past] glories, and connects him to his Arab world 
spanning all [Arab] states.” 162  The time devoted to the subjects of history and 
geography therefore increases at this level, and the subject of civic education is 
introduced for the first time. The document points out that while the curriculum is 
generally modeled on that of Egypt, the history, geography, and civic education 
curriculums “have virtually been rewritten.”163 The report goes on to clarify the purpose 
of these three subjects: 
[They] aim to acquaint the student with the environment in which he lives and 
elucidate the key features of the history of the Arab nation from the most ancient 
times to the present, thus making him aware that he is a member of society with 
duties and rights.164 
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The society in question is both the Kuwaiti waṭan and the Arab umma, for the report 
states that the student’s own country should be the “starting point” for the study of his 
broader nation.165  
 The new wave of locally authored textbooks that the Educational Department 
began to compose in 1955-1956 reflected the curriculum’s nationalist goals. The same 
committee of inspectors in charge of preparing the primary and intermediate 
curriculums also wrote these textbooks, seventeen of which were completed by the end 
of the academic year.166 From 1957-1958, the department’s annual reports began to 
publish lists of textbooks used in Kuwaiti schools.167 Although these lists do not provide 
complete information regarding authorship,168 it appears that the majority of authors 
were Egyptian. This reflects the fact that the vast majority of the department’s 
inspectors, including the inspector of social studies, were Egyptian. The lists also reveal 
that the previous series of local textbooks published from 1953 were abandoned. 
Unfortunately, only one example of the new wave of textbooks could be obtained. 
However, this civic education textbook illustrates the extent of Arab nationalist 
influence within the new curriculum. Furthermore, it has both Egyptian and Kuwaiti 
authors, confirming that Kuwaiti educators participated in articulating this Arab 
nationalist message.  
 Mudhakkirat al-Tarbiyya al-Wataniyya li-l-Sana al-Rabiʿa al-Mutawasita (Civic 
Education Aides-Memoires for the Fourth Intermediate Year) presents a much more 
emphatic and radical Arab nationalist message than previous local textbooks. It was 
published in either 1955-1956 or 1956-1957. 169  Its authors were ʿAbd al-ʿAziz 
																																																								
165 Ibid., 60. 
166 Al-Kuwait wa-Nahdatuha 1955-1956, 18.  
167 Taqrir 1957-1958, 227-243.  
168 The annual reports for 1957-1958 and 1958-1959 list only primary authors for works with multiple 
authors. Reports between 1959-1960 and 1961-1962 provide no information regarding authorship.  
169 The copy consulted does not list a publication date, but a handwritten inscription states that it was 
gifted to the Public Library of Zubair in Iraq in July 1957. ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Hindawi, Uthman Faiz Allah, 
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Hindawi, an Egyptian secondary school teacher, ʿUthman Faiz Allah, the Egyptian 
Inspector of Social Studies, Ibrahim al-Shatti, a young Kuwaiti secondary school 
teacher and graduate of Egypt, and ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain. The book is composed of 
four disconnected chapters linked by the themes of Arab nationalism, progressivism, 
and anti-imperialism. The first covers the concept of waṭanīyya or patriotism, arguing 
that it is based on the following principles: “trust in the nation’s present and future,” 
“mutual trust among the people,” “social awareness,” and “patriotic brotherhood.”170 
The “Arab youth” is also instructed that patriotism requires that he “be proud of his 
Arabism and his nationality, and maintain Arab customs and traditions.”171 
 The second chapter entitled “Enlightened Public Opinion” argues for a 
progressive socio-political order that would have been revolutionary within the Kuwaiti 
context of the time. It starts by establishing a dichotomy between “enlightened” and 
“un-enlightened” public opinion: 
If public opinion is subordinated to obsolete customs and harmful old traditions, 
and is no longer compatible with modern conditions and the progressive 
[taqadumīyya] life, it is said to be unenlightened. Examples include not allowing 
girls to work in teaching or any occupation outside the home, and groups that 
prevent women from entering politics and deprive them of their right to vote.172 
 
It should be kept in mind that women in Kuwait would not gain the right to vote until 
around fifty years after this was written. The chapter also holds that the functions of 
enlightened public opinion are to prevent the tyranny of rulers, allow for the functioning 
of parliamentary life, hold rulers accountable, and ensure that the people within a 
democracy use their freedom responsibly. The text states that those in developing 
countries where public opinion is unenlightened should not be deterred from “trying to 
implement democratic rule.” In these cases, it falls to the “cultured, enlightened class 
[al-ṭabaqa al-muthaqqafa al-mustanīra]” to pursue democracy until the rest of the 																																																																																																																																																																		
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populace can be made aware.173 This statement has a subversive air given that Kuwait 
possessed no representative institutions at this stage. Moreover, it clearly encourages 
the sense of mission and cultural superiority held by the muthaqqafīn.  
The second chapter concludes with a discussion of methods for cultivating 
enlightened public opinion, foremost of which is state education. On the level of the 
curriculum, “studying the nationalist movements and the biographies of the leaders 
[zuʿamāʾ] who served their countries instills within the youth love for their country and 
the dedication to serve it.”174 Just as important are extracurricular activities. One of the 
examples provided is the Educational Department’s own annual cultural season.175 The 
textbook also refers to the department’s efforts to use the cinema “for fostering national 
awareness.”176 The department’s Arab nationalist and progressive agenda is thus made 
clear.  
 The “Arab Homeland” is the title of the third chapter, which focuses on Arab 
unity. It proclaims that the Arabs form “a nation of 90 million with a common origin, 
language, civilization, and history,” and that if “our nation unites and arms itself, it can 
regain the glory of the past and control the balance of power between East and West for 
the benefit of all humanity.”177 Most of the chapter deals with the impediments to unity, 
including lack of education and the “reactionary [rajʿīyya] influences” that repress 
women.178 However, it is “foreign colonialism” that poses the major challenge. This 
began with the Ottoman Turks who were then supplanted by the Europeans. Although 
many Arab countries have won their independence, three main areas remain under 
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colonial rule: Palestine, North Africa, and “the southern and eastern Arabian 
Peninsula.”179  
The colonial threat in Palestine is portrayed as the most serious given the 
strength of the Zionist entity and its expansionist ambitions. Regarding the Maghrib, the 
text argues that its independence is only a matter of time because “the chains of 
colonialism have been broken… in the western part of North Africa.” Signs of this can 
already be seen in Tunisia and Morocco, while the liberation struggle in Algeria has 
reached new heights.180 Although the chapter does not elaborate on the situation in the 
eastern Arabian Peninsula, the mere mention of colonialism in this region is surprising 
given Kuwait’s continued ties to Great Britain. The chapter is also careful to incorporate 
Kuwait into the discussion at various points, referring to it as a “small part of the Arab 
homeland.”181 
 The fourth chapter, finally, deals with the Arab League. This organization is 
portrayed as the end result of “the Arab’s struggle for unity” and the spread of national 
awareness since Ottoman times. This struggle intensified after the Second World War, 
leading the Arab countries to seek greater coordination and unity through the formation 
of the Arab League.182 Its birth in 1945 represented “a new page in the progress of the 
Arab nationalist movement, and it thus became the focus of every Arab’s hopes to 
liberate the Arabs and enable them to assume their proper position in the procession of 
civilization.”183 The chapter holds that one of the Arab League’s goals is to help those 
Arab countries that remain colonized such as Palestine, parts of North Africa, and the 
Gulf emirates, “all of which have expressed their desire for liberation and deliverance 
from the shackles of colonialism.”184 The chapter’s final pages highlight the League’s 
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efforts with regards to Palestine, particularly the Arab economic boycott of Israel.185 
This textbook illustrates the boldness and forcefulness of the Educational Department’s 
efforts at nationalist inculcation in the post-Suez period. 
 On the secondary level, where the curriculum in use was still that of Egypt, the 
Educational Department appears to have introduced Arab nationalist guidance into this 
curriculum through modifications to the subjects of history and geography.186 Though 
the department’s annual reports provide little information regarding these modifications, 
the lists of textbooks used in secondary schools reveals the material used to inculcate 
Arab nationalism. One text, which was probably a supplement to the Egyptian 
curriculum,187 is Qissat al-Wihda al-ʿArabiyya (The Story of Arab Unity) by Anwar al-
Sadat. It was assigned to year three students on the literary (adabī) track.188  
This highly polemical work argues in favor of Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir’s project of 
Arab defense cooperation and positive neutrality, and inveighs against the colonial, 
British-inspired Baghdad Pact. Al-Sadat supports his arguments with examples from 
history and current affairs, his recollections of diplomatic visits and meetings, analysis 
of British newspaper articles, and even The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Moreover, 
the book is interspersed with vitriolic attacks on the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Saʿid 
and Jordan’s King Husain, not to mention Great Britain, Israel, and the USA.189 
Particularly noteworthy for a textbook used in Kuwait are the scattered condemnations 
of British policy in the Gulf, from the treaties of protection that fragmented the Arabs of 
the region to the recent Buraimi dispute.190 Twice, al-Sadat commends the action of a 																																																								
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mob in Bahrain that attacked the motorcade of the visiting British foreign minister in 
March 1956. He also alludes to a plot to encourage foreign (presumably Iranian) 
immigration to the islands to “eliminate Arab nationalism there.”191 
In the academic year 1960-1961, Kuwait’s Educational Department began 
assigning locally authored history and geography textbooks for the first year of the 
secondary level.192 Unfortunately, these were not available for analysis. In the same 
report, the department stated its intention to undertake a more comprehensive 
adjustment of the secondary curriculum,193 but this was not implemented until later in 
the 1960s.194 As the decade wore on, a national secondary school curriculum came to 
gradually replace that of Egypt, but this development is beyond the scope of this 
study.195  
Popular Acculturation 	
 Yet another area in which the Educational Department’s more extreme Arab 
nationalism became apparent was its program of popular acculturation, which 
developed significantly from its inception in the early part of Husain’s tenure. The 
department oversaw an increasing number of events and projects by which it sought to 
cultivate a cultural field beyond the classroom. For example, in 1958 it opened a 
temporary national museum, and started planning a permanent museum in conjunction 
with a UNESCO adviser.196 However, the most important initiatives for disseminating 
Arab nationalist ideology were the cultural season, the Literary Association, and the 
1958 Arab Men of Letters Conference.  
 The cultural season, which the Educational Department had hosted annually since 
1955, continued to be the cornerstone of popular acculturation. Such was its popularity 																																																								
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that during the 1957 season “large crowds… filled the hall of the secondary school to 
overflowing,”197 and in 1958 the hall, “capable of holding about 2,500 people… [was] 
filled to capacity.”198 Female attendance was also significant.199 As in the previous 
cultural seasons, Arab nationalism formed the central theme. In 1957, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz 
Husain opened the event by alluding to the Suez Crisis and its contribution to the 
advancement of Arab national unity and liberation, and pointed to the cultural season’s 
role in reinforcing national awareness.200 He employed similar rhetoric in subsequent 
years.201 In 1958 the Political Agent noted that it had become “the accepted and 
inevitable norm” for Educational Department officials to punctuate the lectures with 
“passing reference to the political themes of Arab unity and anti-imperialism.”202 A 
British Council report from the same year added that “pamphlets on British atrocities 
were freely distributed to the audiences.”203  
 The choice of lecturers and topics also reflected the department’s Arab nationalist 
agenda. From 1957, the season’s organizers “made a conscious effort… to invite 
speakers from all parts of the Arab world.”204 That year, participants hailed from Syria, 
Lebanon, Iraq, Sudan, and Egypt.205 It was intended for Tawfiq al-Madani of Algeria’s 
National Liberation Front to speak at the 1958 season, but for some reason this did not 
occur.206 Former Red Book Group members also continued to participate, suggesting 
the persistence of al-Miqdadi’s influence. These were Munif al-Razzaz, a leader of 
Jordan’s Baʿth Party who gave two lectures on nationalism in 1957, 207  and the 
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Palestinian Burhan al-Dajani, who spoke about “Arab Economic Unity” in 1958.208  
 It is noteworthy that two speakers lectured on the role of education in fostering 
Arab national awareness: Jamil Saliba of the Syrian University in 1958,209 and the 
Egyptian educator Muhammad Fuʾad Jalal in 1959.210 It will be remembered that this 
was also the subject of previous lectures by ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz in 1956 and 
Ismaʿil Qabbani in 1955. The prominence of this topic in the cultural season may reflect 
the Educational Department’s own ongoing efforts in this field. The cultural season also 
provided the department with an opportunity to further the cause of female 
emancipation. In 1957, the Egyptian literature professor ʿAʾisha ʿAbd al-Rahman 
(known by the pen name Bint al-Shatiʾ) “made history in Kuwait by being the first 
woman to lecture in public.” 211  Female participation continued in all seasons 
thereafter.212 
 An important activity related to the cultural season was Mahrajan al-ʿUruba al-
Fanni (The Arabism Arts Festival), which was held on the margins of the 1958 season. 
The centerpiece of the event was a play entitled al-Wihda al-Kubra (Greater Unity), 
which celebrated the creation of the UAR. The play was written by Ahmad Abu Bakr 
Ibrahim, one of the department’s Egyptian inspectors, and directed by the prominent 
Egyptian playwright Zaki Tulaymat, who had also spoken at the cultural season. The 
actors were students, particularly from the Drama Club at Shuwaikh Secondary School. 
The play featured an unprecedented traditional dance performance by schoolgirls, 
whose appearance before a male audience was hitherto considered taboo.213 This arts 
festival suggests that the Educational Department may have intended to broaden the 
scope of the cultural season. However, it did not have the opportunity to do so. The 																																																								
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1959 cultural season was cut short by a government crackdown, and the event was 
discontinued thereafter.214  
 A second element of the Educational Department’s program of popular 
acculturation was the establishment of al-Rabita al-Adabiyya (The Literary Association) 
as an independent club in May 1958. The department had previously contributed to the 
cultural activities of the muthaqqafīn by subsidizing the clubs. Now, Husain and his 
administration cooperated directly with the clubmen, building on the close relationship 
they had developed during the 1956 protests. The Literary Association was Husain’s 
brainchild, yet he established it in coordination with MAN, Baʿthist, and independent 
Arab nationalist elements, including a substantial number of Arab expatriates.  
 The Literary Association’s diversity was reflected in the association’s board, 
which included ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain as secretary general and the MAN headmaster 
ʿAbd Allah Ahmad Husain as secretary. The remaining board members were the 
director’s close associate Ahmad al-ʿAdwani, the Egyptian inspector Ahmad Abu Bakr 
Ibrahim, the independent Fadil Khalaf, the MAN member ʿAbd al-Razzaq al-Basir, and 
the South Arabian Baʿthist ʿAli ʿAqil. Other members included the MAN cadres 
Muhammad al-Saddah (a Kuwaiti headmaster), Ghassan Kanafani (a Palestinian 
teacher), and Salam Ahmad (an Iraqi), and the Baʿthists Hamad Yusuf al-ʿIsa and the 
Palestinian Naji ʿAlush. The association’s goals included: “steering Arabic literature in 
a nationalist direction beneficial to emancipatory Arab ideology in all areas of the Arab 
homeland,” and its bylaws restricted membership to Arabs who espoused Arab 
nationalism.215 
 ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain created the Literary Association as part of a plan to host 
Muʾtamar al-Udabaʾ al-ʿArab (the Arab Men of Letters Conference) in Kuwait in 
December 1958. The association’s bylaws stated that it “should be linked with the 																																																								
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permanent office of the Conference of Arab Men of Letters.”216 Husain had led the 
Kuwaiti delegation to this annual conference when it was held in Cairo in December 
1957. There, he extended an invitation from Kuwait’s ruler to hold the next year’s 
conference in Kuwait. Husain was then elected, along with his co-delegate al-ʿAdwani, 
to the conference’s permanent office.217 The Literary Association played an active role 
in hosting this conference in Kuwait in conjunction with the Educational Department.218 
 In the 1958 Arab Men of Letters Conference, the Educational Department’s 
efforts to promote Arab nationalism on the public, transnational, and educational levels 
intersected. The conference’s program, which the department planned in cooperation 
with Egypt’s cultural authority, centered on the theme of “Heroism in Arabic 
Literature.”219 Fourteen delegations numbering 200 persons attended from across the 
Arab world,220 and included anti-colonial parties. The President of the South Arabian 
League Muhammad ʿAli al-Jifri represented South Arabia,221 and the Imamate’s envoy 
to Cairo Muhammad ʿAmin ʿAbd Allah (also a leader of the Omani Union party) spoke 
for Muscat and Oman.222  
 Kuwait’s twenty five-member delegation to the conference was also remarkably 
diverse. It included Kuwaiti, Egyptian, and Palestinian employees of the Educational 
Department, and to a lesser extent the departments of Press and Publishing and Social 
Affairs. A noteworthy representative of the latter department was the Bahraini 
oppositionist ʿAli Sayyar, then in exile in Kuwait. Almost all of the Literary 
Association’s board members also participated in the delegation, in addition to a 
significant number of educated merchants including the nationalists al-Nisf and al-
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Saniʿ.223 
 The conference was highly politicized and saturated with Arab nationalist and 
anti-imperialist rhetoric. Even before the event started, “posters were put up 
everywhere… stressing Arab Unity [and] anti-Shu’ubiya.”224 As Secretary General of 
the conference, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain delivered the opening speech. He compared 
historic Arab heroism to the current “struggle of the Arab people to realize its 
nationalist creed, which aims towards unity and liberation.”225 He elaborated:  
Our battle with colonialism and Zionism is ongoing, and the blood of our martyrs 
in Palestine has not yet dried, and still exhorts us to take vengeance. Our martyrs 
in Oman and the Southern [Arabian] Peninsula continue to fall in the face of 
colonial bullets, just as their brothers did at Port Said, and the flames of revolution 
still blaze in Algeria.226 
 
The headmaster ʿAbd Allah Ahmad Husain also welcomed guests “to this segment of 
the Arab homeland,” and called for “comprehensive Arab unity that will demolish the 
distinguishing marks of existing [political] entities.”227 Later, the Kuwaiti teacher Salih 
al-Shihab recited a colloquial Kuwaiti poem dating to the Second World War, which 
attacked British colonialism in Arab nationalist terms and longed for a Nazi victory.228  
 The event was marked by hostility between Arab nationalists and communists, a 
symptom of the dispute between the Egyptian and Iraqi leaders that then overshadowed 
regional politics. The proceedings were interspersed with heckling and scuffles, at one 
point necessitating police intervention. The Iraqi delegation was angered by the hostile 
reception it received from other delegates, the audience, and the local press. It 
eventually withdrew from the conference, condemning the meeting and ʿAbd al-ʿAziz 
Husain personally as “[tools] of imperialism and the oil companies.”229 The conference 
concluded by issuing a number of resolutions, many of which were political. Some 																																																								
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condemned the aggression of the Zionists in Palestine, the French in Algeria, and the 
British in South Arabia. Others protested the mistreatment of POWs in Oman, “affirmed 
the Arabness of Bahrain” in the face of Iran’s claim to the islands, and denounced the 
British-backed “colonial” federation in South Arabia.230 
 Finally, the department held a number of “auxiliary activities” reflecting the 
theme of Arab heroism. These included performances by Cairo’s National Theater and a 
special showing of the Egyptian film Jamila, which depicted the eponymous heroine of 
the Algerian revolution.231 More significant was the Arab Heroism art exhibit for 
students, which added an educational dimension to the conference’s activities. The 
British Council representative derided the artwork as “mostly crude and brutal political 
cartoons.”232 Paintings depicting armed resistance in Algeria, Palestine, and the Suez 
Canal were intermixed with battle scenes from Islamic and Kuwaiti history. Stylized 
portraits of Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir and Jamila Buhirad were common. Other works 
contained more symbolic representations of Arab unity and anticolonial struggle.233 
Nationalism on Display: Sports Days and Celebrations 	
 The Educational Department displayed its Arab nationalist colors most 
conspicuously in the mass meetings it held at the Shuwaikh Secondary School stadium 
during its annual sports days and celebrations of the UAR. So bold and blatant were 
these events that the last of them provoked the ruler to sharply curtail the department’s 
nationalist activities and crack down on Kuwait’s nationalist opposition as a whole. 
This is another area in which the department’s public and educational roles intersected. 
While clubs often assisted the department in organizing these meetings, students took 
center stage in the performances.  
 While there is no evidence that the school sports days in the first half of the 1950s 																																																								
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were political, the first such event held after the Suez Crisis in May 1957 was described 
by a KOC official as “nearer in character to a military rally than a sporting event.” 
Involving 2,100 students and 11,000 spectators, the event featured young boys armed 
with air rifles marching to Arab nationalist anthems. A variety of parade floats depicted 
nationalist themes. One featured Egyptians shooting down British paratroopers at Port 
Said, another the Arab states liberating Palestine, and a replica of a tank signified 
Algeria’s independence struggle. A fourth float represented the defeat of Israel at the 
hands of Arab soldiers, complete with a captive David Ben Gurion. The Arab heroes 
Salah al-Din and Harun al-Rashid appeared alongside Egyptian Pharaohs and scenes 
from Kuwaiti history.234 The Egyptian and Kuwaiti identities were thus interwoven 
within a larger Arab nationalist fabric.  
 The establishment of the UAR on February 1st 1958 provided another annual 
occasion that the Educational Department celebrated by holding mass meetings. A day 
after unity between Egypt and Syria was announced, the newly renamed Union of 
Kuwaiti Clubs (UKC)235 in conjunction with the Kuwait Student Union organized a 
public rally at the Shuwaikh Secondary School. It is unclear to what extent the 
Educational Department was involved in planning this event, but the participation of an 
Egyptian inspector and the superintendent of technical affairs, a Syrian, lent the event 
official sanction. A Kuwaiti teacher spoke on behalf of the UKC. The event featured 
students and delegations from various clubs parading around the stadium with banners, 
and was noteworthy for the unprecedented participation of female students. 236 
Moreover, it revealed that three years after the Suez Crisis, ties between the Educational 
Department and the opposition movement remained strong.  
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 The celebration of the UAR was followed only a month later by the 1958 sports 
day, which proceeded on similar lines to that of the previous year. The British Political 
Agent noted that it included “gymnastic displays on familiar Egyptian/Hitler Youth 
lines,” and floats with “historical and political scenes.” The event was also the first of 
its kind to feature performances by schoolgirls, indicating the department’s increasingly 
progressive attitude.237 As a finale, “a mock attack on an Israeli frontier post was staged 
most realistically with smoke bombs and bangs. At the conclusion of the attack, the 
Israeli prisoners were lined up and shot.” When ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain asked the British 
Political Agent his opinion on the display, the latter expressed “his disgust that hatred 
and a grave offence against international law should be officially taught to Kuwaiti 
children.”238 The Political Agent’s outburst drew criticism from the Kuwaiti press. Even 
Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Mubarak, then serving as Acting Ruler, made the following 
comment to a local newspaper: 
The fellow behaved extremely badly, insulted our honour and struck a blow at our 
nationhood (qaumiyeh) [sic]. Everyone who does that gets the reward he deserves. 
In fact I've given orders to the Education Department not to send him and his 
companions any more invitations.239 
 
The shaykh had in fact given his personal permission for the Educational Department to 
borrow the smoke and sound bombs from his Department of Public Security, indicating 
the growing nationalist mood within the Kuwaiti state as a whole.240 
 On February 1st 1959, the Educational Department’s mass meetings culminated 
with the celebration of the first anniversary of the UAR’s founding, which was called 
ʿId al-Wihda (the Festival of Unity). The event revealed the extent of the department’s 
Nasserist leanings and its ties to the nationalist opposition. While the celebration 
initially reflected the high degree of cooperation between the nationalist movement and 
the ruling family, it pushed this relationship to the breaking point. The initiative behind 																																																								
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the event came from the UKC and al-Rabita al-Kuwaitiyya (the Kuwaiti League), which 
the MAN formed in 1958 as a front for merchants aligned with the opposition 
movement.241 According to al-Saddah, who at that time was Secretary General of the 
UKC and a headmaster, the Educational Department obligingly furnished the Shuwaikh 
Secondary School as a venue. Furthermore, its carpentry workshop built the parade 
floats that represented the various clubs and schools participating in the event.242 
 Support for the celebrations also came from the ruling family. In his capacity as 
acting ruler, Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Mubarak proclaimed the day a public holiday, 
although it was not “on the official list of Government holidays.”243 Moreover, he 
ordered the mosques to pray for Arab unity, and on the morning of the event he 
participated in a parade around the town in which Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir’s portrait was 
displayed. The President of the Educational Department ʿAbd Allah al-Jabir represented 
the Al Sabah at the function held at the school. 244 
 The display that day, which attracted “at least 20,000” spectators,245 reflected the 
growing radicalism and self-assurance of Kuwait’s Arab nationalist movement. It 
featured fiery speeches, all of which made “adverse references to the present Iraqi 
regime and ‘Imperialism.’”246 These were interspersed with “student processions with 
floats.” The décor set the tone for the function: “the only portrait of the [Kuwaiti] Ruler 
on display was sandwiched between larger images of Colonels Nasser and Aref.”247 
Prominent among the speakers was Ahmad Saʿid, the director and chief announcer of 
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Cairo’s Voice of the Arabs radio station,248 who was then visiting the country. In 
addition to attacking the leaders of Jordan, Tunisia, and Iraq, he “was wildly cheered 
when he said that revolution must not spring up here or there, but as an even harvest 
throughout the Arab world.” 249  Another noteworthy participant was the female 
secondary school student ʿAwatif al-Badr, who eulogized the UAR on behalf of 
Kuwaiti women.250 To add to this unprecedented emancipatory gesture, a group of 
female secondary school students “strolled round the arena ostentatiously trampling on 
their abbas.”251 
 The speeches of the leaders of Kuwait’s Arab nationalist opposition movement 
carried the greatest weight. Ahmad al-Khatib concerned himself with regional affairs, 
and is reported to have stated: “All wish to unite with the U.A.R.”252 The ex-Police 
Director Jasim al-Qatami, however, focused on Kuwait, stating: “I wish, oh brothers, 
that we were like Homs or Hama, with the flag of unity fluttering over us.” Even more 
provocatively, he added: “if the Kuwaitis have been content with tribal rule since the 
time of Sabah the First, the time has now come for popular, democratic rule in which 
the people will have their constitution and ministers.”253 The ruler is said to have taken 
this reference to “tribal rule” as a personal insult and a deprecation of his modernizing 
reforms. 254  The following day, he began his crackdown against the nationalist 
opposition. The impact of these measures and subsequent developments was acutely felt 
in the Educational Department, where the mounting tide of nationalism now began to 
fall, never to return to its previous height.   
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The Ruling Family’s Response, 1959-1961 	
 The day after the UAR anniversary celebrations, the Public Security Department 
called in the organizers of the event and reprimanded them severely, withdrawing their 
passports and firing those with government jobs. They included the two UKC and MAN 
affiliated headmasters ʿAbd Allah Ahmad Husain and Khalid al-Masʿud. Over the next 
few days, the government permanently shut down all clubs and newspapers, even those 
not linked to the event,255 and warned against protests.256 The ruler outlined the reasons 
for this response in a leaflet in which he criticized “certain youth” for endangering 
Kuwait’s relations with other Arab countries, and for personally insulting him despite 
his prosperous reign. At the same time, he admitted that shortcomings existed in some 
departments, and promised that they would soon be rectified.257 
As the ruler’s statement suggested, the stick was accompanied by a carrot in the 
form of an intensive campaign of administrative reform. A departmental reshuffle was 
announced only days after the crackdown.258 Before the month was over, the Supreme 
Council undertook to employ the eminent Egyptian jurist ʿAbd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri to 
construct a modern legal system for Kuwait, and appointed an advisory committee 
made up of seven merchants.259 The latter included the nationalists al-Saniʿ and al-Nisf, 
and others associated with the 1930s Majlis Movement.260 With the assistance of al-
Sanhuri and other experts, the council set about improving the administration of 
departments and issuing a spate of new legislation, such that by 1960 the country had 
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acquired “the framework of a governmental machine a l'Egyptienne.”261 Finally, the 
ruler also sought to centralize power and reduce corruption among the shaykhs. This led 
him to dismiss the notorious Fahad al-Salim in 1959, followed by ʿAbd Allah al-
Mubarak in 1961.262 
 Given its role in organizing the UAR anniversary celebrations, it is only natural 
that the crackdown carried repercussions for the Educational Department. Immediately 
after the repression began, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain submitted his resignation, followed by 
his personal secretary Ahmad al-ʿAdwani and the Director of Social Affairs Hamad al-
Rujaib. However, their resignations were refused, and they were apparently convinced 
to retain their positions.263 Nevertheless, it is clear that the ruling family sought to rein 
in the Educational Department’s hitherto largely independent administration. The 
British Council’s report for 1959-1960 states: “sports days are not allowed to turn into 
political demonstrations; [and] there has been no cultural season this year, always in the 
past an outlet for political speechifying under the cloak of culture and education.”264 In 
fact, the cultural season would never again be held.265 Furthermore, an appointed 
Educational Council was restored in March 1960.266 The Political Agent reported that it 
was “composed of nine dour Kuwaiti merchants with instructions to keep a watchful 
eye on… the activities of Sayyid Abdul Aziz Hussain.”267 
 It appears that these British observers were overoptimistic regarding the ruling 
family’s will to curtail nationalist influence within the department. In 1959, the British 
Council representative observed that “the real explanation” behind the crackdown was 
“that the reformists mingled their support for Nasser and Egypt with aspirations for 
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more power at home.” Relations with Egypt were a different matter, on which the 
ruler’s position was as yet unclear.268 In fact, Kuwait’s ties to Egypt appear to have been 
unscathed by the affair. Despite rumors of Egyptian educational employees resigning in 
protest at the repression, none actually did, and there was “suspicion that Cairo has 
advised teachers to hold their hands.”269 For their part, the Kuwaiti authorities did not 
take any measures against the Egyptian Educational Mission. As the Political Agent 
observed, “clearly the Ruler no more wants a showdown… than the Egyptians 
themselves seem to want it.”270 Kuwait continued to rely on Egyptian expertise in 
education and other fields, as in the legal and administrative reform discussed above.   
 The 1959 crackdown by no means signaled a wholesale rejection of Arab 
nationalist and Nasserist ideology on the part of the ruling family, and in the subsequent 
period the Educational Department continued to implement nationalist policies. For 
example, in December 1959, the department issued what a British Council report 
described as a “fierce edict” imposing new rules for private educational institutions.271 
These aimed to “affirm national sovereignty” and serve “national (qawmīyya) goals” by 
requiring all private institutions to teach their Arab students the “national (qawmīyya) 
subjects.” These were listed as: Arabic, religion, history, geography, and civic 
education, all of which had to be taught in Arabic.272 In 1960, moreover, a committee of 
experts tasked with drafting a plan for the establishment of a national university 
included Qustantin Zuraiq, suggesting that ties to the former Red Book Group network 
were alive and well.273 Even more tellingly, the supposed ban on the politicization of 
sports days did not last long. The British Council’s 1960-1961 report states: “the 
Annual Sports Day given this year… took the form of large ballet displays, hundreds of 
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boys dressed in khaki dug trenches, bayonetted their opponents and stimulated everyone 
into anti-Israel feeling.”274 
 The Educational Department also continued its support of Pan-Arab causes. As if 
to reaffirm its Arab nationalist stance in the wake of the 1959 crackdown, the 
government intensified its fundraising campaign in support of the Algerian 
revolution.275 The Educational Department participated alongside other departments in 
collecting donations for this fund in the summer of 1959.276 In November 1961, the 
Kuwaiti government observed the Day of Solidarity With Algeria with a symbolic ten-
minute strike. As part of the event, the Educational Department organized a 
demonstration of male and female students in Kuwait City. In addition, it did not serve 
students their morning meals, instead donating their cost to Algeria.277  
 The government’s administrative reform was probably more effective in hindering 
the Educational Department’s nationalist activities than its punitive measures. The 
reforms began to undermine the decentralization that allowed the Kuwaiti muthaqqafīn 
and their Arab expatriate colleagues to run the department more or less independently. 
The expansion of central authority is apparent in the standardization of legislation and 
administrative practices, and the increased effectiveness of the Supreme Council.278 
Moreover, the downfall of shaykhs Fahad al-Salim and ʿAbd Allah al-Mubarak marked 
a decline in the independent fiefdoms that characterized the Kuwaiti administration in 
the 1940s and 1950s. The lack of “important family opposition” following the departure 
of these men enabled the ruler to “accelerate the centralization and formalization of 
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family rule.”279 
 The central government now administered the Educational Department much 
more closely, and while the department was still allowed to engage in Arab nationalist 
activities it now did so at the government’s behest. In January 1962, the British 
Ambassador observed:  
The political activities of the [Egyptian teachers]… have been more strictly 
controlled… It is true that on public occasions organised by the Department 
proper homage is paid, not always in very restrained terms, to the causes of the 
Arabs, but these are causes to which the Ruling Family themselves subscribe.280 
 
This is apparent in the pro-Algerian activities mentioned above, which formed part of a 
larger government policy. Furthermore, as a result of the imposition of central control, 
the department’s scope for engaging in activities outside the educational sphere became 
severely limited. The department had already forfeited its role in backing the clubs and 
the press. In May 1959, the ruler issued two edicts that further restricted its range of 
activity, particularly on the transnational level. The first prevented all departments apart 
from Social Affairs from distributing financial assistance to any individual or entity.281 
The second allocated to the Press and Publishing department the sole responsibility for 
dealing with newspapers and journalists domestically and internationally.282  
 The former edict appears to have virtually ended the Educational Department’s 
independent program of assistance for cultural and political groups abroad. This is 
revealed by a letter received from Baghdad’s Islamic Education Association in May 
1960 asking for the continuation of the annual payment it had been receiving from the 
department. The Educational Council could only forward this request to the Social 
Affairs Department with a recommendation that the payment be continued. 283 
Restrictions even appear to have been placed on the department’s ability to grant 																																																								
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scholarships to Arab students. Thus, when the South Arabian League asked the 
Educational Council to provide further scholarships for its students in February 1961, 
the latter passed on the request to the Supreme Council.284  
 Surprisingly, the Educational Department’s Arab nationalist orientation was dealt 
an even heavier blow by the emergence of a rapprochement between the ruler and the 
opposition. In late 1960, there began a gradual easing of restrictions on the clubs and 
the press.285 In March 1961, rumors emerged that the MAN leader Jasim al-Qatami 
would join the soon to be established Foreign Ministry. With Kuwait’s independence 
looming, the ruler apparently felt that the opposition’s educated cadres and pan-Arab 
credentials would help attain regional recognition for his fledgling state.286 The need for 
this help became crucial when Iraq laid claim to Kuwait days after its independence in 
June 1961.287 In October, al-Qatami became Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry,288 
while the dismissed headmaster and MAN member ʿAbd Allah Ahmad Husain was also 
appointed to a senior position.289  
 Given the Educational Department’s high proportion of muthaqqafīn, the 
institution became a primary recruiting ground for Kuwait’s nascent diplomatic corps, 
and thus lost many of its most capable and committed employees.290 The worldly ʿAbd 
al-ʿAziz Husain, with his strong pan-Arab connections, was the perfect candidate to 
represent Kuwait at the United Nations in June 1961, and subsequently at the Arab 
League.291 Although his duties required him to be abroad for most of the time, he 
continued to nominally serve as Director of Education until he reluctantly accepted the 
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post of Kuwaiti ambassador to Cairo in December.292 The untimely death of Assistant 
Director Darwish al-Miqdadi in March compounded the department’s leadership 
crisis.293 Other department employees who transferred to the Foreign Ministry in 1961 
alone include: 
- Muhammad al-Saddah – Headmaster and MAN member,294 
- Yaʿqub al-Rushaid – Teacher at Kuwaiti school in Karachi and MAN member,295 
- Muhalhil al-Mudaf – Inspector of Physical Education,296 
- ʿAbd Allah Bishara – Vice Principal of Shuwaikh Secondary School,297 
- Hasan al-Dabbagh – Inspector of English (Palestinian),298 
- Sulaiman Abu Ghosh – Inspector of Non-Government Schools (Palestinian).299 
Over the next several years, the department lost more of its high-ranking employees to 
the Foreign Ministry and other departments.300 It thus ceased to be the main site of 
employment for the muthaqqafīn within the bureaucracy. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis seeks to elucidate the depth of Kuwait’s engagement with modernist 
ideology generally and Arab nationalism specifically, with implications for the study of 
the Gulf region as a whole. It challenges the conventional wisdom as to when Arab 
nationalist ideology first spread to Kuwait, the extent of its political and social 
influence, and the country’s role in its development and dissemination. It argues that the 
educational field was central to Kuwait’s prolonged and profound engagement with 
Arab nationalism. While much of the literature implicitly assumes that Kuwait’s Arab 
nationalist movement sprang-up fully formed around the 1930s, the first chapter 
demonstrates that it in fact grew out of a pre-existing Islamic modernist movement with 
strong Arabist tendencies and wide-ranging regional connections. This latter movement 
emerged in the first two decades of the twentieth century, a time when, according to 
many scholars, Kuwait was cut off from the influence of the more developed Arab 
countries. While it is indisputable that Kuwait and the Gulf were situated at the 
periphery of the Arab world during this period, the persistent myth of a region existing 
in pristine, traditional isolation until the arrival of oil must be discarded. On the 
contrary, modern schools, the press, cultural and charitable associations, visits by 
prominent Arab personalities, and merchant communities abroad all facilitated a vibrant 
intellectual exchange with the Arab states that had a transformative impact on Kuwaiti 
society.  
The second chapter traces the expansion of this modernist movement, and its 
gradual turn towards a more secular Arab nationalist ideology. It details the neglected 
origins of organized Arab nationalist activism in the early 1930s, years before the 
discovery of oil, and its close ties to developments in Iraq and Palestine. It goes on to 
draw connections between the merchants’ Pan-Arab activism and their founding of the 
elected administrative councils. This is particularly apparent in the 1936 Educational 
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Council, whose members relied on their political ties to Amin al-Husaini and 
Muhammad ʿAli al-Tahir to staff Kuwait’s schools. Arab nationalist influence was thus 
very closely tied to the modernization of the Kuwaiti state. The chapter also argues that 
Arab nationalist ideology and regional networks were central to the Majlis Movement 
of 1938/1939, an aspect denied or downplayed by many scholars. Finally, the chapter 
places early state education in Kuwait within the broader Arab context, demonstrating 
that it resembled other Arab states in its politicization and susceptibility to cross-border 
influences. Contrary to exaggerated conceptions of Gulf exceptionalism, 1930s Kuwait 
thus exhibited significant commonalities with its northern Arab neighbors in both 
politics and education.  
 The under studied decade of the 1940s forms the subject of the third chapter, 
which demonstrates that Arab nationalist activity continued in the face of unfavorable 
domestic and regional climates. Unable to engage in conventional politics, Kuwait’s 
budding proto-effendiyya, many of them teachers and scholarship graduates, used the 
schools as a base for activism focused within the cultural field. They received support 
from certain Arab nationalist members of the Educational Council, indicating that 
nationalist influence within the state survived the demise of the Majlis Movement. 
Though they cooperated with certain Arab expatriate teachers, it was the local teachers 
who spearheaded this cultural nationalist current at a time when the Egyptian 
educational administration was ambivalent towards Arab nationalism. This reverses the 
prevailing image of Arab expatriates indoctrinating a passive Kuwaiti populace, 
demonstrating the extent to which Arab nationalism had become rooted within the 
country.  
 During the 1950s, Arab nationalism once again returned to the forefront of 
Kuwaiti politics with the reemergence of a popular opposition movement led by the 
MAN, the influx of Arab expatriates, and the rising power of Nasserist Egypt. Although 
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the existing literature addresses these themes, it largely limits its analysis to clubs and 
political groups. Chapters Four and Five provide a more holistic assessment of Arab 
nationalism in Kuwait during this decade, addressing its broader influence within 
society and the state. They investigate the social underpinnings of the nationalist 
movement through an analysis of its vanguard, the muthaqqafīn stratum, which 
corresponds to the intelligentsia and the Arab effendiyya. This yet again undermines 
Gulf exceptionalism by allowing Kuwait’s Arab nationalist movement to be compared 
to other such movements in the Arab states and beyond.  
  The fourth and fifth chapters also detail how the muthaqqafīn, in concert with 
sympathetic shaykhs, Palestinian expatriates, and seconded Egyptian experts, carved out 
spheres of Arab nationalist influence within the Kuwaiti state. These were the 
Educational Department and its offshoots, the Departments of Social Affairs, and Press 
and Publishing. With the Nasserist fervor of the late 1950s, an Arab nationalist mood 
became apparent within the government as a whole. Rather than opposing the state 
outright, the Arab nationalist movement thus intersected with it in a complex manner, as 
is most clearly exhibited by the Educational Department’s support for the popular 
protests during the Suez Crisis.  
Finally, the Educational Department’s policies in the 1950s reveal that Kuwait 
was an important site in the development of the Arab nationalist approach to education. 
That Kuwait preceded Nasserist Egypt in making the fostering of Arab national 
awareness a primary goal of its curriculum marks out the tiny Gulf state as a leader in 
this field. This is largely attributable to Darwish al-Miqdadi, who first pushed for 
curricular reform on Arab nationalist lines, and drew on the expertise of a host of 
prominent nationalist educators, many of them associated with the Red Book Group 
network. However, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain and other Kuwaiti staff came to play an active 
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role in this policy early on, belying the British assumption that Egyptian machinations 
were mostly to blame for the department’s nationalist position.  
 In addition to reassessing Kuwait’s engagement with Arab nationalism, this 
thesis calls for a new understanding of the history of the modern state in Kuwait and the 
Gulf, and disputes widely held assumptions within the rentier state literature. It 
advances three main points. Firstly, it demonstrates that the modernization of the state 
began in the pre-oil era, and that institutions founded in this period continued to form 
the basis of the post-oil state. Kuwait’s first modern state institutions were the elected 
Municipal and Educational Councils of 1930 and 1936, which oversaw specialized 
government departments with legal regulations and independent budgets. The 1938 
Legislative Council took the modernization process further, creating new government 
departments. After defeating the Majlis Movement, Shaykh Ahmad al-Jabir retained the 
administrative council system (albeit without elections) and expanded it throughout the 
1940s. In 1950, Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Salim reintroduced the elected administrative 
councils, which persisted until 1954. Subsequently, the ruler formed appointed councils 
intermittently until independence in 1961.  
The continuity between pre and post-oil institutions was not only in form. This 
thesis argues that the progressive, Arab nationalist character of the Educational 
Department in the 1950s was to a large extent a legacy of the 1930s. This was in large 
part due to the continued presence of reformist merchants on the Educational Council. 
The extent to which oil altered the basic structure of the state must therefore not be 
overstated.  
 The thesis also challenges rentier state theory’s position on the division between 
state and society, arguing that popular oppositional forces wielded significant influence 
over governmental institutions. Even after oil rents began to empower the ruler at the 
expense of the merchant opposition in the 1940s, the latter were able to retain a degree 
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of representation on the administrative councils due to the shaykh’s conciliatory policy. 
The merchant opposition had considerably weakened by this point, but this was by no 
means the case with the muthaqqafīn in the 1950s. Their increasing influence over key 
sectors of the bureaucracy coincided with their assumption of leadership over the 
country’s opposition movement. Moreover, they were able to capitalize on their 
position within the state to divert resources towards supporting their political activism.  
 Finally, this thesis builds upon Hertog’s argument regarding the variegated and 
fragmented nature of the rentier state in the Gulf, adding that state institutions not only 
varied markedly in levels of efficiency but also ideological outlook. In 1950s Kuwait, 
departments presided over by the muthaqqafīn and sympathetic shaykhs comprised 
quasi-independent bastions of Arab nationalism and progressivism that contrasted 
sharply with the corrupt and patrimonial character of certain shaykhly fiefdoms. This 
was made possible by a high degree of decentralization within the state due not only to 
intra-ruling family factionalism, but also the penetration of the state by external actors 
such as Egyptian missions and (in the early 1950s) British advisers. This highlights the 
need for a more nuanced understanding of the pre-independence Gulf state, often 
sweepingly characterized as a traditional tribal entity under firm British tutelage. 
 The final area to which this thesis seeks to contribute is an analysis of the role of 
education in the formation of national identity. It identifies three broad approaches to 
this issue within nationalism theory: top-down, grassroots, and indirect, and argues that 
all three apply to the case of education in Kuwait at different stages in its development. 
During the formative stage of the 1910s and 1920s, modern education with a strong 
Arabist (if not yet Arab nationalist) character emerged as the result of grassroots 
initiatives. These merchant-funded schools, which were part of a broader Arab-oriented 
cultural movement, accord with Chatterjee’s theory of anti-colonial nationalism 
emerging in the “spiritual domain” before asserting itself politically. They employed 
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politically minded Arab teachers who exerted a great deal of influence on their students 
and society at large. Furthermore, they made it easier for Kuwaitis to pursue their 
education in Arab countries, undertaking Andersonian “pilgrimages” whereby they 
recognized their common Arabness.  
 Following the advent of state education in 1936, the Palestinian teachers 
introduced Iraq’s Arab nationalist curriculum to Kuwait, thus inaugurating the top-
down method of nationalist inculcation. At the same time, ideologically committed 
Palestinian and Syrian teachers continued to disseminate Arab nationalist ideas on the 
grassroots level through interpersonal interaction and extracurricular activities. 
Moreover, scholarships began to increase the numbers of Kuwaiti youth engaging in 
Pan-Arab “pilgrimages,” and the first hints of the indirect, social effects of education 
became felt as small numbers of these students returned to Kuwait, having adopted the 
modernistic worldview and habits of the effendiyya.  
 The onset of Egyptian control over the Educational Department in 1943 and the 
importation of a new curriculum from Cairo ended the department’s top-down policy of 
Arab nationalist education. However, Arab nationalist Kuwaiti teachers, in association 
with their Arab expatriate colleagues, continued to foster an Arab nationalist identity on 
the grassroots level. With the political field severely restricted, the “spiritual domain” of 
the schools acquired renewed importance for Kuwait’s Arab nationalists, who used it as 
a base for cultural forms of Arab nationalist activism. While Egyptian control of 
education in Kuwait did not directly contribute to the growth of Arab nationalism, it did 
so indirectly by overseeing the expansion of the educational system, and providing 
unprecedented numbers of Kuwaiti youth the opportunity to study in Egypt on 
scholarship. These developments were central to the emergence of the muthaqqafīn 
stratum in the early 1950s.  
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 With the appointment of Darwish al-Miqdadi as Director of Education in 1950, 
there began a gradual return to the top-down dissemination of Arab nationalism through 
the curriculum. This developed further after ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Husain assumed the helm of 
the department in 1952, culminating with Kuwait’s first national curriculum of 1955-
1956. At the same time, the muthaqqafīn coalesced into a distinct social stratum. In 
accordance with Smith’s theory of the intelligentsia, the modernist and reformist 
aspirations of this stratum became channeled into a reinvigorated Arab nationalist 
opposition movement. Top-down, grassroots, and indirect processes can thus be seen to 
be intricately connected and mutually reinforcing, demonstrating the necessity of a 
nuanced and holistic approach to explaining the role of education in forging political 
identity.  
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